

Minority Legislators & Legislative Effectiveness in Congress

A thesis presented

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Abstract

Given the relatively new membership of racial and ethnic members of Congress, is there variation in their effectiveness within the legislative process compared to their white counterparts? Moreover, how does early tenure in the legislature function (if at all) in shifting the effectiveness of racial and ethnic minority members of Congress in pushing forward their legislative agenda? I explore these questions by utilizing the Center for Effective Lawmaking's Legislative Effectiveness Datasets of the House and the Senate from 1973-2017. Empirically, my results suggest that non-white members of Congress's effectiveness vary between the two chambers. I find that racial minority members of Congress are legislatively less effective than their white counterparts in the House when in the Majority party. In contrast, these findings were less evident in the Senate. Moreover, This thesis seeks to contribute to the rich scholarship that investigates the role of descriptive representation in substantive representation.

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Chapter 1


Introduction

There are burgeoning shifts in the congressional membership of the nation’s legislature. In 2019, the 116th Congress ushered in the most racially and ethnically diverse class yet with 116 members recognized as Black, Latinx or Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI). This marshaled a record 22% of the voting members of the United States (U.S.) Congress being racial and ethnic minorities¹. Indeed, this demographic shift in the legislative body signifies an upward trend where—for the last five consecutive congressional terms—racial and ethnic minority legislators are running increasingly triumphant campaigns and securing more seats at the table (Bialik 2019). Figure 1.1 below illustrates the growing faction of non-white members of Congress in the bicameral legislature, whereby non-white House members have a significant increase across congressional sessions while non-white Senators have more modest but steady additions.

Beyond these historic shifts, the very presence of minority legislators along the halls of Congress signals to the polity a symbolic implication of who is suitable to rule (Mansbridge 1999; Sanbonmatsu 2015). Thus, the historically homogeneous legislative ecosystem of Congress indicates arcane—perhaps exclusionary—conduction of legislative business. That is, legislative activities have traditionally been presided by white members of Congress. The arrival of minority legislators in the contemporary Congress warrants an investigation of how demographic characteristics influence their lawmaking. Given the relatively new membership of racial and ethnic members of Congress, is there variation in their effectiveness within the

¹I define minority in this analysis as racial and ethnic minorities of Black, Latinx, and AAPI backgrounds. However, I recognize other legislative minorities (defined by, e.g., class, gender, or party). Additionally, I exclude Native, Indigenous members of Congress. Though, future scholarship should seek to examine Native, Indigenous MCs with three new members in the 116th and 117th Congresses who joined the ranks of the other Native, Indigenous MCs.

Figure 1.1: Non-White Members of Congress, 93rd-115th Congressional Sessions



legislative process compared to their white counterparts? Moreover, how does early tenure in the legislature function (if at all) in shifting the effectiveness of racial and ethnic minority members of Congress in pushing forward their legislative agenda?

Considering these questions, there have been scholars that have sought to contribute to the longstanding and persistent discourse on representation vis-à-vis the politics of race and ethnicity. Within the literature, they looked to explain the mechanics of descriptive representation and its merits concerning substantive representation among different legislative minorities (Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran, 1996; Casellas, 2015; Gay, 2002; Grose, 2011;

Mansbridge, 1999; Tate, 2003; Swain, 2006; Rouse, 2013; Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer, 2013). Pioneering scholarship define descriptive representation as when a representative shares the same characteristics or lived experiences as the people with whom they represent² (Griffiths and Wolheim, 1960, p. 188; Pitkin, 1972). In contrast, substantive representation is defined more broadly as representatives representing and prioritizing their constituents' interests, not bound by descriptive markers.

Seminal work like Mansbridge (1999) argues that there are benefits for constituents represented by their descriptive representative for greater substantive representation in contexts of more pronounced representative-constituent communication via shared experiences. She contends that this is especially true from those represented by historically distrustworthy representatives. Moreover, Mansbridge argues that descriptive representatives push for higher quality deliberation of previously neglected minority interests. Beyond substantive representation, Mansbridge argues that descriptive representatives also prove beneficial in more symbolic instances, such as in “constructing social meaning and de facto legitimacy” (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 648).

On the contrary, Swain (2003) argues that descriptive representation is less so important, in fact, unnecessary to push for substantive representation. Instead, minority (Black) legislators should aim to deliver substantive interests by legislating with representatives with different backgrounds. Fenno (2003) provides more nuance and emphasizes the burden and responsibility Black representatives carry in representing underrepresented communities across the nation, not just in the confines of their congressional districts through his qualitative study—also known as surrogate representation. While Mansbridge argues that descriptive representation motivates substantive representation (varies by context) and Swain posits a different view. These early debates have produced scholarship generated by researchers to

²e.g., black legislators represent black constituents, or farmers represent a farming-centric district (Mansbridge, 1999).

reach a consensus if there are links between the two.

Does a legislator's racial and ethnic identity matter in their effectiveness as a lawmaker—pushing forward their legislative agenda—in national politics? In essence, this is the central question I seek to answer in this thesis. While others have argued that it does, for instance, Griffin & Keane (2006) “show that minority lawmakers are often less well positioned in Congress to advance the interests of the black community and are, in general, somewhat less effective legislators” (Griffin 2014, p. 331). Moreover, this position is consistent with Volden and Wiseman's (2013) findings where African American MCs are found to be less effective than their white counterparts. Rocca and Sanchez (2008) provide more nuance from these findings and argue that racial minority legislator's effectiveness is contingent on which party holds Congress. Therefore, there may be impeding factors as to why racial and ethnic MCs are less effective than their white counterparts. However, these findings do not touch upon certain factors influencing their ineffectiveness.

The U.S. Congress, as an institution, conducts legislative business in a distinct and idiosyncratic manner. Congress is filled with rules and regulations and bureaucratic intricacies that members of Congress have to navigate to accomplish what they set out to do—which is to influence the legislative agenda. Members of Congress must intricately decipher the puzzle of effective lawmaking. Some may naturally have a knack for legislating. Some come from political dynasties, where they have been exposed to the role early on. While others utilize networks that help them better integrate in Congress. There have been efforts to bridge these disparate advantages. The growing number of racial and ethnic minority members of Congress has resulted in a network of different racial and ethnic congressional caucuses.

The first was established in 1971, called the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). In 1976, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) was formed. Lastly, in 1994, the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus (CAPAC) was launched. These three caucuses were founded to prioritize their respective racial and ethnic-specific concerns. In 2001, all three

caucuses met to commiserate and bridge the gap and create a collective legislative agenda that meets the concerns of their respective caucus priorities (Clemetson, 2002). In so doing, this allowed the three caucuses to develop political clout and act as a unified group with an influential voice in Congress. In recent times, the Tri-caucus—composed of the CBC, CHC, and CAPAC—release public statements that signal to the Congress writ-large their legislative bargaining power. While researchers have investigated the impact of minority congressional caucuses, previous findings show disparate results on its effects and its role as an organization (Barnett, 1975; Brenson, 2016; Champagne and Rieselbach, 1995; Singh, 1998). Additionally, little is known about the impact of the recently formed Tri-Caucus, as well as in general the legislative differences of Asian American Pacific Islander members of Congress.

Chapter 2

Literature Review & Theoretical Considerations

2.1 Related Literature

2.1.1 Minority Legislators

In helping to motivate why might we expect that racial and ethnic minority members of Congress differ in their legislative effectiveness compared to their white counterparts, can we find literature that suggests that they act differently outside of Congress? That is, are there legislative or behavioral differences between racial and ethnic legislators and their white counterparts outside of the nation's legislature? In the electoral arena, there is evidence that indicates that minority candidates shift turnout, where they improve their respective subgroups' turnout (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Griffin and Keane, 2006; Washington, 2006) c.f. (Gay, 2001; Keele et al., 2018). This alludes to possible electoral appeals or unique strategies that these minority candidates are employing to win an electoral seat compared to their white candidate counterparts, which may impact political participation. Additionally, there have been studies identifying the benefits of Latino candidates in the electoral process and their impact on voter choice, knowledge, and district competitiveness (Manzano Sanchez, 2010; Sigelman et al., 1995; Branton, 2009).

Moreover, McDermott (1998) explores through his quasi-experimental data and finds that voters evaluate candidates through ideological cues through the lens of race. That is, voters are more likely to perceive minority candidates to be more liberal than their white counterparts, even after all else is identical besides race. This is also shown in how constituents perceive their representatives. Gay (2002) aimed to uncover the opinions of the

constituents of these descriptive representatives. She finds that white constituents place a higher premium on their representative's race concerning descriptive representation than Black constituents. Black constituents rely more on policy similarities with their representatives and not so much on their descriptive characteristics. However, Gay argues that Black constituents are more likely to reach out to their representative if they share the same race. This implies that voters and constituents alike place minority candidates and representatives in a different standard or different assessments that determine whether they approve of them or not. Thus, minority candidates and representatives have to either outperform or appease their constituents differently compared to their white counterparts.

Once minority candidates overcome obstacles present in the electoral stage, political scientists have considered how minority legislators impact representation and pushing for substantive interests of their minority constituencies. In subnational legislatures, Bratton and Haynie (1999) have investigated that minority legislators have distinctly different policy agendas compared to their white counterparts. Herring (1990) also present similar findings as Haynie (1999) in examining state senators in three deep Southern State legislatures—Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana—where he looks at roll call voting behaviors and found that racial and ethnic legislators were more likely to vote in favor of minority interest bills (bills that have a sizeable racial component in content). These findings provide further suspicion that minority legislators are likely to act differently than their non-minority counterparts, which may also display that because of their different legislative priorities, it may also be the case that they have different legislative strategies when in Congress.

In the U.S. Congress, Welch and Hibbing (1984) find that Latino representatives are more likely to push for more liberal policies than their non-Latino counterparts if they have majority Latino constituencies. Contrastingly, Hero and Tolbert contest that there is no such link. This may be caused by the Democratic party agenda, and that substantive representation is more correlated with the party's influence. Grose (2011) contends that

African American legislators deliver greater substantive representation than their non-Black counterparts by more acutely engaging in constituency services, especially with districts with large African American constituencies.

Bernhard and Sulkin (2018) further exemplifies this, when investigating the legislative styles of freshmen racial minority members of Congress between the 101st to 110th. They find correlations that racial minority MCs adopt “policy specialist” and “district advocates” styles. The former denotes a legislative style that tailors their time through focused agendas, championing specific issues. In comparison, the latter style reflects a more significant dedication to allocating resources back to their home districts. These findings warrant further examination of how racial minority members of Congress push forth substantive representation. That is, there is corroborating evidence that at-face-value, racial minority MCs aim to push for substantive representation. However, institutional barriers may prevent them from pursuing their intention to push their legislative agendas. They often do this by evaluating the minority legislators’ roll-call voting behaviors (e.g., Cameron et al., 1996; Canon, 1999; Griffin and Newman, 2007; Grose, 2011; Lublin, 1999; Swain, 1995; Whitby, 2000). However, roll call voting behavior does not take into account other factors that are necessary to be an effective lawmaker.

2.1.2 Definition and Measurement of Legislative Effectiveness

I hope to measure how racial and ethnic minorities are navigating the legislative process and putting forward their agendas. Therefore, I employ an evaluation beyond roll-call voting behaviors of these representatives but consider their legislative effectiveness. Scholars have generated diverse literature on the determinants and measurements of a successful legislator (e.g., Mayhew, 2000; Miquel and Snyder, 2004; Schiller, 1995; Wawro, 2000). Anzia and Berry define a legislator’s success by evaluating a Congress member’s ability to distribute federal spending to their constituents (Anzia and Berry 2011). While others may be more

interested in assessing their fundraising capacities or their responsiveness to constituent concerns via constituency outreach, the former more commonly known as “fundraising effectiveness” and the latter as “electoral effectiveness” (Wiseman and Volden, 2009). While these performance measures are equally important to assess a representative’s effectiveness, I am most interested in analyzing their legislative effectiveness—their central role as a lawmaker and their ability to push for their constituents’ needs and preferences into more tangible policy via the advancement of legislation.

To trace the rich scholarship generated in examining legislative effectiveness, I look to Matthews (1960) as he aimed to measure a Senator’s bill and resolution sponsorship and passage divided by the total they put forward, which would later be referred to as what Franztich (1979) called “batting average”—the proportion of a congressperson’s bills passed out of the chamber against the bills they introduced. Building upon Matthews and Franztich’s studies in capturing legislative success and effectiveness, Moore and Thomas (1990) contend that Matthews and Franztich’s measure does not consider committee-level success. Therefore they indicate legislative effectiveness as a Senator’s ability to pass their bills through the committee stage divided by those they proposed overall. Some scholars measure performance by analyzing the bills introduced through the legislative process and passed the committee level or out of the chamber (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman, 2003; Cox and Terry, 2008; Hasecke and Mycoff, 2007). While these metrics to determine legislative effectiveness were essential to understanding how effective a legislator can be in one aspect of lawmaking, thus capturing the essence of a legislator’s effectiveness and their success in navigating the legislative process, I aim to utilize a measure that provides a more complete view of what legislators do and accomplish in Congress

I aim to build upon previous scholarships that measure legislative effectiveness and inherit more novel approaches to determining a legislator’s success. Utilizing Craig Volden and Alan Wiseman’s examination of legislator performance, they illustrate that legislative effec-

tiveness is the “proven ability to advance a member’s agenda items through the legislative process and into law.” The application of this definition is illustrated by their introduction of the Legislative Effectiveness Score. First, Volden and Wiseman identified a legislator’s bill introduction record, and then where in the bill’s legislative life cycle. Second, they create a mechanism to categorize all bills. This protocol enabled Volden and Wiseman to account for the bills’ variances, in that some bills may be more challenging to move through the legislative process than others. Thus, the combination of a congress member’s bill progress and the ability to pass more significant bills are assigned a legislative effectiveness score (Volden and Wiseman, 2009 and 2014).

2.2 Theoretical Considerations

The following hypotheses below first aim to confirm previous scholarship that argue that there are mechanisms to which minority legislators are subject to less effective lawmaking through institutional barriers. Then, I hypothesize the ways these same legislators mitigate these racialized hurdles throughout their early tenure in Congress.

2.2.1 Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypothesis

Extensive scholarship rests on the idea of a “party brand,” where legislators under the same party often will aim to maintain a reputation and often vote or act cohesively (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Snyder and Groseclose, 2000). While these arguments often look at how parties work as a unit or how they discipline their rank-and-file members to act accordingly, I theorize that these same mechanisms occur at the caucus-level. Caucus members share similar legislative agendas and often work as a unit and utilize their political clout to leverage their substantive interests. Specifically, I believe

this is true for the Tri-caucus—CBC, CHC, and CAPAC—because they have established that they will seek to push for and advocate for one another’s legislative interests and work in solidarity with one another. Some scholars argue that minority congressional caucuses are often just weakly-linked networks within Congress and that they are merely there to form affinity relationships (Singh, 1998). I deviate from Singh (1998) and I model my theory from Brenson (2016), where she contends against Singh’s view and posits that minority congressional caucuses play an integral role in the legislative process because of the resources and networks that go into these caucuses.

Previously, researchers examined the effects of racial and ethnic identity of legislators separately (Grose, 2011; Hall, 1996; Minta, 2011). That is, they often look to examine one racial group at a time. I propose that this view does not take into account the critical role relationships play in Congress. That is why I hope to examine the three racial groups—Black, Latinx, and AAPI—in the aggregate, precisely because in Congress, they have been vocal about signaling to the public that they are a united front via public statements. Additionally, Brenson (2016) argues that while studies of minority congressional caucuses were previously examining the elasticity of their voting cohesion, “caucuses as organizations...assist members’ individual and collective agenda-setting behavior” (Brenson 2016, p. 10). These networks receive advantages that can translate into the caucus staff they work with. They share similar legislative profiles, which furthers the idea that they will act similarly even as individual legislators.

Moreover, Building upon previous research that Volden and Wiseman (2013) established, which found evidence to support that when African American MCs are legislating in the majority, Black MCs perform less effectively than when they are in the minority party, in which they are equally effective as their non-Black co-partisan colleagues. This underperformance in navigating the legislative process is a result of compounding factors. Additionally, these barriers to effective lawmaking may not be as pronounced when in the minority party because

of expected overall ineffectiveness from minority party members to pursue their legislative agendas because the majority party often overtakes the agenda. I argue that Latinx and AAPI MCs will also result in similar outcomes when in the majority and in the minority party because of the identical, if not the same, strategies influenced by the caucuses. Additionally, I note that there are distinct institutional differences between the House and the Senate. Volden and Wiseman (2018) suggest that the Senate is “considered to be far more egalitarian and individualistic than the hierarchical and institutionally driven House” (Volden and Wiseman 2018, p.2; e.g., MacNeil and Baker 2013). While there are institutional differences, I posit the same hypothesis for the Senate because, unlike the House, more racial and ethnic MCs in their legislative body than there are in the Senate. Therefore, I argue that this disadvantage in numbers alludes to the fact that their resources provided through the caucus may be less apparent, resulting in the same hypothesis as in the House. I introduce my racial minority effectiveness hypotheses:

H₁ : *In the House, when in the majority party, racial and ethnic minority MCs are less effective than white MCs. In the minority party, racial and ethnic minority MCs and non-minority MCs are likely to be equally effective.*

H₂ : *In the Senate, when in the majority party, racial and ethnic minority senators are less effective than white senators. In the minority party, racial and ethnic minority senators and non-minority senators are likely to be equally effective.*

2.2.2 Learning-curve Hypothesis

While in my racial minority effectiveness hypothesis, I argued that racial minority MCs are either less effective or just as effective, depending on which party controls Congress. I posit that this ineffectiveness may be due in part to the inexperience or disadvantages present. Although at face value, it seems as though racial and ethnic minority MCs seem less effective lawmakers. This ineffectiveness may be countered by a more significant improvement in

effectiveness from their first term in Congress to their 2nd term than their white counterparts. While it is true that experience or seniority plays a role in being a better legislator (e.g., Schiller, 1995), I argue that specifically, racial and ethnic minority MCs improve at a greater rate. I theorize this by borrowing Anzia and Berry (2011) where they contend that female candidates face greater electoral challenges; thus, only the most talented candidates win electoral seats. In the same vein, I argue that only the most talented racial and ethnic minority candidates become victorious. However, because of the intricacies of Congress, they become less effective in their role as lawmakers but alleviate these disadvantages by showing a greater improvement in their early tenure.

I theorize that because of the institutional race-related bar to which minority legislators endured in the electoral landscape by winning their respective contests, they are capable of adjusting and developing more conducive strategies for more effective lawmaking—thus will be explored between their first and second terms. Their first term will then indicate that they may need first to assess how to navigate Congress’s uncharted legislative territories, resulting in less effective lawmaking. Then, once they have adjusted to the legislative institution’s demands, I predict a more firm and successful approach to performing their role as an MC, where they may find that they can better mitigate these institutional barriers and more effectively forward their legislative agendas. My learning curve hypotheses present this:

H₃ :*In the House, after one term in Congress, Racial and Ethnic minority members of Congress (MC) experience a greater improvement in more effectively navigating the legislative process than their non-minority counterparts.*

H₄ :*In the Senate, after one term in Congress, Racial and Ethnic minority senators experience a greater improvement in more effectively navigating the legislative process than their non-minority counterparts.*

Chapter 3

Data & Methods

3.1 Data Collection & Measurements

Drawing from the foundational dataset aggregated by the Center for Effective Lawmaking heralded by Craig Volden and Alan Wiseman. I will utilize their House and Senate datasets ranging from 1973-2017, 93rd -115th Congresses. Though for the purposes of my analysis, I am particularizing my scope of interest from 107th - 115th Congresses for my racial minority effectiveness hypotheses, which covers the years 2001-2017—spanning 16 years of coverage. I justify this timeline as this was the first year in which the Tri-caucus was created, which allows me to understand how their aggregated legislative power impacts their individual legislative effectiveness. The dataset includes variables from party rank, minority identification (e.g., African-American, Latino, Women), and Committee affiliation. While the dataset is comprehensive in more easily accessible and observable characteristics, I aim to fill in the gap by collecting a previously understudied and growing faction of minority legislators—Asian American Pacific Islander members of Congress.

I aim to contribute to the literature on descriptive representation by collecting the data on this variable from a primary source. I traced the legislator’s Asian American, Pacific Islander identity by utilizing the official governmental archival database, History, Art Archives: United States House of Representatives; this source displays all demographic characteristics of representatives that I identify to a particular group or identity. This aggregation of the AAPI legislators will allow me to analyze their legislative behaviors, how they may similarly behave as other racial minority MCs (or not), thus demystifying AAPI representatives’ presence in the halls of Congress.

3.1.1 Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score

To redress findings from Rocca and Sanchez (2011), I contend that their metric of legislative effectiveness does not demonstrate the nuances necessary to investigate the efficacy of minority legislators. Therefore, for my analysis, instead of just defining legislative success as the likelihood of passing non-minor bills that a legislator has sponsored, I borrow the measure put forth by Volden and Wiseman (2013), which is the legislative effectiveness score (LES).

To date, Volden and Wiseman’s comprehensive measure of legislative effectiveness indicates a consensus among congressional scholars, generating scholarship devising this measure as their primary outcome of variables. Similarly, I am following these scholars, as I am developing my analysis through Volden and Wiseman’s (2014) definition of legislative effectiveness: “the proven ability to advance a member’s agenda items through the legislative process and into law.” To generate this score, Volden and Wiseman sought to address confluent measurement indicators. First, the bill’s importance—its level of significance relative to other bills. Then, the bill’s progression across the legislative process. To address the former, they devised three distinct categories that shape the bills: (1) Commemorative/symbolic, (2) Substantively significant¹, (3) Substantive. To address the latter, they track the bill’s progression across the legislative process accounting for five components of a member’s bills:

1. Introduction of the bill.
2. Committee-level Action.
3. Beyond Committee-level Action.
4. Pass the House/Senate²
5. Enacted into law.

¹Volden and Wiseman (2014) define certain bills as substantively significant if the bill appears in the year-end *Congressional Quarterly Almanac report*.

²Volden and Wiseman (2018) employ identical methodology with the Senate.

This two-pronged approach to legislative effectiveness is considerably meticulous, thus providing more contextual and sound analyses of the efficacy of legislators—which hopes to confirm or challenge Rocca and Sanchez’s (2011) findings on Latino MCs, giving a richer contribution to minority legislator research.

3.1.2 Alternative Dependent Variables for Robustness Checks

Some congressional scholars are skeptical of the aggregation of the legislative effectiveness score, determining that the score is too reliant on a simplistic metric and may not account for the nuances of legislative success. While I am confident that the LES does provide more nuanced approaches to its measurement, I will construct robustness checks by analyzing other dependent variables. In particular, I will examine the five stages of the legislative process: (1) Bills Introduced, (2) Bills with action in Committee, (3) Bills with action beyond Committee, (4) Bills passed by the Chambers, (5) Signed into Law. While the LES does take these stages into account when it’s devised, by disaggregating the stages, I can pinpoint the variances at which stages minority legislators may be falling behind in comparison to their white counterparts.

Alternatively, a measure I could investigate is the federal spending data (e.g., Anzia and Berry, 2011), as this may also be good to use as a dependent variable for legislator performance. Though, the spending data from the Federal Assistance Awards Data System (FAADS) ends in 2010. Since the scope of my racial and ethnicity variables began in 2001, this timeline does not have enough observations and variation in that overlap to use the federal spending data as an outcome.

3.1.3 Independent Variable: Racial and Ethnic minority member of Congress

In examining the legislative effectiveness of racial and ethnic minority legislators, I derive a primary explanatory variable: an aggregate racial and ethnic minority member of Congress.

Though I also include (1) African American MCs, (2) Latinx MCs, (3) AAPI MCs as a way to showcase possible variations in their effectiveness, though I argue that there may be similar, if not the same. In the dataset provided by Volden and Wiseman, the African American and Latinx MCs are coded as binary variables: 1 indicating that they are either African American or Latinx MCs or 0 if they are not those identities. Intuitively, using my newly collected data from the archival database, I coded AAPI members of Congress in the same manner as African American and Latinx MCs in Volden and Wiseman’s dataset. I categorize these members as 1, indicating that they are AAPI and 0 if they are not.

3.1.4 Alternative Explanations & Controls

In painting a more precise evaluation of the effect of racial and ethnic minority identity on legislative effectiveness, providing control variables in my analysis is necessary to control for alternative explanations of legislative effectiveness. I expect that congressional leadership positions are key actors in legislative effectiveness, i.e., key party leaders, committee chairs and sub chairs, members of certain powerful committees (e.g., Speaker of the House, Majority and Minority Leaders, members of the Appropriation, Rules, or Ways and Means). Additionally, Seniority or an MCs extend experience in Congress is also a predictor of legislative effectiveness (Miquel and Snyder, 2004; Schiller, 1995). and seniority. I also expect majority party status as affecting the legislative effectiveness of a member (Moore and Thomas, 1991).

Additionally, it may be the case that previous state legislative experience can account for a member’s legislative effectiveness (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer, 2013). It may also be the case that being a female legislator has an effect in legislative effectiveness, as they engage in more consensus-building activities, and generally reach across the aisle more than male legislators (Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer, 2013). I expect that these variables, in particular, have a hegemonic influence on the legislative process. Therefore, controlling for these critical variables can help assess the direct effects of being a racial and ethnic minority in Congress.

Similarly, I will control the vote share received in an MCs previous election; this will control district competitiveness, which may affect who is elected into office.

3.2 Methods

3.2.1 Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypotheses

Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Legislative Effectiveness Scores & Outcomes in the U.S. House, 107th-115th

Racial Group	Legislative Effectiveness Score	Bills Introduced	Bills with Action in Committee	Bills with Action beyond Committee	Bills passed House	Bills became Law
Non-White	.74	14.46	1.46	1.58	1.28	.54
AAPI	.72	15.81	1.37	1.37	1.08	.44
Black	.77	15.68	1.37	1.61	1.36	.58
Latinx	.72	12.33	1.66	1.62	1.25	.49
White	1.05	14.41	2.03	2.14	1.63	.62

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the summary statistics of the LES and the average number of bills across the five different legislative stages of each racial group. These mean levels are subsetted to reflect the 107th - 115th Congresses covering the years 2001-2017—spanning 16 years of coverage. Table 3.1 illustrates the variance between the mean LES and the mean number of bill passage across each racial group’s legislative stages in the two chambers. In examining the House’s averages, White legislators chiefly outperform the other three racial groups. White MCs have an average LES of 1.05, which was made up of the average of the three-bill types (Commemorative, Substantive, and Substantive Significant) across the five legislative stages (Bills Introduced, Bills with Action in Committee, Bills with Action beyond Committee, Bills passed in the House, and Bills became law). Additionally, when disaggregated, my theory about the three racial groups and their similar legislative effectiveness scores seem correlated when looking at the summary statistics. Although on average,

Black and AAPI MCs introduce more bills, 15.81 and 15.68, respectively— than that of White MCs’ moderate 14.41 bills, White MCs survived more bills across later stages of the legislative process.

Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Legislative Effectiveness Scores & Outcomes in the U.S. Senate, 107th-115th

Racial Group	Legislative Effectiveness Score	Bills Introduced	Bills with Action in Committee	Bills with Action beyond Committee	Bills passed Senate	Bills became Law
Non-White	1.04	44.88	6.74	5.19	1.28	.54
AAPI	1.47	43.70	11	8.35	3.41	1.65
Black	.44	32.90	2.81	1.82	.73	.45
Latinx	.95	55	4.67	3.93	1.67	.87
White	1.00	34.60	6.32	5.00	2.26	1.08

Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics in the U.S. Senate. The mean of the LES and bill passages across each racial group’s legislative stages paint a different result than the U.S. House. The Senate’s AAPI senators take the lead in higher LES and the mean total bills across all five legislative stages, with White legislators trailing behind and Latinx and Black legislators with lower LES and bills across the five legislative stages. For instance, AAPI senators’ average LES is 1.47, and Black senator’s average LES is at .44, which differs significantly. Interestingly, Latinx senators introduce the most bills, averaging 55 bills; however, their average LES is only at .95. This may indicate an underlying relationship regarding the types of bills they introduce and why these bills are not surviving the later legislative stages. The variance between the racial groups reveals a correlation between a legislator’s race and their legislative effectiveness. However, this correlation does not necessarily indicate a causal mechanism between the two variables. For instance, it may be the case that AAPI legislators have greater legislative effectiveness in the Senate. Still, other factors such as seniority, party leadership, etc., have not been factored into the analysis. Thus, I seek to investigate whether there are still these differences when controlling for other factors that

may explain these differences in my regression analysis.

To reiterate, my ***Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypotheses*** are:

H₁ : *In the House, when in the majority party, racial and ethnic minority MCs have a lower legislative effectiveness score than white MCs. In the minority party, racial and ethnic minority MCs and non-minority MCs are likely to the same legislative effectiveness score.*

H₂ : *In the Senate, when in the majority party, racial and ethnic minority MCs have a lower legislative effectiveness score than white MCs. In the minority party, racial and ethnic minority MCs and non-minority MCs are likely to the same legislative effectiveness score.*

This aims to capture, in a more testable scheme, the legislative effectiveness of racial minorities by investigating their legislative effectiveness scores when in the Majority or Minority party. These hypotheses is tested by the model in Figure 4.1, where I run the regression that further explains the correlation found in the summary statistics in the preceding section. Below are the regression equations of the racial minority effectiveness hypotheses for both chambers.

Figure 3.1: 1st Hypothesis Regression Equation for both Chambers

Models 1-4: House Regression Equation

$$\begin{aligned} LegislativeEffectiveness_{idt} = & \alpha + \beta_1 RacialMinorityinMajorityParty_{it} \\ & + \beta_2 RacialMinorityinMinorityParty_{it} + \gamma_{idt} + \delta_{id} + \theta_t + \epsilon_{idt} \end{aligned}$$

Models 5-8: Senate Regression Equation

$$\begin{aligned} LegislativeEffectiveness_{ist} = & \alpha + \beta_1 RacialMinorityinMajorityParty_{it} \\ & + \beta_2 RacialMinorityinMinorityParty_{it} + \gamma_{ist} + \delta_{is} + \theta_t + \epsilon_{ist} \end{aligned}$$

I model the regression as such, where $LegislativeEffectiveness_{ist}$ is the legislative effec-

tiveness score of member i from state or district s/d in congress t . My main independent variable is $\beta_1 \text{RacialMinorityinMajorityParty}_{it}$ and $\beta_2 \text{RacialMinorityinMinorityParty}_{it}$ which is 1 if β_1 the member is a racial minority and in the majority party, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, β_2 is 1 if the member is a racial minority and in the minority party, and 0 otherwise. I denote γ_{ist} as the control variables where I account for variables: Committee Chair, Female, Democrat, Majority Party Status, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Power Committee, Seniority, State Legislature Experience, Vote Share, (Black, AAPI, Latinx, for the robustness check models). I note that δ_{id} is the district/state fixed effects, θ_t is the congress fixed effects and ϵ_{ist} as the error term.

Chapter 4

Findings

4.1 Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypotheses

The (OLS) Ordinary Least Squares regressions below are modeled mainly after Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer's (2013) study on women's legislative effectiveness. I deviate from their model by examining non-white members of Congress. Additionally, I apply these models in both chambers of Congress, where these models can be found on Tables 4.1 and 4.2, which report mixed results. The regression outputs below include control variables and District/State and Congress fixed effects. The former allows us to control for differences across districts or states¹ that are constant over time and the latter allows us to control for differences across time that remain constant across units. Table 4.1 illustrates that being a non-white member of Congress in the House has a statistically significant negative relationship concerning their legislative effectiveness score when in the Majority party. Specifically, being a non-white Member of Congress while in the Majority party has, on average, a -0.505 difference in the effect of their legislative effectiveness scores between non-white majority members and white majority members, all else equal. Since the average LES score in the contemporary Congress when in the majority party is 1.59, this -.505 impact being a racial minority MC translates to around a 31.76 % decrease in legislative effectiveness when in the Majority party. However, being a non-white MC in the minority party is not significant. These results found in the House show support for my racial effectiveness hypothesis, where when in the majority, racial and ethnic minority MCs are less effective. Contrastingly, when in the minority, they are not significantly less effective than their white counterparts.

¹I run District FE's for House and State FE's for Senate.

I note, though, that when the non-white MCs are observed individually in the House, only Latinx MCs reveal a statistically significant negative relationship toward their LES.² That is, being a Latinx MC has an approximately .837 decrease in their LES when in the majority, all else equal. Given that the mean average is 1.59 in the majority party, Latinx MCs find a 54% decrease in their LES when in the majority party. This ineffectiveness follows them in the minority party, where they experience a .312 decrease in their LES. Though AAPI and Black MCs do not have a statistically significant relationship against their LES, the results illustrate it to be in the expected direction.

Table 4.2 reveals a different story, in which the regression results do not find support for my racial minority effectiveness hypothesis. However, the coefficients are in the expected direction. However, this result may indicate more pronounced institutional differences between the two chambers. I also note the significantly fewer racial and ethnic senators. Therefore I would argue not to make conclusive claims found in this analysis regarding the effectiveness of racial minority senators.

²These results can be found in the Appendix, Table 7.

Table 4.1: Regression Outputs for the Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypothesis in the House, 2001-2017

Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score	
	LES
Non-white Majority Party Member	-0.505*** (0.133)
Non-white Minority Party Member	-0.167 (0.107)
Committee Chair	2.905*** (0.100)
Female	0.100 (0.083)
Democrat	-0.128 (0.080)
Majority Party	0.662*** (0.062)
Majority Leader	0.451*** (0.131)
Minority Leader	-0.041 (0.128)
Power Committee	-0.203*** (0.063)
Seniority	0.014** (0.007)
Subcommittee Chair	0.313*** (0.061)
State Legislature Experience	0.103* (0.059)
Vote Share	-0.001 (0.002)
District-level Fixed effects	
	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	
	Yes
Observations	3,358
R ²	0.574
Adjusted R ²	0.501
Residual Std. Error	1.041 (df = 2869)
Significance Levels	
	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.2: Regression Outputs for the Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypothesis in the Senate, 2001-2017

Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score	
	LES
Non-white Majority Party Senator	-0.030 (0.251)
Non-white Minority Party Senator	0.090 (0.278)
Committee Chair	1.034*** (0.092)
Female	0.048 (0.109)
Democrat	-0.002 (0.085)
Majority Party	0.363*** (0.115)
Majority Leader	0.105 (0.121)
Minority Leader	-0.032 (0.117)
Power Committee	0.100 (0.078)
Seniority	0.004 (0.008)
Subcommittee Chair	0.042 (0.107)
State Legislature Experience	0.023 (0.071)
Vote Share	0.001 (0.004)
State-level Fixed effects	
State-level Fixed effects	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes
Observations	793
R ²	0.470
Adjusted R ²	0.419
Residual Std. Error	0.745 (df = 722)
Significance Levels	
	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.1.1 Robustness Checks

Can the effectiveness of racial minority MCs be found across the different legislative stages? I run regressions examining their effectiveness across the five stages of the legislative process. Table 4.3 suggests that the ineffectiveness of racial minority MCs in the majority found in the first model is sustained across the five stages. I note that this ineffectiveness is less significant at the bill introduction stage, with the coefficient at -1.994 at the significance level $p < 0.1$. The ineffectiveness shifts to highly significant at the $p < 0.01$ level through the following four legislative stages.

Table 4.4 investigates the effectiveness of racial minority Senators, suggesting that non-white senators significantly introduce more bills when in the majority party. That is, being a racial minority senator impacts their bills introduced at 12.111. Interestingly, this is contrary to what I had anticipated, in which I believed that racial and ethnic senators would be just as ineffective as they are in the House.

To sum these findings, I report mixed results when investigating the racial minority effectiveness hypotheses from both chambers. When looking at the racial effectiveness hypothesis in the House, my regression outputs suggest that racial minority MCs are less effective than their white counterparts in the majority party. Additionally, when in the minority party, this ineffectiveness is not significant. Interestingly, this hypothesis does not hold when observing racial and ethnic senators. The regression outputs indicate no statistically significant findings regarding their effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) in either the majority or minority party. In fact, when running my robustness checks, I report that minority senators significantly introduce more bills. However, I note that though this is highly significant, this does not sustain in the following stages.

Table 4.3: Non-White Legislators in the House - Robustness Checks of the 1st Hypothesis across Legislative Stages

	Dependent Variable: Across Five Legislative Stages				
	bill introduction	committee action	beyond committee	pass house	law from house
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-white Majority Party Member	-1.994* (1.050)	-0.555** (0.249)	-0.867*** (0.269)	-0.745*** (0.218)	-0.331*** (0.123)
Non-white Minority Party Member	-0.935 (0.844)	-0.252 (0.200)	-0.305 (0.216)	-0.283 (0.175)	-0.116 (0.099)
Committee Chair	3.227*** (0.793)	3.863*** (0.188)	5.418*** (0.203)	4.016*** (0.165)	1.866*** (0.093)
Female	1.420** (0.653)	-0.059 (0.155)	0.127 (0.168)	0.173 (0.135)	0.074 (0.077)
Democrat	1.616** (0.632)	-0.141 (0.150)	-0.368** (0.162)	-0.220* (0.131)	-0.080 (0.074)
Majority Party	3.698*** (0.490)	1.397*** (0.116)	1.418*** (0.126)	1.054*** (0.102)	0.344*** (0.058)
Majority Leader	-1.476 (1.034)	0.481** (0.245)	0.691*** (0.265)	0.676*** (0.214)	0.366*** (0.122)
Minority Leader	-3.435*** (1.014)	-0.101 (0.240)	-0.068 (0.260)	0.085 (0.210)	0.095 (0.119)
Power Committee	-1.232** (0.496)	-0.775*** (0.117)	-0.617*** (0.127)	-0.405*** (0.103)	-0.111* (0.058)
Seniority	0.004 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.010 (0.006)
Subcommittee Chair	-0.408 (0.484)	0.665*** (0.115)	0.689*** (0.124)	0.482*** (0.100)	0.169*** (0.057)
State Legislature Experience	-0.603 (0.463)	0.060 (0.110)	0.149 (0.119)	0.140 (0.096)	0.145*** (0.054)
Vote Share	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
District-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358
R ²	0.512	0.570	0.575	0.530	0.416
Adjusted R ²	0.429	0.497	0.503	0.449	0.317
Residual Std. Error (df = 2869)	8.216	1.945	2.107	1.704	0.966

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.4: Non-White Legislators in the Senate - Robustness Checks of the 1st Hypothesis across Legislative Stages

	Dependent Variable: Across Five Legislative Stages				
	billsintro (1)	committeeaction (2)	beyondcommittee (3)	passenate (4)	lawfromsenate (5)
Non-white Majority Party Senator	12.111** (6.162)	-1.761 (1.556)	-1.433 (1.337)	-0.488 (0.781)	-0.125 (0.472)
Non-white Minority Party Senator	4.188 (6.827)	-0.123 (1.724)	-0.306 (1.481)	0.485 (0.866)	0.298 (0.522)
Committee Chair	8.817*** (2.270)	5.696*** (0.573)	6.114*** (0.492)	2.483*** (0.288)	1.251*** (0.174)
Female	-0.596 (2.672)	0.235 (0.675)	0.415 (0.580)	0.161 (0.339)	0.067 (0.205)
Democrat	7.322*** (2.087)	-0.334 (0.527)	-0.430 (0.453)	-0.484* (0.265)	-0.437*** (0.160)
Majority Party	1.879 (2.821)	2.049*** (0.712)	2.732*** (0.612)	1.071*** (0.358)	0.366* (0.216)
Majority Leader	3.156 (2.978)	0.143 (0.752)	0.223 (0.646)	-0.032 (0.378)	0.236 (0.228)
Minority Leader	-0.211 (2.886)	-0.989 (0.729)	-0.564 (0.626)	-0.235 (0.366)	0.068 (0.221)
Power Committee	1.799 (1.920)	0.758 (0.485)	0.463 (0.417)	0.523** (0.243)	0.041 (0.147)
Seniority	-0.392** (0.184)	-0.068 (0.047)	0.037 (0.040)	0.002 (0.023)	0.014 (0.014)
Subcommittee Chair	3.518 (2.626)	0.288 (0.663)	-0.484 (0.570)	-0.322 (0.333)	0.133 (0.201)
State Legislature Experience	5.078*** (1.744)	0.451 (0.440)	0.098 (0.378)	0.213 (0.221)	-0.051 (0.133)
Vote Share	0.067 (0.095)	0.001 (0.024)	0.021 (0.021)	0.010 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.007)
State-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	793	793	793	793	793
R ²	0.463	0.474	0.514	0.387	0.289
Adjusted R ²	0.411	0.423	0.467	0.327	0.220
Residual Std. Error (df = 722)	18.326	4.627	3.976	2.324	1.402

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.2 Learning Curve Hypotheses

After investigating the effectiveness of racial and ethnic MCs, are they more effective

Table 4.5: Summary Statistics: Difference of Legislative Effectiveness Scores & Outcomes. Mean Differences of the legislative effectiveness scores, as well as across the five legislative stages of the 1st & 2nd Terms in the U.S. House among racial groups.

Racial Group	Difference in Legislative Effectiveness Score	Difference in Bills Introduced	Difference in Bills with Action in Committee	Difference in Bills with Action beyond Committee	Difference in Bills passed in House	Difference in Bills became Law
Non-White	.17	3.56	.45	.49	.46	.21
AAPI	-.12	3.97	.14	.14	-.07	-.21
Black	.31	3.98	.55	.81	.76	.44
Latinx	.10	2.69	.45	.20	.25	.17
White	.19	3.46	.46	.35	.25	.10

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the mean differences of the legislative effectiveness scores among racial groups. These tables also report the mean differences of all five legislative stages. In the House, Black MCs enjoyed the greatest improvement with an average .31 difference compared to the other racial groups where white legislators follow with .19, Latinx MCs at .10, and AAPI with a decrease of .12. Interestingly, it seems as though AAPI and Black have a greater improvement in their bill introduction, where they enjoyed a difference of 3.97 and 3.98, respectively. This trend is further followed in the later stages, where it does seem like racial and ethnic minority MCs improve compared to their white counterparts in the House.

In the Senate, the summary statistics paint a different story. While in the House, AAPI senators were lagging behind the other groups. It seems that they have the more significant improvement between their legislative effectiveness scores where their mean difference is .34 while white Senators are at .32. This may be due to the fact that they are relatively more effective in the Senate. Though, white Senators did better in the later stages of the legisla-

Table 4.6: Summary Statistics: Difference of Legislative Effectiveness Scores & Outcomes. Mean Differences of the legislative effectiveness scores, as well as across the five legislative stages of the 1st & 2nd Terms in the U.S. Senate among racial groups.

Racial Group	Difference in Legislative Effectiveness Score	Difference in Bills Introduced	Difference in Bills with Action in Committee	Difference in Bills with Action beyond Committee	Difference in Bills passed in Senate	Difference in Bills became Law
Non-White	.20	10.09	2.64	1.00	.36	.27
AAPI	.34	13.00	4.25	0.75	.75	.25
Black	.13	6.75	1.50	1.00	.50	.25
Latinx	.11	10.67	2.00	1.33	-.33	.33
White	.32	9.78	3.08	1.35	.87	.45

tive process. Black and Latinx Senators are relatively similar in their improvement with .13 and .11, respectively. This correlation can be further addressed through the regression results in the following section. Below I reiterate that my *Learning Curve Hypotheses* are:

H₁ : *In the House, after one term in Congress, Racial and Ethnic minority members of Congress (MC) have a greater difference in legislative effectiveness scores from their 1st and 2nd terms than their non-minority counterparts.*

H₂ : *In the Senate, after one term in Congress, Racial and Ethnic minority members of Congress (MC) have a greater difference in legislative effectiveness scores from their 1st and 2nd terms than their non-minority counterparts.*

This aims to capture, in a more testable scheme, the difference in legislative effectiveness of racial minorities compared to their white counterparts. The regression model equations are below.

Figure 3.2: 2nd Hypothesis Regression Equation for both Chambers

House Regression Equation

$$Difference\ in\ Legislative\ Effectiveness_{ist} = \alpha + \beta_1 Racial\ Minority_{it} + \gamma_{ist} + \delta_{is} + \theta_t + \epsilon_{ist}$$

Senate Regression Equation

$$DifferenceinLegislativeEffectiveness_{ist} = \alpha + \beta_1 RacialMinority_{it} + \gamma_{ist} + \delta_{is} + \theta_t + \epsilon_{ist}$$

For the learning curve hypotheses, I model the regression as such, where

$DifferenceinLegislativeEffectiveness_{id}$ is the Difference in the legislative effectiveness score of member i from state or district s/d in Congress t between their first and second term. My main independent variable is $\beta_1 RacialMinority_{it}$ is 1 if β_1 the member is a racial minority, and 0 otherwise. I denote γ_{ist} as the control variables where I account for variables: Female, Democrat, Majority Party Status, Power Committee, Vote Share, State Legislature Experience, lagged Vote Share, lagged Legislative Effectiveness Score, lagged Majority Party status, (Black, AAPI, Latinx, for the robustness check models). I note that δ_{id} is the district/state fixed effects, θ_t is the congress fixed effects and ϵ_{ist} as the error term.

Table 4.7: Regression Outputs for the Learning Curve Hypothesis in the House

	Dependent Variable: Difference in Legislative Effectiveness Score between the first two terms			
	diffinLES			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-white Member	0.024 (0.096)			
AAPI Member		0.035 (0.193)		
Black Member			0.076 (0.133)	
Latinx Member				-0.076 (0.140)
Female	0.057 (0.065)	0.056 (0.065)	0.055 (0.065)	0.056 (0.065)
Democrat	-0.109** (0.053)	-0.108** (0.053)	-0.109** (0.053)	-0.108** (0.053)
Majority Party	0.442*** (0.064)	0.444*** (0.064)	0.445*** (0.064)	0.444*** (0.064)
Vote Share	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
State Legislature Experience	0.005 (0.043)	0.005 (0.043)	0.006 (0.043)	0.005 (0.043)
lagged Legislative Effectiveness Score	-0.540*** (0.042)	-0.541*** (0.042)	-0.541*** (0.042)	-0.541*** (0.042)
lagged Majority Party Status	-0.110* (0.065)	-0.112* (0.065)	-0.112* (0.065)	-0.112* (0.065)
lagged Vote Share	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Black		0.054 (0.132)		0.054 (0.132)
AAPI			0.037 (0.193)	0.035 (0.193)
Latinx		-0.076 (0.140)	-0.073 (0.140)	
District-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,288	1,288	1,288	1,288
R ²	0.554	0.555	0.555	0.555
Adjusted R ²	0.267	0.266	0.266	0.266
Residual Std. Error	0.584 (df = 783)	0.585 (df = 781)	0.585 (df = 781)	0.585 (df = 781)

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.8: Regression Outputs for the Learning Curve Hypothesis in the Senate

	Dependent Variable: Difference in Legislative Effectiveness Score between the first two terms			
	diffinLES			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-white Member	-0.295 (0.263)			
AAPI Member		-0.187 (0.585)		
Black Member			-0.388 (0.430)	
Latinx Member				-0.266 (0.412)
Female	0.126 (0.115)	0.131 (0.117)	0.131 (0.117)	0.131 (0.117)
Democrat	-0.093 (0.092)	-0.091 (0.092)	-0.091 (0.092)	-0.091 (0.092)
Majority Party	0.377*** (0.082)	0.379*** (0.083)	0.379*** (0.083)	0.379*** (0.083)
Power Committee	0.004 (0.027)	0.004 (0.027)	0.004 (0.027)	0.004 (0.027)
Vote Share	0.058 (0.080)	0.060 (0.081)	0.060 (0.081)	0.060 (0.081)
State Legislature Experience	-0.538*** (0.098)	-0.536*** (0.099)	-0.536*** (0.099)	-0.536*** (0.099)
lagged Legislative Effectiveness Score	-0.170** (0.086)	-0.170* (0.087)	-0.170* (0.087)	-0.170* (0.087)
lagged Majority Party Status	0.001 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)
lagged Vote Share		-0.388 (0.430)		-0.388 (0.430)
Black			-0.187 (0.585)	-0.187 (0.585)
AAPI		-0.266 (0.412)	-0.266 (0.412)	
State-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	255	255	255	255
R ²	0.487	0.487	0.487	0.487
Adjusted R ²	0.255	0.247	0.247	0.247
Residual Std. Error	0.462 (df = 175)	0.465 (df = 173)	0.465 (df = 173)	0.465 (df = 173)

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

After running the regressions above while controlling for relevant factors, the correlation found in the summary statistics does not find support for my learning curve hypothesis. There are no statistically significant findings found in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 that indicate being a non-white member has a substantial impact on the difference in their legislative effectiveness score between their 1st and 2nd term. While it is true that seniority may play a factor in a member's legislative effectiveness, I do not find data to support that presents that racial minority MCs 1st term is a factor in more significantly improving their LES in their 2nd term compared to their white counterparts. I argued this as I believed that congressional networks such as the Tri-Caucus might result in better resources or different strategies to adapt from the electoral arena that they may apply in the lawmaking process.

Chapter 5

Discussion & Conclusion

Are Racial and Ethnic members of Congress more effective lawmakers than their white counterparts? My results posit mixed answers. My results suggest that they are less effective in the lower chamber when in the majority party and less so when in the minority party. While in the upper chamber, I find no conclusive evidence to support that they are—in either the majority or minority party. These mixed results allude to institutional differences between the two chambers, which I did not fully account for in my analysis. While I believed that because the House included a more significant racial and ethnic minority voting bloc compared to the Senate, these differences would result in similar outcomes in legislative effectiveness. However, key features in the Senate grant Senators greater influence in steering the legislative agenda. For instance, institutional characteristics such as the filibuster and the Senate hold even the playing field for white and non-white senators. Any one senator can wield the filibuster to halt a vote from concluding. Additionally, the Senate hold like the filibuster, allows Senators to hold significant control over the procedural processes of lawmaking. These mechanisms in the Senate provide greater clarity as to why we may see differences in the legislative effectiveness of Senators and House members. Further, these instances shape how we view these legislators.

While I did believe racial and ethnic members of Congress to be less effective lawmakers, I argued that this might be alleviated through a more significant improvement in their legislative effectiveness between their first and second term. As I discussed, this may be because they may be more adaptive, thus resulting in a greater increase in their early tenure and possible legislative advantages through the congressional minority caucuses—Tri-Caucus. Unfortunately, the data is insufficient to conclude in terms of their effectiveness as a law-

maker.

Future scholarship should further examine the institutional differences between the two chambers, especially in the bill introduction stages. I found an interesting entry point in how racial and ethnic minority senators effectively introduce bills. Additionally, scholars should also follow suit in examining the legislative skills of Asian American Pacific Islander members of Congress. Phillips (2017) investigates Latina and AAPI, candidates. Therefore, a closer examination of these representatives in all levels of legislatures could be of interest. Additionally, this study does not examine the content of the bills introduced and eventually passed. However, they are identified by the rigor in which it can pass as legislation, particular attention to the type of minority interest bills these members of Congress are focusing on is a critical investigation.

Another avenue of research scholars may have of particular interest after identifying “ineffectiveness” of racial and ethnic MCs in the House is to examine how racial and ethnic MCs’ presence impacts the committee dynamics. This stream of research was previously examined by Ban et al. (2020), where they examined another legislative minority, women. With these in mind, researchers may decide to provide greater clarity in these findings and investigate racial and ethnic MCs in a more nuanced and intersectional approach. As I had only examined one aspect of a legislator’s identity—their racial and ethnic minority identity—are there variations in racial and ethnic minority women’s legislative effectiveness? Lastly, as I have illustrated in chapter 1, the trends suggest that racial and ethnic MCs may reach critical mass in future Congresses. Therefore, revisiting the analysis I examined in the future may contribute to expanding the literature on descriptive representation at the nexus of congressional studies.

These findings fill a gap in the literature investigating racial and ethnic minority members of Congress—Black, Latinx, and AAPI—in the aggregate. This justification was due to the prominence of the Congressional Tri-Caucus. Racial and ethnic minority members

of Congress sought to support one another's legislative agendas and support each other's legislative portfolios through similar congressional staff.

Finally, I hope this research provides greater insight into the "ineffectiveness" of racial and ethnic members of Congress in the lawmaking process. Previous literature sought to examine if descriptive representatives seek to push for minority interests and more excellent substantive representation. However, little has been done to identify if—even with the intention of pushing forward minority interests—are racial and ethnic minority members of Congress capable of overcoming the disparities to navigate the lawmaking process. This study identifies the legislative differences between racial and ethnic minority members of Congress and their white colleagues. The study also underscores the importance of examining the substantive interests of minority legislators and the institutions that aim to push forward their legislative agendas—such as the halls of Congress.

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Table 1: Regression Outputs for the Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypothesis in the House
- Overall LES of each Racial Group, whole dataset

	Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score			
	LES			
	By Non-white (1)	By AAPI (2)	By Black (3)	By Latinx (4)
Non-white Member	-0.265*** (0.101)			
AAPI Member		-0.125 (0.235)		
Black Member			0.010 (0.154)	
Latinx Member				-0.502*** (0.134)
Committee Chair	2.902*** (0.101)	2.906*** (0.101)	2.906*** (0.101)	2.906*** (0.101)
Female	0.101 (0.083)	0.088 (0.083)	0.088 (0.083)	0.088 (0.083)
Democrat	-0.141* (0.080)	-0.138* (0.080)	-0.138* (0.080)	-0.138* (0.080)
Majority Party	0.609*** (0.059)	0.606*** (0.059)	0.606*** (0.059)	0.606*** (0.059)
Majority Leader	0.444*** (0.131)	0.442*** (0.131)	0.442*** (0.131)	0.442*** (0.131)
Minority Leader	-0.030 (0.129)	-0.025 (0.128)	-0.025 (0.128)	-0.025 (0.128)
Power Committee	-0.204*** (0.063)	-0.189*** (0.063)	-0.189*** (0.063)	-0.189*** (0.063)
Seniority	0.015** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)
Subcommittee Chair	0.310*** (0.061)	0.317*** (0.061)	0.317*** (0.061)	0.317*** (0.061)
State Legislature Experience	0.103* (0.059)	0.105* (0.059)	0.105* (0.059)	0.105* (0.059)
Vote Share	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Black		0.010 (0.154)		0.010 (0.154)
AAPI			-0.125 (0.235)	-0.125 (0.235)
Latinx		-0.502*** (0.134)	-0.502*** (0.134)	
District-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358
R ²	0.573	0.574	0.574	0.574
Adjusted R ²	0.500	0.501	0.501	0.501
Residual Std. Error	1.042 (df = 2870)	1.041 (df = 2868)	1.041 (df = 2868)	1.041 (df = 2868)

Significance Levels

Table 2: Regression Outputs for the Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypothesis in the Senate
- Overall LES of each Racial Group, whole dataset

	Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score			
	LES			
	By Non-white	By AAPI	By Black	By Latinx
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-white Senator	0.020 (0.220)			
AAPI Senator		-0.240 (0.574)		
Black Senator			-0.122 (0.365)	
Latinx Senator				0.178 (0.288)
Committee Chair	1.033*** (0.092)	1.032*** (0.092)	1.032*** (0.092)	1.032*** (0.092)
Female	0.052 (0.108)	0.054 (0.109)	0.054 (0.109)	0.054 (0.109)
Democrat	-0.002 (0.085)	0.005 (0.085)	0.005 (0.085)	0.005 (0.085)
Majority Party	0.359*** (0.114)	0.360*** (0.114)	0.360*** (0.114)	0.360*** (0.114)
Majority Leader	0.106 (0.121)	0.105 (0.121)	0.105 (0.121)	0.105 (0.121)
Minority Leader	-0.035 (0.117)	-0.035 (0.117)	-0.035 (0.117)	-0.035 (0.117)
Power Committee	0.100 (0.078)	0.096 (0.078)	0.096 (0.078)	0.096 (0.078)
Seniority	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)
Subcommittee Chair	0.040 (0.107)	0.042 (0.107)	0.042 (0.107)	0.042 (0.107)
State Legislature Experience	0.020 (0.071)	0.015 (0.071)	0.015 (0.071)	0.015 (0.071)
Vote Share	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Black		-0.122 (0.365)		-0.122 (0.365)
AAPI			-0.240 (0.574)	-0.240 (0.574)
Latinx		0.178 (0.288)	0.178 (0.288)	
State-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	793	793	793	793
R ²	0.470	0.470	0.470	0.470
Adjusted R ²	0.419	0.418	0.418	0.418
Residual Std. Error	0.745 (df = 723)	0.745 (df = 721)	0.745 (df = 721)	0.745 (df = 721)

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Regression Outputs for the Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypothesis in the House

	Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score			
	LES			
	By Non-white (1)	By AAPI (2)	By Black (3)	By Latinx (4)
Non-white Majority Party Member	-0.505*** (0.133)			
Non-white Minority Party Member	-0.167 (0.107)			
AAPI Majority Party Member		-0.136 (0.397)		
AAPI Minority Party Member		-0.123 (0.242)		
Black Majority Party Member			-0.012 (0.195)	
Black Minority Party Member			0.016 (0.158)	
Latinx Majority Party Member				-0.837*** (0.174)
Latinx Minority Party Member				-0.312** (0.148)
Committee Chair	2.905*** (0.100)	2.906*** (0.101)	2.907*** (0.101)	2.909*** (0.100)
Female	0.100 (0.083)	0.088 (0.083)	0.087 (0.083)	0.093 (0.083)
Democrat	-0.128 (0.080)	-0.138* (0.080)	-0.137* (0.080)	-0.140* (0.080)
Majority Party	0.662*** (0.062)	0.606*** (0.059)	0.608*** (0.061)	0.635*** (0.060)
Majority Leader	0.451*** (0.131)	0.442*** (0.131)	0.443*** (0.131)	0.437*** (0.131)
Minority Leader	-0.041 (0.128)	-0.025 (0.129)	-0.026 (0.129)	-0.034 (0.128)
Power Committee	-0.203*** (0.063)	-0.189*** (0.063)	-0.189*** (0.063)	-0.188*** (0.063)
Seniority	0.014** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)
Subcommittee Chair	0.313*** (0.061)	0.317*** (0.061)	0.318*** (0.061)	0.322*** (0.061)
State Legislature Experience	0.103* (0.059)	0.105* (0.059)	0.105* (0.059)	0.105* (0.059)
Vote Share	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Black		0.010 (0.155)		0.017 (0.154)
AAPI			-0.125 (0.235)	-0.113 (0.235)
Latinx		-0.502*** (0.134)	-0.502*** (0.134)	
District-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358
R ²	0.574	0.574	0.574	0.575
Adjusted R ²	0.501	0.501	0.501	0.502
Residual Std. Error	1.041 (df = 2869)	1.041 (df = 2867)	1.041 (df = 2867)	1.040 (df = 2867)

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Regression Outputs for the Racial Minority Effectiveness Hypothesis in the Senate

	Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score			
	LES			
	By Non-white (1)	By AAPI (2)	By Black (3)	By Latinx (4)
Non-white Majority Party Member	-0.030 (0.251)			
Non-white Minority Party Member	0.090 (0.278)			
AAPI Majority Party Member		-0.562 (0.605)		
AAPI Minority Party Member		0.133 (0.615)		
Black Majority Party Member			-0.388 (0.465)	
Black Minority Party Member			0.302 (0.586)	
Latinx Majority Party Member				0.554 (0.359)
Latinx Minority Party Member				-0.255 (0.380)
Committee Chair	1.034*** (0.092)	1.045*** (0.092)	1.029*** (0.092)	1.038*** (0.092)
Female	0.048 (0.109)	0.041 (0.109)	0.052 (0.109)	0.057 (0.108)
Democrat	-0.002 (0.085)	0.003 (0.085)	0.006 (0.085)	0.002 (0.085)
Majority Party	0.363*** (0.115)	0.362*** (0.114)	0.368*** (0.115)	0.350*** (0.114)
Majority Leader	0.105 (0.121)	0.105 (0.121)	0.100 (0.121)	0.111 (0.121)
Minority Leader	-0.032 (0.117)	-0.024 (0.117)	-0.031 (0.117)	-0.042 (0.117)
Power Committee	0.100 (0.078)	0.095 (0.078)	0.101 (0.078)	0.099 (0.078)
Seniority	0.004 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)
Subcommittee Chair	0.042 (0.107)	0.050 (0.107)	0.041 (0.107)	0.035 (0.107)
State Legislature Experience	0.023 (0.071)	0.014 (0.071)	0.020 (0.071)	0.005 (0.071)
Vote Share	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Black		-0.115 (0.365)		-0.100 (0.365)
AAPI			-0.240 (0.574)	-0.237 (0.574)
Latinx		0.175 (0.288)	0.223 (0.292)	
State-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	793	793	793	793
R ²	0.470	0.473	0.471	0.473
Adjusted R ²	0.419	0.420	0.418	0.420
Residual Std. Error	0.745 (df = 722)	0.744 (df = 720)	0.745 (df = 720)	0.744 (df = 720)

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: AAPI Legislators in the House - Robustness Check of the 1st Hypothesis across Legislative Stages

	Dependent Variable: Across Five Legislative Stages					
	LES (1)	billintro (2)	committeearction (3)	beyondcommittee (4)	passhouse (5)	lawfromhouse (6)
AAPI Majority Party Member	-0.136 (0.397)	4.081 (3.125)	0.738 (0.742)	-0.068 (0.804)	-0.229 (0.650)	-0.302 (0.368)
AAPI Minority Party Member	-0.123 (0.242)	6.071*** (1.906)	-0.604 (0.452)	-0.607 (0.490)	-0.572 (0.396)	-0.155 (0.225)
Committee Chair	2.906*** (0.101)	3.192*** (0.791)	3.876*** (0.188)	5.426*** (0.203)	4.022*** (0.165)	1.868*** (0.093)
Female	0.088 (0.083)	1.314** (0.653)	-0.073 (0.155)	0.102 (0.168)	0.153 (0.136)	0.062 (0.077)
Democrat	-0.138* (0.080)	1.627*** (0.629)	-0.156 (0.149)	-0.387** (0.162)	-0.236* (0.131)	-0.086 (0.074)
Majority Party	0.606*** (0.059)	3.562*** (0.466)	1.324*** (0.111)	1.314*** (0.120)	0.970*** (0.097)	0.309*** (0.055)
Majority Leader	0.442*** (0.131)	-1.556 (1.031)	0.484** (0.245)	0.680** (0.265)	0.666*** (0.214)	0.358*** (0.121)
Minority Leader	-0.025 (0.129)	-3.357*** (1.011)	-0.096 (0.240)	-0.043 (0.260)	0.107 (0.210)	0.108 (0.119)
Power Committee	-0.189*** (0.063)	-1.189** (0.497)	-0.761*** (0.118)	-0.586*** (0.128)	-0.378*** (0.103)	-0.095 (0.059)
Seniority	0.014** (0.007)	0.017 (0.054)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.011)	0.009 (0.006)
Subcommittee Chair	0.317*** (0.061)	-0.400 (0.483)	0.673*** (0.115)	0.701*** (0.124)	0.492*** (0.100)	0.175*** (0.057)
State Legislature Experience	0.105* (0.059)	-0.569 (0.462)	0.064 (0.110)	0.153 (0.119)	0.143 (0.096)	0.147*** (0.054)
Vote Share	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Black	0.010 (0.155)	-1.494 (1.216)	0.036 (0.289)	0.200 (0.313)	0.149 (0.253)	0.131 (0.143)
Latinx	-0.502*** (0.134)	-3.165*** (1.056)	-0.598** (0.251)	-0.927*** (0.271)	-0.789*** (0.219)	-0.397*** (0.124)
District-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358
R ²	0.574	0.515	0.571	0.576	0.530	0.417
Adjusted R ²	0.501	0.433	0.498	0.503	0.450	0.318
Residual Std. Error (df = 2867)	1.041	8.194	1.944	2.106	1.703	0.965

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Black Legislators in the House - Robustness Check of the 1st Hypothesis across Legislative Stages

	Dependent Variable: Across Five Legislative Stages					
	LES	billintro	committeeaction	beyondcommittee	passhouse	lawfromhouse
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Black Majority Party Member	-0.012 (0.195)	-0.853 (1.538)	-0.038 (0.365)	0.118 (0.396)	0.142 (0.320)	0.159 (0.181)
Black Minority Party Member	0.016 (0.158)	-1.698 (1.246)	0.069 (0.296)	0.228 (0.320)	0.154 (0.259)	0.122 (0.147)
Committee Chair	2.907*** (0.101)	3.196*** (0.791)	3.867*** (0.188)	5.424*** (0.203)	4.020*** (0.165)	1.868*** (0.093)
Female	0.087 (0.083)	1.321** (0.653)	-0.073 (0.155)	0.101 (0.168)	0.153 (0.136)	0.063 (0.077)
Democrat	-0.137* (0.080)	1.587** (0.631)	-0.147 (0.150)	-0.381** (0.162)	-0.235* (0.131)	-0.088 (0.074)
Majority Party	0.608*** (0.061)	3.455*** (0.477)	1.355*** (0.113)	1.332*** (0.123)	0.976*** (0.099)	0.303*** (0.056)
Majority Leader	0.443*** (0.131)	-1.572 (1.032)	0.477* (0.245)	0.680** (0.265)	0.664*** (0.214)	0.358*** (0.122)
Minority Leader	-0.026 (0.129)	-3.352*** (1.012)	-0.088 (0.240)	-0.042 (0.260)	0.109 (0.210)	0.107 (0.119)
Power Committee	-0.189*** (0.063)	-1.192** (0.497)	-0.757*** (0.118)	-0.585*** (0.128)	-0.377*** (0.103)	-0.096 (0.059)
Seniority	0.014** (0.007)	0.018 (0.054)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.011)	0.009 (0.006)
Subcommittee Chair	0.318*** (0.061)	-0.401 (0.483)	0.672*** (0.115)	0.701*** (0.124)	0.492*** (0.100)	0.175*** (0.057)
State Legislature Experience	0.105* (0.059)	-0.564 (0.462)	0.061 (0.110)	0.152 (0.119)	0.142 (0.096)	0.147*** (0.054)
Vote Share	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
AAPI	-0.125 (0.235)	5.759*** (1.849)	-0.397 (0.439)	-0.523 (0.475)	-0.519 (0.384)	-0.178 (0.218)
Latinx	-0.502*** (0.134)	-3.163*** (1.056)	-0.595** (0.251)	-0.927*** (0.271)	-0.789*** (0.219)	-0.397*** (0.124)
District-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358
R ²	0.574	0.515	0.570	0.576	0.530	0.417
Adjusted R ²	0.501	0.433	0.497	0.503	0.450	0.318
Residual Std. Error (df = 2867)	1.041	8.194	1.946	2.107	1.704	0.965

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Latinx Legislators in the House - Robustness Check of the 1st Hypothesis across Legislative Stages

	Dependent Variable: Across Five Legislative Stages					
	LES	billintro	committeereaction	beyondcommittee	passhouse	lawfromhouse
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Latinx Majority Party Member	-0.837*** (0.174)	-4.191*** (1.374)	-0.874*** (0.326)	-1.462*** (0.353)	-1.277*** (0.285)	-0.651*** (0.162)
Latinx Minority Party Member	-0.312** (0.148)	-2.593** (1.167)	-0.436 (0.277)	-0.623** (0.300)	-0.512** (0.242)	-0.254* (0.137)
Committee Chair	2.909*** (0.100)	3.213*** (0.791)	3.868*** (0.188)	5.426*** (0.203)	4.024*** (0.164)	1.870*** (0.093)
Female	0.093 (0.083)	1.331** (0.653)	-0.067 (0.155)	0.111 (0.168)	0.161 (0.136)	0.067 (0.077)
Democrat	-0.140* (0.080)	1.613** (0.629)	-0.153 (0.149)	-0.389** (0.162)	-0.238* (0.131)	-0.088 (0.074)
Majority Party	0.635*** (0.060)	3.619*** (0.470)	1.369*** (0.112)	1.368*** (0.121)	1.017*** (0.098)	0.328*** (0.055)
Majority Leader	0.437*** (0.131)	-1.555 (1.031)	0.469* (0.245)	0.668** (0.265)	0.656*** (0.214)	0.356*** (0.121)
Minority Leader	-0.034 (0.128)	-3.398*** (1.011)	-0.093 (0.240)	-0.052 (0.260)	0.097 (0.210)	0.100 (0.119)
Power Committee	-0.188*** (0.063)	-1.193** (0.497)	-0.756*** (0.118)	-0.583*** (0.128)	-0.376*** (0.103)	-0.095 (0.058)
Seniority	0.014** (0.007)	0.016 (0.054)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.011)	0.008 (0.006)
Subcommittee Chair	0.322*** (0.061)	-0.385 (0.483)	0.675*** (0.115)	0.707*** (0.124)	0.498*** (0.100)	0.178*** (0.057)
State Legislature Experience	0.105* (0.059)	-0.565 (0.462)	0.062 (0.110)	0.153 (0.119)	0.143 (0.096)	0.147*** (0.054)
Vote Share	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
AAPI	-0.113 (0.235)	5.800*** (1.849)	-0.387 (0.439)	-0.505 (0.475)	-0.502 (0.384)	-0.169 (0.218)
Black	0.017 (0.154)	-1.486 (1.216)	0.051 (0.289)	0.215 (0.312)	0.162 (0.252)	0.136 (0.143)
District-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358	3,358
R ²	0.575	0.516	0.571	0.577	0.531	0.418
Adjusted R ²	0.502	0.433	0.497	0.504	0.451	0.319
Residual Std. Error (df = 2867)	1.040	8.192	1.945	2.105	1.701	0.964

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: AAPI Legislators in the Senate - Robustness Check of the 1st Hypothesis across Legislative Stages

	Dependent Variable: Across Five Legislative Stages					
	LES	billsintro	committeeaction	beyondcommittee	passenate	lawfromsenate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
AAPI Majority Party Member	-0.562 (0.605)	3.731 (14.866)	2.025 (3.757)	-0.844 (3.234)	-2.136 (1.889)	-1.062 (1.139)
AAPI Minority Party Member	0.133 (0.615)	14.928 (15.122)	5.758 (3.822)	1.245 (3.290)	-0.225 (1.922)	0.427 (1.159)
Committee Chair	1.045*** (0.092)	9.000*** (2.273)	5.758*** (0.574)	6.144*** (0.494)	2.510*** (0.289)	1.275*** (0.174)
Female	0.041 (0.109)	-1.058 (2.672)	0.151 (0.675)	0.390 (0.581)	0.164 (0.340)	0.056 (0.205)
Democrat	0.003 (0.085)	7.808*** (2.095)	-0.345 (0.530)	-0.413 (0.456)	-0.481* (0.266)	-0.441*** (0.161)
Majority Party	0.362*** (0.114)	2.101 (2.810)	2.002*** (0.710)	2.704*** (0.611)	1.054*** (0.357)	0.360* (0.215)
Majority Leader	0.105 (0.121)	2.901 (2.971)	0.167 (0.751)	0.233 (0.646)	-0.018 (0.378)	0.244 (0.228)
Minority Leader	-0.024 (0.117)	0.109 (2.879)	-1.007 (0.727)	-0.575 (0.626)	-0.228 (0.366)	0.081 (0.221)
Power Committee	0.095 (0.078)	1.464 (1.922)	0.740 (0.486)	0.440 (0.418)	0.513** (0.244)	0.039 (0.147)
Seniority	0.005 (0.008)	-0.396** (0.186)	-0.076 (0.047)	0.035 (0.041)	0.005 (0.024)	0.016 (0.014)
Subcommittee Chair	0.050 (0.107)	3.864 (2.621)	0.291 (0.662)	-0.480 (0.570)	-0.312 (0.333)	0.145 (0.201)
State Legislature Experience	0.014 (0.071)	5.029*** (1.744)	0.462 (0.441)	0.076 (0.379)	0.176 (0.222)	-0.066 (0.134)
Vote Share	0.001 (0.004)	0.081 (0.095)	0.002 (0.024)	0.022 (0.021)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.007)
Black	-0.115 (0.365)	-5.835 (8.957)	-2.307 (2.264)	-1.931 (1.949)	-0.069 (1.138)	0.163 (0.686)
Latinx	0.175 (0.288)	17.413** (7.076)	-1.768 (1.788)	-0.717 (1.539)	0.244 (0.899)	0.107 (0.542)
State-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	793	793	793	793	793	793
R ²	0.473	0.467	0.477	0.514	0.388	0.292
Adjusted R ²	0.420	0.413	0.424	0.466	0.327	0.222
Residual Std. Error (df = 720)	0.744	18.291	4.623	3.980	2.324	1.401

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Black Legislators in the Senate - Robustness Check of the 1st Hypothesis across Legislative Stages

	Dependent Variable: Across Five Legislative Stages					
	LES	billsintro	committeeaction	beyondcommittee	passenate	lawfromsenate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Black Majority Party Member	-0.388 (0.465)	-9.691 (11.413)	-3.587 (2.886)	-3.773 (2.481)	-1.025 (1.451)	-0.256 (0.876)
Black Minority Party Member	0.302 (0.586)	0.029 (14.398)	-0.361 (3.640)	0.955 (3.129)	1.408 (1.830)	0.792 (1.105)
Committee Chair	1.029*** (0.092)	8.746*** (2.269)	5.673*** (0.574)	6.081*** (0.493)	2.463*** (0.288)	1.243*** (0.174)
Female	0.052 (0.109)	-0.884 (2.668)	0.209 (0.675)	0.413 (0.580)	0.192 (0.339)	0.080 (0.205)
Democrat	0.006 (0.085)	7.853*** (2.097)	-0.330 (0.530)	-0.400 (0.456)	-0.472* (0.267)	-0.435*** (0.161)
Majority Party	0.368*** (0.115)	2.181 (2.820)	2.028*** (0.713)	2.753*** (0.613)	1.076*** (0.358)	0.368* (0.216)
Majority Leader	0.100 (0.121)	2.822 (2.976)	0.141 (0.752)	0.198 (0.647)	-0.037 (0.378)	0.235 (0.228)
Minority Leader	-0.031 (0.117)	-0.015 (2.878)	-1.049 (0.728)	-0.583 (0.625)	-0.245 (0.366)	0.063 (0.221)
Power Committee	0.101 (0.078)	1.551 (1.927)	0.768 (0.487)	0.476 (0.419)	0.533** (0.245)	0.048 (0.148)
Seniority	0.004 (0.008)	-0.410** (0.186)	-0.081* (0.047)	0.032 (0.040)	0.003 (0.024)	0.014 (0.014)
Subcommittee Chair	0.041 (0.107)	3.712 (2.620)	0.240 (0.662)	-0.512 (0.570)	-0.339 (0.333)	0.125 (0.201)
State Legislature Experience	0.020 (0.071)	5.126*** (1.750)	0.494 (0.442)	0.115 (0.380)	0.198 (0.222)	-0.055 (0.134)
Vote Share	0.001 (0.004)	0.088 (0.095)	0.005 (0.024)	0.024 (0.021)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.007)
AAPI	-0.240 (0.574)	8.928 (14.104)	3.758 (3.566)	0.129 (3.066)	-1.248 (1.793)	-0.371 (1.082)
Latinx	0.223 (0.292)	18.095** (7.178)	-1.541 (1.815)	-0.402 (1.560)	0.411 (0.912)	0.182 (0.551)
State-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	793	793	793	793	793	793
R ²	0.471	0.466	0.476	0.515	0.387	0.289
Adjusted R ²	0.418	0.413	0.423	0.466	0.326	0.218
Residual Std. Error (df = 720)	0.745	18.302	4.628	3.978	2.326	1.404

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Latinx Legislators in the Senate - Robustness Check of the 1st Hypothesis across Legislative Stages

	Dependent Variable: Across Five Legislative Stages					
	LES	billsintro	committeearrival	beyondcommittee	passenate	lawfromsenate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Latinx Majority Party Member	0.554 (0.359)	35.267*** (8.766)	-0.907 (2.234)	0.004 (1.922)	0.594 (1.123)	0.642 (0.677)
Latinx Minority Party Member	-0.255 (0.380)	-3.080 (9.274)	-2.722 (2.363)	-1.527 (2.033)	-0.139 (1.189)	-0.494 (0.716)
Committee Chair	1.038*** (0.092)	9.079*** (2.251)	5.704*** (0.574)	6.117*** (0.493)	2.481*** (0.288)	1.256*** (0.174)
Female	0.057 (0.108)	-0.708 (2.647)	0.226 (0.675)	0.433 (0.580)	0.202 (0.339)	0.088 (0.205)
Democrat	0.002 (0.085)	7.730*** (2.081)	-0.340 (0.530)	-0.412 (0.456)	-0.478* (0.267)	-0.440*** (0.161)
Majority Party	0.350*** (0.114)	1.608 (2.793)	1.969*** (0.712)	2.680*** (0.612)	1.039*** (0.358)	0.342 (0.216)
Majority Leader	0.111 (0.121)	3.208 (2.951)	0.179 (0.752)	0.244 (0.647)	-0.014 (0.378)	0.252 (0.228)
Minority Leader	-0.042 (0.117)	-0.383 (2.855)	-1.081 (0.728)	-0.620 (0.626)	-0.264 (0.366)	0.049 (0.221)
Power Committee	0.099 (0.078)	1.615 (1.909)	0.753 (0.486)	0.449 (0.418)	0.519** (0.245)	0.045 (0.147)
Seniority	0.004 (0.008)	-0.414** (0.185)	-0.080* (0.047)	0.033 (0.040)	0.003 (0.024)	0.015 (0.014)
Subcommittee Chair	0.035 (0.107)	3.425 (2.601)	0.230 (0.663)	-0.518 (0.570)	-0.341 (0.333)	0.117 (0.201)
State Legislature Experience	0.005 (0.071)	4.575*** (1.737)	0.448 (0.443)	0.062 (0.381)	0.171 (0.223)	-0.077 (0.134)
Vote Share	0.001 (0.004)	0.085 (0.095)	0.004 (0.024)	0.023 (0.021)	0.010 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.007)
AAPI	-0.237 (0.574)	9.076 (13.995)	3.761 (3.566)	0.130 (3.068)	-1.248 (1.794)	-0.368 (1.081)
Black	-0.100 (0.365)	-4.917 (8.899)	-2.295 (2.268)	-1.910 (1.951)	-0.068 (1.140)	0.179 (0.688)
State-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress-level Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	793	793	793	793	793	793
R ²	0.473	0.474	0.476	0.514	0.387	0.291
Adjusted R ²	0.420	0.422	0.423	0.465	0.325	0.220
Residual Std. Error (df = 720)	0.744	18.161	4.628	3.981	2.328	1.403

Significance Levels

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01