

Saving a Country without a State: Foreign Intervention and State Capacity in 21st Century Somalia

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Table of Contents

I.	Introduction: 3
II.	Research Design: 8
III.	Literature Review: 14
	a. State Capacity
	b. Foreign Intervention in Civil Wars
IV.	Background on Somalia: 23
V.	The US and UN Interventions, 2004 to mid-2006: 30
	a. Background/Course of Events
	b. Measuring Foreign Intervention Success
	c. Measuring State Capacity
VI.	The Ethiopian Intervention, December 2006 to January 2009: 45
	a. Background/Course of Events
	b. Measuring Foreign Intervention Success
	c. Measuring State Capacity
VII.	AMISOM's Intervention in Somalia, January 2009 to August 2011: 61
	a. Background/Course of Events
	b. Measuring Foreign Intervention Success
	c. Measuring State Capacity
VIII.	Kenya's Intervention in Somalia, October 2011 to October 2012: 79
	a. Background/Course of Events
	b. Measuring Foreign Intervention Success
	c. Measuring State Capacity
IX.	Conclusion: 98

Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the end of World War II, civil wars have become more prevalent than interstate wars, and have thus presented the international community with unique challenges to the preservation of global peace. From Lebanon to Bosnia to Syria, foreign powers have intervened in bloody internal conflicts, sometimes with ostensibly humanitarian aims, often in the pursuit of specific strategic agendas, and all too often with little discernible success. The question of what determines success or failure in a foreign intervention into a civil war is one of the most debated in the literature on international relations. Many prominent political scientists, such as Patrick Regan, have concluded that interventions tend to prolong rather than resolve civil wars. Rather than attempt to identify a universal secret to successful foreign intervention in all cases of civil war, I instead seek to understand the importance of state capacity in facilitating interventions that are successful in overcoming rebel insurgencies. Specifically, I intend to use the experience of Somalia, through the comparison of several recent instances of intervention in that country's torturous civil war, to gain some insight on how the state capacity of a host country's government can help or hinder a supportive foreign intervention against its rebel opponents. Somalia's civil war began with the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, which left the country a failed state. Since the UN interventions of the 1990s, the international community struggled to resolve the state of anarchy and conflict in Somalia, and repeated interventions seemed unable to overcome powerful insurgents. However, in the last few years, Somalia has experienced some success in building up state capacity, reducing violence, and reining in the insurgency, with the support of foreign entities such as Kenya, the United States, and the UN. I find that state capacity has been the consistent, determining factor in the relative success of foreign intervention in the Somali Civil War. While there are other factors influential to the success or failure of specific instances of intervention in Somalia, such as interethnic hostility or insurgent fragmentation, I argue that no phenomenon explains the degree of success across multiple interventions in the last two decades better than the gradual growth of state capacity in the Somali government.

My hypothesis fundamentally asserts the influence of an independent variable, state capacity, on the dependent variable of foreign intervention success. State capacity is a concept almost as broadly discussed as that of foreign intervention in civil war. The concept gained popularity and depth in the academic scholarship during the 1970s and 80s, as scholars sought to understand the different dimensions of state growth, as observed in the numerous new states that emerged in the postcolonial era. The exact definition of state capacity has been debated, as the term is often used in different

disciplinary contexts, but one could consider Theda Skocpol's 1985 definition to be a mainstream one: state capacity is the ability to "implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances."¹ The impact of state capacity on internal conflict is controversial. Many scholars observe that weak state capacity can be a reliable predictor for the onset of civil war, but the effect of state capacity on resolving civil wars is less thoroughly understood. Recent studies suggest that state capacity is vital in incentivizing parties to adhere to peace agreements. But there has been less research on state capacity's influence on military, rather than diplomatic, solutions to internal conflict, especially when foreign powers are involved. It is this potential relationship I intend to explore, through the case of Somalia. Scholars tend to distinguish between different kinds of state capacity, including coercive, juridical, fiscal, and administrative. For the purposes of my study, I intend to focus on these four dimensions of capacity, as well as to examine the development of overall state capacity in a holistic sense. These encompass the central government's extraction of tax revenue, the presence of basic social services like healthcare and government pensions, and the establishment of a judicial system to administer justice and adjudicate social or economic disputes. I'm also interested in the government's ability to preserve a stable climate for business, through the provision of basic security, consistent taxation and regulation, and limiting graft.

I intend to observe the extent (or lack thereof) of these various operationalizations of my independent variable through government and NGO records, other relevant sources of data, and assessments of different dimensions of state capacity from respected, neutral sources for each time period in my case studies. For my dependent variable, observing that every instance of foreign intervention I'm studying has been in support of the internationally-recognized government of Somalia against non-state actors, I define success in foreign intervention as the consistent reduction of rebel violence and territorial control. A successful intervention should contribute to a decline in rebel violence and territorial control not just for a matter of weeks but with some permanence. To measure this variable, I thus examine the decline in violence and proportion of the country controlled by insurgents over the course of a year from the beginning of the intervention period.

It is also necessary to specify what I consider an intervention for the purposes of this thesis. Somalia's unusually weak coercive capacity makes the role of intervener particularly important to this conflict. Many scholars have identified a state's fiscal and administrative capacity as complimentary to its ability to maintain security. The Somali state has struggled to field any kind of cohesive military force since its disintegration in the 1990s, and it could be said to have therefore outsourced the function of coercive state capacity to clan militias and, more importantly, to foreign interveners. The interplay

between the state's administrative and fiscal capacity and the military support provided by its foreign partners is thus highly relevant to the progression of the Somali Civil War. While there are many broad definitions of foreign intervention discussed in the literature, for the purposes of this study, I focus on military interventions, in which the interveners apply military force, either through forces on the ground or with airpower, or through covert operations to provide indirect assistance, to support the central government against insurgents. This is not to neglect the significance of economic and diplomatic intervention on behalf of the Somali government, which undoubtedly had some effect on the growth of state capacity over the last decade. However, while understanding that the relationship between state capacity and foreign intervention can in part be complementary, I also seek to explain the observation by some Somalia experts that much of the recent growth in state capacity can be attributed to internal developments within Somalia, rather than simply an influx in foreign aid.

I seek to illustrate that the hypothesized mechanism by which state capacity facilitates military success against the insurgency ultimately, through a feedback effect, contributes at least in part to the recent growth in Somali state capacity. The mechanism by which I hypothesize state capacity affects foreign intervention is as follows: as the Somali state increases its capacity, it spends more revenue on the improvement of social services, bureaucracy, and a judicial system. The state is thus better able to compete with rebel groups in providing some of these basic functions of governance, and gradually important interest groups, including clan elders and business elites, defect from supporting the rebel groups to supporting the government, taking certain constituencies with them. This process undermines the cohesion and popularity of the insurgency, facilitating the ability of foreign forces to defeat insurgents militarily and in the long-term reduce their violence and territorial control. Military success against the insurgents in turn gives the state more breathing room to build up capacity, and thus reinforce this mechanism.

My research design is fundamentally a qualitative, comparative one, using case studies of recent Somali history to explore the hypothesized connection between the independent variable of state capacity and the dependent variable of successful foreign intervention. The first case I analyze is the United States' involvement in supporting the ruling coalition of warlords in Mogadishu, known as the ARPCT (the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism), against various enemies, most notably the insurgents of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of radical Islamic militias that seized power in June 2006. This case will also consider the UN's efforts to install the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the internationally-recognized product of protracted political negotiations. The second case study is Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia from December 2006 to January 2009, when

Ethiopian forces defended the Transitional Federal Government, then in its infancy, from the encroaching Islamic Courts Union. The Ethiopian intervention installed the TFG in Mogadishu swiftly, but immediately faced an insurgency from the ICU. The third case of intervention is the involvement of the AMISOM peacekeeping force as they struggled to defend the TFG after Ethiopia's withdrawal in January 2009. This period lasts until AMISOM's victory in the battle of Mogadishu in August 2011. The fourth case of intervention is Kenya's military incursion in October 2011, lasting through October 2012, and occurring after an agreement in Kampala to prepare for the TFG's replacement with a more permanent federal government in 2012. During Kenya's intervention, al-Shabaab rapidly lost territorial control of much of Somalia, and transformed into a less dangerous rural insurgency. In each of these cases, I will observe the growth or decline of state capacity and the corresponding success of military operations against insurgents like the ICU or al-Shabaab, intending to observe any causality, in part by identifying other possible factors at play in each intervention that could explain military success or failure.

Since 2006, Somalia has emerged from stateless chaos and the brink of an Islamist takeover to something more closely resembling a functioning, if still violence-stricken and impoverished, country. Al-Shabaab's control of Somalia has been reduced to rural pockets in recent years. There are many possible explanations for this relative success story, but I aim to demonstrate how no explanation is as consistently reliable across multiple interventions as the growth in the central government's capacity. While there have been differences in intervener strategy and ethnic composition, I argue that these differences are not substantial enough to account for the increasing success of intervention. Furthermore, the strategy and composition of the insurgency has not varied significantly enough to serve as a convincing explanation in and of itself. The Islamic Courts Union fragmented considerably after the Ethiopian invasion and there was thus an opportunity for the new government to secure the loyalty of these insurgent constituencies, but the lack of state capacity incentivized these constituencies to throw their support behind a more radical al-Shabaab insurgency. Thus, the results of this research paper lead me to a theory for Somalia's recent improvement that emphasizes the significance of state capacity in the success of foreign support for governments besieged by insurgencies. A causal link between state capacity and foreign intervention could be highly relevant in studying civil wars across the world. In demonstrating this theory, I will consult existing documentation, contemporaneous reporting, and scholarship on the case studies outlined above, and compare them to determine the nature of Somalia's growing state capacity since 2006. In researching this theory, I hope to gain valuable insight on one of the world's most intractable civil wars and shed some light on possible means for successful interventions in other conflicts.

Works Cited

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Chapter 2: Research Design

This thesis intends to explore a broad, complicated matter, that of the success of interventions in civil war, through the lens of a specific case, the Somali Civil War. Although this thesis will not lack whatsoever in empirical rigor, its approach is qualitative, rather than quantitative. The research design pulls from datasets, primary documentation, and secondary analysis to construct clear pictures of what occurred in each of the four case studies of intervention. By comparing and contrasting the trends the variables take on for each case, I seek to explore whether state capacity provides a better explanation for the increased success foreign intervention in the Somali Civil War has had than any alternative.

In attempting to put forward an explanatory mechanism for the recent improvement in Somalia, it is important to remain cognizant of the difficulties in distinguishing between correlation and causation. This thesis will display a correlation between two hypothesized variables, state capacity and foreign intervention success. Part of the value of employing case studies in the context of a comparative approach is that a comprehensive analysis of these case studies should help illustrate a degree of causality between the variables. Proving causation can be a challenge to any research conducted in political science. However, a comparative approach can facilitate the consideration of different hypotheses to explain the apparent causal links among certain variables, and this thesis seeks to test a specific hypothesis. I intend to explore the hypothesis that state capacity drives success in foreign intervention while also recognizing that these variables interact and affect each other in important ways.

This thesis' dependent variable is the success of foreign intervention in Somalia in accomplishing its main strategic aims: the defense of the central government, the military defeat of anti-government insurgents, and the reduction in insurgent violence in Somalia. A foreign intervention which makes visible and lasting progress towards these aims will be considered successful. There should be further clarity as to what this thesis will consider a successful foreign intervention. As explained in Chapter 3, there is significant debate among scholars as to the definition of foreign intervention success. Much of this depends on the character of the intervention, and the strategic aims of the intervener. Many interventions by the United Nations, for example, do not ostensibly support any particular party but instead seek to reduce violence and enforce ceasefires. Interventions by sovereign states, however, will often aim to secure victory for one party over the other. As discussed more fully in Chapter 3, there are distinctions between interventions aiming to support rebels in overthrowing a government and those defending a government from insurgents or rebels. This thesis only considers interventions defending a

central government from rebel opposition. Furthermore, this thesis only examines interventions that intend for the victory of the party being defended (in all cases being considered here, the central government) and the eventual resolution of the conflict. Some interventions do not necessarily desire these aims, instead pursuing strategic goals that actually call for the perpetuation of internal conflicts. One could argue, for example, that American involvement in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s was interested less in the overthrow of the central government and instead for the entrapment of the Soviet Union in a protracted counterinsurgency. Having distinguished between these different types of intervention, this thesis will focus strictly on interventions defending the central government against rebels. The UN interventions of the 1990s can be compared to the more neutral, humanitarian peacekeeping missions alluded to earlier, but while these interventions will be considered as useful background for the period in Somali history being reviewed, they will not be counted as among the case studies.

Defining success in a foreign intervention for each of the cases as progress towards the defeat of insurgents against the central government, raises the question of operationalization. Two measurements of military success over insurgency can be discerned as relevant. A reduction in overall violence can be indicative of progress against insurgency. However, this depends in large part on the range of time being considered. It should hardly be surprising, for example, that in the immediate course of an intervention when a foreign military goes on the offensive against insurgents, that rates of violence should actually increase. The measure of intervention success should be that the interveners defeat the insurgents militarily with a permanence that sees a visible decline in violence in the medium-term, and preferably the long-term. For the purposes of this thesis, the amount of conflict-related violence at the onset of the intervention will be compared with the amount at least a year after. I will also operationalize the territorial dimension of military intervention, measuring the success of an intervention as the amount of territory the insurgency controls or has an active presence in and thus defining success by the intervention against the insurgency as the reduction in insurgent territorial control.

This thesis' independent variable, as described in the introduction, is the state capacity of the central government of Somalia. State capacity has many distinct definitions and can be measured across multiple dimensions. For the purposes of this thesis, state capacity will be measured along four specific dimensions: fiscal, administrative, coercive, and juridical. To elaborate, fiscal capacity is a measurement of the state's ability to extract revenue from its subjects and the amount and nature of resulting government spending, including on basic social services. By extension, the ability of the government to

address the socioeconomic needs of its populace, particularly in times of humanitarian crisis, is one of the most important measures of a state's underlying capacity, and will be assessed as such.

Administrative capacity encompasses the general efficacy of its bureaucracy and other institutions of state, as well as its ability to provide a stable, transparent business climate without corruption or excessive rent-seeking. Juridical capacity measures the efficacy, transparency, and consistency of the state's system of laws, including its ability to adjudicate disputes and enforce laws in a fair and effective manner. Coercive capacity measures the ability of the state to provide law and order, control its own territory, and protect its populace from banditry and terrorism. These dimensions of state capacity are intended to illustrate the growth in Somalia in the institutions and functions that are generally considered necessary to the effective governance of a country.

The operationalization of these two variables will be applied to four case studies, all selected from the Somali Civil War, which has experienced several different interventions since its inception in 1991. Somalia provides a unique example of one country having experienced multiple interventions at different times, by different countries, and against different opponents. Seeking to analyze intervention in civil wars from a comparative, qualitative perspective, comparing military interventions from different conflicts posed challenges for drawing any reliable conclusions when dealing with highly distinct contexts. The advantage to Somalia is that it offers several examples of intervention all occurring within the same country, thus allowing for the comparison of governments and insurgencies that have some broad contextual similarities but also distinctions that can be explored. Somalia is also a useful case because it represents a unique example of a state that has had to develop its own capacity from next to nothing after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. While this also presents significant challenges in the research process (such as the deficiency in reliable data in a country that has experienced state failure), Somalia presents an ideal opportunity to study the connection between state capacity and foreign military intervention.

In selecting individual cases of intervention, I chose to exclude the UN interventions of the 1990s. This partially reflected the paucity of data from that period of time, as well as the possibility that comparing interventions over too long a period of time could undermine the overall generalizability of this thesis' conclusions. Furthermore, the UN interventions were of a different character from subsequent interventions, being purely multilateral and with a humanitarian mission rather than a military one. Although the United States provided a military component to those interventions, this was in many respects done on an ad hoc basis when militias started attacking UN aid convoys. The UN interventions cannot be characterized as an effort to defend a central government against insurgents, as

there was no central government to defend, and thus do not meet the definition of intervention put forward earlier. Therefore, this thesis' analysis of Somalia's growing state capacity starts in 2006, when the first major instances of foreign intervention in support of a central government occurred. 2006 can be considered a turning point in the course of the Somali Civil War because the United States' support for the ARPCT (Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism) coalition of warlords, the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Ethiopia's response were pivotal events in the formation of Somali state capacity, giving the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) an opportunity to stake a claim for sovereignty as Somalia's internationally-recognized central government.

The first case of intervention considered in this thesis is the covert role the United States played in supporting the ARPCT, a coalition of warlords that formed in early 2006 with the explicit intent of gathering support and legitimacy from the US under counterterrorism pretexts. The ARPCT had control of Mogadishu, and was thus the closest thing Somalia had to a central government at the time. The de jure government of Somalia during this period was the Transitional Federal Government, the formation of which was facilitated by the United Nations. The interplay between these two rival claimants for sovereignty over Somalia, and the role of foreign entities in backing them, is highly relevant to how the conflict unfolded in the following years. However, the emphasis in that chapter will be on the ARPCT's efforts to defeat Islamist forces, most notably the ICU, an alliance of Islamic courts and militias that formed in opposition to both the ARPCT and the TFG. The second case of intervention is Ethiopia's intervention, starting with its invasion of Somalia against the ICU in December 2006. Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia changed from a conventional military conflict to a protracted occupation, often entailing counterinsurgency, after the ICU dissolved in January 2007. Ethiopia's intervention lasted until January 2009, when the country withdrew all of its forces from Somalia, leaving the task of defending the central government to international peacekeepers.

The third case of intervention concerns these peacekeepers, a force brought together by the African Union and the UN to defend the TFG after Ethiopia's withdrawal. Although the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was authorized by the African Union and the United Nations in early 2007, their role as the primary coercive arm of a transitional government that still lacked authority of its own did not become evident until after Ethiopia withdrew its forces. While AMISOM would play a role in Somalia past the confines of this case study, it was the primary line of defense for the TFG against the al-Shabaab insurgents between January 2009 and October 2011, when Kenya intervened, and their involvement during this time can be considered an intervention of its own. Early 2009 was a significant turning point in the history of the TFG and the development of its capacity in more respects than just

the withdrawal of Ethiopia. President Ahmed resigned from the TFG and put the government at serious risk of disintegration in the face of al-Shabaab's offensives. A power-sharing agreement with moderate defectors from the Islamic Courts Union radically changed the composition of the new TFG. The resulting period of time, as the data shall display, witnesses both stagnation or deterioration in most measures of state capacity, and a continuing deterioration in the security situation, although the peacekeepers were eventually able to force insurgents out of Mogadishu. The experience of AMISOM following Ethiopia's withdrawal thus presents an important case of an intervention struggling in the face of disruption and stagnation in state capacity.

The fourth and final case of intervention is Kenya's intervention in Somalia from October 2011 through October 2012, named Operation Linda Nchi. During this military operation, Kenyan forces, in alliance with the TFG and AMISOM, rolled back al-Shabaab's recent gains throughout much of south-central Somalia, culminating in a crucial victory over the insurgents at Kismayo in October 2012. This military incursion occurred in the context of important developments for the TFG. Only two months before, in August, the TFG's defenders, namely AMISOM but also including local militias, successfully forced al-Shabaab from Mogadishu. This offered the TFG an important opportunity to develop its state capacity in its own capital. Also in 2011, the TFG reached an agreement on the nature of its full assumption of sovereignty and the end of its transitional status the following year. In summary, I selected these four cases on the basis of their constituting four separate periods of intervention involving some degree of military support, whether it be covert support in the case of the United States and the ARPCT or a full-blown invasion in the case of Ethiopia installing the TFG, deployed in support of a central government against hostile insurgents. While the time period being studied encompasses less than a decade of Somalia's decades-long civil war, roughly from 2006 to 2013, no major cases of intervention have occurred since Kenya's operation, and the UN/US interventions of the 1990s lie outside the scope of this thesis based on their primarily humanitarian character. All four of these cases vary in the level of state capacity of the central government, which allows for comparison with the degree of intervention success in each case.

Research on these case studies and the operationalization of the two variables depends on an accurate, thorough understanding of the data and related evidence. Somalia can be somewhat challenging in that regard, as even in recent years, the maintenance of consistent, detailed records can be spotty. Only a few organizations have maintained datasets on Somalia that are thorough and consistent for the period of time being reviewed, such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, whose data on conflict-related violence will be used in operationalizing the dependent variable. Therefore, this

thesis relies in part on indicators measured by third-party analysts for the aforementioned operationalizations of state capacity and foreign intervention. These sources include the Corruption Perceptions Index, the World Governance Indicators (which encompass a wide range of measurements of both state capacity and political violence), the Quality of Government indicators, and Bertelsmann's Transformation Index (BTI). While most of these indicators encompass all years since the beginning of my analysis in 2006, they do not break down on the monthly level. This can make an assessment of these measures' progression over the course of an intervention that in some cases lasts only months somewhat difficult. This is addressed in part by assessing where these measures stand both during the intervention and a year after, when enough time has passed to assess its impact. Understanding that other factors could conceivably be driving any changes in measurements after an intervention, evidence beyond these datasets and indicators will be considered.

Reflecting that this is a more qualitative than quantitative study, the work of those who have closely studied and reported on these interventions will be consulted, including, where possible, the domestic press in Somalia, which sometimes includes eyewitness testimony from Somalis. Primary sources, such as government documents and records, are especially pertinent to assessing the development of Somali state capacity, and are an indicator of state capacity. Finally, I also aim to draw conclusions about the potential relationship between the variables by briefly considering other factors in the analysis of the case studies. Other potential explanations will be considered for why more recent interventions succeeded where earlier ones failed, and apply these to the analysis of the four case studies. An entire chapter will be dedicated to considering the case studies in a comparative analysis, in order to draw further conclusions about the likely causal factors behind increased success in foreign intervention. For example, I will consider if there is any evidence in the case studies of interethnic or transnational animosity between Somalia and its interveners noticeably affecting the success of the intervention. I expect to find that while many factors likely effect the success of military intervention, no explanation will be as consistent or convincing as my hypothesis.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

State Capacity

In order to explore the effect of state capacity on foreign intervention into civil war, it's necessary to understand the current scholarly consensus on these complicated topics. The literature on state capacity grew in significance during the 1970s and 1980s, as the international community increasingly grappled with the problems presented by weak, fragile states coming out of colonialism. In recent decades, state capacity has been studied across several different dimensions and in different disciplinary fields. This has elicited some concern from scholars that there is a lack of clarity on the precise nature and definition of state capacity across the literature. Some scholars are also concerned about the presence of endogeneity in studies of state capacity and internal conflict, as civil wars can both result from and create low capacity. This endogeneity leads some scholars, such as Thies, but by no means all to claim that this makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about the association between the two factors.¹

Nonetheless, there is some consensus on what state capacity means, especially in its relevance to state formation and state breakdown. State capacity has been defined in distinct ways. Skocpol refers to it as the ability to “implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups”; while Weber provides a widely cited academic definition, defining state capacity as the state having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.^{2,3} Some authors argue that a state's ability to tax effectively is a good measure of its overall capacity. For example, Acemoglu posits that state capacity must ideally reach an equilibrium of strength where the state is politically weak enough that its ability to tax is constrained from self-interested excess but not so weak that it is overcome with inefficiency and overshadowed by local actors.⁴ States generally are able to raise their tax revenue when there is greater investment in public goods, increasing the public incentive to comply with taxation. A review of the literature by the RAND Corporation observes several frequent indicators of capacity that researchers tend to use for empirical purposes, and which provides insight on how to operationalize state capacity for the purposes of this thesis. These include “the ratio of taxes to GDP, GDP per capita, the ratio of trade to GDP, government spending,” and political indices like the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the International Country Risk Guide, and the Political Instability Task Force's scores of state fragility.⁵

The literature on the relationship between state capacity and armed conflict suggests a complicated and endogenous connection. Charles Tilly's *Formation of National States in Western Europe* is a particularly influential work on state capacity, which argued that state formation is driven by the unique needs of individual countries to make war and thus raise tax for these purposes.⁶ Other scholars have come to elaborate and also to some extent question this hypothesis that war drives state capacity. Cardenas et al argue that internal conflict undermines state capacity but there is limited empirical evidence that external war strengthens capacity.⁷ There is some evidence that the presence of state capacity prevents civil war and conflict, as per Fearon and Laitin, and DeRouen et al, and that state capacity is a significant determinant in the successful implementation of peace agreements.^{8,9} In fact, Fearon and Laitin suggest that state capacity is a more relevant predictor of conflict than democracy is. Their research indicates that when controlling for per capita income as an indicator of state capacity, democracies are neither more nor less likely than autocracies to experience civil war. This implies that the much-touted democratic peace theory, while undoubtedly relevant to the incidence of interstate conflict, does not necessarily apply to intrastate conflict.

A common factor identified as a link between weak state capacity and internal conflict is lootable resources. Collier and Hoeffler hypothesize that a weak, corrupt state will often plunder natural resources for its own benefit, fostering grievances among the population and opening a space for militants to compete for control of these resources.¹⁰ However, it's worth noting that Somalia is not very rich in lootable resources. Some scholars suggest that both resource-rich and resource-scarce countries are more susceptible to poor governance and ultimately conflict. Fjelde also finds state capacity to be a significant predictor of civil peace, specifically measured in government spending on public goods and the presence of trustworthy institutions.¹¹ This suggests that state capacity and conflict, both internal and external, are intertwined, the presence of each affecting the other.

Some scholars have observed that state capacity can have a direct effect on the success of intervention in resolving armed conflict. DeRouen argues that states with limited capacity have a noticeably negative effect on foreign intervention in its favor in an internal conflict. Lower state capacity not only decreases the success of supportive intervention, but also makes a state vulnerable to the spread of regional conflict (as per Braithwaite)¹². DeRouen and Sobek also argue that state capacity is central to the duration and outcomes of civil wars, but it is not entirely clear in what way, as they have evidence that effective bureaucracy favors the state in a conflict, but that the impact of greater coercive power does not necessarily have the same effect, perhaps owing to the tendency of rebels to resort to guerilla warfare in the face of greater government force.¹³ McBride et al also agrees that state capacity

is crucial in successful peace agreements, as the parties to a conflict must determine that the payoff from accepting peace is greater than continuing to take up arms in the pursuit of disputed rents.¹⁴

The literature has additional insights into how foreign intervention interacts with state capacity. Besley and Persson argue that cash aid has little effect in building up weak states, but direct support for infrastructure can raise private incomes and thus indirectly incentivize growth in state capacity.¹⁵ It is thus possible that as international strategies of state building change from giving cash to possibly corrupt governments to instead investing directly in infrastructure and development, Somalia's state capacity will gradually improve. Recent progress in Somalia can also be attributed to internal changes to government strategy against the insurgents. Peic argues that central governments are more successful against insurgencies when their force is supplemented by local civilian defense forces.¹⁶ Driscoll argues that fragmentation in civil wars can be reversed when the government selectively coopts atomized insurgent commanders through the formation of coalitions.¹⁷ There is evidence that the Somali government has employed both strategies, as it has delegated security to clan militias defending themselves from the radicalism of al-Shabaab, and more moderate elements of the former ICU have been coopted into a burgeoning Somali national military. It seems likely that these changes in the nature of Somalia's coercive capacity have been instrumental in the success that foreign interveners like Kenya and peacekeeping forces like AMISOM have had in rolling al-Shabaab back from highly-populated areas and gradually diminishing the strength of the insurgency.

State capacity can assume at least four dimensions: coercive, juridical, fiscal, and administrative, with the latter two being of particular interest. There has been some consensus that these two forms of capacity can only occur after the establishment of the state's coercive capacity. However, the importance of a strong, predictable legal system has increasingly been regarded as important too. There can be no adequate environment for investment or innovation in a free market without institutions that can define and enforce contracts. Thus, fiscal and administrative capacity can be strengthened not only coercively but also juridically. The aforementioned RAND review emphasizes the significance of coercive capacity, and notes that a corrupt, abusive, and poorly-disciplined security force can be as damaging as a weak or nonexistent one.¹⁸ A country like Somalia arguably exhibits characteristics of both, lacking any national army for years after the civil war started, but also later being controlled by warlords and militias whose rapacity and corruption stoked conflict and invited exterior intervention. The same RAND review notes that the nature of any observed association between state capacity and civil conflict depends on how these variables are measured and what dimensions are emphasized. RAND does not suggest that this undermines the drawing of any conclusions between state capacity and civil war, merely that the

latter can affect the former through multiple different mechanisms. Jeffrey Herbst also observes an interplay between administrative and coercive capacity, suggesting that a state can only extend its reach to all corners of the country if it possesses strong state institutions as well as the coercive capacity to enforce these institutions.¹⁹ Thus, a failure of a central government (or, for that matter, its intervener allies) to account for both of these dimensions of capacity could sustain an insurgency in the face of any intervention.

Connecting some of the theory on state capacity to Somalia, one could argue that Somalia is a classic example of a state with weak institutions that quickly succumbed to internal pressure and remained vulnerable to internal conflict in the absence of state capacity. The lack of state capacity undermined any incentive for combatants, including the warlords of the 1990s and the Islamist militias of the 2000s, to comply with negotiated agreements, as the very weak state was unable to satisfy the interests of the insurgents' constituents. Prominent among these constituents were the clan-based business elites, who wanted security and justice in conducting business, and believed the Transitional Federal Government was unable to provide this. Even though there would be progress in building up the TFG into something more closely resembling a central government, Somalia has nonetheless struggled to build up certain dimensions of state capacity, such as coercion, for which they still to some extent depend on foreign peacekeepers and soldiers. Somalia can be considered an example of what Migdal describes as a strong society with a weak state in which control is diffused on the local level, hindering the formation of a strong state.²⁰ Somali politics have historically been clan-based, and its recent history is no exception. However, the importance of fiscal and administrative capacity to resolving conflicts can perhaps explain some of the progress Somalia has made recently, as the TFG evolved into a more conventionally functioning government able to better satisfy the needs of the business elites when once they turned to the ICU.

Foreign Intervention

The literature on foreign intervention in civil conflict is as comprehensive as that on state capacity, if not more so. Patrick Regan, one of the leading scholars on foreign military intervention, in 2000 defined third party military intervention as "convention-breaking military" involvement in a foreign country's internal affairs "with the aim of affecting the balance of power between government and opposition forces."²¹ He observed that civil wars with exterior intervention tend to last longer than those without, but did not initially establish with confidence causality between intervention and conflict

duration. However, in a separate paper published in 2002, Regan's data analysis suggested military intervention indeed extends the expected duration of civil wars. He suggested that "intervention is not a terribly effective strategy" to "shorten the length" of a civil war.²² To complicate matters, Regan returned to a position of ambiguity on the impact of intervention on civil conflict, in 2006, finding little statistically significant effect on the duration of civil wars.²³

The question of whether interventions of all kinds in civil wars tend to succeed or fail is relevant to determining the impact of state capacity on intervention success. Scholars have long been divided on whether foreign intervention exacerbates or mitigates the duration and intensity of civil wars. For example, in the 1970s, fresh off America's doomed intervention in Vietnam's civil conflict, Gurr and Duvall argued that interventions exacerbate both the duration and intensity of civil wars.²⁴ Pearson concurred, and suggests that some interventions in support of a besieged government are aimed strictly at shoring up said government, and thus resolving the civil conflict itself is not always the aim of a foreign intervention.²⁵ Decades later, some scholars suggested that certain types of internal conflict were more receptive to successful intervention than others. Elbadawi and Sambanis observe that conflicts running on ethnic lines, rather than ideological ones, bring about a fractionalization of society that facilitates rebel mobilization and thus makes such conflicts unusually intractable.²⁶ Collier et al puts forth a similar but distinct argument, that homogenous societies are less likely to experience protracted internal conflict, but also that societies which were heterogenous enough, on the other end of the spectrum, tend to divide on ideological rather than ethnic lines, and would thus be more receptive to intervention.²⁷ Both of these authors' findings imply that intervention with the aim of resolving conflict can be more challenging depending on the ethnic and ideological composition of the country being intervened in.

Stephen Gent emphasizes the impact of military intervention on the outcome of the conflict, rather than the duration. Differing somewhat from Regan, Gent argues that interventions in support of rebels tend to succeed, but those in favor of governments do not. His explanation for this is that third parties intervene in defense of governments only when said governments are in the greatest danger, and thus these interventions empirically are less effective. While Gent concedes that there is a conventional wisdom in the discipline that "military interventions increase the duration of civil conflicts," he argues that recent studies indicate a more complicated consensus, in part due to an occasional failure to distinguish between an intervention's impact on the duration of a conflict and its outcome.²⁸ Such a distinction is important for my purposes, as I seek to understand the factors influencing the outcome of Somalia's civil war, more so than its duration. It is also important to

understand whether interventions can be predicted to fail in civil wars in general, rather than strictly in countries with particularly weak state capacity. The above literature suggests that interventions can be a difficult and risky business even in the best of cases, but that there is not a strong consensus behind there being a negative relationship between intervention and the outcome of a civil war. However, there is evidence that states with weak capacity are particularly unreceptive to intervention.

As alluded to earlier, the resolution of civil wars is often contingent upon overcoming commitment problems, to which state capacity can be relevant. Gent, as well as other scholars like Fearon, and Azam and Mesnard, utilize models reflecting this, attempting to determine the point at which a party's incentive to commit to nonviolence overcomes its suspicion that the other side will continue to engage in violence against said party.^{29,30} While there remains to this day considerable debate on the extent to which military interventions in civil wars are prone to success or failure, one can observe from the literature that interventions in support of weak governments like Somalia's in the face of intense ethnic fractionalization and serious commitment problems between parties can be especially fruitless. Through these observations, we can make sense of the failure of prior interventions in Somalia, like those of the UN and Ethiopia, to reduce both the duration and the intensity of the conflict. The literature on foreign intervention thus also makes Somalia's recent improvement in the face of joint Kenyan–American–UN involvement somewhat confusing. However, as reviewed above, the literature on state capacity suggests that improvement on all dimensions of state capacity (administrative, fiscal, coercive, etc.) increases the likelihood of resolving internal conflict. This observation is often applied to the diplomatic resolution of conflicts like Sierra Leone's, where international aid incentivized rebels to lay down arms in exchange for greater economic opportunities. However, while this sort of economic intervention played some role in Somalia, the mechanism by which state capacity interacted with military intervention is less clear. This is in part because there has been less research on how military interventions are affected by state capacity and the presence of strong institutions in the government being defended.

If we understand the various intervening forces in Somalia to be taking over, rather than merely supplementing, the coercive capacity of a domestic government against an insurgency, then the existing literature on state capacity in civil conflict offers greater insight. One can argue that until recently, the internationally-recognized government of Somalia (then called the TFG) was so weak that it outsourced the fight against rebels like al-Shabaab to exterior intervening forces. The aforementioned RAND review considers how different dimensions of low state capacity fuel internal conflict and undermine the military efficiency of the intervener.³¹ This low capacity entails a failure of the government to provide

public goods and services driving impoverished populations to violence; a failure to provide security and law and order creating opportunities for militant groups to serve these roles; and a failure to tax effectively and thus finance the basic functions of government. All these factors fueled insurgents at the expense of intervening militaries in Somalia. The relationship between state capacity and civil conflict is reciprocal, because as low capacity contributes to conflict, so too is it destroyed by conflict, as occurred after the fall of Siad Barre. This provides further reason to believe that interventions that only consider coercion are unlikely to succeed if the underlying dimensions of state capacity remain feeble. In other words, early interventions provided the incipient Somali government with the coercive capacity it lacked, but only when the government developed other forms of capacity, including administrative, fiscal, and juridical, were the interveners more successful in their coercive tactics against insurgents.

Ultimately, this thesis pulls from broad, complex subjects including state capacity, civil war, foreign intervention, and, to a lesser extent, counterinsurgency, and thus there is a considerable breadth of literature that should be understood. While there is still considerable debate among academics on some aspects of all of these subjects, there are observable lessons that can be gleaned from the literature that are relevant to analyzing the question of how recent intervention in Somalia has presided over more success than before. This literature review intended to synthesize these lessons and provide relevant background for the research I conducted in this thesis.

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Chapter 4: Background on Somalia

Somalia has been immersed in civil war since 1991, in a conflict that has attracted several distinct military interventions and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. To understand the four case studies of intervention that I will be analyzing in subsequent sections, it is necessary to shed some light on the history of Somalia and its civil war. The story of Somalia's descent into state failure and its partial revival in recent years is a highly complex one which still attracts some historiographical debate. In studying recent examples of intervention in Somalia, it would also be negligent not to consider the lessons from the two interventions by the United Nations in the 1990s. Although these interventions differ enough from my case studies to not be included among them, they still offer some insight on the problems bedeviling foreign interveners in the chaos that has been the Somali Civil War.

Somalia, formally the Federal Republic of Somalia, occupies a strategic position on the Horn of Africa and thus attracted the attention of European colonial powers in the 19th century. Prior to then, various ethnic Somali empires reigned in parts of what is now the state of Somalia, but none governed over the entirety of the contemporary borders. Somalia has been regarded as something of an anomaly in Africa, being a highly homogenous country comprised mainly of the same ethnicity with a common language and faith, but still being divided into distinct clans.¹ Somalis are ethnically Cushitic – that is to say, they are indigenous to northeast Africa, and speak languages in the Cushitic subgroup of Afroasiatic languages – and comprise 85% of the population of Somalia. The other 15% include Bantu speakers and Arabs, often concentrated in the country's south.² Ethnic Somalis are also present in neighboring countries, like Ethiopia and Kenya, and the status of Somalis in said countries has often been the focus of diplomatic tension. Many insurgents in the civil war, including elements of the Islamic Courts Union and al-Shabaab, had as their objective the unification of ethnically Somali regions under a Greater Somali caliphate.

In 1884, Britain imposed a protectorate on the northern region of Somalia known as Somaliland. Six years later, Italy acquired the rest of what is now Somalia and ruled it as a colony until World War II. In 1941, the British seized control of Italian Somaliland and administered it until the region came under UN trusteeship and Italian administration in 1950. The two Somalilands achieved their independence on July 1st, 1960, and united to form the Somali Republic. However, this first government was short-lived. On October 15th, 1969, President Abdirashid Shermarke was assassinated by his bodyguards, and six days later, a bloodless military coup d'état overthrew the Republic.³ The coup was engineered by Major

General Siad Barre, who dominated the ensuing military junta. Barre quickly implemented a state ideology of 'scientific socialism' and aligned the new Somali Democratic Republic with the Soviet Union. Barre's regime transformed Somali society with modernizing programs involving literacy, nationalization, collectivization, and, perhaps most significantly, the outlawing of all clan-related behavior and loyalty. Like in many communist regimes during the Cold War, the repression of ethnic and tribal identities was only successful in the short-term, bottling up the tensions that would explode during the civil war.

The fall of the Ethiopian monarchy to a communist regime in 1974 would end up profoundly changing Somalia's history. In 1977, Barre was convinced by ethnic Somali insurgents in the Ethiopian Ogaden region to launch a military incursion into territory Somalia coveted for itself. However, by spring 1978, the Soviet Union switched its support in favor of Ethiopia, assisting it in defeating Somalia in what would become known as the Ogaden War.⁴ Barre's regime was significantly weakened by this humiliation, and discontent against the oppression and poverty he presided over mounted during the 1980s. Clan-based opposition groups formed during this period, the most significant of which was the Somali National Movement, based among the Isaaq clan of the north. Barre cracked down brutally on these rebels in the Isaaq city of Hargeisa in 1988, but this only galvanized further opposition to his regime, including among former loyalists who were disillusioned by his peace treaty with Ethiopia. In January 1991, a coalition of rebel groups called the United Somali Congress (USC) ousted Barre from Mogadishu.⁵ However, in the absence of any totalitarian regime to keep clan rivalries in check, the various clan-based groups armed themselves with the remnants of the Somali military and established their own spheres of influence in Mogadishu. The state largely disintegrated in southern Somalia, leading the more stable Somaliland, now under the control of the Somali National Movement, to declare independence that May.

Inter-factional warfare soon consumed the Mogadishu region, as Hawiye clan warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid undermined the authority of the interim USC government. The disruption this caused to the grain-producing regions brought a catastrophic famine to southern Somalia in 1992. In that year alone, as many as 350,000 people died in Somalia, primarily from famine and starvation.⁶ This severe humanitarian crisis attracted international concern. The United Nations Security Council in April authorized UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia) to provide humanitarian relief in Mogadishu and throughout the country. However, militias like Aidid's Somali National Alliance refused to adhere to the ceasefire that had been brokered and disrupted the distribution of aid through attacks and looting. The lack of any cohesive government with which to cooperate left UNOSOM friendless and

defenseless. Thus, in December 1992, the United States offered to lead a multinational force of 35,000 troops for the purpose of enforcing the humanitarian intervention. The UN approved this under the operation UNOSOM II, replacing its failed predecessor. UNOSOM II was at first successful, with thousands receiving humanitarian aid that mitigated the famine, and 15 Somali factions reaching a peace accord in early 1993.⁷ Yet the security situation deteriorated rapidly in mid-1993, and an operation that the American government expected to be fairly simple escalated with an increasing military dimension. The United States, initially there mainly to defend the peacekeepers, went on the offensive against the warlords, particularly Aidid. But a botched raid to capture Aidid on October 3rd, 1993 escalated into a full-blown battle for Mogadishu in which 19 US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis died. Domestic support for the intervention declined, and the Clinton administration withdrew its troops in March 1994. The UN operation lasted only a year longer, departing a Somalia that was somewhat less violent and famine-threatened than in 1992 but still more or less a failed state.

International attempts at brokering political reconciliation in Somalia floundered throughout the rest of the 1990s, but reached a potential breakthrough in 2000. That year, a peace conference in Djibouti led to the establishment of a Transitional National Assembly representing the various clans.⁸ While this new government had little authority or impact in Somalia, being based in Kenya, it set a precedent for a subsequent agreement after talks sponsored by the regional body IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development). This agreement established the more enduring Transitional Federal Government (TFG). While the TFG experienced many of the same problems of capacity and authority as its predecessor, it was still able to relocate into Somalia proper in February 2006, meeting in the city of Baidoa, as Mogadishu remained too insecure.⁹

The year 2006 was a turning point in contemporary Somali history, bringing the fledgling TFG into direct conflict with a more powerful but unrecognized claimant to state power: the Islamic Courts Union. While there will be discussion in greater detail on the last dozen years of the Somali Civil War, what follows is a concise summary. The Islamic Courts Union formed as a coalition of Islamic courts and militias representing a populace that had become alienated from the rapacity of Mogadishu's warlords. In June 2006, the ICU defeated these warlords and seized control of the capital. In the following months, they spread across southern Somalia, eliciting international concern. Ethiopia, mindful of the militants' revanchist ambitions for the Ogaden, dispatched soldiers to defend the TFG in Baidoa. Tensions escalated until Ethiopia launched a full-scale invasion against the ICU in December 2006. The following month, the ICU was forced from Mogadishu, on the verge of disintegration, and the TFG was installed in its place. Yet the most hardline elements of the ICU reconstituted themselves as the fierce insurgent

group al-Shabaab, and Ethiopia was forced into a desperate defense of a TFG that still lacked in state capacity. Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia under duress in early 2009, and the TFG was saved only through compromise with the moderates of the former ICU, who elected one of their own, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, to become the new President of the TFG.¹⁰

For several years thereafter, the TFG was dangerously vulnerable to al-Shabaab, which at times controlled large swathes of Mogadishu, despite the best efforts of AMISOM, the peacekeeping authority organized by the African Union and authorized by the UN. However, al-Shabaab was expelled from the capital in summer 2011, and Kenya intervened that October, significantly rolling back the territorial control of the insurgents. At the same time, Somalia took a notable step towards regaining its state capacity when the Transitional Federal Government transitioned into a fully sovereign, elected government with a provisional constitution in August 2012. Al-Shabaab experienced increased setbacks in the following years, especially when its leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed in an American drone strike on September 1st, 2014.¹¹ While Somalia remains a dangerous, unstable country to this day, with the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) reporting 4,969 conflict-related deaths in 2017, the power and extent of the insurgency has declined considerably in recent years, and the federal government is no longer at risk of collapse.¹²

The recent history of Somalia gives some context for the analysis of my case studies. For example, why did the UN interventions of the 1990s fail? The lessons from the UN and American struggles in Somalia remain hotly debated to this day, and cannot be conclusively resolved in the space of this thesis. Chester Crocker of *Foreign Affairs* summarizes some of the contemporaneous analysis of these interventions. Many analysts pointed to the “pitfalls of intervention” in “places lacking civil order and legitimate political institutions,” highlighting the difficulty the UN peacekeepers and their American defenders had in cooperating with a central government that for all intents and purposes did not exist. Others considered the failure of the Somalia interventions an indicator of the incompetence of the United Nations as a multilateral institution.¹³ While the efficacy of the United Nations as a global peacekeeper and the role of the United States in it are not the central focus of this thesis, the problems both parties experienced in the course of their interventions pose pertinent questions. As Crocker, and others, points out, UNOSOM I and II were not complete failures in humanitarian terms, saving as many as a quarter million lives through the aid that was successfully disbursed.¹⁴ However, in terms of these operations’ ability to restore order and defend a disintegrating central government, the interventions’ failure was abject. While violence did end up declining by the end of the 1990s, Somalia became a byword for anarchy in its complete lack of state capacity. UNOSOM II recognized the difficulty in keeping

the peace and distributing aid without a proper government with which to cooperate, and was therefore authorized to pursue 'nation-building' efforts through UNSC Resolution 814. Crocker argues this was carried out with strategic confusion, and fostered mistrust among many Somalis who had thrown their support behind warlords in the absence of any coherent government. He asserted that the United States should act, preferably through diplomacy, before state failure, rather than after, because of the complexities of engaging with non-state hierarchies in the absence of state capacity.¹⁵ While the reasons behind the failure of the UN interventions might be many, there can be little denying the significance of state capacity to how the UN and the US were overwhelmed by the chaos that confronted them in Somalia.

This state capacity was already quite fragile by the end of the Barre regime. Earlier during his rule, much of the economy was nationalized, coinciding with a general rise in corruption. The end of Soviet support to Somalia in 1978 after the Ogaden War left Barre's regime isolated and fragile. By the end of the following decade, the state's institutions had been hollowed out by war, corruption, and economic collapse. Dominik Balthasar characterizes the "prevailing view" on Somalia that its collapse can be attributed to Barre's "authoritarian rule" in the 1970s and 80s. Balthasar qualifies this by also emphasizing the "seeds of state fragility" sown during the transition from colonialism in the 1960s, and observing that the earlier part of Barre's regime could be characterized as a period of state consolidation before the setback of the Ogaden War.¹⁶ Even at the height of Barre's police state, Somalia's coercive capacity was flawed and limited, relying in large part, at least for internal security, on vigilantes called Victory Pioneers. Barre did have a system of National Security Courts to implement effective justice, a system that disappeared after his ouster, but also one that was corrupt, ideological, and overly harsh.¹⁷ Unlike most socialist dictators of the era, Barre was never fully successful in securing the loyalty of the military, which grew to resent him after the debacles with Ethiopia, and facilitated the emergence of rebellion in the late 1980s. And Somalia's wayward position in the international economy, estranged from much of the rest of the communist world after 1978 but never integrating into the capitalist sphere, left Somalia with little economic capacity to speak of by 1991.

Another important aspect to Somalia's contemporary history in understanding its civil war is its unique clan system. Barre attempted to destroy this form of social stratification and unify Somalis behind one nation and government, but these efforts ultimately backfired. Somali society has always been heavily clan-based, with the people looking to clan elders for guidance and adjudication. Clans usually consist of different lineages whose members form subgroups that are bound by blood, and socially contracted to certain juridical, political, and social obligations, such as the payment of *dia* (blood

compensation).¹⁸ These traditional forms of social organization were significantly disrupted by Barre's regime, which sought to coopt the clan elders by placing them under the authority of party functionaries, who often lacked loyalty to and familiarity with the clans they supposedly represented.¹⁹ Barre outlawed all expressions of clan loyalty, but this did not prevent dissidents from organizing along clan lines when his regime started to crumble. Somewhat reminiscent of how ethnic tensions reemerged with the fall of communism in Yugoslavia, Barre's ouster left Somalia with raging divisions among the clans but no functioning government to adjudicate them. Barre's totalitarian regime did not end the clan system, it merely turned the system against the state. Clans were effective at creating some sort of social order among themselves, but not between different clans. Thus, the collapse of the Barre government left Mogadishu ripe for dispute between clans and sub-clans. This anarchic competition overwhelmed the UN interventions, and only later in the 1990s had the clans sufficiently contested the spoils of the former state and learned to coexist to a greater extent.

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Chapter 5: The US and UN Interventions, 2004 to mid-2006

Intervention in Somalia in the years preceding the rise of the Islamic Courts Union, specifically between 2004 and mid-2006, involved both the United States and the United Nations, and on both counts utterly failed to provide stability and overcome insurgent violence. This chapter will emphasize the United States' covert intervention in supporting the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT) against Islamist forces in Mogadishu, as this intervention involved indirect military aid, and the ARPCT held power as the de facto government in the capital. However, this chapter will also consider the United Nations' diplomatic involvement in establishing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as an alternative to the ARPCT, as the political dispute between the TFG, the ARPCT, and later the ICU provide an important backdrop to events in subsequent interventions. The United States' intervention was an absolute failure, achieving the opposite of the intervener's intentions, as the ARPCT was overthrown and replaced by an Islamist government under the ICU that the United States feared included foreign jihadists. The UN's efforts to develop an internationally-recognized, sovereign government for Somalia were also derailed by the rise of the ICU. The interventions failed in large part because the ARPCT had failed to develop state capacity and lost the support of the population, including important interest groups, who instead threw their support behind the ICU, which had a more credible claim to provide capacity and legitimacy. State capacity failed to improve on all dimensions during this period, as the ARPCT abused its coercive capacity to extort its subjects, ignored rampant poverty that could have been addressed with proper fiscal capacity, and did not develop political institutions or a formal judiciary in the pursuit of administrative or juridical capacity.

Somalia experienced considerable political change and disruption between 2004 and 2006. UN-brokered diplomacy presented an opportunity for Somalia to obtain its first legitimate central government since the collapse of the Barre regime. The international community sought to stabilize Somalia after over a decade of devastating civil war, with the United States especially mindful of the security threat posed by a failed state in Somalia after the attacks of September 11th. During the 2000s, the United States pursued a covert intervention that emphasized counterterrorism, seeking to ensure al-Qaeda found no safe haven amidst the country's chaos, while the United Nations and other international bodies sought political reconciliation through the establishment of an internationally-recognized unity government. While these approaches were distinct and in practice sometimes contradictory, the involvement of both the United States and the UN in Somalia's internal affairs during this period was motivated by a desire to end Somalia's status as a failed state and prevent a takeover by

hostile Islamists. However, the TFG, which emerged out of the UN-brokered negotiations, failed miserably to satisfy the needs of key interest groups and stabilize Somalia. Furthermore, the existing political arrangement in Mogadishu, rule by the warlords of the ARPCT, was no longer sustainable either. In the mid-2000s, significant elements of Somalia's population were ready to do away with the fractious political order in favor of a convincing alternative. The failure of the ARPCT and its foreign allies to present this alternative ceded ground to the determined Islamists that would form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The rapid rise and fall of the ICU would plunge Somalia into its greatest chaos and bloodshed in a decade, and further highlight the failure of foreign intervention that failed to take into consideration the importance that state capacity had in sustaining insurgency and instability. The failure of both the ARPCT coalition and the TFG government to address the political concerns of interest groups like clan elders and the business community by providing the necessary state capacity sustained and indeed escalated the level of internal conflict within Somalia, and stymied the efforts of both the United Nations and the United States to promote their interests – creating a stable, sovereign government for the former, countering Islamist terrorism for the latter.

Background/Course of Events

The first concrete form of progress the United Nations experienced in forming a government that could be recognized as legitimate in Somalia emerged from peace talks in Djibouti in 2000. This Transitional National Government (TNG) was mainly dominated by Mogadishu-based clans, particularly the Hawiye.¹ Predictably, the TNG had limited support beyond the capital, and was opposed by Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the autonomous state of Puntland. Yusuf came to hold great influence over a coalition of anti-TNG clans and militias known as the Somali Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Council (SRRC), supported by Ethiopia.² The lack of broad national support for the TNG, combined with its vision for a strong federal state, made it very difficult to win the loyalty of key powerbrokers at a time when it had so little capacity it could not even base itself inside Somalia. The failure of the TNG thus resulted in negotiations towards a broader power-sharing agreement brokered by IGAD – the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, the regional trade bloc – in cooperation with the UN. These talks were intended to secure a countrywide ceasefire as a precursor to power-sharing. However, as Somalia specialist Kenneth Menkhaus notes, the Somali delegates to these talks demonstrated “little interest” or progress in addressing the issues underlying the inter-factional conflict.³ IGAD thus forewent further efforts to secure a lasting ceasefire, and the talks culminated in the establishment of the TFG.

While the TFG represented more clans than the TNG, the inability to address the underlying divisions between the various armed groups guaranteed continued instability in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country that the TFG was powerless to influence.

The Transitional Federal Government experienced challenges to its legitimacy from its conception. The SRRC and its constituents, which had strongly opposed the Mogadishu-based TNG, dominated the TFG.⁴ Its anti-Islamist inclinations, arguably stoked by Christian-majority Ethiopia, perhaps the TFG's greatest patron, alienated the Islamist-sympathetic, Mogadishu-centered base of what would become the Islamic Courts Union. While long-standing animosity between Ethiopia and Somalia doubtless played a role in the alienation of much of the population from the TFG, arguably more significant were the failings of the TFG to compete with the emerging ICU in securing the loyalty of Mogadishu's powerbrokers. In addition to clan partisans hostile to the TFG based strictly on its composition, influential business interests and civil society groups were skeptical of the TFG.⁵ These elements, sometimes referred to as the Mogadishu Group, quickly broke with the TFG over its refusal to relocate to the capital, where the TFG feared the Mogadishu Group might dominate them, rather than Baidoa under the guard of Ethiopian peacekeepers. The TFG's support for the deployment of said Ethiopian peacekeepers alienated the Mogadishu Group even further. The dispute over the TFG's relocation prevented the legislature from convening in an official capacity until February 2006, about a year and a half after the TFG was established.⁶ It was in this context that powerbrokers in Mogadishu became increasingly suspicious of the TFG and that Ethiopia's influence over the TFG expanded, sowing the seeds for inevitable conflict between these two elements.

The United States covertly increased its involvement in Somalia during this period, and in doing so inadvertently further destabilized the country by supporting the ARPCT, when the aim was a counterterrorist agenda to prevent Islamists from turning Somalia into a safe haven. The ARPCT emerged from a split in the Mogadishu Group that had been briefly united in opposition to the formation of the TFG. The split occurred in October 2005, and produced two factions: the ruling warlords that had been receiving increased support from the United States and newer Islamist elements that would constitute the ICU. The United States had provided financial and intelligence support to a loose coalition of Mogadishu-based warlords since the War on Terror began, in order to prevent al-Qaeda figures from seeking refuge in Somalia.⁷ The warlords, some of whom had held sway in the capital since the battle of Mogadishu in 1993, formally established the ARPCT (Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism) at the behest of the United States in February 2006 due to the growing presence of the ICU and their constituent militias, who were both challenging the authority

of warlord rule and gaining popular support by building schools and hospitals.⁸ The United States was particularly concerned about the possible presence in Mogadishu of suspects behind the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.⁹ Although the ARPCT provided the US with some intelligence in tracking down low-level operatives with suspected al-Qaeda involvement, they were not able to apprehend Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, one of the masterminds behind the 1998 bombings who ironically would become a leading military commander in al-Shabaab.¹⁰ In addition to significant financial support, the United States also reportedly provided the ARPCT with weapons, including anti-aircraft guns and mortars, in apparent violation of the UN's arms embargo on Somalia.¹¹

However, the US failed to recognize the increasing unpopularity of the ARPCT and the risk of an Islamist backlash. This backlash was engendered in part by the anti-Islamist agenda of the TFG, but also by events in Mogadishu, such as a political initiative by the warlords in mid-2005 known as the Mogadishu Stabilization and Security Plan. This mass-based initiative was temporarily successful in restoring order and demobilizing militias in the capital, but the wave of populism it inspired threatened the local political elites, and the movement was soon terminated by the warlords.¹² Soon after, violence and instability returned, and with it, an opening for the ICU. The United States' support for the ARPCT also undermined, if unintentionally, the TFG and the UN-backed peace process, despite officially expressing its public support. This was publicly alleged by TFG spokesman Abdirahman Dinari, who accused the US of stoking the increase in violence that would result in the ICU's takeover. Researchers on African affairs were also wary of the effects of the US policy, with Ted Dagne of the Congressional Research Service expressing concern that little was being done in economic or political terms to provide Somalis with alternatives to the growing appeal of Islamist militancy.¹³

For three months in spring 2006, the ARPCT and ICU, each highly suspicious of the other, battled for Mogadishu. The outcome represented a total failure for the United States' policy of supporting the warlords. Despite having emerged as a political force relatively recently, the ICU displayed better motivation, leadership, and strategy than the ARPCT, and decisively won control of Mogadishu in June 2006. After seizing Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts Union consolidated power and expressed increased political ambition. The warlords were quickly ousted from Jowhar, the city to which they had relocated from Mogadishu, and by the end of June were effectively defeated as a political and military force, their forces either defecting to the ICU or fleeing across the border to Ethiopia.¹⁴ No more just an alliance of convenience between various Islamist militias and courts, the ICU sought to reunify Somalia and even extend their reach into neighboring countries. They were presented with a unique opportunity for state-building, winning the support of important domestic constituents after over a decade of anarchy. Yet



the ICU would overreach by rushing into confrontation with Ethiopia. In the second half of 2006, the ICU extended its reach from Mogadishu to the majority of the southern countryside. Further indicative of its impotence, the TFG relied only on the Ethiopian peacekeepers in Baidoa to protect itself, as it had lost its remaining political authority to the rising ICU.

Measuring Foreign Intervention Success

Both the data and qualitative evidence indicate that foreign military intervention, this thesis' dependent variable, was unsuccessful, as not only did violence increase over the course of 2006, but the central government the United States aimed to defend had been dissolved, and a hostile insurgent force had taken over. Unlike subsequent case studies, in this instance, the insurgent group in question was successful in overthrowing the central government despite the efforts of foreign interveners. The United States' policy of supporting secular warlords against Islamists had ironically resulted in the ICU seizing power and creating perhaps the strongest government Somalia had seen since 1991. And the UN's efforts to facilitate the creation of a unity government amongst the feuding clans had produced a government utterly incapable of defending itself against the expansion of the ICU, forcing the TFG further into the orbit of a foreign power, Ethiopia, whose invasion would result in further instability and death in Somalia. The dependent variable of intervention success can be operationalized by measuring the extent and lethality of the insurgency, mainly represented by the ICU. The first map included in Figure 5.1 displays the ICU's control of territory, depicted in dark green, in south-central Somalia in June 2006, when it seized control of Mogadishu. The second map displays the ICU's control of territory in December 2006, when Ethiopia invaded, and shows the rapid growth in territorial control over the course of only six months. Maps of Somali political control prior to this time are more difficult to come by.

In measuring lethality, the other operationalization, during the period of the ICU's rise to power, there was a noticeable increase in conflict-related fatalities in Somalia, as measured by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which provides conservative estimates of the number of events and fatalities related to armed conflict. As displayed in Table 5.1, there were 670 fatalities in 2004 and 309 in 2005, but the number surged to 1,174 in 2006, and to 1,620 in 2007, after their fall. When measuring the success of foreign intervention in Somalia during this period, the extent of insurgent violence visibly increased over the course of 2006.

Figure 5.1



A third indicator of the success and failure of foreign intervention during this period is the geographic spread of conflict-related violence during this period. This measure of intervention success provides an understanding of the distribution of violence in the insurgency and thus the territorial breadth of insurgent forces. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) categorizes every such event it documents based on the region of Somalia in which it occurred. Somalia is divided into 18 administrative regions, but for the purposes of this thesis, only the 11 regions in which the central government and various insurgent groups have competed for power will be considered; that is to say, the 7 regions administered by the autonomous states of Somaliland and Puntland will not be included. Looking at the presence of conflict-related events in all regions under consideration is not by itself representative of the intensity of the insurgency and the extent to which foreign intervention has succeeded against it. As we shall see in studying the period after 2011, when al-Shabaab transforms from an insurgency administering territory, including major towns, to one restricted to rural settings, an insurgency can be responsible for a large number of conflict-related events across different regions without posing a significant threat to the survival of the central government. However, the UCDP data recorded in Table 5.2 is still of interest when considered alongside aforementioned information on the territorial extent and the lethality of the insurgency.

As displayed in Table 5.2, one can observe that the number of events in each region corresponds to the trend displayed in Table 5.1, with violence declining somewhat in 2005, but sharply escalating in 2006. As we shall also see in subsequent case studies, the majority of events occurred in the region of Banaadir, which includes the capital Mogadishu. This should not be surprising, given the ARPCT's efforts to consolidate control of the capital in the years preceding 2006, and then the ICU's takeover in summer 2006. While insurgent violence was predictably concentrated on Mogadishu throughout this period, the data indicates a growing breadth to the insurgency, as 6 regions in 2004 and 5 regions in 2005 experienced at least one conflict-related event, but this number would increase to 8 for 2006. In summary, the UCDP data indicates that insurgent lethality, its threat to the capital, and its breadth all increased during this period of time.

Table 5.1: Conflict-Related Fatalities in Somalia by Year, 2004 to 2006¹⁵

Year	Conflict-Related Fatalities
2004	670
2005	309
2006	1174

Table 5.2: Conflict-Related Events in Somalia by Region, 2004 to 2006¹⁶

Region	2004	2005	2006
Banaadir	13	0	39
Galgudud	14	4	7
Hiran	2	2	3
Middle Shabelle	0	0	2
Lower Shabelle	0	0	0
Mudug	0	6	2
Bakool	0	0	0
Bay	9	7	24
Gedo	3	4	0
Middle Juba	0	0	1
Lower Juba	6	0	3

Measuring State Capacity

That both the TFG and the ARPCT utterly failed in their tasks to provide some modicum of state capacity is not particularly shocking, given the overwhelming success of the ICU by mid-2006. The experience of both the TFG, the de jure central government during this time, and the ARPCT, the de facto government, indicates that the counterinsurgent efforts of the UN and the US failed in the face of the ICU's ability to provide alternative state capacity. The evidence indicates serious failings in state capacity by both the ARPCT and the TFG, providing the ICU with an opportunity to present itself as an alternative. State capacity will be considered both holistically and along the specific dimensions outlined in Chapter 2: coercive, juridical, fiscal, and administrative. Assessing state capacity in Somalia during this period can be difficult, because unlike in subsequent case studies, the TFG, the internationally-recognized central government, was not based in Mogadishu and in fact, for some time, had no presence in Somalia at all. Thus evaluating the failure of foreign intervention to prevent insurgents from filling this vacuum in state capacity also requires an understanding of the capacity, or lack thereof, of the ARPCT. The state capacity of both governments will also be contrasted with the ICU's, to better illustrate how the ICU's popular appeal overcame the efforts of foreign intervention to defeat them. With the TFG often resembling a government-in-exile under guard of Ethiopian peacekeepers, and the ARPCT being a

coalition of warlords rather than a properly-functioning central government, evaluating data on state capacity for either of these actors is quite difficult. However, there are some credible sources that can help provide useful measurements of state capacity across different dimensions. These include indicators from NGOs such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, as well as reports from the World Bank and the Economist Intelligence Unit, which provided regular reports on the political and economic outlook in Somalia during the entirety of the timeframe covered in this thesis. Together these indicators provide a uniform picture of state capacity across all case studies. These sources will be consulted in every subsequent case study for the sake of consistency. Other sources such as international and local press will also be used.

Coercive capacity to maintain law and order during this period was extremely weak, being practically nonexistent under the TFG because of its limited remit, and applied corruptly and haphazardly by the ARPCT. This failure of coercive capacity in turn affected the other dimensions of capacity, and will therefore be particularly emphasized. Reporting on the popular sentiment in Mogadishu following the ICU's takeover is revealing. Many Somalis interviewed by the UN's IRIN News following the ARPCT's fall revealed disdain for the era of warlord rule, with businessman Ali Muhammad claiming that the warlords regularly extorted passersby at checkpoints, and that money and property were regularly vulnerable to theft, but that the ICU quickly put a stop to the rampant crime and corruption. Halimo Abdi, who lived in a highly dangerous neighborhood of Mogadishu, claimed that after the ICU took over he could walk freely at night for the first time in 16 years.¹⁷ While the optimistic testimony of such Somalis in the early days of the ICU's rule might not by itself be fully indicative of state capacity under the TFG and ARPCT, it is nonetheless to some extent indicative of popular sentiment on the ICU and its predecessors in power, and taken together with other sources can reveal something of the decrepit state of central administration during this period. Similarly, reports from the Somali press at the time of the ICU's takeover, such as an editorial from Garowe Online, are indicative of the unpopularity of the ARPCT and the counterproductivity of the US' decision to ally with them. The editorial celebrates the ICU's restoration of law and order, and accused the ARPCT of having deceived the US about its counterterrorism efforts out of a desire for financial and military support. The editorial claims that central to the ICU's emergence was the security vacuum that the warlords presided over, with the ICU's leader, Sheikh Ahmed, allegedly having decided to take up arms after his child was kidnapped.¹⁸

Turning to external sources, in their February 2006 report, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) highlighted the deleterious effects of piracy and roadblocks on economic conditions in Somalia under

the TFG and ARPCT, and noted that the lack of security prevented the disbursement of aid and the development of infrastructure by contractors in most parts of the country.¹⁹ In contrast, in their November 2006 report, the EIU attests to the stability the ICU provided to areas under its control, which brought about the reduction of basic food prices and the reopening of Mogadishu's port to aid and commerce. In their words, the "effective maintenance of law and order" associated with ICU rule "brought economic dividends" to Somalis, in large part due to the end of the extortionary roadblocks and checkpoints that had strangled economic activity in Mogadishu.²⁰ Whereas the ARPCT did not have any effective police force in place to guarantee security, the ICU improved security by reactivating police stations and banning the open carry of firearms.²¹ An economic memorandum issued by the World Bank on January 11th, 2006, contrasts the "relative peace and security" of the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland with the prevalence of violence in south-central Somalia.²² The ARPCT did not have any effective police force in place to guarantee security. The Quality of Government (QoG) indicator for the rule of law was a dismal 6.9 out of 100 in 2004 and 2005, but improved slightly to 7.3 in 2006; it's not clear to what extent this improvement coincided with the ICU's reign.²³ The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), all of which comprise a range of -2.5 (the lowest score) and 2.5 (the highest score) assessed rule of law in Somalia as -2.17 in 2005, the lowest of any country in the world.²⁴

Administrative capacity during this period is more difficult to measure, because the ARPCT did not develop formal political institutions, still ruling Mogadishu primarily as warlords, and the TFG's political authority was extremely weak. This in itself is indicative of a serious lack of administrative and fiscal capacity. The EIU noted the continuing difficulties the TFG had in establishing any administrative presence in Mogadishu, as the warlord Muse Yalahow disregarded the TFG in selecting the new members for Banaadir region's governing council.²⁵ The aforementioned World Bank memorandum also makes note of the lack of stable political institutions under the ARPCT compared to in Puntland and Somaliland.²⁶ After relocating from Kenya to the Somalian town of Baidoa, the TFG demonstrated "virtually no capacity to govern" the towns surrounding Baidoa.²⁷ Menkhaus argues that the Transitional Federal Government was crippled from its inception in 2004 by its limited base, being a narrow coalition of bureaucrats with little connection to the real powerbrokers in Somalia, where a government of national unity was necessary.²⁸ The ARPCT had little control or knowledge of who was entering Mogadishu, or even Somalia itself, due to the absence of immigration enforcement.²⁹ The QoG also measured bureaucratic corruption as a mounting problem, growing from an indicator of 69.9 out of 100 in 2002 to 71.1 in 2006.³⁰ The Worldwide Governance Indicators ranked Somalia at or near the bottom of their rankings (again, in a range from a low of -2.5 to a high of 2.5) for all countries during this period

on indicators of administrative capacity such as regulatory quality (at -2.15 in 2005), and government effectiveness (-2.13 in 2005).³¹

Fiscal capacity is also difficult to measure due to the lack of functioning political institutions. Socioeconomic standards can be regarded as a proxy measurement for the extent or absence of government spending on health, education, and poverty. Documents from the World Bank provide additional insight on state capacity in Somalia, and will be referred to in subsequent case studies as well. The aforementioned World Bank document estimated that absent internal conflict, income per capita would have been a third higher. Educational and health outcomes were described as low even by African standards. The World Bank did praise the resilience of the private sector in the absence of government institutions, but noted that the security situation disrupted sectors like the industrial sector, and described “the very limited provision of key public goods” as harming both common Somalis and the business elite. Examples provided included the “crumbling road networks” and the provision of “pure public goods” like education and health.³² Somalis could not rely on the TFG for social welfare either. The US State Department announced in 2005 that it could not provide donor assistance directly to the TFG because it had yet to establish a functioning government in Somalia, and that the country’s outstanding debt of \$600mil restricted the provision of aid under US statute.³³ In contrast to the poor business climate under the ARPCT, the ICU cultivated a close relationship with business interests in southern Somalia for years prior to its takeover. Its constituent courts provided a then-unfamiliar degree of governance and security. Commerce thus functioned more smoothly after the ICU seized power, with the airport and port reopening in Mogadishu after years of disruption.³⁴

Juridical capacity was sorely lacking in Somalia during this period, which had serious implications, and reinforced the tendency of Somalis to turn to traditional institutions like clan elders for the adjudication of disputes in the absence of state juridical capacity. The World Bank memorandum highlighted problems of juridical capacity, as general insecurity and the lack of formal institutions with qualified judges led Somalis to rely on traditional clan authorities for dispute resolution.³⁵ The EIU’s November 2006 report also contrasted the ICU with the ARPCT, claiming the former had developed a “reputation for fairness” in the establishment of Islamic courts.³⁶ Islamic courts constituted the core of the ICU, through which basic judicial services were provided to localities. Having emerged on the local level in the 1990s, these courts served to arbitrate internal disputes, provide public services including education, and approve commercial transactions.³⁷

Some sources provide a more general picture of state capacity in Somalia during this period. The BTI (Bertelsmann Transformation Index) provided by Bertelsmann Stiftung, a German non-profit which

monitors development in Third World countries, offers further indication that state capacity was abysmal prior to the ICU's takeover. The BTI report issued in 2006, covering the period from 2003 to 2005, gave Somalia a status index, aggregating multiple different indicators on state capacity, of 1.36 of 10, the very lowest of the countries assessed. For some reference, war-torn Iraq was rated 2.79, more than twice as high. For the next period, covering 2005 to 2007, this measurement remained at 1.36. However, the values of some of the constituent indicators changed. While Somalia's democratic status declined from 1.58 to 1.43, the extent of private property increased from 1.5 to 2.5.³⁸ This probably reflected both the increased authoritarianism and the security of property under the ICU, although the brevity of their reign (a short six months) makes it difficult to draw firm measurements of the ICU's state capacity from these kinds of indicators.

The ICU's positive impact on state capacity during its brief rule after expelling the ARPCT from Mogadishu should be reemphasized. In the words of Menkhaus, the ICU "appeared to be the springboard" for "state revival and public order" in Somalia, developing a broad base of constituents by relying less on clan support alone, and providing effective administration from Mogadishu.³⁹ Under the ICU, Somalia arguably experienced more law and order than at any time since 1991, as the Courts successfully cracked down on the gangs and militias that had disrupted Mogadishu for so long. The ICU to some extent replaced the clan divisions that had undermined prior governments with a broader appeal to nationalism and Islamism. While much of this growth in state capacity was accomplished through authoritarian rather than democratic means, it was real growth nonetheless. It can be little surprise, then, that the ICU developed much greater popular support than the ARPCT, and also that its ensuing destruction by Ethiopia would be met with overwhelming resistance from Somalis, particularly when the TFG proved incapable of restoring state capacity.

The above evidence, both qualitative and data-based, suggest that state capacity, whether measured by corruption, the security of private property, or administrative effectiveness, was sorely lacking during the years of intervention studied above. Although the causal connection between this deficit in state capacity and the failure of US and UN intervention will be analyzed in more detail in the conclusion, there can be little doubt that the efforts of the United States to support the ARPCT and the UN to build up the legitimacy of the internationally-recognized TFG were both undermined by the failures of these governments to provide basic needs for the Somali population and to satisfy important interest groups who instead threw their support behind the ICU.

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Chapter 6: The Ethiopian Intervention, Dec. 2006 to Jan. 2009

Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia in December 2006 significantly changed the course of the Somali Civil War. The operation quickly defeated the Islamic Courts Union, a militant force that had come close to unifying Somalia for the first time since 1991 but under the rule of devoted Islamists. However, Ethiopian forces soon found themselves trapped in a quagmire against the hardline insurgents of al-Shabaab. The United States and its allies supported Ethiopia out of concern for al-Qaeda connections among the ICU, and the United Nations soon after authorized an African Union peacekeeping force, AMISOM, to support the fledgling Transitional Federal Government. Yet in the years following December 2006, al-Shabaab's grip over much of Somalia steadily increased. Ethiopia had intervened in large part out of concern that a Somalia ruled by Islamists, with their revanchist designs on ethnic Somali regions in Ethiopia, would be a serious security threat. However, Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia in early 2009 with the TFG on the brink of collapse in the face of an insurgency more radical than the ICU. Why did Ethiopia, one of the regional military powers of eastern Africa, fail to overcome al-Shabaab's improvised militias? And why did the TFG, provided the ideal opportunity to secure the loyalty of Somalis in the wake of Ethiopia's initial military gains, become so unpopular? Why Ethiopia's intervention was unsuccessful is one of the more important questions of the Somali Civil War and is closely connected to the changes that occurred in Somalia's central government during this time. Ethiopia experienced a lesson in counterinsurgency that has bedeviled many powerful countries in recent decades: that intervening militarily in the absence of meaningful state capacity in the host country can be a recipe for failure. Furthermore, the international community's hopes for an end to internal conflict in Somalia after Ethiopia's invasion were quickly dashed. The failures of the TFG and the ensuing insurgency produced some of the most violent years for Somalia since the early 1990s.

Ethiopia's intervention against Islamist forces in Somalia, while initially an apparent military triumph, resulted in dismal failure by the time of its withdrawal in early 2009. Operationalizing the dependent variable of foreign intervention success as the lethality and extent of the insurgency, the intervention failed on both counts, as the insurgency grew more violent than in the preceding period, and insurgents controlled most of south-central Somalia by the time Ethiopia withdrew its forces. The only positive mark of the Ethiopian intervention was that, unlike in the case of the United States and the ARPCT, the central government the intervener was protecting was not overthrown during the course of the intervention, even though, by January 2009, the TFG was clinging to power extremely tenuously, and had to rely on coopting moderates in the insurgency and on the intervention of another force, AMISOM,

to survive in the following period. The failure of Ethiopia's intervention coincided with a record of serious failure on the part of the newly-empowered TFG to establish and demonstrate state capacity, both in general and along the four dimensions described in Chapter 2: coercive, administrative, fiscal, and juridical. By most measurements, the independent variable of state capacity stagnated or declined during the period of Ethiopia's intervention, and Somalia's socioeconomic and political status was close to the worst it had ever been by January 2009. As this chapter and Chapter 9 will demonstrate, there is good reason to believe that these deficits in state capacity were largely responsible for the failure of the intervention.

Background/Course of Events

By the end of 2006, divisions within the ICU escalated between the relatively moderate wing under Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and the hardliners under Hassan Dahir Aweys, as the latter accumulated more influence in the movement. In December 2006, Ethiopia prepared for war with the ICU, with the tacit approval of the United States, which issued its strongest condemnation of the ICU's hardliners yet and helped lift the arms embargo on the Horn of Africa through the UN Security Council.¹ For their part, hardliners in the ICU seemed intent on provoking Ethiopia, calling for a cross-border jihad and accepting arms from Eritrea, Ethiopia's nemesis.² This provocative stance may have been mainly intended for domestic consumption, as the ICU had further success in building up its legitimacy by exploiting the apparent threat posed by Ethiopia. The antagonism was also motivated by the widespread perception that the TFG, then based only in the town of Baidoa, was a puppet of Ethiopia. Indeed, Ethiopia held significant sway over the TFG, and its parliament had elected Abdullahi Yusuf, a close ally of Ethiopia, as its President. On December 24th, the tensions between Ethiopia's forces located around Baidoa and the ICU escalated into all-out warfare. Ethiopia launched a broad offensive that routed the ICU, driving them back to Mogadishu. There, by the end of 2006, the ICU government disintegrated into clan-based militias, many of which fled to the Kenyan border to resume their resistance from the bush.³ Ethiopian tanks rolled into Mogadishu triumphantly, but it wasn't long before a new insurgency emerged.

Ethiopia hoped to withdraw from Somalia swiftly, lest its forces get bogged down in a quagmire, but the TFG was desperately reliant on Ethiopian protection as clan-based militia violence returned to Mogadishu in the first half of 2007. The international community sought a means to provide the TFG with security through less controversial means than an Ethiopian occupation, and the UN thus endorsed the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping force authorized by the African Union.

Yet for the time being, AMISOM was ineffective, bolstering only 1,800 Ugandan soldiers.⁴ It would only become a significant intervention force in its own right after Ethiopia's withdrawal, which will be explored in the next chapter. The Western powers were reluctant to involve themselves, after the debacles of the 1990s. The security situation became inexorably intertwined with the issue of political reconciliation, as Mogadishu's powerbrokers refused to support a compromise with the TFG so long as it remained pro-Ethiopian and anti-Islamist.

By spring 2007, this insurgency had significantly destabilized Mogadishu, and much of the rest of Somalia. At this point, the remnants of the ICU's militias, often referred to as al-Shabaab, had not yet coalesced into the distinct organization that that name would later represent, and most of the insurgents comprised clan-based militias. However, radical Islam remained an increasingly salient force among Somali militants, as the ICU's Salafi "grassroots network of mosques, schools, and private enterprises" survived the Ethiopian invasion largely intact and had significant support from the private sector.⁵ In late April, an Ethiopian offensive was successful in pacifying many of Mogadishu's restive neighborhoods, but this would not last. Within a year and a half, Ethiopia was preparing to withdraw with its intervention widely regarded as a debacle, and the TFG on the brink of falling to an ever-more powerful, and unified, al-Shabaab.

By the end of 2008, two years after Ethiopia's forces had first invaded, insurgents had taken control of most of Somalia again, and violence was at highs unseen since the 1990s. It was little surprise that Ethiopia announced its withdrawal in December 2008 amidst mounting losses for its own troops, highly frustrated by President Yusuf's leadership of the TFG and its general failures in governance. Ethiopia also recognized it had become a lightning-rod of opposition for the insurgency, and came to believe its presence was doing more harm than good.⁶ While Ethiopia's withdrawal at the beginning of 2009 seemed to give al-Shabaab an opportunity to seize Mogadishu, this crisis would also indirectly spur some degree of political reconciliation for the TFG. The ensuing period for the Somali Civil War will be discussed in further depth in the next chapter.

Measuring Foreign Intervention Success


The success of foreign intervention during this period, being the dependent variable of this thesis, can be measured as a failure. Ethiopia had intervened to overcome a security threat to itself and its ally, the TFG, posed by the radical Islamists in the ICU. However, by the time Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia, many international analysts concluded the intervention had been a failure, significantly

destabilizing Somalia and producing a more militant Islamist insurgency than before.⁷ Within a year of Ethiopia's invasion, political violence had increased rather than decreased, and the territorial control of the insurgents was growing rapidly. By the end of 2008, Islamist forces controlled almost as much territory as they did prior to Ethiopia's invasion, with Baidoa and parts of Mogadishu being the only urban areas under the TFG's control.⁸ Ethiopia's intervention thus meets the definition of failure outlined earlier in this thesis, as both the lethality and territorial extent of the insurgency, the two operationalizations of this dependent variable, had grown during the Ethiopian occupation.

By late 2008, two years after the invasion, the insurgents had a presence nearly everywhere in south-central Somalia, with al-Shabaab in control of nearly all towns outside of Mogadishu and Baidoa. This deteriorating situation is evident in the maps in Figure 6.1. Conflict-related deaths escalated in the two years following Ethiopia's invasion. Table 6.1 displays the yearly death tolls from conflict-related events recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. While the UCDP provides conservative estimates of fatalities when compared to some figures reported in the press, they are consistent and reliable, given the UCDP's reputation for compiling thorough data on conflict-related events. Their data indicates a noticeable upsurge in violence after Ethiopia's invasion, with 1,620 fatalities in 2007 and 1,751 in 2008, compared to 1,174 in 2006.

Other sources also indicate an increase in conflict-related violence during this period. Violence was reported to have escalated sharply in Mogadishu in spring 2007, with over 1,000 civilian casualties reportedly occurring in the first few months of combat.⁹ In Somalia in general, the Elman Peace and Human Rights Center, a Mogadishu-based monitor, recorded 8,636 civilian deaths in 2007 and 7,574 civilian deaths in 2008 prior to December 10th, tolls estimated to be significantly higher than in previous years.¹⁰ Specific data on 2006 deaths for comparison is harder to come by, but the US Justice Department estimated that around 300 were killed in and around Mogadishu immediately prior to the Ethiopian invasion.¹¹ Most reporting of the conflict observed a clear increase in violence between 2006 and 2007, despite the intensity of the ICU's conflict with the ARPCT. Furthermore, the Worldwide Governance Indicator for political stability and violence displays a noticeable deterioration between 2006 and 2008, from -2.75 to -3.31.¹² It's worth observing, from the casualty figures, that the failure of Ethiopia's intervention was not for lack of military strength. During the initial phase of the invasion, as many as 8,000 members of the ICU were killed, compared to Ethiopian losses of 225.¹³

Figure 6.1¹⁴



Political geography of Somalia during the Ethiopian occupation

Table 6.1: Amount of Conflict-Related Fatalities in Somalia by Year, 2006 to 2009¹⁵

Year	Conflict-Related Fatalities
2006	1174
2007	1620
2008	1751
2009	2204

Table 6.2: Conflict-Related Events in Somalia by Region, 2006 to 2009¹⁶

Region	2006	2007	2008	2009
Banaadir	39	240	180	159
Galgudud	7	1	12	19
Hiran	3	9	16	20
Middle Shabelle	2	0	8	4
Lower Shabelle	0	8	19	9
Mudug	2	0	1	3
Bakool	0	0	3	8
Bay	24	10	36	10
Gedo	0	1	6	9
Middle Juba	1	3	0	0
Lower Juba	3	17	6	14

As explained in the previous case study, Table 5.2 displays the number of conflict-related events in each relevant region of south-central Somalia from 2004 to 2014. This helps measure both the lethality and the extent of the insurgency, as breaking down conflict-related events by region displays the distribution of insurgent violence. The table indicates an observable increase in the number of events during this period, particularly in Banaadir, the region comprised of the Mogadishu area, increasing from 39 events in 2006 to an extraordinary 240 in 2007 due to that spring's battle of Mogadishu, and then declining to a still-high 180 events in 2008. Although violence seemed to peak in Mogadishu in 2007, it increased in other regions from 2007 to 2008, consistent with the reporting that al-Shabaab increased its territorial control during this period. While in 2006 and 2007, 8 regions had at least one reported conflict-related event, this number increased to 10, excluding just Middle Juba, in 2008 and 2009. In summary, in the two years of its intervention in Somalia, Ethiopia failed to prevent

the vanquished Islamic Courts Union from reemerging as a violent insurgency that controlled much of the country and threatened the fledgling TFG. Much as, to draw a broad comparison, the American intervention in Iraq ran aground in the occupation phase, the initial military conflict with the ICU was not the difficult part for Ethiopia. Instead, they failed to contain and preempt the insurgency that their occupation predictably triggered, and were forced to withdraw with their main objectives not met.

Measuring State Capacity

While many factors doubtlessly contributed to the rise of al-Shabaab and Ethiopia's ignominious retreat, a careful examination of this phase of the conflict reveals that the problems in state capacity, either stagnating or deteriorating from an already dismal status, were significant and that this was arguably the driving factor determining the persistence of conflict in Somalia. With the fall of the ICU, the TFG had had a unique opportunity to assume power as Somalia's sovereign government, but faced extraordinary challenges in developing its near-nonexistent capacity. Ethiopia's failure to account for this was part of what Somalia expert Kenneth Menkhaus described as a series of tragic mistakes that "produced unintended outcomes" at serious "cost in human lives".¹⁷ The dismantling of the ICU and its replacement by the TFG was always going to lead to a chaotic transition. But most indicators of state capacity in 2007 and 2008 reveal that the TFG was never successful in rebuilding the capacity that Somalis had gotten a taste of under the ICU's brief reign. This provided an opportunity for al-Shabaab to develop its own competing state capacity that helped sustain its insurgency, and thus their capacity will also be considered in measuring the TFG's. To measure the development in state capacity, or lack thereof, during this period, the same sources utilized in the previous chapter will be consulted, including the BTI indicators, the World Bank, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, in addition to other sources, such as contemporary press reports.

The TFG's coercive capacity was very weak, as many of the hallmarks of warlord rule, including extortion and banditry, returned to Mogadishu soon after the fall of the ICU. Over the course of this period, the TFG did little to improve this critically important dimension of its state capacity, and struggled to even control parts of its own capital. Piracy escalated precipitously during this period, in part because of the increasingly dire humanitarian and economic situation, and in part because the TFG lacked any naval capacity. In the words of Admiral Farah Omaar, the Somali Navy was "practically nothing" in 2009, at a time when piracy was spiking and attracting global attention.¹⁸ The TFG's failure to institutionalize its coercive capacity was especially stark. As a "military actor," the TFG was "weak and

fragmented,” in the words of Somalia expert Michael Woldemariam.¹⁹ It relied almost entirely on unpopular Ethiopian occupation forces, with what few domestic militias under its name being corrupt and clan-based. The aforementioned BTI in its 2010 report (covering the period from 2007 to 2009) observed that the Somali police force was underfunded and ill-trained, with high desertion rates and no command and control structure. In fact, in 2008-09, about 40% of the UN-trained Somali police force defected due to lack of pay from the central government.²⁰

In its February 2007 report, immediately following the Ethiopian invasion, the Economist Intelligence Unit expressed skepticism that the newly-empowered TFG would successfully maintain law and order when it had failed to establish ministries or a singular security force. This report explicitly drew a connection between the restoration of the relative stability provided by the ICU and the prospects for political and economic recovery in Somalia, observing that “peace and stability” of the sort the ICU provided was “essential,” and that Ethiopia’s military victory was “the easy part” compared to the task of ensuring the legitimacy of the TFG when most Somalis perceived it to be an Ethiopian vassal.²¹ In August 2007, the EIU reported that the TFG and its Ethiopian allies had made little progress in providing security to the capital and disarming the militias that were wreaking havoc. The increased insecurity had caused the Somali shilling (Somalia’s national currency) to depreciate by 25%, and closed the Bakara market, significantly reducing economic activity in Mogadishu. This was indicative of how the TFG’s coercive incapacity was affecting the broader economic situation. Various measures taken by the TFG, such as a nighttime curfew and the offer of amnesty to some insurgents, failed to reduce violence, and the EIU reiterated that providing law and order would be crucial to the success of the TFG and the Ethiopian intervention.²²

In its February 2008 report, the EIU expressed continued doubt that the TFG and the Ethiopians alone could overcome the insurgency, and advised the TFG to engage elements of the insurgency, which is precisely what would happen later in the year.²³ Also commenting on the issue of coercive capacity, in an Interim Strategy Note issued in June 2007, the World Bank described the security environment as unstable, and assessed core state capacity as “very low”.²⁴ Indicators by NGOs assessed the TFG’s ability to impose law and order as very weak. The Worldwide Governance Indicator (which measures its indicators in a rough range of -2.5 to 2.5, although extreme cases can diverge from that range, as in this instance) for the rule of law declined from -2.34 in 2006 to -2.61 in 2008.²⁵ Displaying a similar trend, the Quality of Government indicator for rule of law also shows a decline, from 7.3 out of 100 in 2006 to 6.9 in 2009.²⁶

In addition to its coercive capacity, the TFG proved woefully incapable in developing adequate administrative capacity. It lacked any functioning civil service, with most ministries vacant, and influxes of foreign aid ineffective in the short term.²⁷ The Worldwide Governance Indicators showed further decline in many measures of administrative capacity. Regulatory quality decreased from -2.55 to -2.65 between 2006 and 2008, while government effectiveness declined from -2.19 in 2006 to -2.40 in 2008 and control over corruption deteriorated from -1.73 to -1.87 in the same period, all ranking among the lowest in the world.²⁸ BTI reported that, in contrast to the government of the de facto independent Somaliland region, which was largely immune to the Islamist insurgency, the TFG during this period failed in rebuilding local administrative capacity, ceding ground to Islamist forces. By 2009, most of the TFG's ministries barely functioned, if at all, with little recruitment of staff below the ministerial level.²⁹

In its November 2008 report, the EIU observed that the TFG was "losing what little authority it had" left in most of the country, as insurgents brought "Islamist administration" to towns like Kismayo and Jowhar, where the EIU argued insurgent rule was preferred to the central government because of the relative stability it provided.³⁰ The EIU's analysis is indicative not only of the abysmal failure of the TFG and its allies to secure the loyalty of Somalis in the immediate aftermath of the Ethiopian invasion, but of the specific ways in which this failure of capacity drove parts of the population to sympathize with the insurgents. In the aforementioned Interim Strategy Note, the World Bank observed that, despite the military victory against the ICU, the "absence of core public services" had made the TFG unpopular with significant portions of the population and had made little progress in developing a unitary state. The document drew attention to the absence of a civil service, political infighting, and rent-seeking.³¹

Indirect measurements of the TFG's fiscal capacity, which are necessary to examine given the paucity of direct budgetary information from this period, indicate a failure of the TFG to spend money constructively in addressing the country's dire socioeconomic needs. The TFG failed to fund or even institute a proper welfare system, with clans and extended families instead assuming the role of providing social services to the many impoverished. Foreign humanitarian aid, from sources such as the United Nations, was plentiful, but often ineffective because of the security situation. Militias attacked aid groups, and the rise in piracy prevented some aid from even reaching Somali ports.³² This in turn illustrates how the government's coercive capacity (or lack thereof) affected other dimensions of state capacity. The EIU described a worsening in socioeconomic conditions in its February 2008 report, with the currency continuing to depreciate, and more and more Somalis requiring humanitarian assistance that the government was unable to provide. Food prices, which had gone down under the ICU, reached "record high levels" in many parts of the country.³³

Although there are few sources directly assessing the ability of the TFG to tax and spend, the World Bank provides some insight into the TFG's fiscal state. It assesses there was no budget framework in place, and that expenditures were determined on an ad-hoc basis, through ministries that lacked clear mandates and had little institutional capacity.³⁴ Furthermore, the BTI report described the TFG's collection of revenue as close to nonexistent, lacking the fiscal capacity to tax its subjects, as well as the coercive capacity to enforce its threadbare taxation system, and instead relying on foreign donations that were often embezzled.³⁵ Most assessments of Somalia's infrastructure, one of its most important spending priorities, were negative. Although the Quality of Government indicator for infrastructure runs somewhat contrary to this trend, measured at 4.6 out of 100 in 2005 and increasing slightly to 6.3 in 2009, this is still quite low by international standards.³⁶ The BTI indicates debilitating socioeconomic stagnation during this period, with the quality of Somalia's welfare system remaining at 1.0, its economic performance at 1.0, and its sustainability also at 1.0, all on a 0-10 scale.³⁷

While there is limited information on the TFG's juridical capacity during this period, there is evidence to indicate it was sorely lacking. Its limited, top-down nature suffered direct competition from the bottom-up Islamic judiciary developed by al-Shabaab. The BTI report described the sharia courts from which the ICU emerged as the primary source of juridical capacity in Somalia, often being the only source of civil and penal law enforcement in the absence of a proper judicial system under the TFG.³⁸

Many contemporary reports characterized Somalia's state capacity from 2006-09 as generally dismal. Most sources reported socioeconomic and political conditions in Somalia as having deteriorated in the years following the Ethiopian invasion. Crisis Group claimed that in 2007 Somalia's state capacity was reduced to what it had been at the time of the TFG's formation in 2004, reversing the short-term gains of the ICU.³⁹ The relevance of state capacity in Ethiopia's ensuing counterinsurgency efforts was emphasized by Crisis Group, which was among many analysts to observe that the defeat of the Islamists was largely dependent on whether the TFG could "restore stability" and secure the support of the population.⁴⁰ In a subsequent report in 2008, Crisis Group characterized the TFG as "non-functional," having completely failed to develop state capacity and reconcile with other clans and interest groups in Somalia.⁴¹ The Enough Project, an NGO, observed in 2009 that the TFG's failure to develop basic checks and balances and an adherence to the rule of law undermined international efforts at capacity-building during the Ethiopian occupation, resulting in weak institutions and limited support for the government.⁴²

Other indicators also provide empirical support to a view that state capacity experienced significant decline during the period of Ethiopia's intervention. Many of the BTI indicators for state

capacity indicate general regression or stagnation in Somalia's state capacity during this period of time. The BTI report for 2008, which measures progress from 2005 to 2007, gives Somalia an overall score (combining all measurements of political and economic progress) of 1.36 out of 10, while the report for 2010, measuring progress from 2007 to 2009, gives a score of 1.34, showing a slight decline. On more specific indices, between the two reports the BTI shows stagnation on measurements of rule of law (at 1.0) and 'stateness' (state cohesion, at 1.8), and a decline in political participation (1.8 to 1.3) and the security of private property (2.5 to 2.0).⁴³ The BTI also issued a general criticism of the TFG's failure to expand capacity, describing it as "plagued by internal power struggles" and implicated in serious corruption. The BTI observed how Somalia's economy remained privatized and localized after years of anarchy, with entrepreneurs relying on militia protection to operate in an unstable environment.⁴⁴ The reliance of the business community on militias like al-Shabaab in the face of the TFG's feebleness thus remained one of the greatest challenges in confronting the insurgency. Additionally, the World Bank alleged that the TFG suffered from "low credibility and popularity among the population". It concluded that support for the TFG from the Somali population would depend on "progress toward the rule of law and provision of social services," which would not be forthcoming in the months and years following the publication of this report.⁴⁵ The World Bank's observations indicate that the TFG squandered a period of opportunity following the fall of the ICU to secure the loyalty of the population, and that the failures in state capacity contributed to the increasingly violent insurgency during this period.

Having established the TFG's failures in state capacity, it's important to contrast these weaknesses with the ability of al-Shabaab to provide an alternative state capacity to elements of the population dissatisfied with the failures of the TFG. This in itself demonstrates that it was possible to build state capacity in Somalia during this time. Moreover, Al-Shabaab's cultivation of popular support in this manner illustrates a vital part of the hypothesized mechanism outlined in Chapter 2 by which state capacity failure from the central government resulted in foreign intervention failure. It was primarily through earning the loyalty of important interest groups in Somalia that al-Shabaab was able to sustain an extensive insurgency against a militarily superior intervention force. It is also worth emphasizing that the state capacity displayed by insurgent forces in these case studies is not a competing, separate variable to the independent variable of central government state capacity. Rather, insurgent state capacity is in itself a reflection and indication of the weakened state capacity of the central government, as the insurgency would not have been able to develop state capacity if the central government had the capacity sufficient to control its own country and provide for its citizens. Insurgent state capacity

necessarily resulted from weakened government capacity, and is one of the mechanisms by which the failure of foreign intervention is determined.

The differences in capacity between the central government and al-Shabaab were manifold. In one aspect, the TFG was still clan-based, dominated by the Darod clan, while al-Shabaab, much as the ICU before them, sought to transcend clan. Its constituent units hailed from many of Somalia's different regions, and its Salafist ideology successfully overcame the suspicions and tensions that historically existed between the clans.⁴⁶ The TFG's authoritarian, top-down approach to establishing government, without consulting local authorities, engendered a backlash among many Somalis.⁴⁷ Al-Shabaab secured the loyalty of the peoples it ruled through effective, organized administration. It created wilayahs, or regional administrations, featuring departments for various forms of governance, including internal security and religious affairs, and these were supported by local shura councils that represented their corresponding constituents.⁴⁸ Al-Shabaab emphasized public outreach when entering communities, negotiating with clan elders and offering social services to the downtrodden.

The implementation by al-Shabaab and other Islamist forces of sharia law, while often harsh and coercive, provided at least some kind of social and judicial cohesion to satisfy the demands of conservative constituents, whereas the TFG was insufficient in its lack of functional administrative and juridical institutions.⁴⁹ Al-Shabaab's harsh coercive capacity also gained the support of those imperiled by the spike in criminality and banditry that followed the Ethiopian invasion, as al-Shabaab made the punishment of criminals an important part of its platform. Insurgents were also successful in drawing attention to the damage to property and markets from Ethiopian and TFG offensives, such as the brutal fighting in Mogadishu in spring 2007.⁵⁰ Somali business elites found good reason to support al-Shabaab as opposed to the TFG, which failed to provide coherent regulation, protect property, and facilitate international trade. In addition to providing security and consistent laws, Islamic organizations such as al-Shabaab offered unique business contacts with the Arab world, opening up trade opportunities for some Somali businesses.⁵¹

While the period of Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia will be discussed in broader comparison to the other case studies in the final chapter, some observations are worth emphasizing here. Ethiopia's intervention, which involved one of the strongest military forces in Africa, was doomed by the failure of its partner, the TFG, to provide sufficient state capacity to satisfy parts of the population that would become sympathetic with the insurgents. The Islamic Courts Union had seized power in Somalia, developing into a genuine security threat to Ethiopia, largely because they satisfied the needs and interests of large sectors of the population that had tired of the chaos and insecurity of the warlord era.

When Ethiopia invaded Somalia, the loosely-organized, poorly-trained ICU was no match for Ethiopia militarily, and the ICU government disintegrated rapidly. However, Ethiopia's attempts to leave Somalia more peaceful and less dangerously Islamist than when it had invaded quickly ran aground when faced with a fierce Islamist insurgency under al-Shabaab. While Ethiopia was successful in winning most military engagements, such as the battle of Mogadishu in spring 2007, it was unable to restore order to Somalia and withdrew ignominiously in early 2009. While many factors can be observed in this failure, none loom larger than the failure of Ethiopia and the TFG to replace the ICU with a government of sufficient state capacity. Over the course of Ethiopia's occupation, the TFG failed to develop any kind of capacity, administrative, fiscal, coercive, or juridical, to satisfy the former ICU's constituents. As a result, no amount of force that Ethiopia could bring to bear would deny insurgents like al-Shabaab succor among interest groups that were sympathetic to them, especially influential business elites and clan elders.

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Chapter 7: AMISOM's Intervention in Somalia, Jan. 2009 to Aug. 2011

During the period being reviewed (January 2009 to August 2011), Somalia remained a highly violent and chaotic country, despite the best efforts of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and the TFG's other foreign allies. AMISOM, which had been authorized back in 2007 but was not fully deployed until after Ethiopia's withdrawal, intervened to protect the newly-constituted TFG from being overthrown by al-Shabaab. While AMISOM was technically successful in this regard, deflecting al-Shabaab's major offensive in Mogadishu in summer 2011, its intervention cannot be considered an actual success as defined by this thesis. AMISOM's forces were not successful in greatly reducing the amount of insurgent violence or the extent of insurgent territorial control, the two operationalizations of foreign intervention success. While their eventual success in Mogadishu make this intervention somewhat more successful than the two previous interventions studied here, the difficulties AMISOM experienced in providing stability to the rest of the country was indicative of remaining problems in the central government. The insurgency arguably reached its height during this period, predominantly because of the persisting failure of the TFG to secure the loyalty of important parts of the population through the demonstration of state capacity. Despite this, al-Shabaab also displayed signs of overreach and radicalization that would end up alienating these interest groups too. Integrating the moderate elements of the insurgency into the TFG may have enhanced the legitimacy of the central government in some respects, and by the end of 2011, the TFG was starting to make small steps in developing its capacity. But as this chapter will display, the problems in capacity were still very severe, and undermined AMISOM's efforts for much of the intervention.

Somalia experienced significant political change in the winter of 2008-09 that would profoundly influence the next several years of its civil war. By the beginning of 2009, the security situation in Somalia was increasingly desperate. Al-Shabaab was in control of the majority of southern and central Somalia, and the TFG was under severe pressure in Mogadishu. Furthermore, Ethiopia was at the end of its rope, concluding its intervention was causing more harm than good and thus arranging for its imminent withdrawal. However, this triggered growing international concern that the TFG would be overthrown in the absence of Ethiopian protection. After Ethiopia withdrew its troops in January 2009, only the African Union-run AMISOM force remained to protect Mogadishu from an impending al-Shabaab offensive. To survive, the TFG was forced into serious compromise with the moderate Islamists in the insurgency. Peace talks in Djibouti in 2008 brought about a power-sharing deal with the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) forces loyal to Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, who became the new

President after the Ethiopians withdrew. This ARS-dominated TFG was in many respects a different government from its predecessor, with its members selected not by the UN but instead comprising many former insurgent leaders. This new TFG had an opportunity to diminish the strength of the insurgency. President Ahmed was confronted with the unenviable task of defeating his former comrades in al-Shabaab and building a central government that at that point was still close to nonexistent. In the following two years, the TFG clung desperately to life in Mogadishu as al-Shabaab's insurgency reached its greatest strength. While AMISOM was arguably successful in defending the TFG from destruction, by 2011, the position of the TFG in Somalia still seemed on the verge of collapse. The cooption of a significant portion of the insurgency through the arrangement with Ahmed still did not provide the TFG with the state capacity to meaningfully undermine al-Shabaab, nor did it allow AMISOM to be truly successful in its mandate to stabilize Somalia.

Background/Course of Events

During the years 2009-2011, the international community provided significant support, both military and economic, to the TFG to prevent a violent takeover of Somalia by the radicals of al-Shabaab. Despite this support, the TFG failed to retain any territorial gains that were made against the insurgency, and by 2010 had virtually lost control of its own country. However, United Nations negotiations had offered some hope for political reconciliation in 2008. After the Ethiopian invasion, many of the ICU's most prominent political leaders, including Sheikh Ahmed, had relocated to Asmara in Eritrea. Owing to long-standing animosity with Ethiopia, Eritrea offered support for the anti-TFG Islamist opposition, and, according to the United States' Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, supplied weapons to elements of al-Shabaab, which resulted in UN sanctions being imposed on Eritrea.¹ In September 2007, these anti-TFG political leaders formed the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), a party in defiant opposition to the internationally-recognized government.² However, the hardliners in al-Shabaab had little involvement in this party. The ARS would nonetheless reach an important compromise with the TFG.

In 2008, the United Nations dispatched a special envoy to Djibouti to broker talks between elements of the ARS and the TFG in the hopes of reaching a partial ceasefire. On June 9th, these talks culminated in a power-sharing agreement intended to end active fighting between insurgents and the TFG, and calling for the deployment of more peacekeepers into Somalia.³ While the agreement offered a potential opportunity, it also increased pressure on an Ethiopian withdrawal, as one of the ARS'

conditions was a timetable for the Ethiopians to depart the country. Perhaps more significantly, the agreement was highly controversial within the ARS, and resulted in a schism. Ahmed's loyalists, who supported the agreement, would become ARS-D (in reference to Djibouti) while the rejectionists under Hassan Dahir Aweys would become ARS-A (in reference to Asmara).⁴ Aweys had been one of the most radical leaders in the ICU, and was instrumental in bringing about conflict with Ethiopia in 2006.⁵ He held significant sway in the insurgency, and thus his rejection of the Djibouti agreement immediately diminished its potential to reduce the level of violence.

The aforementioned events had significant implications for Somalia, both political and military, that are worth reviewing in assessing the evolution of the insurgency during this period. Despite growing international concern, the insurgency escalated over the course of 2008. The United States killed al-Shabaab's leader, Aden Farah Ayro, in an airstrike in May, but even this did not dull the group's momentum. By January 2009, the insurgents were in control of all the major cities in southern Somalia except Mogadishu.⁶ The fall of the TFG's former capital of Baidoa at the turn of the year was particularly humiliating. To make matters worse, the TFG was undermined by increased political infighting. President Abdullahi Yusuf ruled with a heavy hand, stacking parliament with his clan allies. This escalated into political crisis in December 2008 when Yusuf attempted to dismiss his adversarial Prime Minister, Nur Adde. Parliament and many leading ministers refused to recognize this, and Yusuf, who was considered a growing impediment to reconciliation and governance in the TFG, resigned.⁷ As a result, further negotiations on power-sharing ensued with ARS-D, and an arrangement was reached whereby half the members of an expanded parliament were Islamists from ARS-D. The new coalition government between the old TFG and the ARS-D will still be referred to as the TFG, for simplicity's sake. The new parliament elected Sheikh Ahmed as the new President, who took office the following month. This created a new political dynamic in Mogadishu. President Ahmed was an Islamist and a former insurgent, but his government seemed to have more legitimacy than the clannish, out-of-touch administration of Yusuf. While there was now some hope that the withdrawal of Ethiopia and the emergence of a more broad-based coalition government could diminish the strength of the insurgency in 2009, this was not to be.

After Ethiopia pulled out its troops on January 25th, 2009, only an undermanned, underequipped AMISOM force remained to protect the TFG in Mogadishu. AMISOM had been conceived by the African Union and authorized by the UN Security Council in February 2007, with the intention of having 8,000 African Union forces replace the Ethiopians. However, the protracted nature of Ethiopia's occupation and difficulties on the part of the African Union delayed the full deployment of AMISOM, such that it

was still short on troops by the beginning of 2009. AMISOM's original mandate encompassed defensive responsibilities, including protecting the institutions of the TFG and facilitating humanitarian operations, as well as providing support to disarmament processes, political reconciliation, and security monitoring.⁸ Uganda provided the majority of AMISOM's members from its inception, with Burundi slowly contributing the second-largest force over the course of 2008. Uganda was a sensible choice as lead contributor, as it was part of IGAD (the regional trade bloc for East Africa) and had a recent history of military intervention (such as in the Congo), but did not border Somalia, and thus lacked the history of interethnic tensions that could have complicated Ethiopia's or Kenya's participation in the force.

After Ethiopia withdrew, AMISOM became the primary foreign force defending the TFG. Ethiopia coordinated its withdrawal with Uganda and Burundi, as lead contributors to AMISOM, to reduce the likelihood of a power vacuum after its departure.⁹ However, the newly-increased AMISOM force still had neither the capacity nor the authority to engage in the sort of counterinsurgency Ethiopia had utilized to counter al-Shabaab's most dangerous offensives. AMISOM did not have a Chapter VII mandate, which would have allowed it to initiate offensives directly against insurgents, and was instead forced to rely on defensive artillery barrages, which often incurred civilian casualties.¹⁰ It was only in July 2010 that ministers of the African Union redefined the mission from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement and thus gave AMISOM more authority to engage al-Shabaab more directly. This came only after al-Shabaab lashed out at AMISOM abroad, in carrying out a terrorist attack in Uganda's capital of Kampala days before. Even then, pressure from the United Nations limited the ability of AMISOM to carry out offensive, rather than just defensive, moves against al-Shabaab, with the UN mandate being expanded only to include narrowly-defined preemptive strikes.¹¹ By the end of 2010, AMISOM was still undermanned, struggling to reach the target of 8,000 troops that had been established in its original authorization in 2007. A UNSC resolution in December 2010 expanded the authorized size to 12,000, but this was still short of the 15,000 soldiers Ethiopia was estimated to have had in Somalia at the height of its occupation.¹²

Upon assuming office, President Ahmed was confronted with a growing security crisis, as the shape of the insurgency changed. The ARS-A (which had defected from Ahmed's forces following the coalition agreement) had reconstituted itself as an Islamist militia, Hizbul Islam, and in a loose alliance with al-Shabaab, the two groups came to dominate the insurgent offensives against the TFG. These two organizations coordinated a major assault on Mogadishu in May 2009, which would prove to be perhaps the TFG's greatest challenge yet. Intense fighting resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, and although the threat of an outright insurgent victory seemed reduced by June, the battle continued for several

months.¹³ At that point, unlike the tactical withdrawal the Ethiopians had forced upon the insurgents in the previous battle for the city in 2007, the insurgents could claim some strategic success by retaining control of North and East Mogadishu. If there was any consolation for the TFG from this desperate situation, it was that the tenuous alliance between Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab ended following the battle for Mogadishu. However, in the infighting that ensued, the extremists of al-Shabaab had the advantage, and by the end of 2009, Hizbul Islam held little sway in most of Somalia. In December 2010, they were officially merged into al-Shabaab's command structure.¹⁴

Thus, by that point, the TFG faced an increasingly cohesive and hardline Islamist insurgency, while not being in control of even all of its capital. As mentioned above, AMISOM had a limited capacity for anything beyond defending TFG positions within Mogadishu, and was unable to successfully exploit any internal fighting within the insurgency. Instead, al-Shabaab's control of parts of Mogadishu and the majority of south-central Somalia went unchallenged in many areas, until the insurgents launched another offensive in August 2010. By then, al-Shabaab had in some respects made AMISOM its primary target. In addition to the aforementioned terror attack in Kampala, designed to lower Ugandan morale, al-Shabaab was explicit in declaring its offensive as a war against AMISOM, which its spokesman termed 'invaders'.¹⁵ Al-Shabaab was possibly concerned by the peacekeepers' rising numbers. Whereas there had only been around 4,000 members of AMISOM in Mogadishu during the 2009 battle, in August 2010 there was 6,000, and these numbers would rise to over 9,000 as the battle unfolded.¹⁶ The ensuing battle for Mogadishu lasted almost a year, and involved several thousand civilian fatalities, but was ultimately a success for the TFG and its AMISOM defenders. In October 2010, AMISOM, bolstered by new rules of engagement, went on the offensive against al-Shabaab, and slowly but surely entered district after district of Mogadishu that had been controlled by insurgents for years. By August 6th, 2011, all parts of Mogadishu were restored to TFG control, and al-Shabaab was forced to retreat back into the countryside.¹⁷ Positive a development though this was, in itself it did not represent victory for the TFG over the insurgency, as one could argue that the TFG was now only where it had been in mid-2007, when Ethiopia had also driven insurgents out of Mogadishu. For the TFG and its allies to secure a meaningful victory over al-Shabaab, the TFG's state capacity had to be addressed.

Measuring Foreign Intervention Success



Having reviewed relevant background information, the dependent variable in this case study can now be assessed. AMISOM's intervention in the Somali Civil War during this period was successful in

preventing an outright collapse of the TFG, but could not secure any lasting military or political gains against a fierce insurgency, and therefore cannot be considered a true success as per this thesis' definition of the dependent variable. Although AMISOM's mandate started in February 2007 (and has yet to expire as of January 2019), AMISOM only became the primary intervening force defending the TFG after Ethiopia's withdrawal but before Kenya's intervention in October 2011. While AMISOM technically succeeded in its mission to protect the TFG from destruction, a real possibility at times in 2009 and 2010, its efforts to make lasting progress against the insurgency and build up the TFG's capacity were mixed at best, and comparable to Ethiopia's prior efforts. Assessing the success of this period of intervention thus necessitates an understanding of the extent of insurgent violence and territorial control between 2009 and 2011.

Data on insurgent and coalition death tolls can be hard to come by, but there are strong indicators of conflict-related violence increasing during this period. By some measures, at least 20,000 civilians were killed in Somalia over the course of 2009 and 2010.¹⁸ In Mogadishu alone, at least 1,739 civilians were killed in 2009, 2,200 in 2010, and 1,400 in the first half of 2011.¹⁹ The UCDP data on conflict-related fatalities also indicates rising death tolls for this period, as displayed in Table 3.1. According to the UCDP, violence peaked in 2010, at the height of the battle of Mogadishu, with 2,722 conflict-related fatalities, before declining somewhat in 2011. Perhaps one of the more alarming signs of the insurgency's escalating vigor was the rise in suicide bombings, until then uncommon in Somalia. These were used to devastating effect, particularly against AMISOM, such as in an al-Shabaab attack in September 2009 in which the deputy commander of AMISOM was one of many killed.²⁰

Table 7.2, which displays the UCDP data on conflict-related events per administrative region, further indicates the territorial extent of the insurgency. With the exception of Middle Juba, every region in south-central Somalia experienced a conflict-related event in 2008-2010, and in 2011, even Middle Juba was no longer exempt. While al-Shabaab seemed to have a presence throughout Somalia, the majority of its efforts were concentrated on the region around Mogadishu, where conflict-related events climbed to 225 in 2010 before declining by more than half to 93 in 2012 after al-Shabaab was defeated in the battle of Mogadishu. The data is also indicative of the unpredictable nature of the insurgent violence, with some regions experiencing steadily increased violence during this period, such as Galgudud (where the militia ASWJ was putting up strong resistance to insurgent expansion), Hiran, and Mudug, while regions like Bakool and Middle Shabelle experienced declines in violence.

Figure 7.1²²



Political geography in Somalia during AMISOM's intervention

Table 7.1: Amount of Conflict-Related Fatalities in Somalia by Year, 2008 to 2012²³

Year	Conflict-Related Fatalities
2008	1751
2009	2204
2010	2722
2011	2118
2012	2990

Table 7.2: Conflict-Related Events in Somalia by Region, 2008 to 2012²⁴

Region	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Banaadir	180	159	225	143	93
Galgudud	12	19	24	7	28
Hiran	16	20	20	15	28
Middle Shabelle	8	4	4	1	12
Lower Shabelle	19	9	1	2	46
Mudug	1	3	10	3	3
Bakool	3	8	4	2	19
Bay	36	10	3	1	29
Gedo	6	9	6	48	60
Middle Juba	0	0	0	2	1
Lower Juba	6	14	7	40	1

By January 2010, a year after Ethiopia withdrew, the insurgency was as territorially extensive as ever, with the TFG only in control of parts of Mogadishu. The territorial situation actually deteriorated after Sheikh Ahmed's forces joined the TFG, as visible in Figure 7.1, where the territory formally controlled by Ahmed's loyalists was quickly lost to al-Shabaab between February and July 2009. One of the few regions, as visible in Figure 7.1, where al-Shabaab experienced some difficulty retaining and expanding its presence during this period was in Galgudud, but this had little to do with efforts by the TFG or AMISOM. Instead, the region's Sufis, an esoteric sect of Islam, under threat of persecution from al-Shabaab, formed the defensive militia ASWJ, which for a time proved to be one of the most effective fighting forces against the insurgents.²¹ While nominally aligned with the TFG, the ASWJ's coordination

with the central government was mostly limited, although, as discussed later, it did serve as a demonstration of changing tactics by the TFG in developing indirect coercive capacity.

Measuring State Capacity

While the TFG's state capacity remained highly underdeveloped, evidence from reputable sources and indicators display a somewhat complicated picture, in which the TFG made marginal progress on certain fronts, but not enough to make a noticeable impact against the insurgency. As before, state capacity is measured across four dimensions (coercive, administrative, fiscal, and juridical), as well as assessed holistically, and contrasted and compared with the changing state capacity of al-Shabaab, which started alienating many of its followers with its extremism during this period.

The TFG's coercive capacity still left a lot to be desired, although some observers reported slight signs of progress. The rule of law, as measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (which measures its indicators in a range from around -2.5 to 2.5, but will sometimes include measurements from outside this range for extreme cases, such as Somalia in 2008), slowly increased from a nadir of -2.61 in 2008 to -2.33 in 2011.²⁵ The Quality of Government indicators showed a more pessimistic measurement for the rule of law, which decreased from 7.3 out of 100 in 2006 to 6.9 in 2009.²⁶ Neither of these movements were substantial based on the scales of the indicators, but at least some were moving in the right direction. During this period, the TFG's coercive capacity remained over-reliant on AMISOM as the government struggled to develop its own independent military. The TFG planned to build its army, the Somali National Security Force, to 8,000, but by November 2009, only had 2,900 on its payroll. Additionally, the TFG relied on independent militias for support, the members of which numbered between 5,000 and 10,000 in late 2009.²⁷ These assorted security forces were disorganized, often arranged on clan lines and commanded on a personalized basis, rather than as part of a structured hierarchy of command and control. The TFG lacked the political commitment, the organization, and the resources to control its security forces effectively, and thus they were never deployed in regiments on the battlefield.²⁸ Instead, with the support of AMISOM, the TFG could resort only to an ad hoc defense of Mogadishu and the few other parts of Somalia under its control whenever pressure from al-Shabaab mounted.

The Economist Intelligence Unit had fairly pessimistic assessments of the status of the TFG's coercive capacity. In its May 2009 report, it described the new administration under Sheikh Ahmed as "very weak" with "little real influence outside the capital," making it difficult for the government to

secure the humanitarian aid and the investment necessary to raise living standards in the population.²⁹ The EIU, in its May 2010 report, expressed doubt that foreign efforts to build up the TFG's coercive capacity would succeed, in light of the lack of a unified, single command. In fact, the EIU went as far as to attribute a "low likelihood" to any change in the military stalemate between the government and the insurgents in the following two years. This pessimism would be defied by the success the TFG and its allies experienced militarily following Kenya's intervention. The EIU did draw attention to the discipline and effectiveness of the aforementioned Sufi militia ASWJ, foreshadowing the success the TFG would experience in 2011-12 by delegating its coercive capacity to autonomous local forces who had come to resent the Islamist insurgents.³⁰ Although the EIU's November 2010 report was still quite pessimistic, highlighting the continuing divisions and lack of popular legitimacy within the TFG, there were some signs of possible progress when it came to coercive capacity. The EIU suggested that the recapture of the town of Bulo Hawo by TFG forces in October was potentially indicative of a shift in the balance of power, as foreign donors continued to provide aid to the TFG while the insurgents suffered from debilitating infighting.³¹ An analysis for the World Bank published at the beginning of 2011 by Somalia expert Kenneth Menkhaus on the drivers of conflict in Somalia argued that efforts to build state capacity had been "consistent failures." He did, however, observe that the TFG successfully expanded its influence by negotiating arrangements with autonomous local authorities, like the aforementioned ASWJ, and raised the possibility that this could be an effective long-term model of state revival.³²

Administrative capacity during this period showed at most only slight improvement. For example, regulatory quality, as measured by the WGI, improved slightly from 2009 to 2010, increasing from -2.65 to -2.39, but still having one of the worst recorded measurements among all countries. Similarly, WGI's measure of government effectiveness increased very slightly from -2.40 in 2008 to -2.23, where it remained fairly stable for the next few years.³³ The WGI's measure of corruption reached a nadir in 2008 at -1.87, but returned to its 2006 levels in 2009 at -1.72, where it more or less remained in the following years.³⁴ The TFG had some limited successes in bringing new elements into the coalition government and thus enhancing its political legitimacy. In March 2010, the TFG signed a power-sharing agreement with ASWJ, which had recently become the most significant force on the ground fighting al-Shabaab.³⁵ However, the implications of this on the TFG's coercive and administrative capacity were uncertain, as ASWJ's influence diminished over the course of 2010.

Despite attempts at reform, the TFG's development of political institutions remained stagnant. Hopes that Sheikh Ahmed would be a more effective leader than his predecessor were generally disappointed, as he had difficulty maintaining unity within his cabinet and parliament.³⁶ The writing of a

draft constitution was needlessly delayed by infighting between the President and his Prime Ministers. And while attempts to root out corruption through a formal commission and the auditing of budgets were steps in the right direction, they made little discernible progress, as the above corruption indicators show.³⁷ Thus, during this period the TFG's administrative capacity remained woefully underdeveloped. The parliament and civil service were "barely functional," with most ministers having poorly defined terms and mandates, and most of the population not receiving vital public goods.³⁸ Corruption and exploitation of what few resources the government had access to, in addition to abuses by the security forces, alienated the TFG from Somalis that were otherwise skeptical of al-Shabaab's extremism and brutality. Even certain gains in capacity, such as the operation of Mogadishu's international port and airport after years out of commission, were tainted by the prevalence of corruption, with government officials not only taking bribes at these locations, but also being accused of using them to engage in visa fraud and migrant smuggling.³⁹

In its November 2009 report, the EIU highlighted the struggle to use international donations to build up the police force and to eradicate corruption, especially when the TFG's Minister of Finance was accused of embezzling money.⁴⁰ In May 2010, the EIU continued to emphasize the issue of corruption, drawing attention to UN reports accusing the TFG's security forces of corruption and ineffectiveness, as well as alleging that up to half of international food aid was diverted criminally from its intended recipients.⁴¹ The report also regarded the finalization of a draft constitution as an important, if overdue, step towards the TFG developing political legitimacy. Menkhaus, in the World Bank report, posited that Somalis had been without a functioning government for so long that they were particularly skeptical of the heavy-handedness and incompetence of the TFG. Menkhaus claimed that state institutions had "gone underfinanced and understaffed," and that foreign aid provided for the purposes of state-building was often abused by corrupt members of the government.⁴²

There is limited information about fiscal and juridical capacity during this period, with the TFG seeming to make little progress on the latter, and mixed progress on the former. As before, it is difficult to assess fiscal capacity directly without documentation on the government's budgets and tax rates. However, we can draw some indirect conclusions from the socioeconomic trends the government presided over. While much of this was financed by foreign aid rather than domestic revenue, government progress on socioeconomic measurements can still be a measure of increasingly efficient government spending. For example, the Quality of Government (QoG) indicators showed rather impressive improvement in infrastructure from 2005 to 2009, increasing from 4.6 to 12.3 out of 100.⁴³ Life expectancy, not directly an indicator of state capacity but of quality of life and thus indirectly the

government's success in raising living standards, also increased slightly, measured by the BTI in 2007 as 48 and in 2009 as 51.⁴⁴ As for the TFG's juridical capacity, most sources indicated little progress in developing a proper judicial system. By the end of 2011, there remained no effective judiciary in place to provide the kind of justice and order that had brought the ICU success in 2006.⁴⁵

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index's measurements in general paint a negative picture of state capacity, with its aggregate score for the period of 2009 to 2011 at 1.22 out of 10, a noticeable decline from 1.34 for the period of 2007 to 2009. Specifically, the BTI also measures a substantial decline in its indicator for political and social integration, from 2.3 in its 2010 report to 1.3 in its 2012 report. Its index of government performance witnesses a decline from 1.80 in the 2010 report to 1.51 in the 2012 report, while on other indicators, there is more stagnation than decline, with the measure of 'stateness' remaining at 1.8, and its market economy status declining only slightly from 1.21 to 1.18.⁴⁶ The picture that these indicators show for state capacity is thus mixed at best. Even though some indicators level off or show some improvement, the TFG still failed to develop the various dimensions of its state capacity to compete with the appeal of the insurgents and thus facilitate success for AMISOM in its mission of shoring up a stable central government in Somalia.

The TFG lacked legitimacy from its population in important respects. To those hoping the withdrawal of Ethiopia and the entry of Sheikh Ahmed into the TFG would increase its legitimacy among Somalis, many insurgent leaders denigrated the TFG and AMISOM as creatures of Ethiopian and American aggression. For example, Iman Abubakar of Hizbul Islam alleged that America's involvement in training Ugandans and Burundians made AMISOM a tool of the West's war on Islam.⁴⁷ Somalia scholars like Shaul Shay claimed that by 2010, AMISOM was the only reason the TFG had not been overthrown, and that this played a major role in al-Shabaab's decision to launch its first foreign terrorist attack against Uganda (the 2010 Kampala attacks).⁴⁸ Such widespread skepticism to the TFG and its foreign allies undermines arguments that the national enmity between Somalia and countries like Ethiopia significantly fueled the insurgency. As long as there were both material and ideological motivations sustaining the insurgents, stemming from the TFG's failure to build capacity, no intervening force, no matter how neutral, could substantially expand the TFG's base.

Comparing al-Shabaab's ability to provide state capacity to the central government's is particularly relevant in this case study, because in many respects, al-Shabaab started to alienate its supporters in a manner that would disrupt the mechanism by which poor state capacity from the central government translated into foreign intervention failure. The growing alienation of Somalis from al-Shabaab in this period is relevant to understanding how the TFG regained the loyalty of its population

when al-Shabaab started losing territory in following years. Up until 2010, al-Shabaab had demonstrated a clear advantage in securing the support of large portions of the population in the face of the TFG's failed capacity. However, al-Shabaab's failure to retain this support, in part due to failures in capacity of its own, provided an opportunity for the TFG and its foreign allies to roll back the insurgents militarily and win back the loyalty of Somalis by demonstrating gains in the TFG's own capacity. This would occur over the course of the next intervention. The period of AMISOM's intervention (2009 to 2011) was a transitional period for al-Shabaab, in which they initially experienced widespread support from Somalis and exerted considerable territorial control. However, this would gradually change over the course of AMISOM's intervention, as cracks formed in al-Shabaab's unity and its supporters grew gradually alienated. Similarly, the years 2009-2011 were also transitional for the TFG, still demonstrating very weak capacity but starting to make subtle progress on some fronts that presaged more progress in subsequent years. Comparing this experience to al-Shabaab's is important in understanding how the balance of power shifted between this intervention and the following intervention.

It should be emphasized that for much of this period, al-Shabaab still demonstrated superior capacity to the TFG's. Initially, insurgent groups like al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam continued to exploit the continued failings of the TFG to retain a base of support for operations against the central government. This persisted throughout the period in question because the grievances of many Somalis were left unaddressed by the TFG. During this time, al-Shabaab expanded its capacity and transformed from a decentralized, clan-based network of militias into a "more centralized organization with a clearer leadership and command structure," reflecting increased ambitions to establish a state rather than just an insurgency.⁴⁹ Many Somali businessmen remained dissatisfied with the TFG and continued to support the insurgents, even during the bloody offensive on Mogadishu in 2009.⁵⁰ In new regions that al-Shabaab conquered, such as the major city of Kismayo, al-Shabaab governed through administrative committees for matters of security, finance, and sharia.⁵¹ Control of Kismayo, which had been seized in 2008, was a major strategic boon for al-Shabaab; taxing its ports brought in approximately \$50mil a year, perhaps half of the group's entire source of revenue.⁵² In many cases, al-Shabaab was more responsive to the political concerns of its constituents than the TFG had been, engaging in public works programs such as the construction of roads connecting Kismayo to surrounding towns.⁵³

Al-Shabaab also arguably had a more effective method of financing its activities than did the TFG. Compared to the corruption, bureaucratic waste, and low tax revenue that undermined the TFG's fiscal capacity, al-Shabaab relied on hawala, a traditional Muslim approach to finance that depended on local trust and brokerage.⁵⁴ In practice, this often involved heavy taxes and tariffs on important Somali

businesses, which were effective in financing al-Shabaab's militant activities but also posed the risk of depressing economic activity and alienating business communities in the long-term.⁵⁵ In general, security increased and crime, once common during the warlord era, decreased in al-Shabaab-controlled territory.⁵⁶ Furthermore, Al-Shabaab's claim to offer justice without discrimination, after a long history of clan division, still appealed to many Somalis. Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, al-Shabaab's leader during this period, gained credibility in the eyes of the public when he had one of his own mujahideen executed for violating the law.⁵⁷ Even among those who regarded al-Shabaab's enforcement of sharia as overly harsh, many Somalis preferred the law and order al-Shabaab claimed to provide to the anarchy they had experienced for so long.

However, the seeds of a backlash against the most radical insurgents were also visible. The BTI reported that during 2009 and 2010 the popularity of al-Shabaab among Somalis declined noticeably, as the character of the insurgency gradually became more extreme, having displaced more moderate elements like Hizbul Islam.⁵⁸ Hizbul Islam had represented the views of many conservative Somalis in rejecting as illegitimate the new coalition government that took over in early 2009. President Ahmed's commitments to implement some form of sharia law did not satisfy Aweys' loyalists in Hizbul Islam, who provided their own form of Islamic administration in the parts of southern Somalia they governed.⁵⁹ However, as the insurgency persisted, Hizbul Islam, as mentioned above, was either marginalized or consumed by al-Shabaab, which represented the more radical fringe of the insurgency. For al-Shabaab, only the most hardline interpretation of sharia could be imposed; negotiation with the TFG was anathema; and the ultimate ambition was turning Somalia into a springboard for global jihad. These more radical views, and the extremely harsh manner by which al-Shabaab imposed sharia over the populations it ruled, alienated many Somalis. Al-Shabaab's conception of sharia law encompassed laws against adultery, strict dress codes, the prohibition of smoking, and the banning of secular music and dance, with these morality laws entailing penalties like flogging, amputations, and executions by stoning.⁶⁰ As early as January 2009, some Somalis resisted al-Shabaab's repressive enforcement of sharia violently, such as in a riot in Kismayo after the insurgents dismantled a soccer stadium.

Al-Shabaab increasingly ran the risk of alienating some of the businessmen that had supported it, when it shut down 'objectionable' businesses and intimidated business owners that criticized them.⁶¹ This both reflected and exacerbated a decline in Somalia's economic output during this period, as the severity of the insurgent violence disrupted the independent trade networks that had fueled economic activity since 1991. The insurgents also undermined efforts to provide humanitarian aid to their own populations, heavily restricting access to international aid organizations.⁶² As discussed in the next

chapter, this would contribute to a catastrophic famine in 2011. The Somali nationalism that had united many different sectors of Somali society behind the ICU was increasingly replaced in al-Shabaab's ideology by a divisive drive for global jihad, increasingly affiliated with al-Qaeda.

The Somali Civil War between Ethiopia's withdrawal and Kenya's intervention was a chaotic and violent period in Somalia's history, one in which an undermanned, underfunded African Union peacekeeping force desperately held the line in Mogadishu against an insurgency that had taken control of most of the rest of the country. While AMISOM was ultimately successful in saving the TFG from al-Shabaab by the end of the battle of Mogadishu in August 2011, the TFG failed to capitalize on the considerable international support it received to sufficiently develop state capacity. Corruption, infighting, and incompetence continued to undermine any opportunity the TFG could've had to develop a base of support amongst a skeptical Somali population that still regarded the central government as a foreign creation. The success of AMISOM's intervention was thus significantly diminished in this regard. However, the tides in Somalia's civil war would shift in 2011-12. Al-Shabaab's increasingly violent and radical rule alienated more and more Somalis, while the entry of Kenya in October 2011 gave the TFG another chance to meaningfully cooperate with a more muscular foreign partner. This phase of the conflict will be the subject of the next chapter.

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Chapter 8: Kenya's Intervention in Somalia, Oct. 2011 to Oct. 2012

After the defeat of al-Shabaab in the battle of Mogadishu in August 2011, there seemed to be a genuine opportunity to meaningfully overcome the insurgency. However, the TFG's failure to develop state capacity threatened to squander this opportunity. As the TFG approached a critical period of transition into formal sovereignty in 2012, international pressure mounted to build the proper conditions of state capacity for Somalia to emerge from civil war and famine. The following years for Somalia were still marked by considerable violence and instability, and at no point would al-Shabaab be completely spent as an insurgent force. However, this period in question, lasting from the end of the battle of Mogadishu in August 2011 to the fall of the city of Kismayo in October 2012, would nonetheless prove to be a possible turning point in the Somali Civil War, and opened a phase in the conflict during which the TFG was no longer threatened with destruction and emerged from its lengthy transitional period into something more closely resembling a sovereign federal government. Kenya's intervention in October 2011, and increased international engagement in other forms, undeniably played an influential role in this story. However, arguably the most significant development in this period was the ability of the TFG to finally develop enough capacity to navigate a difficult political transition and secure the loyalty of interest groups that had supported al-Shabaab but were increasingly alienated by the insurgents' growing radicalism. It was this maturing capacity on the central government's part that played the biggest role in preventing Kenya's intervention from running aground like Ethiopia's. The gradual but meaningful improvement Somalia would experience in the years following 2011 illustrated how important state capacity and legitimacy are to the success of any foreign effort to resolve internal conflict.

Kenya's intervention in Somalia, despite facing serious risks, coming from a country with essentially no experience in foreign interventions, was a success. While Kenya and its allies were not able to decisively defeat al-Shabaab (and indeed insurgent violence remains a serious problem for Somalia's government over 7 years after the Kenyan operation) the intervention can still be considered a resounding success, as it met the two requirements by which this dependent variable is operationalized. Kenya made substantial progress in rolling back al-Shabaab's territorial control in the year following its initial incursion, and in the months and years following the operation, particularly after the fall of Kismayo, insurgent violence declined as well. The success of Kenya's intervention coincided with noticeable, if qualified, progress in state capacity, as measured along the four dimensions (coercive,

administrative, fiscal, and juridical), and in sharp contrast to the deterioration of al-Shabaab's state capacity, as the insurgents' appeal among much of the population eroded.

Background/Course of Events

Al-Shabaab's defeat in the battle of Mogadishu had left AMISOM and the TFG with not undeserved pride for holding the line in the civil war's most dire moments. However, while AMISOM succeeded in its mandate of defending the TFG from destruction, the peacekeepers still lacked both the ability and the authority to pursue the far-reaching offensives necessary to retake the rest of south-central Somalia, which was still under insurgent control. Furthermore, the TFG's security forces were still too underdeveloped to take on al-Shabaab themselves. The still-desperate conditions in Somalia thus attracted foreign intervention from a different source.

Kenya, which had not participated in the AMISOM force because the African Union did not think it wise for any of Somalia's immediate neighbors to be involved, found it increasingly difficult to avoid the Somali conflagration. Much like Ethiopia, Kenya had a substantial Somali minority population whose loyalties and territories al-Shabaab coveted. Al-Shabaab had a significant presence in the bush near the Kenyan border, as the ICU had regrouped there after the Ethiopian invasion. As a result, by fall 2011, the conflict had started spilling over into Kenya, a sign that the TFG, having only real influence around Mogadishu, still lacked control of its own borders. A spate of cross-border kidnappings in Kenya, which threatened to devastate the country's economically vital tourism sector, proved to be the impetus for intervention.¹ On October 16th, 2011, the Kenyan government announced Operation Linda Nchi, a cross-border operation to clear al-Shabaab from southern Somalia and neutralize the security threat it posed. While the operation appeared spontaneous, Kenya had actually planned an intervention in Somalia since 2010, mindful of al-Shabaab's designs on eastern Kenya and concerned of further refugee flows from the famine that was devastating the region at this point. This famine had struck the Horn of Africa over the course of 2011, and killed as many as 260,000 people, something to which al-Shabaab, at the time still in control of much of the rural population, was either incapable or unwilling to effectively respond.² By this point, the Dadaab refugee camp in eastern Kenya was one of the largest, if not the largest, refugee camps in the world, and there were concerns of al-Shabaab infiltration.

The hard-fought efforts of AMISOM and the TFG in defeating al-Shabaab in Mogadishu partially informed Kenya's decision to intervene. By October 2011, the insurgents were on the backfoot and the recent kidnappings provided a legitimate security pretext to intervene.³ The Kenyan intervention was

closely coordinated with the TFG and AMISOM for the purposes of efficiency and international legitimacy. The fact that the TFG were, in 2011, unlike in 2006, in control of their own capital may have allowed some Somalis to perceive the Kenyans more as partners of the central government than invaders seeking to impose a puppet government, as had been the case with Ethiopia. However, the TFG still displayed considerable confusion in their initial response to the intervention. The government initially claimed to have endorsed the intervention, but then criticized it and asserted to have never authorized it. Eventually, the Somali prime minister signed a memorandum of agreement with Kenya on the intervention.⁴ Although such contradictory signals threatened to undermine both the legitimacy of Kenya's intervention and any real confidence that the TFG was in control of events in its own country, it did not have an overall deleterious effect on the success of the intervention, as the TFG and Kenya's forces were able to develop a fairly stable working relationship, keeping in mind the priority of defeating the insurgency.

Kenya's intervention force comprised thousands of soldiers with support from Kenya's air force, and quickly focused on the southern port city of Kismayo. The initial weeks of the offensive were successful, and liberated considerable territory for the TFG to eventually administer for itself, with some 17 towns and 95,000 square kilometers reclaimed from al-Shabaab by December 2011.⁵ Al-Shabaab warned of fierce retaliation against Kenya for its incursion. Indeed, in the following years, Kenya would suffer an increased tempo of terrorist attacks organized by al-Shabaab, including on the Westgate mall in Nairobi in September 2013 and on a rural college in April 2015.⁶ However, unlike Ethiopia, Kenya was not intimidated into disengaging from Somalia, benefiting from a more stable partner in Mogadishu and facing an insurgency losing support from many of its former constituents.

Despite some initial confusion, the TFG displayed better preparation in taking advantage of Kenya's offensives when compared to previous interventions. When Kenyan forces halted their advance in November due to torrential rains impeding their tanks, TFG forces stepped in to continue the offensive against al-Shabaab and establish a presence in the areas already liberated.⁷ Before launching an offensive on the vital city of Kismayo, Kenya decided to bide its time and weaken al-Shabaab by strangling its supply lines. This delay was crucial, as it allowed for important political and military developments within the TFG that better enabled it to participate in the battle against al-Shabaab and restore lasting authority in Kismayo. Additionally, in June 2012, the Kenyan intervention force was bolstered logistically and legally by formally integrating into AMISOM, thenceforth having access to the funds and equipment made available to AMISOM, whose numbers now reached 17,000.⁸ In September 2012, the federal government and its allies had made significant progress against al-Shabaab. That

month, they launched a long-anticipated offensive on Kismayo, the insurgents' most valuable remaining possession. Al-Shabaab expected the local population to join in the resistance to the Kenyan and central government forces, but were disappointed. The Kenyans operated with more sensitivity to the political and cultural complexities of Somalia than Ethiopia had, and were generally welcomed by the locals.⁹ Thus, within days of the offensive's beginning, al-Shabaab was routed from its most economically valuable stronghold, and forced to withdraw back into the bush.

The following years witnessed continued violence from al-Shabaab, but also further gradual progress by the central government, which had transitioned from the TFG to become the FGS (Federal Government of Somalia), in rolling back insurgent control of rural territory. On September 6th, 2011, the TFG reached an agreement known as the Roadmap for the End of Transition on developing its transitional federal institutions into a permanent, fully sovereign state. This roadmap encompassed efforts at further political outreach and reconciliation, as well as the writing and passage of an official constitution by June 2012. The central government's transitional status was to formally end on August 20th, 2012.¹⁰ This agreement came out of the Kampala Accord signed in June 2011, which ended a political stalemate between President Ahmed and Speaker of Parliament Sharif Adan on the planning of new elections and the end to transitional status. The political deal entailed the resignation of Prime Minister Mohammed, and came out of increased international pressure for political reconciliation, providing further incentive for the central government to enhance its capacity.¹¹ The TFG's ability to successfully implement the Roadmap both affected and was affected by the recent military efforts against al-Shabaab, and was in large part eased by the internal divisions and problems of capacity undermining the insurgent group.¹² This process accelerated with Operation Indian Ocean, a military offensive led by the FGS in coordination with AMISOM and the United States, in August 2014. The operation was successful in killing many of al-Shabaab's top leaders and recapturing several pockets of insurgent territory in south-central Somalia.¹³ This progress was all the more impressive because it occurred amidst the TFG experiencing a significant political transformation.

Kenya's intervention, unlike Ethiopia's, elicited no escalation in the insurgency, and in fact precipitated the decline of al-Shabaab as a territorial force. While some could attribute the difference in reaction to Ethiopia's unpleasant history with Somalia, this is misleading. Although Kenya was not quite as feared or loathed among Somalis as Ethiopia, the two countries nonetheless had a history of ethnic tension. In the 1960s, Kenya's ethnic Somalis waged an insurgency for union with Somalia that the Somali government secretly sponsored. The Kenyan government retaliated with brutal repression that lasted decades, including the massacre of 5,000 Somalis in 1984.¹⁴ Thus, Al-Shabaab's support for

Kenya's Somalis was, at least in theory, a popular position. Relatedly, Kenya had its own designs on Somali territory that could have conceivably inspired a considerable insurgent backlash. The Kenyan government provided no timetable for its withdrawal after the operation started, and suspicions quickly emerged that it sought to establish an autonomous region close to its border that would in essence serve as a buffer state to prevent Somali militancy from spilling into Kenya. Kenya had a willing partner in this regard, as an autonomous state named Azania had been declared in the border region of Jubaland in April 2011.¹⁵



Yet while these moves on Kenya's part would bring about tension with the TFG, Kenya's involvement with AMISOM was undisturbed. In fact, the TFG (at that point, the FGS) would eventually recognize Jubaland as an autonomous region similar to Puntland. Also indicative of how conditions within Somalia had changed relative to 2006 was the fact that Ethiopia also dispatched troops into Somalia at the same time as Kenya. A force of several hundred secured territory, including the strategic town of Beledweyne, close to the Ethiopian border, taking advantage of al-Shabaab being besieged from many sides, with AMISOM pressing from the north, Kenya from the south, and now Ethiopia from the west.¹⁶ Ethiopia's presence, however, did little to inspire resistance among the insurgents, who rather than defend urban areas to the death started retreating into the bush. The absence of severe Kenyan–Somalian strife following its intervention and the ensuing decline of al-Shabaab seemed indicative of changes in the capacity of both the TFG/FGS and the insurgent group. Somalis flocked to al-Shabaab in 2007 when it provided a convincing alternative to the state capacity of a then-extremely weak TFG, but were gradually alienated by al-Shabaab's form of rule. With the support of Kenya and AMISOM, the TFG/FGS presided over a gradual but meaningful development of state capacity and regained the loyalty of Somalis as al-Shabaab suffered defeats on the battlefield in 2011-12.


Measuring Foreign Intervention Success

The Kenyan intervention was successful, noticeably more so than its predecessors. Progress against the insurgency during 2011-12 was markedly visible. By the end of 2012, al-Shabaab had retreated from nearly all major towns in southern and central Somalia, having controlled almost everything except the capital in 2010.¹⁷ While al-Shabaab still posed a formidable threat as a rural insurgency, it was no longer in control of urban areas and did not present a meaningful challenge to the sovereignty of the central government in many of these areas. Figure 8.1 displays, through three different maps, some of the observable progress the government made against the insurgency,

especially during 2012. Between the first map, in February 2012, and the second, in August 2012, al-Shabaab lost much of its hold over central Somalia. The third map indicates how al-Shabaab has survived in pockets into the present. Death tolls for this period still come with some uncertainty, but Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) estimated 2,118 conflict-related deaths in 2011 and 2,990 in 2012, declining to below 1,500 deaths per year in the three years following, as displayed in Table 8.1.¹⁸ The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) measured around 3,150 deaths in 2013, and about 1,900 deaths in 2014, also indicating a gradual decline.¹⁹

Figure 8.1²¹ for first map, 22 for second





Political geography of Somalia after the Kenyan intervention

The UCDP data displayed in Table 8.2 indicates a continued insurgent presence throughout much of Somalia, but also suggested that the nature of this presence was changing, with al-Shabaab becoming a more traditional insurgency.²⁰ Although some regions, like Lower Shabelle and Bay, experienced more conflict-related events after 2011 than before, other regions, like Mudug and to some extent Galgudud, experienced generally fewer conflict-related events after 2011. It should therefore be noted that the geographic spread of the insurgency does not always correlate with the lethality of the insurgency, as during this period al-Shabaab transformed from a proto-state in control of much of the country to a rural insurgency that increasingly emphasized ambushes and bombings. Regions like Lower Shabelle that were once solidly controlled by the insurgents were now contested by the federal government and its allies, explaining the rise in conflict-related events there. Thus, what is significant about the geographic spread of the insurgency for this period was not that the insurgency still had a presence in most regions, nor even that in some regions, the number of conflict-related events increased. What should instead be emphasized is the decline in conflict-related events in areas of greatest importance to the survival of the TFG, especially the capital region of Banaadir, which was consistent with the decline in fatalities after 2011.

Table 8.1: Amount of Conflict-Related Fatalities in Somalia by Year²³

Year	Conflict-Related Fatalities
2011	2118
2012	2990
2013	1045
2014	1247
2015	1221

Table 8.2: Conflict-Related Events in Somalia by Region²⁴

Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Banaadir	225	143	93	116	148
Galgudud	24	7	28	2	15
Hiran	20	15	28	20	33
Middle Shabelle	4	1	12	21	14
Lower Shabelle	1	2	46	66	53
Mudug	10	3	3	3	4
Bakool	4	2	19	19	29
Bay	3	1	29	41	32
Gedo	6	48	60	23	30
Middle Juba	0	2	1	3	4
Lower Juba	7	40	1	58	34

Measuring State Capacity

The years during and following Kenya's intervention were transformational ones for Somalia, in which the TFG was replaced by a permanent government. There is good evidence to suggest that during this time, Somalia finally started making meaningful progress in developing state capacity, across the four main dimensions studied in this thesis. While this capacity was still quite weak by international standards, its development facilitated the success of Kenya's intervention and prevented a comeback by the insurgents, as had occurred after Ethiopia's invasion. The response of al-Shabaab to these developments is particularly relevant in this period, as the insurgents' ability to maintain the loyalty of important segments of the population had been a significant aspect of the mechanism by which the

central government's state incapacity undermined the success of past foreign intervention. For that reason, the TFG/FGS's gradual progress on state capacity will be contrasted with the failings of al-Shabaab.

While still relying in large part on AMISOM, Kenya, and Ethiopia for its coercive capacity, the TFG made increased progress in developing this dimension of capacity during this time, particularly important in regions just liberated from al-Shabaab. The TFG started restoring security to Mogadishu, where conditions improved noticeably after mid-2012, and trained, with the support of the UNDP (UN Development Program), a 5,000 strong Somali Police Force to patrol the streets. These efforts were not flawless, as the SPF were often underpaid and would sometimes resort to extortion. As the FGS still struggled to formally extend its capacity to the parts of the country liberated from al-Shabaab, it instead started relying more on militias loyal to it, such as ASWJ and the Ras Kamboni militia, to rebuild local administration.²⁵ In this respect, it could be argued that the FGS developed its coercive capacity through indirect delegation to proxies rather than successfully developing a more closely integrated federal military. Although the Worldwide Governance Indicator's measure for the rule of law slightly declined from -2.33 in 2011 to -2.42 in 2012, other indicators were more positive.²⁶ Reflecting the setbacks suffered by al-Shabaab, the WGI's measure for political stability and violence went steadily up from its 2009 nadir at -3.31, reaching -2.86 in 2012 and -2.38 in 2015, the year al-Shabaab lost sway in much of the Somali countryside.²⁷

In its May 2012 report, the Economist Intelligence Unit argued recent military gains occurred more rapidly than most expected. Furthermore, the EIU described the period following Mogadishu's liberation in August 2011 as one of "relative calm," indicating that the TFG was better at providing security and order than it had been when unrest first emerged in the capital in early 2007. The EIU drew a connection between this improvement in security and a "relative economic boom" in Mogadishu, further improving the government's legitimacy in the eyes of Somalis.²⁸ In its February 2013 report, the EIU suggested the new government's coercive capacity would continue to grow, as the UN lifted its long-standing arms embargo, in itself a sign of growing optimism about Somalia.²⁹ An Interim Strategy Note issued by the World Bank in November 2013, about a year after the successful liberation of Kismayo, also observed that the TFG's ability to restore security to Mogadishu after its liberation in August 2011 had produced an economic "peace dividend," in which returning Somalis brought vital capital and labor.³⁰ This further illustrates the impact that the central government's coercive capacity had on other dimensions, and on improving socioeconomic standards in the regions it controlled in general.

The central government's administrative capacity, while still leaving much to be desired, made important gains during this period. Although many aspects of the FGS' administrative capacity remained sorely lacking, with ministries being dysfunctional and undermanned, and the provision of public goods still limited, even in Mogadishu, the TFG/FGS was more committed to reform and accountability than before. Reflecting this, upon taking office President Mohamud committed himself to a bottom-up approach for building administrative capacity, working with existing local actors rather than trying to impose a highly overstretched FGS into newly-liberated areas.³¹ The Corruption Perceptions Index would remain at 8 out of 100 through this period, only improving to 10 in 2016.³² However, the WGI's measure of corruption displayed some improvement, reaching -1.59 in 2012, and would remain in that range through 2015. Its measure of government effectiveness stayed fairly constant in 2011 and 2012 (moving from -2.14 to -2.20) and actually declined to -2.45 in 2014. However, the WGI showed regulatory quality improving gradually from -2.39 in 2010 to -2.25 in 2012 and to -2.12 in 2014.³³

The Economic Intelligence Unit in its November 2011 report remained doubtful about the competence of the TFG's institutions, even as al-Shabaab suffered setbacks on the battlefield. However, it did take note of the TFG reaching an agreement for a 'road map' on replacing the TFG in August 2012 and approving a constitution.³⁴ While the EIU expressed skepticism about the success of this road map, the TFG would transition smoothly to the FGS in August 2012, indicating Somalia's political capacity was growing gradually. Indeed, in its May 2012 report, the EIU described the military gains by the TFG and its allies, particularly around Mogadishu, as a "critical juncture for Somalia's dysfunctional institutions," indicating some optimism in the changing balance of power and of the impact that increased political stability had on success on the battlefield.³⁵ In November 2012, the EIU described the convening of the new federal parliament as "an important milestone" in the road map that they had expressed such skepticism about only a year before. The end of Sheikh Ahmed's kleptocratic rule was considered a sign of progress in the struggle against corruption.³⁶

In its February 2013 report, the EIU regarded the development of a new political order as somewhat promising, as autonomous regions like Galmudug and Puntland agreed to cooperate with and respect the authority of the FGS.³⁷ The aforementioned Interim Strategy Note issued by the World Bank described Somalia's trajectory as "now positive" and considered the inauguration of the Federal Government of Somalia in August 2012 a "transformational moment". The document claims the FGS had, in its short tenure, emphasized more effective governance and economic management, as well as political reform in its development of a federal system acceptable to most interest groups in Somalia. The document praised the FGS for reaching out to autonomous regional administrations, passing

legislation to formally include them within the constitutional framework, and building on relationships that had emerged to successfully counter the al-Shabaab threat.³⁸

As before, the fiscal capacity of a central government remained limited, and recordkeeping is spotty. Socioeconomic indicators must be consulted to help understand whether the TFG/FGS was spending its money effectively. Nonetheless, for the first time, there existed some documentation of the central government's budgetary capacity. In 2012, the FGS reported only \$39,500,000 in revenue in its yearly budget, but in 2013, this number had almost tripled to \$114,300,000.^{39, 40} Unfortunately, a fuller picture of the evolution of Somalia's budgetary capacity is elusive, because no budgets prior to 2012 were successfully documented by the TFG. Meanwhile, the QoG's indicators for rule of law and infrastructure, continued to improve, reaching highs of 9.4 and 15.6 out of 100, respectively, in 2013.⁴¹ In its May 2012 report, the EIU took note of a rise in infrastructure development, such as Turkish projects in Mogadishu.⁴² Although its November 2012 report noted that the impact from the 2011 famine would continue to restrain economic growth, the EIU highlighted the improvement in the Somali shilling and the improvement in infrastructure.⁴³ Furthermore, the IMF officially recognized the Somali government, further opening the economy to capital and investment from abroad.⁴⁴ One of the challenges the World Bank highlighted for the new administration was reforming public financial management after it had been to a large extent hijacked by al-Shabaab when the insurgents controlled key sources of revenue, like the ports of Kismayo. To this end, in May 2013, the FGS applied to participate in a "capacity strengthening project" regarding public financial management provided by the World Bank. The Bank argued that this initiative showed promise because, as described in the Project Information Document, security had improved and the central government had developed enough political legitimacy to make such a project possible.⁴⁵ This was corroborated by the IMF's recent recognition of the FGS, giving the government newfound access to international finance.

The TFG/FGS' efforts at building up juridical capacity had mixed results, and there is limited documentation regarding the central government's formal judiciary. As before, the government's juridical capacity can be understood in part by comparing it with the traditional sharia forms of justice provided by the insurgents. As covered below, this period was distinguished by al-Shabaab overextending its juridical capacity, as its extreme interpretation of sharia made the populace more sympathetic to the flawed but moderate justice system of the central government. The TFG's establishment of a military court in Mogadishu to prosecute soldiers for criminal activity was hailed as a step in the right direction towards providing justice, but would later come under criticism for human rights violations and lack of due process.⁴⁶ Corruption also remained a problem, as some in the FGS saw

opportunities for profit in taking over the regions al-Shabaab once ruled. The UN Monitoring Group reported more than 68% of the TFG's revenues had gone unaccounted for in 2011, with the records for 2012 unclear.⁴⁷

In making general assessments of the central government's state capacity, many sources display a qualified, mixed picture, but generally depict state capacity as moving in the right direction for the first time in years. For example, in its report on Somalia's political and economic transformation from 2011 to 2013, BTI (Bertelsmann's Transformation Index) expressed more hope than in its previous reports that recent military victories against al-Shabaab would lead to meaningful political progress and reconciliation.⁴⁸ After 2012 especially, BTI observed promising signs of the federal government's increased capacity and the gradual return to normality in the areas it ruled, even if much work remained to be done. For example, internally displaced persons and refugees from abroad started returning to Mogadishu, bringing with them a surge in economic investment and activity, such as the opening of restaurants, shops, and other businesses.⁴⁹

BTI's indicators for Somalia's state capacity in 2011-2013 again display a complicated picture. The BTI's report for 2011-13 shows noticeable overall improvement in state capacity, with its overall status index at 1.32 out of 10 compared to 1.22 for its previous report. BTI's measurement of 'stateness' improved from 1.8 to 2.3, and of political participation from 1.3 to 1.5, but rule of law and political and social integration remained constant from the last report at 1.0 and 1.3 respectively. The BTI measurement for market economy status improved slightly from 1.18 to 1.21, and its governance index improved markedly from 1.51 to 1.70, with its constituent measurements of resource efficiency and consensus building both showing improvement.⁵⁰ Taken together, these indicators display somewhat contradicting trends on Somalia's state capacity, with most indicative of a very weak state by international standards but nonetheless displaying meaningful improvement from previous years. It is also worth considering the impact of the TFG's transition into the FGS. The presence of a substantially different government after mid-2012 presented the potential of political instability, especially at a time when the government was prioritizing its coercive capacity and rolling back al-Shabaab on the battlefield. In this respect, the ability of the TFG to weather this transition into the FGS fairly seamlessly was a sign of progress in itself, and the fact that it coincided with improvement on measures such as rule of law and infrastructure is all the more impressive.

An important element of the TFG's growing capacity, particularly on the juridical and administrative dimensions, that should be considered was gaining the support of the clan elders, who had retained significant authority in jurisprudence following the collapse of the Somalian state in 1991

and had in many cases supported the insurgents as a more reliable partner in providing law and order than the TFG. By giving the clan elders many of the seats in the National Constituent Assembly that had been selected to write Somalia's constitution, the TFG gained an important source of juridical authority and legitimacy. This facilitated the drafting of a provisional constitution that was adopted to relatively limited opposition on August 1st, 2012.⁵¹ The TFG also displayed important progress in its arrangements for the establishment of new Houses of Parliament. Whereas before, the TFG had been dominated by select clans like the Darod and had limited support or input from Somalia's influential elders, the provisional constitution called for the selection of members of Parliament by elders from all clans, and formalized a formula whereby every major clan would have proportionate representation in the new Parliament. Furthermore, to limit the influence of the hated warlords that had once ruled Mogadishu, an independent committee was established to vet the credentials of all nominees for parliament to ensure that none had ties with warlords. Thus, on August 20th, a federal legislature was sworn in with greater legitimacy and support from influential constituents than the TFG had ever possessed.⁵² The new President whom the Parliament elected in September was former activist Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, untainted by corruption or radicalism as his predecessor, Sharif Ahmed, had been, and thus generally welcomed by Somalis upon his election.⁵³

To understand how the central government's growing state capacity translated into greater foreign intervention success during this period, it is necessary to understand the internal division and popular dissent that undermined al-Shabaab during this period. What arguably distinguished this period of the war from preceding years was that al-Shabaab did not maintain its cohesion and popular appeal in the face of government advances, which in turn facilitated the military success of Kenya and its allies. Whereas the insurgency had been resilient in the face of Ethiopian offensives due to common interests and motives, al-Shabaab started splintering even before the Kenyan intervention, and this process accelerated in the following year. One of the most prominent factors driving this process was al-Shabaab's increased brutality, which alienated even many of its own fighters. At least 1,500 insurgents defected from al-Shabaab during the Kenyan-TFG offensives, and many explained their growing distaste at having to kill innocents and steal humanitarian aid on the orders of the radical leadership.⁵⁴

Another sign of al-Shabaab's failures in coercive capacity was the clan-based infighting that became increasingly disruptive to its military operations. Despite the group's best efforts at overcoming clan divisions in the name of Somali nationalism and Islamism, al-Shabaab's constituent militias were generally clan-based, and often clashed with each other.⁵⁵ Al-Shabaab's clan divisions influenced the power struggle between the moderates and the radicals. The latter were largely comprised of northern

clans originating in Somaliland, and, with limited connections to the people of south-central Somalia, had less reticence about civilian casualties in the waging of the insurgency. In contrast, the moderates represented the clans of south-central Somalia where al-Shabaab predominantly operated, and were skeptical of the hardliners' Salafist ideology and connections with al-Qaeda.⁵⁶ The growing predominance of the radicals in al-Shabaab's leadership resulted in increased insurgent brutality and thus the alienation of its base of popular support. The internal divisions brought on by al-Shabaab's radicalization resulted in the end of Hizbul Islam's alliance with the group in September 2012. Hizbul Islam accused al-Shabaab of being un-Islamic and indicated openness to entering negotiations with the FGS, implying it was willing to join the new government if it was sufficiently Islamic.⁵⁷

Al-Shabaab also became increasingly unpopular among the populations it ruled. The insurgents administered their territory with growing brutality, implementing a very harsh interpretation of sharia law. However, by the end of 2011, al-Shabaab now struggled to provide the basic quality of life for which some Somalis had abandoned the TFG and supported the insurgents in the past. This was especially important at a time when, particularly in the second half of 2011, famine was devastating much of Somalia's rural population. Instead of prioritizing this humanitarian crisis, al-Shabaab restricted the access of humanitarian aid organizations upon which much of the population depended, even expelling the Red Cross in January 2012. These capricious actions alienated many of al-Shabaab's former supporters, who in many instances ignored the leadership's edicts on cooperating with aid organizations, and thus exacerbating the split between moderates and radicals.⁵⁸

Al-Shabaab displayed its increasingly transnational character in its recruitment of non-Somali Kenyans both prior to and after Operation Linda Nchi. In 2011, the UN reported that after 2009, al-Shabaab developed a following among Kenyans receptive to the insurgents' vision of an Islamist state crossing regional borders.⁵⁹ While this would better enable al-Shabaab to launch terrorist attacks within Kenya, it also suggested the danger that al-Shabaab was overreaching by trying to assimilate other nationalities into its vision of a regional caliphate, antagonizing other governments while losing the loyalty of its original nationalist constituents. Many in al-Shabaab resented having to take orders from jihadists who were foreigners, and some prominent members came out in opposition to pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda, including former ICU radical Hassan Aweys.⁶⁰ Al-Shabaab's administrative capacity, already flawed, was further weakened by the loss of Kismayo, from which the insurgents extracted the majority of their revenue. After the battle of Kismayo, al-Shabaab transformed into a rurally-based insurgency, no longer interested in or capable of ruling over significant populations. Al-Shabaab survived this period as a radicalized shell of the broad insurgent movement it had once been,

still capable of inflicting significant damage to Somalia but no longer on the precipice of seizing control of the country. This transformation was accelerated when Ahmed Abdi Godane, the emir of al-Shabaab, orchestrated a purge of moderates within the organization in summer 2013, doubling down on its shift towards greater extremism. This brought al-Shabaab momentary and valuable unity, but Godane's death in an American drone strike in September 2014 further weakened al-Shabaab and presaged further territorial losses that winter.⁶¹

The period discussed above was arguably a turning point in the Somali Civil War, as al-Shabaab was pushed back from the edges of Mogadishu and suffered repeated defeats on the battlefield. By the beginning of 2013, al-Shabaab no longer controlled any major cities or towns in Somalia, and had to transform into a rurally-based insurgency that relied increasingly on hit-and-run attacks and suicide bombings. Prior to 2011, it seemed as if Somalia was only getting more violent and unstable with every passing year. The intervention of Kenya could have further destabilized the country, as Ethiopia's in 2006 had. Yet the TFG displayed some genuine progress in developing state capacity, and weathered a potentially disruptive handover from transitional status in 2012. While the federal government would continue to struggle with significant problems of state capacity in the following years, al-Shabaab's failings proved to be more severe. Once providing an alternative to conservative Somalis and businessmen with grievances against the TFG, al-Shabaab grew more radical during this period and alienated many of its most influential constituents. As a result, the efforts of both domestic and foreign forces fighting al-Shabaab experienced more lasting progress, despite their own flaws. The decline of al-Shabaab and the gradual growth of the Somali government after 2011 presents intriguing questions and revealing insight on the relevance of state capacity to the resolution of civil wars and the fate of its combatants, both domestic and foreign. The next section will compare these different periods in the Somali Civil War from this perspective.

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Chapter 9: Conclusion

The history of intervention in Somalia has been one of tribulation and disappointment but also, after 2011, some success. Somalia's descent back into full-scale civil war a decade ago, and the threat of jihadists seizing control of the country like an African Taliban, have transitioned into a situation that, while still severe, offered some hope for recovery from state failure. The previous four chapters sought to illustrate the forces at work that resulted in a sharp deterioration in the security situation in Somalia after 2006 but to some extent reversed after 2011. Moreover, they explored the question of why the involvement of many foreign actors, including Ethiopia and the United States, struggled to remedy Somalia's internal crisis, but why Kenya seemed more successful. By operationalizing foreign intervention success as the extent of conflict-related violence and insurgent control, it was established in the first case study that the efforts of the United States to counter radical Islamism by supporting the ARPCT coalition of warlords backfired considerably. In the second case study, the lightning military success of Ethiopia against the ICU was shown to be illusory, as Ethiopia was forced to withdraw in the face of an insurgency more dangerous and radical than what they had intervened against in the first place. After Ethiopia's withdrawal, the African Union's AMISOM force sought to stabilize Somalia, but were only barely able to hold the line in Mogadishu for the better part of three years, as most of the rest of the country fell under the rule of al-Shabaab. However, from mid-2011, intervention in Somalia experienced markedly greater success. First, AMISOM and the TFG successfully defeated al-Shabaab in the battle of Mogadishu. Soon after, Kenya's cross-border offensive against al-Shabaab resulted in a series of unexpected defeats for the Islamist group, culminating in their rout in Kismayo in October 2012, and their transition to a rural insurgency rather than a rival proto-state.

The four case studies corresponded with subtle but significant trends in state capacity, operationalized across many different dimensions, including measurements of government effectiveness, the extent of corruption, the rule of law, and standards of living. These chapters established the woeful lack of central government state capacity provided by both the TFG and the ARPCT, and the relative improvement during the brief rule of the ICU. They proceeded to observe the initial failure of the TFG to build up state capacity following the Ethiopian invasion, and how al-Shabaab was able to exploit this by providing capacity of their own. However, despite initially displaying serious deficits of capacity, the TFG proved capable of regaining the loyalty of its populace by making subtle but important improvements on several dimensions of state capacity. Having assessed my two variables in each case study, however, what remains is to better establish the connection between the two

variables, by comparing each case study and considering possible alternative explanations to the argument put forward in this thesis.

Understanding why some foreign interventions in civil wars succeed and others do not is an intensely complicated matter. This is especially the case in a civil war as complex and protracted as Somalia's. At the same time, the fact that Somalia experienced so many different foreign interventions over the course of a decade does allow for the benefit of comparative analysis. While these interventions included different actors with some distinctions in strategies and interests, they were generally motivated by a counterinsurgency mission that aimed to shore up an extremely weak government against hostile domestic enemies. For example, although the United States made a conscious decision to provide support for the *de facto* central government rather than the *de jure* TFG government in its support for the ARPCT, it was still motivated by a desire to preserve stability and suppress emerging Islamist forces in the country. While Ethiopia overthrew the *de facto* ruling government of the ICU, it did so partially in defense of the internationally-recognized TFG, which it proceeded to defend. This thesis is less concerned with why Ethiopia was able to defeat the ICU so readily (its superiority in conventional military strength was transparent) than why it failed to pacify Somalia in its subsequent two-year occupation. There were undeniably different underlying interests amongst the interventions. The United States was particularly concerned with the presence of al-Qaeda because of the War on Terror, and thus paid less attention to the political implications of their support for the ARPCT. Ethiopia and Kenya both had immediate security concerns, with the former also seeking to undermine what it perceived to be the allies of Eritrea, and the latter seeking to establish a buffer zone in Jubaland. While the UN and AMISOM were at least ostensibly neutral, their interventions strictly intended to shore up a legitimate government, the interventions were generally alike in their support for the central government, with none favoring the Islamist insurgents.

Furthermore, with one arguable exception, it is difficult to argue that the strategies of interventions differed substantially. The nature of the interventions in the first case study are indeed distinct from the subsequent interventions. The United States military did not directly intervene in support of the ARPCT, and the UN did not provide any military support to the TFG at all during that period. However, the subsequent three interventions display important similarities in how they involved military forces cooperating with the domestic forces of the TFG in both defensive and offensive capacities against insurgents. Their military strategies and capacities, as discussed in the case studies, were not fundamentally different. In fact, one could argue that the contrasting experiences of Ethiopia and Kenya directly contradict the notion that it was the amount of military force brought to bear by the

intervener that determined the success of the intervention. Ethiopia has one of the largest and most powerful militaries in Africa, battle-tested by a long civil war and two major interstate wars in recent decades (the wars with Somalia in 1977-78 and with Eritrea in 1998-2000). It was this military superiority that allowed them to initially overwhelm the ICU. In contrast, Kenya's military is decidedly smaller, and prior to 2011 had no experience in extraterritorial intervention. It nonetheless played a vital role in undermining al-Shabaab and promoting its own interests (with the establishment of an autonomous area in Jubaland) in the course of its intervention.

Some might still argue that while conventional military strength was not the major determinant of intervention success, the varying quality of the different interventions' counterinsurgency strategies was decisive. There is limited evidence, however, to suggest that Ethiopia, Kenya, AMISOM, or the United States approached counterinsurgency in dramatically different ways, militarily speaking. While there are distinctions to be observed between the nature of the former two interventions and the latter two, when it comes to the sociopolitical dimensions of counterinsurgency, there is little reason to believe that these distinctions were influential in determining intervention success. To elaborate, Ethiopia and Kenya unilaterally intervened in Somalia, albeit with the cooperation of the TFG. In many cases, they had significant responsibility over the territory they liberated from insurgents, and thus potential failures of counterinsurgency strategy, which often necessitate winning hearts and minds, could have emerged. In contrast, the United States supported the ARPCT in a more indirect manner, and AMISOM generally sought neutrality and to respect the sovereignty of the TFG it was defending. It was not in their mandate to engage in nation-building or pursue individual agendas in the course of fighting al-Shabaab. In both cases, the US and AMISOM left the political matter of securing the loyalty of the population to the central government. However, despite their similarly unilateral approaches to counterinsurgency, Kenya and Ethiopia had widely divergent experiences in Somalia, as did, to a lesser extent, the United States and AMISOM. In other words, there are no clear, consistent explanations for what aspect of Kenya's counterinsurgency strategy, both militarily and politically, contributed to its success that was lacking in the strategies of the United States, Ethiopia, and, to a slightly lesser extent, AMISOM. Conversely, there is no obvious common factor in the strategies of the US, Ethiopia, and AMISOM that can explain the failures of their interventions.

Theories emphasizing interethnic and international tension as a significant factor in determining the success of each intervention are also flawed. The argument seems plausible at first glance, as ethnic pride and nationalism could have incited the Somali population to resist the involvement of a specific intervener more than another. However, upon closer observation, it becomes apparent that Somalis

generally did not look favorably upon any of the interventions, and yet the extent of success varied for each. Even amidst state collapse, many Somalis have clung to a sense of nationalism that could have imperiled any foreign intervening force, no matter how benign their professed intentions were. The United States' intervention in the 1990s, supposedly purely humanitarian, was faced with heavy distrust among many Somalis, especially after the US' military actions started incurring civilian casualties. The debacle of the 1990s meant that the ARPCT was tarnished by its association with the United States. Ethiopia had a similarly negative history with Somalia, which facilitated al-Shabaab's ability to rally support against what many considered the national enemy of Somalis. Somalia's humiliating defeat in the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977-78, the irredentist claims of many Somalis to the ethnic Somali region of Ogaden in Ethiopia, and Ethiopia's alleged meddling in Somalia early in the civil war all contributed to considerable anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis.

But many of these factors also applied to Somalia's history with Kenya. Ethnic Somalis had a similarly bloody history in Kenya, involving insurrections and massacres over the course of decades. Many of the same Somali nationalists calling for a greater Somalia incorporating the Ogaden also sought the Somali-populated border regions of Kenya. Furthermore, Kenya's implicit agenda in Somalia (the establishment of a buffer state in Jubaland) was in some respects a greater affront to Somalia's sovereignty than Ethiopia's involvement, which had no such designs on Somalian territory. There was thus obviously a potential for nationalist blowback against the Kenyan intervention, just as there had been against Ethiopia. Indeed, al-Shabaab sought to retaliate against Kenya any way it could, including with vicious terrorist attacks. But this was not enough to rebuild al-Shabaab's support among many Somalis after the Kenyan incursion. Despite the similar history of international tension, there were obvious distinctions between the success of the Ethiopian and the Kenyan interventions. As for AMISOM, its intervention was not noticeably aided by being a peacekeeping force comprised of African soldiers from countries with no territorial or ethnic disputes with Somalia, authorized by the African Union. Although Somalis did not have the same vitriol for Ugandans and Burundians as they did for Ethiopians and Kenyans, AMISOM's forces struggled to hold the line against al-Shabaab for years, as the appeal of Somali nationalism and Islamism were still strong for the insurgents' supporters, despite AMISOM's professed neutrality. Only in 2011, when Kenya intervened, did AMISOM offensives start making more progress. Evidently, there are factors independent of interethnic and international tension that contributed to the relative success or failure of these interventions.

Another significant factor often considered in analyses of the Somali Civil War is the role that clans played in internal conflict. Although Somalia is unique among African countries for being largely

comprised of one ethnicity, Somalis have still been sharply divided along clan lines, which contributed to the formation of clan-based militias that feuded for control after Siad Barre's fall. However, there is little evidence from the case studies to suggest that the composition of clans in the central government and among the insurgents dramatically affected the success of foreign intervention. Clan politics undoubtedly played a role in the formation of Somalia's central government, first with the creation of the Transitional National Government, and then with the TFG. However, the inability of the central government and its foreign backers to sufficiently satisfy certain clan interests can be seen as a consequence of limited state capacity. While the failure of the TNG to include clans beyond the Mogadishu-centered Hawiye clan likely alienated vast segments of the population, the TFG was created with clan inclusion being a higher priority. Opposition to the TFG emerged primarily not because any particular clan was too dominant or because other clans had specific grievances towards it. In fact, what was remarkable about the emergence of the ICU, and al-Shabaab after it, was how Islamism and Somali nationalism transcended the clan divisions that had characterized the civil war for so long, and unified many Somalis in opposition to a central government that was seen as corrupt and ineffective.

The TFG's inability to satisfy clan elders, who were an important traditional source of authority in Somali society, played a more important role in the perpetuation of armed conflict and thus the failure of foreign intervention. In failing to earn the support of these important interest groups, the TFG's legitimacy was undermined in the eyes of many Somalis, and prevented the government from coopting traditional sources of juridical authority. However, this lack of support from the elders in itself is representative of the central government's juridical state capacity. The TFG initially failed to provide an effective justice system, and this contributed to the decision of influential clan elders to support insurgents who were seen as more honest and more committed to traditional Islamic values. However, by the time of the Kenyan intervention, al-Shabaab had started alienating clan elders with their extremism, and the TFG had started making gradual progress towards greater political reconciliation and improving its administrative and juridical capacity. The TFG's inclusion of clan elders in the process of writing the constitution and giving them influence over the selection of parliamentarians to prevent the return of the hated warlords to political power were both deft decisions that bolstered the government's credibility among interest groups that had previously been hostile to it. In summary, while clan identity has played an important role in Somali politics, it sustained insurgency only in so far as the central government's administrative and juridical capacity failed to satisfy influential clan elders.

While differences in military strategy, interethnic relations, and clan politics may have played their own parts in the success or failure of foreign intervention in overcoming Somalia's insurgents,

there does not seem to be much evidence to suggest that any one of these factors was dominant in determining intervention success across all four cases. But what reason is there to believe that state capacity, this thesis' hypothesized independent variable, is the dominant determinant of intervention success? For one, the previous four chapters aimed to establish measurable trends in the operationalizations of this thesis' two variables. While not perfectly matching, there seems to be a noticeable correlation across cases between the success of foreign intervention and the extent of state capacity. This is visible upon examining the data for each case study. The UCDP data presented in Table 8.1 indicates that Kenya's intervention was the only one which resulted in a decline in violence in its immediate aftermath. After a bloody 2012 in which Kenyan forces and their allies made hard-fought gains against al-Shabaab, violence declined in the following years, with the death toll in 2013 (1,045) being the lowest since 2005 (309). Similarly, the BTI's aggregate indicator for state capacity, the status index, steadily declined during the periods of the first three interventions, but improved noticeably during Kenya's intervention. Although the status index for 2011-13 (1.32) was still quite low by international standards, its increase relative to the previous period was indicative that the TFG was making credible efforts to improve its capacity, thus giving relevant interest groups some confidence that Somalia was on the path to reconstruction.

It is worth noting that intervention success and failure is a matter of degree rather than a dichotomous distribution and that not all interventions succeeded or failed to the same extent. The first intervention, that of the US in support of the ARPCT, failed the most dramatically, because it was the only case in which the central government in question was actually overthrown. It was also at this time that state capacity was in some respects at its worst, and that there was the greatest backlash among the population against the ruling elites, as attested to by primary sources responding with glee to the fall of the ARPCT. In the second intervention, the central government (the TFG) survived, but only barely, and in a markedly worse position than when it had been installed after the Ethiopian invasion. Ethiopia had started its occupation with its forces in control of much of the country and the ICU routed, but withdrew with al-Shabaab in control of vast amounts of territory. Correspondingly, in its early months and years, the TFG struggled to develop its own capacity and legitimacy, and significant amounts of Somalis sympathized instead with the insurgents.

The third intervener, AMISOM, had similar difficulties in inflicting lasting defeats on the insurgents, but unlike with Ethiopia, this period of intervention ended with the insurgency weaker than at the start, al-Shabaab having lost the battle of Mogadishu. Thus while it is difficult to qualify AMISOM's intervention a success, it cannot be considered a failure on par with the United States' or Ethiopia's.

Similarly, the picture of state capacity during this period was also mixed, with the TFG still stagnating or even declining on many measures, but also showing signs of pursuing reform more seriously, at a time when al-Shabaab was just starting to alienate some of its supporters. Finally, the fourth intervention, Kenya's, can be considered the greatest success, as it inflicted lasting military defeats that al-Shabaab would not reverse, even years after the Kenyan operation ended. It was during this time the TFG weathered the long-awaited transition into becoming the FGS, and started making more consistent progress towards developing proper state capacity. Even though Somalia still measured among the world's most poorly-governed countries in the following years, it was the positive movement towards greater capacity, as measured by indicators and attested to by reliable sources, that distinguished this period of intervention from its predecessors.

Although there seems to be a noticeable correlation across the four case studies between foreign intervention success and state capacity, one might argue that this by no means implies causality between the two variables. While causality can be difficult to demonstrate empirically without a significant quantity of data, it can still be inferred from the correlation in intervention success and state capacity when other possible variables, like the ones reviewed above, are not plausible alternatives. We can also infer that it is not likely that intervention success is affecting state capacity more than vice versa. There is little evidence that military victories by interveners on the battlefield translated into the development of state capacity. Ethiopia won an overwhelming victory over the ICU, but this did not prevent the TFG from losing popularity and legitimacy due to its severe issues of capacity. Instead, the TFG was required to demonstrate its state capacity in order to retain the victories won by interveners on the battlefield. None of the interveners could replace the role of the state that Somalia's own central government had to fulfill. Instead, state capacity translated into enduring military success because the TFG was better able to provide law and order, justice, social spending, and functioning governance after Kenya's intervention than in previous interventions. Whereas military successes by Ethiopia and AMISOM prior to 2011 had been followed by a failure of the TFG to regain the loyalty of influential powerbrokers (such as clan elders and business elites), the improvement in the TFG's capacity over al-Shabaab's after Kenya's intervention helped consolidate Kenya's military gains by securing the loyalty of these interest groups. Al-Shabaab was not successful in returning to many of the areas, particularly cities and towns, from which Kenya and its allies ousted them, primarily because the local population was more willing to support the TFG than they had before.

In the absence of sufficient coercive capacity from the TFG, insurgents like al-Shabaab had an opportunity to present their own form of capacity. This would not necessarily have translated into a

sustainable insurgency had the TFG not also failed to provide other important forms of capacity, including fiscal, administrative, and juridical. When the government failed to provide security, reasonable living standards, justice, and a functioning bureaucracy for its citizens, many Somalis looked more favorably upon the insurgents, who at first demonstrated greater competence in providing for these needs. Insurgents like the ICU and al-Shabaab were especially effective in securing the loyalty of important interest groups whose support the TFG required for stability and legitimacy. These included the aforementioned clan elders, as well as business elites that had developed their influence during the most anarchic years of the civil war and wanted a stable, uncorrupt business climate to operate in, which for a time the insurgents seemed better able to provide than the central government. So long as the central government was not able to satisfy these interests, the insurgency had a social and political foundation that allowed it to return to cities and towns even after being ousted from them militarily. Regardless of the size or even the strategy of the intervening military, no intervention force could wrest an entire country from the insurgents if a significant portion of the population supported them over the central government.

In conclusion, the Somali Civil War has been one of the most intractable and complicated conflicts confronting international security since it started three decades ago. Few other countries have experienced so many different foreign interventions, many of which only exacerbated conflict and were counterproductive to the interests of the intervener. However, after Kenya's intervention against al-Shabaab in 2011-12, many observers expressed optimism for the first time that Somalia could be on the path to peace, stability, and reconstruction. Almost 8 years after that intervention, Somalia remains a dangerous place, but not a failed state on the precipice of an Islamist takeover, as it had been for several years in the late 2000s. It is therefore not unfair to characterize Somalia as a qualified success story, given the dire situation it had been in only a decade ago. Understanding why earlier interventions failed where Kenya and, to a lesser extent, AMISOM more recently succeeded is pertinent not only to gaining more insight on how and why the security situation in Somalia has improved. It is also relevant to one of the more vexing questions in the study of international relations: why foreign interventions in civil wars succeed or fail in general. Whether it be Russia's involvement in Syria or Saudi Arabia's in Yemen, foreign interventions continue to characterize civil wars to the present day, for better or for worse. While there is obviously considerable diversity in the kinds of foreign interventions and civil wars occurring around the world, it was the intent of this thesis to present some generalizable insight on why some interventions into complex civil wars like Somalia's succeed or fail.

Accordingly, this thesis has portrayed the Somali Civil War as a complex conflict in which many different factors and actors have played important roles. But from the evidence reviewed in the previous chapters, a strong, reasonable case can be put forward that the state capacity of the central government has been the most influential determinant of foreign intervention success over the course of the civil war. This hypothesis considered state capacity across four dimensions (coercive, fiscal, administrative, and juridical) and detailed how failings on the part of the central government (first as the ARPCT warlord coalition and then as the various incarnations of the TFG) across all these dimensions served to undermine foreign intervention success in the initial interventions considered here. This occurred because the government alienated large portions of the population, particularly influential interest groups like clan elders and business elites, who were persuaded by the superior alternative capacity demonstrated by insurgents like the ICU and al-Shabaab to instead support the insurgency. Through this hypothesized mechanism, even the application of military force by a formidable power like Ethiopia was not able to roll back insurgent violence and territorial control lastingly. Only when the central government started winning over its own population, as the insurgents themselves grew too extreme, could a foreign intervention like Kenya's, replete with many of the same risks Ethiopia faced, succeed. This central hypothesis has been supported by evidence laid out in each of the four case studies. Data provided by reliable sources like the UCDP helped demonstrate and operationalize the success or failure of each foreign intervention. Respected sources like the Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank, among others, as well as indicators provided by NGOs and even some primary sources, attested to the degree of state capacity during each intervention, both holistically and on each dimension. This evidence indicated a noticeable correlation between the dependent variable of intervention success and the independent variable of state capacity. This correlation, taken together with the unlikeliness, as detailed above, that alternative hypotheses such as clan politics, interethnic hostility, or differing military strategies could have explained the variation in intervention success, gives good reason to suggest a causal relationship exists between these two variables, in line with my hypothesis.

The importance of state capacity in influencing the course of Somalia's civil war and its many interventions should be emphasized. Many powerful countries have confronted the challenges of stabilizing a chaotic failed state since the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. However, too many failed to recognize that no amount of firepower could compensate for a central government that was unwilling or unable to provide what its constituents demanded, whether that be security, justice, or social services. The implications of this paper's hypothesis can be readily generalized to the question of

intervention in civil wars in general, albeit with consideration for individual context. Too often, powerful interveners have expected that they could resolve complex civil wars through superior force, willpower, and resources alone. But the lessons of Somalia, as have also been arguably observed in cases from Iraq to Afghanistan, is that for a foreign intervention to succeed, it is almost always necessary to have a local partner in the central government with the state capacity to secure the loyalty of its subjects. It is precisely this tendency that makes nation-building such a perilous and difficult challenge, when states have to be reconstructed, sometimes from nothing. But if subsequent interveners seek to confront conflicts as complex and vicious as Somalia's, they would be wise to heed the experiences of the United States, Ethiopia, AMISOM, and Kenya. Each discovered the importance that state capacity had in determining whether an intervention can become a humiliating quagmire, like Ethiopia's, or a fairly quick victory, like Kenya's. These lessons should be considered not only in regards to new civil wars that emerge in the following years, but to old cases, like Somalia itself. In the last couple of years, violence has started creeping up again, although the insurgency is still far from its strength a decade ago. The Trump administration and other foreign actors would be wise to bear in mind the experience of past interventions in Somalia, as would the central government in Mogadishu itself, which must stay the course of reform and development lest it see its hard-fought gains erode. It would be a tragedy if a country that has backed away from the precipice through the gradual development of its state capacity returned to chaos once more.