

# Tanks and Ticker Tape

The Role of Military Parades and Government Attitudes on the  
Likelihood of Conflict

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“A military parade is really a kind of ritual dance, something like a ballet, expressing a certain philosophy of life. It is simply an affirmation of naked power”

George Orwell, “England, Your England”<sup>1</sup>

The study of war and peace is a long established and robust area of political science and philosophical academia. Many scholars have attempted to figure out the puzzle of war. Among them include the lauded names of Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, Kenneth Waltz, Alexander Wendt, and countless others who have examined war from a myriad of angles. It has held a consistent place in the mind of political scholars because of the curiosity of the event. Despite all this research and the horrors of war, the question remains: why do humans continue to fight each other? By many standards, war, particularly inter-state war, is a rare and seemingly obsolescent occurrence.<sup>2</sup> Yet, this topic is still relevant as tensions between the United States, China, and Russia grow and other crises emerge.

In this thesis, I will present an overlooked cause of war, utilizing rationalist theory, political psychology, and Democratic Peace theory. The central tenet of this essay is that the attitudes of the government have an important role in the likelihood of war or peace. The focus on such attitudes reflects a generally accepted, but overlooked idea that the psychological disposition of leaders has an impact on war. In order to examine these attitudes, I will be using a novel metric: the existence of military parades on the national day of the country. Military parades are a useful metric due to the massive mobilization of resources that is required—mobilization that only an elite in the government could order. They are also

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<sup>1</sup> I found this quote in an Atlantic article about Trump’s desire for a military parade. The article was called “The Truth about Military Parades” by Eliot A. Cohen.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion about the obsolescence of war, check out Carl Kaysen’s essay “Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay” (1990) as well as the work it was in response to: John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (1989).

unnecessary and reflect the values of the government, namely whether they choose to spend national resources on an ostentatious display of military prowess.

My thesis will begin with a brief examination of the different literature on the causes of war and it will selectively focus on rationalist ideology, political psychology, and the Democratic Peace theories of war. It will then transition to a theory section expanding on how attitudes exemplified by military parades contribute to the likelihood of war or peace and how they work with well-established theories of war. I will then explain my research design for how to test a portion of my theory in a manner sensitive to the time and resource constraints I am under. Finally, the data section will explain my findings and analyze them. Ultimately, I find a negative relationship between the existence of military parades and the likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute. This contradicts my hypotheses, but provides a unique and complementary perspective on my theory, which I explain in my analysis and conclusion.

### Literature Review

There is extensive research on many topics connected to my thesis as well as certain gaps. In this section, I will examine a broad overview of the academic discourse on the causes of conflict and its related complications. I will then discuss the implications of political psychology and the limited literature around military parades. Through this review, I will position and frame my work.

There are many different views on the causes of war.<sup>3</sup> These have been grouped into different categories and given different titles, but it can be boiled down to three ideas. Utilizing Kenneth Waltz's well-known three levels of analysis—individual, state, and system—I will

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<sup>3</sup> Another perspective on war which I was not able to incorporate here is the feminist perspective on war which offers gender as another level of analysis. A good entry point is Laura Sjoberg's *Gendering Global Conflict: Towards a Feminist Theory of War* (2013).

briefly explain some of these perspectives.<sup>4</sup> Some political scientists focus on the individual levels, examining the attributes of leaders or the motivations that drive human behavior.<sup>5</sup> Another group of political scientists examine the state level and the role of cultural factors and nationalism.<sup>6</sup> Within the same level of analysis of the state, some examine the regime type of the nation as a factor in their behavior and thus, their propensity for war, arguing that these factors cause friction which lead to conflict.<sup>7</sup> Others, generally realists and liberals, focus on the system-level unit of analysis and the structure of the international system.<sup>8</sup> The structure of the system, whether anarchic—as the realists claim—or based on economic interdependence and international institutions—from the liberal perspective—informs the likelihood of war.

The vast majority of scholars of war agree that there are key ingredients for conflict: human nature, pursuit or lack of security, economic or territorial motivations, and cultural factors. These same scholars disagree about which is the most important cause or to what extent each ingredient should be examined to estimate the probability of war or peace. One cause—the psychological disposition or attitude towards war—has received less focus than I believe it deserves and that is where I will place my argument. Many scholars would agree that how leaders and populations perceive war and peace is a contributing factor as to whether war or peace prevails. Yet the examination of this is limited, especially given that political psychology is an emerging, but underdeveloped field. Thus, my contribution will be examining something

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<sup>4</sup> The levels of analysis mentioned throughout the thesis derive from Kenneth Waltz's influential work *Theory of International Politics* (1979).

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of human motivations, see J.D. Orme's *Human Nature and the Causes of War* (2018) and for a discussion of leader attributes see: *Why Leaders Fight?* by Michael Horowitz, Allen Stam and Cali Ellis (2015).

<sup>6</sup> Key examples of this perspective include Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" (1993) and Alexander Wendt's "Social Theory of International Politics" (1999).

<sup>7</sup> See the work of Micheal Doyle, including "Liberalism and World Politics" (1986).

<sup>8</sup> Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry have a great explanation of the liberal international order in "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order" (1999).

many agree is a contributing factor—the psychological disposition of the leaders making decisions—with a new method of measuring it—military parades.

### Key Theories

There are two key theories which are important to my broader theory explained in the following section, but which do not take into account the attitudes of governmental leaders about war. I will expand on each of those and present how my research represents a novel approach. The first is the rationalist theory of war and peace.<sup>9</sup> The rationalists base their theory of war and peace on the perception of the international system as a state of anarchy (due to the lack of supranational government) and the decision making process of states as rational. Rationalists have presented a variety of theories about the causes of war, namely: anarchy-caused self-help, preventive war, expected benefits being greater than expected costs, and rational miscalculations.<sup>10</sup> Out of these, a key scholar James D. Fearon only finds rational miscalculations to be defensible.<sup>11</sup> Fearon posited two other key causal mechanisms which my theory will engage with: rational miscalculations due to private information or purposeful misinformation and issue indivisibilities. Rationalist theory provides a key framework for my theory by grounding the irrationality of war due to ex post inefficiency. Yet, this theory only briefly touches on the first level of analysis which is the individual when examining the risk aversion of leaders.<sup>12</sup> This is an area I hope to address.

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<sup>9</sup> My sources for rationalist theory pull primarily from James D. Fearon's *Rationalist Explanations for War* (1995).

<sup>10</sup> Fearon (1995), p. 381

<sup>11</sup> He argues that anarchy alone is not enough to cause war because rationally there is always a mutually preferable settlement that would prevent war, thus another causal mechanism must have acted to cause war (384-5). He explains holes in the argument for preventive war and cases when expected benefits are greater than expected costs. Fearon's arguments against preventive war can be found on pages 385-6 of *Rationalist Explanations for War* (1995) and his arguments about cases when expected benefits are greater than expected costs can be found on page 386.

<sup>12</sup> Fearon, p. 388

The second key theory is the Democratic Peace theory, which is the view that liberal democracies are extremely unlikely to fight each other.<sup>13</sup> Russett and Oneal are a foundational work in addressing this theory, pulling from Kantian principles of perpetual peace, they argue that a combination of democracy, economic interdependence and international organizations create feedback loops, which they call virtuous circles. They demonstrate that democracies, trading partners, and states that are members of the same international organizations hardly ever fight each other. Since the publication of this work there have been critiques, specifically that this theory puts too much focus on the role of democracies while ignoring issues such as why democracies have performed contradictory actions such as covert operations against other democracies.<sup>14</sup> I want to contribute to the discourse on the Democratic Peace theory and add the additional variable of the attitudes of the governments towards war. I also want to challenge the limiting focus on democracies. Certainly, democracies may tend to have more pacifistic tendencies, however, attitudes towards war by leaders or elites could explain why some non-democracies are peaceful as well as why some democracies engage in conflict including covert operations.

Each of these explanations shows part of my theory, but they are still missing key aspects. One key aspect in both of these theories is that the characteristics of the system or country matter more than individuals. The Democratic Peace Theory focuses much more on whether a nation in question is democratic or not, or whether they trade or not as opposed to how the leadership or political culture of the nation impacts those characteristics. Realist theory, on the other hand, focuses on the anarchic characteristics of the system and assumes that all nations

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<sup>13</sup> A key source I engage with on Democratic Peace theory is *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations* by Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001).

<sup>14</sup> *Overt Peace, Covert War?: Covert Intervention and the Democratic Peace* by Alexander B. Downes & Mary Lauren Lilley (2010) covers this topic and explains criticisms against the democratic peace.



and, by extension, leaders seek rational self-interest. This fails to take into account the impact of leaders and political elites on the decisions and characteristics of the country. This gap can be at least partially addressed by incorporating principles of political psychology.

### Review of Political Psychology

Political psychology is a longstanding field, but one that has been gaining utility and attention by International Relations scholars. One important scholar is Rose McDermott. McDermott (2004) outlines an essential overview of the role of leadership in international relations.<sup>15</sup> She states that while the study of personality and its impact on political decision-making is difficult because so few leaders take personality tests, it is necessary. There are several important studies which attempted to understand the role of personality. Among them, Friedlander and Cohen (1975) attempted to understand belligerence in leaders as a function of their personality.<sup>16</sup> Margaret Hermann (1980) sought to examine the impact of personal characteristics on the foreign policy of world leaders.<sup>17</sup> Another key study is that of Lloyd Etheredge (1978) who gave personality tests to senior State Department officials and compared them to their foreign policy preferences.<sup>18</sup> This study highlights that political elites and members of the bureaucracy can similarly impact the direction of foreign policy through their personality and opinions. The leader will ultimately make the decision, however, bureaucrats and elites provide the guideposts for decision-making, often through the essential role of agenda setters. The findings of these researchers have had methodological flaws, but they demonstrate

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<sup>15</sup> McDermott, Rose. "Leadership." In *Political Psychology in International Relations*, 215-38. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. Accessed March 12, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.10847.11>.

<sup>16</sup> Friedlander, Saul, and Raymond Cohen. "The Personality Correlates of Belligerence in International Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Historical Case Studies." *Comparative Politics* 7, no. 2 (1975): 155-86. Accessed March 12, 2021. doi:10.2307/421547.

<sup>17</sup> Hermann, Margaret G. "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (1980): 7-46. Accessed March 12, 2021. doi:10.2307/2600126.

<sup>18</sup> Etheredge, L. S. (1978). *Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898–1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory*. *American Political Science Review*, 72(2), 434–451. Cambridge University Press.

some essential premises which position my work. Namely, personality has an impact on leadership and the decisions of the leaders.

My work falls into a similar pitfall as the work of political psychologists—I am unable to analyze the personalities of leaders up close and personal. Thus, similar to political psychologists, I have chosen a metric to analyze specific characteristics. For the purposes of this essay, the metric is military parades. Dissimilarly to political psychologists, I am not looking at direct characteristics such as Friedlander and Cohen’s examination of belligerence and leaders’ responses to conflict or Hermann’s characteristics of beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style. I am instead looking at the indirect characteristics that military parades speak to. Thus, it is necessary to examine the literature on military parades.

#### Review of Military Parades

Military parades are frequently noted to be an area that merits more study by the few scholars who have studied it. Most of these studies such as Moaz Azaryahu (2000) and Hwang and Schneider (2011) focus on specific countries and the roles that military parades play in those contexts. It is certainly useful as a tool, but there may be issues of selection bias with more militaristic countries being chosen for study. It seems unlikely that scholars are going to study the *absence* of military parades given the underdevelopment of the field. Moaz Azaryahu (2000) directly discusses the existence of military parades on the Israeli national day, providing a fascinating perspective on the ceremonial and popular role of military parades as a morale and patriotic building activity.<sup>19</sup> He focuses on the evolution of the national display, its subsequent end in 1973, and its role as both an internal and external message of strength and patriotism. Hwang and Schneider (2011) analyze the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China and

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<sup>19</sup> Azaryahu, Moaz. “The Independence Day Parade: A Political History of a Patriotic Ritual.” *The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society*, edited by Edna Lomsky-Feder, and Eyal Ben-Ari, State University of New York Press, 2000. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucsd/detail.action?docID=3408051>.

its extravagant military parade as a form of cultural governance.<sup>20</sup> They argue that the extravagant celebrations served the purpose of uniting the Chinese cultural and national identity, more than acting as a sign of military prowess or deterrence. The study of military parades is limited, but even these examples demonstrate the relevance of the area. For Azaryahu, the Israeli military parades were nationalistic displays of deterrence and pride meant to unite the Israeli society in the face of hostile Arab countries; the parades ended when Israeli society began to feel more secure perhaps following the successes of the 1973 war. For Hwang and Schneider, the military parades represented an internal action to unite and inspire the Chinese identity. Both of these have implications for the importance of military parades as emblems of political culture and attitudes towards war. They demonstrate that military parades are tied to the search for security, specifically a secure national identity.

Starting with a broader view of war and its causes, it is clear that the reasons for war are numerous and complex. There is no clear cut explanation of war despite thousands of years of study because of these complexities.<sup>21</sup> One contributing factor that has been vastly overlooked is the role of the individual personality and perspectives of leaders and political elites. The work of political psychologists points to the potential relevancy of this factor, however, personality is a difficult measure to gauge. Instead political psychologists have to rely on indirect measures and observations to examine the personality of leaders. This thesis examines the indirect messages of military parades, which play a role in both external and internal social construction. In my next section, I will explain in more detail how these military parades are tied to the prevalence of war.

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<sup>20</sup> Hwang, Yih-Jye, and Florian Schneider. "Performance, Meaning, and Ideology in the Making of Legitimacy: The Celebrations of the People's Republic of China's Sixty-Year Anniversary." *China Review*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2011, pp. 27–55. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/23462196](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23462196). Accessed 12 Mar. 2021.

<sup>21</sup> Other scholarship includes: Ned Richard Lebow's *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (2008)

## A Theoretical Explanation

As war has been studied broadly, there are many theories for why conflicts happen as I have laid out in my Literature Review. In the past, there has been a focus on the Great Man Theory, which claims that history can be explained by the impact of select men. There are substantial issues with this theory and it has largely fallen out of favor. In contrast to this theory, I would argue that history is not completely defined by a handful of individuals, but certain decisions can be explained through the examination of the values of leaders and the surrounding elites. There are likely few theorists who would argue that the values and leadership of a nation do not play a role in the likelihood of war. However, it is difficult to create laws and theory around the inconsistencies of human beings and it is only beginning to find a place in the role of theory. Despite this difficulty, the values of leaders manifest themselves in other ways outside of conflict. I would argue that military parades are one such expression of values. For the sake of this thesis, military parades are defined as large-scale demonstrations in which the military features prominently. I did not count wreath-layings or changing of the guard or other smaller scale military demonstrations. Additionally, please note that references to the government within this paper signify the leader and key elites.

### Explanatory Power of Leaders and Government Elites

Before I begin, it is necessary to address the following question: why examine the government but not the people? From my perspective, looking at the governmental attitudes and values are more effective than looking at the attitudes of a population. Certainly in a healthy democracy, the views of the people are represented in the views of the leaders or at least have an impact on them. Conceivably, if a leader strayed too far away from the values of the populace, that leader would be removed from power. However, in practice, democracy is a slower process

and leaders can make decisions that have large scale implications before they are able to be removed from power by the people. This is possible through the support of governmental elites, even if the people are extremely opposed. There is further benefit in separating government from the public with non-democracies. Non-democracies are less beholden to the populace as their power is derived from other groups. They likely are more concerned with the political support of a small group of elites—for example, oligarchs, generals, etc. Thus, the attitudes of those elites matter as well, and the leader of this non-democracy would reflect those values in order to remain in power.

The focus on individuals in key decision making roles does not deny that regular individual citizens have a role to play. For example, these citizens can help create movements. However, much of the key decision making happens in the halls of power by bureaucrats and elites. They deal with the day-in, day-out minutiae of a wide variety of topics. Bureaucrats and political elites also have the powerful role of agenda setters, regardless of regime type. Conversely, political culture derived from the public has a longer term impact. It often leads to certain election results in democracies and either support or overthrow in non-democracies. Political culture does not have the same effect as key political elites, thus, it is essential to focus this study on under examined, but key players. Taking into account each of these reasons, it is more useful to examine the values of the governmental leaders than the values of the people.

#### Explanatory Power of Military Parades

Next it is necessary to ask, why look at military parades as an emblem of governmental attitudes and values? To begin, military parades cost money. A government must be resolved enough to host a military parade. Perhaps the parade is a tradition or a personal pet project,

regardless, military parades do not happen accidentally. They must be intentional and it is likely a top-down decision with the leader directing their staff to put on a military parade.

Some may argue that a government may be utilizing a military parade to convince other nations they are strong and willing to fight. By hosting such a parade on their national day, often with foreign dignitaries in attendance or paying attention by sending congratulations, government leaders are putting on a show about their values and identity. Some governments may be pursuing this for the purposes of seeming militaristic while other governments may be actually militaristic. This pulls on James Fearon's rationalist explanation of the "incentive to misrepresent."<sup>22</sup> As Fearon argues, private information with incentive to misrepresent leads to failure in bargaining, aka conflict or war. It is assumed that nations with full information can find a mutually beneficial compromise or bargain. Full information, in the case of military parades, would be knowledge of whether or not the government or country's leaders are militarists or pacifists. If the leaders are militarists, they might be spoiling for a fight, which would rationally lead to more concessions from other less militaristic nations. If the leaders are pacifistic, they may be seeking to avoid war by scaring off the other. However, there is incentive to misrepresent. If a nation can convince another that they are more capable—more likely to win or able to fight with lower costs—then the other country may offer a larger concession. Thus, a country can win more by successfully bluffing. A country, knowing there is incentive to misrepresent, may ignore the signal of the military parade. However, this is a risk given that, if a country is truly militaristic, there would be a miscalculation and thus a bargaining failure. Ignoring the military parade risks war but believing the military parade risks a larger concession. Thus, peace will depend on the governmental attitudes or preferences of both or all countries

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<sup>22</sup> Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414. Accessed March 12, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903>.

involved. If a country is more pacifistic—preferring the costs and benefits of peace to the costs and benefits of war—they will choose to give a larger concession and avoid war. If a country is more militaristic—preferring the costs and benefits of war to the costs and benefits of peace—then they will call the other nation’s bluff and there will be a bargaining failure.

It is important to remember that it takes two or more nations to have a bargaining failure and cause a militarized interstate dispute, which is the focus of this essay. If Country A was secretly peaceful and misrepresenting itself in order to protect itself and Country B was truly militaristic and preferred to risk war over giving a concession, then Country A would have to give a larger concession. Thus, the only way there would be a war between these states is if both governments preferred the costs and benefits of war to the costs and benefits of peace.

This idea of a dyad that prefers the costs and benefits of war to the costs and benefits of peace taps into the Neighborhood Theory and spatial geopolitics.<sup>23</sup> States exist in relation to each other. With increased globalization and economic interdependence, no nation is a metaphorical island. Thus, it is essential to consider states in terms of politically relevant dyads. If a nation holds military parades and is surrounded by nations that do not hold military parades, it may not be threatening enough to warrant response or conflict. This line of logic assumes that these countries are situated in the modern globalized world where there are international organizations for the pursuit of support in cases of aggression as well as important economic connections that can reduce tensions and avoid a bargaining failure. The negative effects of politically unstable countries can be warded off by international participation.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> For readings on the Neighborhood Theory or spatial geopolitics, check out Bremer (1992) “Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965” or Vasquez (1995) “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality.”

<sup>24</sup> Grechyna, Daryna, 2017. "Political Instability: The Neighbor vs. the Partner Effect," MPRA Paper 79952, University Library of Munich, Germany.

However, in the absence of mitigating factors, political instability can be contagious and I would emphasize that aggression can be even more so. A showy military parade might provoke another country to demonstrate their military capabilities and instigate a game of Chicken. In the presence of the international community, the threat to reputation is lessened and a conflict may be avoided.<sup>25</sup> Thus, the neighbors of states matter for contextualizing their relations. A nation surrounded by politically unstable nations may experience more insecurity and utilize a military parade to signify strength and ward off threats which could spark a bargaining failure as highlighted above. A nation surrounded by stable and likeminded countries may experience less insecurity and thus a military parade—perhaps in a nationalistic show—would have less of an impact. This follows the logic of the Democratic Peace theory. I would expect that, following the logic of the Democratic Peace theory, economic interdependence and democracy provide a level of assurance to other countries that might give countries hosting military parades the benefit of the doubt with their neighbors.

Essentially, assuming a rationalist perspective of an anarchic world, military parades represent an additional element that countries must analyze to understand the risks associated with engaging with other countries. Depending on a variety of factors surrounding the military parades, including elements put forth by the Democratic Peace theory, a leader of a country may perceive a military parade as a militaristic display of aggression that affects their concessions or they may perceive the military parade as a patriotic or nationalistic display that is less concerning due to the balancing effects of international institutions and other alliances.

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<sup>25</sup> Oye, Kenneth A. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (1985): 1-24. Accessed March 12, 2021. doi:10.2307/2010349.



## Explanatory Power of Institutions

Thus, it is necessary to examine, how do institutions act as constraining factors? As alluded to above, global institutions and interstate relations matter. This issue warrants more discussion. On both of these levels—the national and the systemic, aka international or global—institutions play a role. In the context of this essay, institution means an organizational body whether a treaty, an IGO at the international level or a governmental body or position at the domestic level.<sup>26</sup> Each level of institution has incentives for participation and shapes the prevalence of war and peace. Humans create institutions for a sense of stability and security and to organize resources such as food, land, protection, etc. Governments are a natural extension of this desire. Over time, demands of government have expanded but its essential role has remained the same. Thus, the values of these institutions matter on both the aggregate and individual level. As a simple illustration, an institution with the goal of ending world hunger will dedicate its energy, time, and resources at the aggregate level to this purpose and will get closer to that goal than an institution with the goal of monopolizing grain production in the United States. The values of the organization or institution directs resource allocation, which is the primary purpose for the original formation of an institution.

The first level of institution is the domestic government. The domestic government contains a variety of smaller institutions that make up its structure. In most regimes, whether that be authoritarian or democratic, the head of state directs the goals and priorities of these institutions. Thus, it is important to consider the values of the elites at the top of the government. In democracies, these values are supposed to be reflective of the will of the people, meaning the values of the elites can be constrained by the populace, although often they are elected for certain

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<sup>26</sup> Xinyuan Dai has a good explanation of the differences between international institutions and international regimes that helped inform my definition in “International Institutions and National Policies” (2007).

values. In authoritarian regimes, the values of the elites completely overwhelm the values of the people because the elites hold the power and decision making capabilities. It is likely that democracies have more pacifistic leaders due to focus on material comfort and standard of living which come from a focus on trade and not war, which is disruptive to material comfort. However, that may not always be the case if the people have a need for essential resources that another state has, as the will of the people will demand access to those resources, incentivizing a war to secure those resources.

The next consideration is that there are a variety of international institutions that make up the international system. They are a feature of the modern era as a relatively novel invention. The Concert of Europe was an early international institution that demonstrated the implications and importance of such institutions. It was founded on the values of sovereignty and mutual security and it was formed to balance against the expansionistic France, or any other European nation that sought to increase its share of power.<sup>27</sup> The current institutions created after the second World War were founded on similar principles of sovereignty and security, but they also represent a certain transition to protecting human rights and achieving lofty humanistic goals. For example, the United Nations is a body whose purpose is described as maintaining international peace and security, developing cooperative relationships among nations based on the principle of rights and sovereignty, and addressing international problems which include humanitarian ones.<sup>28</sup> The values of an institution matter because there are incentives for nations to join international organizations. They provide opportunities for cooperation and for access to resources, like funding, act as a reputation boost, or a talking point for the domestic citizenry. If nations are already incentivized to join, they are incentivized to promote the values of the international

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<sup>27</sup> Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, p. 19

<sup>28</sup> The principles and values described here come from The UN Charter website.

organizations. International institutions provide a layer of pacification that serves to protect nations that want to pursue the peace dividend with a reduced risk of being perceived as weak. They can enter these international organizations, including multilateral security agreements and rely on the support of other countries in case of interstate violence. Thus, these international institutions serve as a layer of security, reducing the likelihood of conflict.

The structure of both national and international institutions impacts the decisions of nation-states. National structures, for example, that constrain or increase the power of their executives shape the direction of the nation. International institutions can also do so. If a nation was in a series of interlocking mutual defense pacts, like many European countries were before World War I, the decisions they make would be different compared to the absence of such treaties. Essentially, there are many complex interactions which either encourage or discourage certain paths, including conflict. The attitudes of a government leader, the existence of national and international institutions can all determine the path of a country in terms of conflict. In this theory section, I presented a rationalist account of the impact of military parades on a country's decision making. As expressed earlier, this account may be modified based on features such as domestic and international institutions. For example, if Country A feels threatened by Country B's military parades but they know their allies will not look favorably on them being the aggressor, they may be less likely to engage in conflict as compared to not having that constraining factor.

Ultimately, military parades represent an expression of values from governmental leaders and elites, which are important but overlooked aspects in the decision making of nations. As I have expressed in multiple ways, values matter at all levels of government and institutions. Military parades can impact the likelihood of war or peace through incentive to misrepresent

which can lead to bargaining failures. This impact assumes an anarchic world. However, domestic and international institutions can reduce the impact of military parades by acting as a constraining factor. To sum up my theory, decisions, including those of war or peace, can be understood through the examination of the values of leaders and the surrounding elites as well as their interpretation of the actions of other nations, all within the constraints of the domestic and international institutions they participate in.

### Research Design

My research argues that governmental attitudes towards war impact the number of conflicts that a nation enters into. I argue that military parades point to a glorification of war. In order to test this relationship between military parades and conflict, I will perform an observational study of politically relevant dyads. Focusing on politically relevant dyads reduces the number of country pairs I need to examine and it addresses a key theoretical concern of the need for two states for an interstate conflict to occur.<sup>29</sup> As expressed earlier in my thesis, the countries that neighbor each other or that have a force in the region matter. The likelihood of war will be affected if a nation that glorifies war, or conversely, that is pacifistic is surrounded by other countries that match their attitudes or have opposing attitudes.

My hypotheses are:

- When one or both member(s) of a politically relevant dyad holds military parades, militarized interstate disputes will be more likely.
- When neither member of a politically relevant dyad holds military parades, militarized interstate disputes will be less likely or not occur at all.

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<sup>29</sup> To learn about political relevant dyads and the different ways of categorizing political relevance, see Douglas Lemke “The Tyranny of Distance: Redefining Politically Relevant Dyads.”

- My null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between militaristic parades on national days and the number of militarized interstate disputes that a country enters.

My dependent variable is whether or not a country participates in a militarized interstate dispute in the period of 2004 to 2014. I use the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (1816-2014) to cover all incidents up to 1000 battle deaths, given that it is the most commonly used data set for scholars studying conflict. My primary focus in terms of data is militarized interstate disputes due to the small number of wars over 1000 battle deaths in the period of 2004-2014. My independent variable is whether or not a country has military parades on their national day. In order to approach this variable, I am going to look at the newspaper of record for each country in the year 2014. The following “Methods” section will explain my process more. I perform several statistical analyses to determine if there is a correlation between the existence of military parades on national days and whether a country engages in a militarized interstate dispute, on both the dyadic and monadic level.

I have to recognize a key flaw in my research design. I coded military parades for the year 2014 due to a lack of digital newspaper archives for many countries prior to that year. However, the year 2014 is the very last year in the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set and there are not enough observations to effectively gauge the relationship. Thus, I applied the findings from 2014 to the entire period. If a country had a military parade in 2014, I assumed they had one in 2004-2013 as well. Yet, if my theory is accurate, militarized interstate disputes would follow a military parade. Thus, I am putting the cart before the horse. Given the limited amount of time and data collection issues, I was not able to code a more complete dataset, including earlier years. If I had more time, I would code as many years and their corresponding military parades within the COW time frame, 1816-2014. Thus, my research likely suffers from a

Type II error due to missingness in my data. It will be harder to prove my hypotheses because my data is not as sensitive as I planned and this may have affected the findings. A lack of findings may not signify a lack of a relationship or the academic irrelevance of a study of military parades.

### Methods and Datasets

In terms of my methods and datasets, I utilized a variety of datasets in the time frame of 2004-2014, merged together with a program called NewGene. This time range was an arbitrary choice—a decade before the end of the Correlates of War MID dataset. The majority of my datasets came from the Correlates of War, specifically National Material Capabilities and Militarized Interstate Disputes. I additionally utilized Polity V to understand the relationship between regime type and conflict. Future research may be supplemented with the SIPRI-PRIO dataset or the ARCHIGOS dataset, however, those are not utilized in my current findings.<sup>30</sup> The main focus is on my novel addition—a dataset containing whether or not a nation had a military parade on their national day in the year 2014.

In order to code this, I followed a series of steps. First, I looked up the date of the country's national day using Google and then I searched for the newspapers of that country. I started with the highest circulation or most renowned. I would search in the inquiry box on the newspaper website for “national day 2014” or “independence day 2014” depending on the name of the day, as some countries had unique names for the day. If there was no inquiry box, I searched for an archive. In the absence of an archive, I would choose another newspaper and restart the process. If my search yielded results, I would comb through them, using a Google Translate extension if necessary, to find any information about how the country celebrates its

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<sup>30</sup> The SIPRI-PRIO dataset is another dataset of armed conflicts from 1946 to 2008. The ARCHIGOS dataset includes information on leader traits and term lengths which could strengthen further analysis.

national day. If possible, I would limit my search to the month of the national day, leaving a couple of weeks before and after to catch early or late articles. If I found nothing for 2014, I would look for another year. If I found another year, I saved the link and searched other newspapers to find a 2014 article. On average, I would examine 3-6 newspapers for each country. If I was unable to corroborate I went back to Google and searched “[country] national day celebration 2014” and looked through Google news and images. If I did not find anything, I would use the other year, code accordingly and note in the assumptions category what year it was based on.

In terms of how I coded, a 1 signified a military parade and a 0 signified no parade (or not enough information). I coded troop reviews, wreath layings, changing of the guard or other small demonstrations such as parachuting displays, as a 0. If I could not find affirmative evidence of a military parade, I coded a 0.

Some issues I ran into included language barriers, lack of digital archives, and lack of reporting. The language barriers were addressed with the use of Google Translate. The lack of digital archives was a substantial barrier, especially for the smaller nations. A third issue was the lack of reporting on the *content* of celebrations. Often speeches were transcribed, awards announced, articles about congratulations from foreign dignitaries were all in the newspaper record, but a list of events or even a brief description of celebrations was frequently missing. One possible explanation would be that most people, especially in smaller nations, would go to the events or knew generally what was going on without the need for an article declaring it.

#### Variables, Controls and Models

My focus is on two binary variables: whether or not a given country had a parade and whether or not they had a militarized interstate dispute.

1) Military Parades: My independent variable is whether or not a country had a military parade on their national day in the year 2014. It is based on a self-created dataset pulled from newspapers. H1 and H2 both predict that there will be a strong positive relationship between a military parade and participation in militarized interstate disputes. The following table explains the number of countries that had or did not have a militarized interstate dispute as well as the number of countries that had or did not have a military parade.

2014	Had a MID	Did not have a MID
Had a military parade	6.97%	28.35%
Did not have a military parade	18.41%	46.26%

It is evident from the table that approximately 7% of countries in the year 2014 both had a military parade and participated in a militarized interstate dispute. Conversely, 28% of countries had a military parade but did not participate in a militarized interstate dispute. 18% of countries did not have a military parade, but did participate in a militarized interstate dispute. 46% of countries did not have a military parade nor participated in a militarized interstate dispute.

2) Participation in Militarized Interstate Disputes: My dependent variable is whether or not a country participates in a militarized interstate dispute. Utilizing the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset, I created a dataset of all of the conflicts from 2004-2014. I then merged



this dataset with my dyadic dataset to create a binary variable of whether each politically relevant dyad had a conflict each year from 2004-2014.

Given that there is a flaw in my research design with the military parades being coded for a year after the military interstate disputes had already happened, it is important to see if 2014 is a representative year for conflicts as it may impact whether 2014 is a representative year for military parades. The following two figures examine the normalcy of the number of MIDs per year according to the Correlates of War.




Fig. 1

Figure 1 demonstrates a clear outlier in the form of 2011. It is unclear why 2011 was such a particularly aggressive year, however, it stood out with over 600 conflicts.<sup>31</sup> I decided to remove the year 2011 from the graph in order to test for normalcy without the strong skew.

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<sup>31</sup> A complete breakdown of the number of conflicts for each year in 2004-2014 is available in the Appendix.




Fig. 2

Figure 2 is the previous graph without the outlier year, 2011. In the absence of the outlier year, 2014 stands out. It is 2 standard deviations above the mean, meaning it was the second highest year for conflicts in the period of 2004-2014. This is within the normal bell curve for militarized interstate disputes in this period. This means that 2014 is within the window of representative years.

In addition to these core variables, I also consider some additional control variables.

- 1) CINC scores: One control variable I employ is the level of national material capabilities. I pull this from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset. One constraining factor on nations participating in a militarized interstate dispute is whether they have the capability to risk a military conflict. If a nation knows they cannot handle a conflict due to lack of resources, they will be more likely to accept a deal and avoid war completely. Additionally, national material capabilities would also tie into the size and

technological prowess displayed in a military parade. A nation with low capability would have a less threatening military parade than a nation with a high capability.

- 2) Polity: A second control variable is the regime type of the countries. I use polity scores from Polity V for the period of 2004-2014. Scores range from -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic). There may be a relationship between the regime type of nations and the level of perceived threat to neighbors. The Democratic Peace theory posits that democracies are less likely to fight each other. This may explain some variation in politically relevant dyads where both countries are democracies yet have military parades but do not engage in conflict with each other.

Beyond my control variables, there are additional variables of interest which may impact my findings.

- 1) Hostility Level: A variable of interest is the hostility level metric, derived from the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset. Hostility levels vary from 1 (no militarized action) to 5 (war).<sup>32</sup> Hostility level may reveal that military parades correlate to a higher or lower level of conflict when it does occur. This will be briefly explored in this thesis.
- 2) Assumption: Another variable of interest is that of whether or not I had to assume when coding my parade variable. Due to a high degree of missingness in my military parade data collection, I had to assume whether or not a country had a military parade based on a different year or if I was unable to find information. If I could not find definitive evidence of a military parade (time stamped photos, time stamped article from a reputable news source), I coded a 0 for the country.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> More information on the levels of hostility can be found in the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dataset V5 Codebook.

<sup>33</sup> I performed regression analysis of my data without the assumptions and it is available in the Appendix.

## Results

The following are two tables which present the relevant summary statistics from the two models utilized in my analysis. I utilized a linear model regression in order to test my data, given my dichotomous dependent variable. These findings are broken up into monadic and dyadic in order to test the effect of a military parade on a country's own participation in a conflict, compared to the effect of a military parade on the likelihood of a politically relevant dyad entering into a conflict with each other. I segmented these findings into two tables based on the time period. In the first table, I only examine the data from 2014. In the second table, I examine the data from the time period of 2004-2014. This is to account for the flaw in the data collection. As I recognized earlier, the cause (military parades) should not follow the effect (conflict), but unfortunately, I was only able to collect data for the year of 2014, making my research less sensitive and making it more difficult to prove my hypotheses. By separating 2014, I hope to see if there is any relationship that may be obscured.

**Table 1: Monadic vs Dyadic Effects of Military Parades in 2014 alone.**

2014 Regressions		
	Monadic Linear Regression	Dyadic Linear Regression
Parade	-0.131622 *	-4.993e-03 .
CINC scores: Country 1 [Country 2]	4.651094 ***	9.650e-01 *** [1.772e-01 ***]
Polity: Country 1 [Country 2]	0.003267	1.363e-04 * [3.268e-04 ***]
Constant	0.333683 ***	5.065e-03 ***
R-Squared	0.2017	0.03528
F Statistic	17.17 on 3 and 189 DF	96.54 on 5 and 13056 DF
Observations	189	13056

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Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

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From this table, it is evident from this table that there is a mildly statistically significant, but decidedly negative relationship between the existence of a military parade and whether or not a country participates in a militarized interstate dispute. The existence of a military parade in a country indicates a 0.131622 point **decrease** in the probability that there is a militarized interstate dispute that country is involved in. The existence of one or both countries having a military parade results in a 4.993e-03 decrease in the probability that there is a militarized interstate dispute, according to dyadic analysis from 2014. The result from the monads is statistically significant at the 95% significance level, signified by the p-value. The result from the dyadic regression is statistically significant at the 90% significance level.

In contrast, there is strong statistical significance for the constant and the other control variables. The constant can be interpreted as when there is no military parade, the likelihood of a conflict for that monad is 0.333683 and for a dyad pair, it is 5.065e-03. In the case of the dyadic pairs in 2014, only 3.52% of the variation in the existence of a militarized interstate dispute can be explained by knowledge of the existence of a military parade. In the case of monads in 2014, only 20.17% of the variation in the existence of a militarized interstate dispute can be explained by knowledge of the existence of a military parade.

**Table 2: Monadic vs Dyadic Effects of Military Parades in 2004-2014.**

2004-2014 Regression Coefficients		
	Monadic Linear Regression	Dyadic Linear Regression
Parade (Dummy)	-0.1137708 ***	-3.686e-03 **
CINC scores: Country 1 [Country 2]	5.2642375 ***	8.732e-01 *** [7.222e-02 ***]

Polity: Country 1 [Country 2]	-0.0031530 ***	5.282e-06 [2.390e-05 ***]
Constant	0.3117947 ***	5.991e-03 ***
R-Squared	0.1572	0.02802
F Statistic	127.2 on 3 and 2027 DF	828.8 on 5 and 143573 DF
Observations	2027	143573
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1		

Table 2 presents a slightly different story. Both parade variables from monadic and dyadic analyses are highly statistically significant, however similar to 2014, the coefficients are negative. In terms of the monadic analysis, the existence of a military parade in a country indicates a 0.1137708 point **decrease** in the probability that there is a militarized interstate dispute that country is involved in. With the dyadic analysis, the existence of one or both countries having a military parade results in a 3.686e-03 decrease in the probability that there is a militarized interstate dispute between the dyad members. The R-squared value for the 2004-2014 monad tells us that 15.72% of the variation in the existence of a MID can be explained by knowledge of the existence of a military parade in that country. For the dyads, only 2.8% of the variation in the existence of a MID can be explained by knowledge of the existence of a military parade in that dyad pair. The constant can be interpreted as when there is no military parade, the likelihood of a conflict for that monad is 0.31179 and for a dyad pair, it is 5.991e-03.

In terms of my control variables, there are a variety of fascinating conclusions. Interestingly, in certain regressions, the effect of democracy from the Polity scores is positive. Typically, democracy means that nations are less likely to go to war, at least with another democracy. In all regressions, the effect of democracy is small, although it is occasionally statistically significant. For example, in my dyadic analysis for the year 2014, holding all other

variables constant including the regime type of the other country, the existence of democracy in Country 1 is associated with a  $1.363e-04$  unit increase in the likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute, which is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. Holding all other variables constant including the regime type of Country 1, the existence of democracy in Country 2 is associated with a  $3.268e-04$  unit increase in the likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute, which is statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level.

Military capability, represented by the CINC score variable, is associated with increased probability of conflict. In a monadic analysis of 2004-2014, higher CINC scores is associated with a 5.2642375 unit increase in the likelihood of that country participating in a militarized interstate dispute. In a dyadic analysis of 2004-2014, high CINC scores in Country 1 are associated with an  $8.732e-01$  unit increase in the likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute between the two countries. A high CINC score in Country 2 is associated with a  $7.222e-02$  unit increase in the likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute between the two countries. All three of these findings are statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level.

I performed additional regression analyses on each category and time period to test whether the assumptions I made affected the results and whether the year 2011 had an outsized effect on the results. The tables are available in the appendix for examination, however, there was no noticeable change. The relationship between military parades and militarized interstate disputes was negative in all regressions and statistically significant in the same regressions as highlighted in the earlier tables.

Overall, there is statistical evidence that military parades and militarized interstate disputes have a negative relationship. With the higher observation levels in the 2004-2014 range, there was high statistical significance for this fact. It seems that the impact of a military parade is

much stronger on the actions of an individual country, given the higher coefficients and r-squared values. A dyad pairing where either one or both members of the pair had a military parade seemed to be less explanatory of the existence of militarized interstate disputes between the pair. In the following section, I will examine why this might be the case. More data points are needed to more accurately understand the relationship between military parades and conflicts. Combating missingness in data on this subject will be hard, as many newspapers do not report on the actual events of their national day. However, in order to truly determine if these findings are correct, there needs to be more data points, which can more sensitively and accurately determine the relationship.

### Analysis

The negative relationship between military parades and militarized interstate disputes directly contradicts my hypotheses. I hypothesized that a militarized interstate dispute would be more likely to occur involving nations that had a military parade on their national day and less likely to occur involving nations that did not have a military parade on their national day. The evidence does not support these hypotheses as it seems a country is less likely to have a militarized interstate dispute when they have a military parade. This fits, however, with my theory. In my theory section, I laid out several constraining factors as well as presented an explanation of how military parades affected the bargaining range for countries. A country's military parade may have convinced another nation of the militaristic attitude of the first, leading to better concessions for the first nation as well as an avoidance of war. Thus, a country that had a military parade might have avoided war by achieving their interests through bargaining.

Beyond bargaining range, another consideration is that countries that may have governmental attitudes that tended towards war might have been affected by the constraining



factors of institutions. A key example is the case of President Donald Trump and his attempt to host a military parade in the United States. Despite the fact that President Trump's term began in 2016 which is outside of the range of this thesis, his example may shed some light on the results. President Trump wanted a military parade during his term and he is the kind of personality type one might expect to cause conflict, or even a large-scale war. His bombastic tendencies fit the mold of my argument and yet no military parade occurred. Why? One likely explanation is the bureaucracy around him was not supportive so they steered him away from it. They saw it as flashy and unnecessary and overly costly. Some may see this as President Trump breaking my argument, however, I would argue that this fits well into my argument. The attitudes of the government matter. Certainly the leader is a large part of it, but the elites around said leader contribute to the culture and decision making of the nation. While we can never know the inner workings of the administration and the views behind key decisions, it is evident that oppositional attitudes from other domestic political elites can act as a constraint or a deterrent. Thus, institutions both domestic and international could mitigate the effects of military parades.

This may also explain why there were positive coefficients with Polity scores in certain cases. Typically, following the Democratic Peace Theory, democracies are more peaceful and fight less with each other. However, there are several democracies which hold military parades, including France. There is research that democracies may fight other non-democracies, given certain circumstances.<sup>34</sup> While typically democracies are less prone to fighting amongst themselves, it seemingly does not mean that they are less likely to fight in general. As explained by Downes and Lilly (2010), democracies participate in conflicts, such as militarized interstate disputes, even if they are less likely to fight all out wars.

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<sup>34</sup> *Overt Peace, Covert War?: Covert Intervention and the Democratic Peace* by Alexander B. Downes & Mary Lauren Lilley (2010) explains an example when democracies do fight other countries.

The other perspective is that military parades may not be inherently threatening, that they are more examples of patriotism or nationalism. This argument is dependent on the capabilities of impacted countries. For example, the United States will likely not feel threatened by a military parade in the country of Barbados. However, neighboring countries of Barbados might see consistent displays of military might and patriotism as threatening, especially if they lack the capacity or will to defend themselves. Conversely, the United States continues to feel threatened by the military parades of China, for example. This notion of capability is supported by the coefficients of the CINC scores. These scores showed that military capability had explanatory power when it comes to militarized interstate disputes. A higher CINC score provides more confidence for the nation and these countries may be more capable of backing up their policies with military action. Higher capability means higher threat level to nearby countries. A lower capability might lower the threatening impact of a military parade.

The negative relationship between military parades and militarized interstate disputes directly contradicts my hypotheses. My hypotheses may only be true in a truly anarchic world and as I explained in my theory, institutions can limit the effects of anarchy. The negative relationship, however, does not fully contradict my theory. There are several factors that I laid out in my theory section that are useful in this scenario. Namely, the impact of parades on the bargaining range may be a more compelling force to avoid conflict than to prompt it. Governmental elites can have militaristic attitudes, but not have military parades due to domestic institutional constraint. Capability also plays a large role in the likelihood of conflict, given that most nations would make concessions to avoid a fight if they knew the other nation was more capable.

## Conclusion

War is a complex issue with many moving parts. This thesis sought to argue that the attitudes of a government towards war, which is an under discussed lens of analysis, affected the number of conflicts a country enters. I quantitatively measured these governmental attitudes through the existence of military parades on a country's national day, a novel metric.

Scholars of war have debated the causes of war for centuries with many theories being posited. The Democratic Peace theory and realist theories both provide crucial perspectives on the causes of war and peace, yet both are lacking a critical examination of the role of the individual. Recent developments in the field of political psychology have provided a limited, but promising foundation for an examination of the topic. I utilized the lessons from these well-established theories as well as newer contributions to form a theory on the ways that governmental attitudes towards war—in particular, via the lens of military parades—shape whether or not a country is likely to go to war. I explained the essential nature of the attitudes of governmental elites and why it was the prime focus for my research. I laid out a process for how military parades fit into pre-existing theories, specifically realist theory, and provided explanations of further elements that might constrain the effects of military parades.

My data proved a negative relationship between the existence of military parades and the likelihood of a country to engage in a militarized interstate dispute and, overall, contradicted my hypotheses. However, it demonstrated that my theory of the constraining factors might be an accurate one and there is future research that could be done into the circumstances under which military parades have the greatest impact. Certainly, the flaws of my research design also limits my ability to definitively answer the questions I posed in this thesis. If anything, the difficulty of data mining and the lack of pre-existing data proves the importance of this area of study. Military

parades have not received the level of academic investigation they merit. They offer a crucial insight into the psyche and values of leaders and governmental elites as well as the citizenry who attend. More research is required to examine the relationship between these two variables and to further understand the psychology and implications of military parades.

While my thesis focuses on one specific aspect which is the attitudes of the leader and governmental elites towards war, war depends on so many factors from governmental regimes to institutions to the nature of the international system and more. My thesis attempted to provide a theoretical framework for this impact of attitudes. However, data collection and time restraints dampened progress. Further research is required into the study of military parades and how they impact relations among states and into the psychology and attitudes of leaders. I feel certain that a more in depth version of this thesis with coding for a larger number of years would be a valuable contribution to this school of thought.

The implications of my work is not to prescribe banning or encouraging military parades as a way to end war and achieve global peace. It is evident that many countries engage in conflict with or without hosting a military parade. Understanding the nature of military parades, however, can lead to increased understanding of the way that public rituals play out in international relations and diplomacy. It is a fascinating mesh of hard and soft power and its utility lies in the nuance, not the policy.

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## Appendix

**Appendix Table 1: Monadic vs Dyadic Effects of Military Parades in 2014 alone, without assumptions.**

2014 Regressions		
	Monadic Linear Regression	Dyadic Linear Regression
Parade	-0.009611	-0.0022176
CINC scores: Country 1 [Country 2]	5.584580 **	1.1982014*** [0.2307163 ***]
Polity: Country 1 [Country 2]	0.004202	0.0002170 [0.0006996 ***]
Constant	0.308041 ***	0.0075872 ***
R-Squared	0.07894	0.05115
F Statistic	3.914 on 3 and 99 DF	57.86 on 5 and 5268 DF
Observations	99	5268

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Please note that there were 124 observations left over after removing assumptions, a further 21 observations were deleted due to missingness from other categories such as the Polity and the Cinc scores.

**Appendix Table 2: Monadic vs Dyadic Effects of Military Parades in 2004-2014, without assumptions.**

2004-2014 Regressions		
	Monadic Linear Regression	Dyadic Linear Regression
Parade (Dummy)	-0.1131310 ***	-4.928e-03 **
CINC scores: Country 1 [Country 2]	-0.0034478 ***	1.034e+00 *** [6.919e-02 ***]

Polity: Country 1 [Country 2]	4.6950968 ***	-4.595e-05 [-2.794e-05]
Constant	0.3670410 ***	8.858e-03 ***
R-Squared	0.1604	0.04067
F Statistic	87.36 on 3 and 1353 DF	501.5 on 5 and 59023 DF
Observations	1353	59023

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

**Appendix Table 3: Monadic vs Dyadic Effects of Military Parades in 2004-2014, without 2011.**

2004-2014 Regressions		
	Monadic Linear Regression	Dyadic Linear Regression
Parade (Dummy)	-0.110529 ***	-3.094e-03 ***
CINC scores: Country 1 [Country 2]	5.403490 ***	7.794e-01 *** [1.006e-01***]
Polity: Country 1 [Country 2]	-0.003334 ***	-6.435e-05 *** [-3.149e-05 *]
Constant	0.286747 ***	2.024e-03 ***
R-Squared	0.1708	0.03699
F Statistic	126.3 on 3 and 1822 DF	1001 on 5 and 130226 DF
Observations	1822	130226

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

**Appendix Table 4: Number of militarized interstate disputes for the time period of 2004-2014.**

Year	Number of MIDs
2004	48

2005	47
2006	39
2007	31
2008	41
2009	33
2010	27
2011	650
2012	63
2013	74
2014	140

**Appendix Table 5: Monadic vs Dyadic Effects of Military Parades on Hostility Level of MIDs in 2004-2014.**

2004-2014 Regressions		
	Monadic Linear Regression	Dyadic Linear Regression
Parade (Dummy)	-0.330580 ***	-1.380e-02 ***
CINC scores: Country 1 [Country 2]	14.997431 ***	2.907e+00 *** [1.807e-01 ***]
Polity: Country 1 [Country 2]	-0.006728 ***	-2.640e-05 [-4.792e-06]
Constant	0.890451 ***	1.904e-02 ***
R-Squared	0.12	0.02779
F Statistic	93.23 on 3 and 2027 DF	821.7 on 5 and 143573 DF
Observations	2027	143573

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

**Appendix Table 6: Raw Dataset of Parades per Country for 2014, with sources**

Country	Code	Date	Parade	Assumed	Newspaper	Link
Afghanistan	700	August 19th	0		Pajhwok News Agency, Bakhtar News Agency	<a href="#">Source</a>
Albania	339	November 28th	0		Gazeta Tema	<a href="#">Source</a>
Algeria	615	July 5th	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Andorra	232	September 8th	0		Diari d'Andorra	<a href="#">Source</a>
Angola	540	November 11th	0		Angonoticias	<a href="#">Source</a>
Antigua and Barbuda	58	November 1st	1		Antigua Nice	<a href="#">Source</a>
Argentina	160	July 9th	0		La Nacion	<a href="#">Source</a>
Armenia	371	September 21st	0		Asbarez	
Australia	900	January 26th	0		The Guardian AU	<a href="#">Source</a>
Austria	305	October 26th	0	a	The Local	<a href="#">Source</a>
Azerbaijan	373	October 18th	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Bahamas	31	July 10th	0		The Bahamas Weekly	<a href="#">Source</a>
Bahrain	692	December 16th	0		Bahrain News Agency	<a href="#">Source</a>
Bangladesh	771	March 26th	0		The Daily Star	<a href="#">Source</a>
Barbados	53	November 30th	1	using 2015	Nation News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Belarus	370	July 3rd	1		Belta	<a href="#">Source</a>
Belgium	211	July 21st	0		SudInfo	<a href="#">Source</a>
Belize	80	September 21st	0		Amandla	<a href="#">Source</a>
Benin	434	August 1st	1	using 2015	La Nation	<a href="#">Source</a>
Bhutan	760	December 17th	0		The Butanese	<a href="#">Source</a>
Bolivia	145	August 6th	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	346	November 25th	0		Dnevni avaz	<a href="#">Source</a>
Botswana	571	September 30th	0		Mmegi Online	<a href="#">Source</a>
Brazil	140	September 7th	1	using 2015	Rio Times Online	<a href="#">Source</a>
Brunei Darussalam	835	February 23rd	1		Ministry of Defence	<a href="#">Source</a>
Bulgaria	355	March 3rd	0		Novinite	<a href="#">Source</a>
Burkina Faso	439	December 11th	1		Le Pays	<a href="#">Source</a>
Burundi	516	July 1st	1	using a blog	Travel and Tour World	<a href="#">Source</a>
Cambodia	811	November 9th	0		The Cambodia Daily	<a href="#">Source</a>

Cameroon	471	May 20th	1		Presidency of the Republic	<a href="#">Source</a>
Canada	20	July 1st	0			<a href="#">Source</a>
Cabo Verde	402	July 5th	0		A Nacao	<a href="#">Source</a>
Central African Republic	482	August 13th	0		Agence Centrafricaine de Presse	<a href="#">Source</a>
Chad	483	August 11th	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Chile	155	September 18th	1		La Tercera	<a href="#">Source</a>
China	710	October 1st	1		China Daily	<a href="#">Source</a>
Colombia	100	July 20th	1		El Espectador	<a href="#">Source</a>
Comoros	581	July 6th	1	using 2013 and 2017	Al-watwan	<a href="#">Source</a>
Democratic Republic of the Congo	490	June 30th	0	a	couldn't find a source	

Republic of the Congo	484	August 15th	1		Les Dépêches de Brazzaville	<a href="#">Source</a>
Costa Rica	94	September 15th	0		Tico Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Cote d'Ivoire	437	August 7th	1	using 2016	Agence Ivoirienne de Presse	<a href="#">Source</a>
Croatia	344	June 25th	0		Slobodna Dalmacija	<a href="#">Source</a>
Cuba	40	July 26th	0		Granma	<a href="#">Source</a>
Cyprus	352	October 1st	1		In Cyprus / Anastasia	<a href="#">Source</a>
Czech Republic	316	October 28th	0	a	couldn't find a source	<a href="#">Source</a>
Denmark	390	June 5th	0		CPH Post	<a href="#">Source</a>
Djibouti	522	June 27th	1		Brussels Diplomatic	<a href="#">Source</a>
Dominica	54	November 3rd	1		Dominica News Online	<a href="#">Source</a>
Dominican Republic	42	February 27th	1		Listin Diario	<a href="#">Source</a>
East Timor (Timor-Leste)	860	November 28th	1	using 2020	Timor Leste Government	<a href="#">Source</a>
Ecuador	130	August 10th	1	using 2019	El Universo	<a href="#">Source</a>
Egypt	651	July 23rd	0	a	couldn't find a source	
El Salvador	92	September 15th	1		La Prensa	<a href="#">Source</a>
Equatorial Guinea	411	October 12th	1		La Gaceta de Guinea Ecuatorial	<a href="#">Source</a>
Eritrea	531	May 24th	1		Ministry of Education Eritrea	<a href="#">Source</a>

Estonia	366	February 24th	1		ERR	<a href="#">Source</a>
Ethiopia	530	May 28th	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Fiji	950	October 10th	1		Fiji Sun	<a href="#">Source</a>

Finland	375	December 6th	1		YLE	<a href="#">Source</a>
France	220	July 14th	1		French Government	<a href="#">Source</a>
Gabon	481	August 17th	1	using 2012, 2020	L'union	<a href="#">Source</a>
The Gambia	420	February 18th	1		The Guardian	<a href="#">Source</a>
Georgia	372	May 26th	0		Agenda	<a href="#">Source</a>
Germany	255	October 3rd	0	using 2015	The Local	<a href="#">Source</a>
Ghana	452	March 6th	1		Citi FM online	<a href="#">Source</a>
Greece	350	March 25th	1		I Avgi	<a href="#">Source</a>
Greenland	unknown	June 21st	0	using 2015	Sermitsiaq	<a href="#">Source</a>
Grenada	55	February 7th-8th	1	using 2015, 2016	Now Granada	<a href="#">Source</a>
Guatemala	90	September 15th	1	students dressed like soldiers	La Hora	<a href="#">Source</a>
Guinea	438	October 2nd	0	using 2018, yes	Guinee News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Guinea-Bissau	404	September 24th	0	using 2020, yes	O Democrata	<a href="#">Source</a>
Guyana	110	May 26th	0	a, using 2012	Stabroek	<a href="#">Source</a>
Haiti	41	January 1st	0	a	Haiti Libre	<a href="#">Source</a>
Honduras	91	September 15th	0		La Prensa	<a href="#">Source</a>
Hong Kong		October 1st	0	same as China	BBC	<a href="#">Source</a>
Hungary	310	March 15th	0	using 2015	Blikk	<a href="#">Source</a>
Iceland	395	June 17th	0		Iceland Review	<a href="#">Source</a>

India	750	August 15th	0		Hindustan Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Indonesia	850	August 17th	0		Jakarta Post	<a href="#">Source</a>
Iran	630	February 11th	0		Al Jazeera	<a href="#">Source</a>
Iraq	645	October 3rd	0		Middle East Monitor	<a href="#">Source</a>
Ireland	205	March 17th	0		The Telegraph	<a href="#">Source</a>
Israel	666	April 16th-17th	0		Jerusalem Post	<a href="#">Source</a>
Italy	325	June 2nd	1	using articles about traditions	The Local	<a href="#">Source</a>
Ivory Coast	437	August 7th	1		Abidjan.net	<a href="#">Source</a>
Jamaica	51	August 6th	0	a, using 2016	Caribbean National Weekly	<a href="#">Source</a>
Japan	740	February 11th	0	a	Culture Trip	<a href="#">Source</a>
Jordan	663	May 25th	0		The Jordan Times	<a href="#">Source</a>

Kazakhstan	705	December 16th-17th	0	a, using 2013	Astana Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Kenya	501	December 12th	0		The Standard	<a href="#">Source</a>
Kiribati	946	July 12th	0		Kiribati Updates	<a href="#">Source</a>
North Korea	731	September 9th	0	only every 5 years	NK News	<a href="#">Source</a>
South Korea	732	August 15th	0		Asia Society	<a href="#">Source</a>
Kosovo	347	February 17th	1		Portalb	<a href="#">Source</a>
Kuwait	690	February 25th	0	a	Kuwait Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Kyrgyzstan	703	August 31st	0	a, using 2017	AKI Press	<a href="#">Source</a>
Laos	812	December 2nd	0	a, using 2017	The Laotian Time	<a href="#">Source</a>

Latvia	367	November 18th	1	a, using 2015	Public Broadcasting of Latvia	<a href="#">Source</a>
Lebanon	660	November 22nd	0	using other years, yes	The Daily Star Lebanon	<a href="#">Source</a>
Lesotho	570	October 4th	0		Lesotho Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Liberia	450	July 26th	0	troop review	Government of the Republic of Lesotho	<a href="#">Source</a>
Libya	620	December 24th	1	a, using 2015	The Libya Observer	<a href="#">Source</a>
Liechtenstein	223	August 15th	0	a	Liechtenstein	<a href="#">Source</a>
Lithuania	368	February 16th	0		Alkas	<a href="#">Source</a>
Luxembourg	212	June 23rd	1		L'essentiel	<a href="#">Source</a>
Madagascar	580	June 26th	1		Prokerala	<a href="#">Source</a>
Malawi	553	July 6th	1	a, using 2016 and 17	The Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Malaysia	820	August 31st	0	using 2018, yes (2014 cancelled due to Malaysian flights cancelled)	The Star	<a href="#">Source</a>
Maldives	781	July 26th	0		Maldives Insider	<a href="#">Source</a>
Mali	432	September 22nd	1	a, using 2010, 2016 and 2018	Journal du Mali	<a href="#">Source</a>
Malta	338	September 21st	1		Alamy	<a href="#">Source</a>
Marshall Islands	983	May 1st	0	a, using 2018	Marshall Islands Journal	<a href="#">Source</a>
Martinique	part of France	July 14th	1	a, using 2015 and 2018	Radio Caraibes International	<a href="#">Source</a>
Mauritania	435	November 28th	1	a, using 2015	Le Calame	<a href="#">Source</a>
Mauritius	590	March 12th	1		L'express	<a href="#">Source</a>
Mexico	70	September 16th	1		Excelsior	<a href="#">Source</a>

Micronesia	987	November 3rd	0	a, using 2018	Kaselehlie Press	<a href="#">Source</a>
Moldova	359	August 27th	0	a, using 2013 and 2017	Timpul de dimineata	<a href="#">Source</a>
Monaco	221	November 19th	1		The Court Jeweller	<a href="#">Source</a>
Mongolia	712	December 29th	0		News.mn	<a href="#">Source</a>
Montenegro	341	July 13th-14th	0	a, unclear year	Made in Montenegro	<a href="#">Source</a>
Morocco	600	November 18th	0		Morocco World News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Mozambique	541	June 25th	1		SABC News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Myanmar	775	January 4th	1		Al Jazeera	<a href="#">Source</a>
Namibia	565	March 21st	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Nauru	970	January 31st	0	a	iExplore	<a href="#">Source</a>
Nepal	760	September 20th	0	other years, yes	The Kathmandu Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Netherlands	210	May 5th	0		Dutch News	<a href="#">Source</a>
New Zealand	920	February 6th	0		New Zealand Herald	<a href="#">Source</a>
Nicaragua	93	September 15th	0		Vianica	<a href="#">Source</a>
Niger	436	December 18th	0		Niamey	<a href="#">Source</a>
Nigeria	475	October 1st	0		Premium Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
North Macedonia	343	September 8th	0	a, using 2011	Balkan Insight	<a href="#">Source</a>
Norway	385	May 17th	0	a, using 2016	Norway Today	<a href="#">Source</a>
Oman	698	November 18th	0	usually yes	National News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Pakistan	770	August 14th	0		The Nation	<a href="#">Source</a>

Palau	986	October 1st	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Panama	95	November 3rd	0		El Siglo	<a href="#">Source</a>
Papua New Guinea	910	September 16th	0		The National	<a href="#">Source</a>
Paraguay	150	May 14th-15th	0	a	Ultima Hora	<a href="#">Source</a>
Peru	135	July 28th	1	a, using 2008	United Planet	<a href="#">Source</a>
Philippines	840	June 12th	0	a, using 2018	Manila Bulletin	<a href="#">Source</a>
Poland	290	November 11th	0	a, using 2016	Krakow Naszemiasto	<a href="#">Source</a>
Portugal	235	June 10th	1		AnibalCavaco Silva.arquivo.p residencia.pt	<a href="#">Source</a>
Qatar	694	December 18th	1		Doha News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Romania	360	December 1st	1		Radio Romania International	<a href="#">Source</a>



Russian Federation	365	November 4th	0	yes on Victory Day	Izvestia	<a href="#">Source</a>
Rwanda	517	July 4th	1		The Government of Rwanda YouTube	<a href="#">Source</a>
Saint Kitts and Nevis	60	September 19th	0	a, using 2016	St Kitts and Nevis Observer	<a href="#">Source</a>
Saint Lucia	56	December 13th	1		St Lucia Star	<a href="#">Source</a>
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines	57	October 27th	1		iWitness News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Samoa	990	June 1st	0		Samoa News	<a href="#">Source</a>
San Marino	331	September 3rd	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Sao Tome and Principe	403	July 12th	0	a	couldn't find a source	
Saudi Arabia	670	September 23rd	0		Saudi Gazette	<a href="#">Source</a>

Senegal	433	April 4th	1		Agence de Presse Senegalese	<a href="#">Source</a>
Serbia	unknown	February 15th-16th	0	for Victory Day, yes	Politika	<a href="#">Source</a>
Seychelles	591	June 29th	1		Seychelles News Agency	<a href="#">Source</a>
Sierra Leone	451	April 27th	0		The Patriotic Vanguard	<a href="#">Source</a>
Slovakia	317	September 1st	0	a, using 2018 and 2012	The Mayor.eu	<a href="#">Source</a>
Slovenia	349	December 23rd	0		Slovenia Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Solomon Islands	940	July 7th	0	a, using 2016	Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation	<a href="#">Source</a>
Somalia	520	July 1st	0	a, using 2016 and 17	Goobjoog News	<a href="#">Source</a>
South Africa	560	April 27th	0		Government Communications of South Africa	<a href="#">Source</a>
South Sudan	626	July 9th	0	a	VOA News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Spain	230	October 12th	1		El Universo	<a href="#">Source</a>
Sri Lanka	780	February 4th	1	a	Sri Lanka Air Force	<a href="#">Source</a>
Sudan	625	January 1st	0		Daily Trust	<a href="#">Source</a>
Suriname	115	November 25th	0		Waterkant	<a href="#">Source</a>
Swaziland	572	September 6th	0	a	couldn't find a source	

Sweden	380	June 6th	0		Swedish Royal Court	<a href="#">Source</a>
Switzerland	225	August 1st	0		The Local	<a href="#">Source</a>
Syria	652	April 17th	0		Irish Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Taiwan	713	October 10th	1		Taipei Times	<a href="#">Source</a>

Tajikistan	702	September 9th	0		Radio Free Europe	<a href="#">Source</a>
Tanzania	510	December 9th	1	a, using 2015	BBC News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Thailand	800	December 5th	0		Bangkok Post	<a href="#">Source</a>
Togo	461	April 27th	1		Le Temps	<a href="#">Source</a>
Tokelau	N/A	October 22nd	N/A		Pacific Guardians	<a href="#">Source</a>
Tonga	955	November 4th	0		Matangi	<a href="#">Source</a>
Trinidad and Tobago	52	August 31st	1	a, using 2017	Trinidad and Tobago Newday/ Trinidad Express	<a href="#">Source</a>
Tunisia	616	March 20th	0	a, using 2013 and 2016	Tunisie Numerique	<a href="#">Source</a>
Turkey	640	October 29th	1		Daily Sabah	<a href="#">Source</a>
Turkmenistan	701	September 27th	1		Radio Free Europe	<a href="#">Source</a>
Tuvalu	947	October 1st	0		Tagata Pasifika	<a href="#">Source</a>
Uganda	500	October 9th	0		New Vision	<a href="#">Source</a>
Ukraine	369	August 24th	1		Radio Free Europe	<a href="#">Source</a>
United Arab Emirates	696	December 2nd	0		Khaleej Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
United Kingdom	200	April 23rd	0		Telegraph UK	<a href="#">Source</a>
United States	2	July 4th	0		KPBS	<a href="#">Source</a>
Uruguay	165	August 25th	0		TeleSUR Tv	<a href="#">Source</a>
Uzbekistan	704	September 1st	0		Prokerala	<a href="#">Source</a>
Vanuatu	935	July 30th	0	a, using 2015	Daily Post	<a href="#">Source</a>

Venezuela	101	July 5th	1	a, using 2019	La Patilla	<a href="#">Source</a>
Vietnam	816	September 2nd	0		Vietnam News	<a href="#">Source</a>
Yemen	679	May 22nd	0	a, using 2010	Yemen Post	<a href="#">Source</a>
Zambia	551	October 24th	0	a, using 2015 and 2012	Lusaka Times	<a href="#">Source</a>
Zimbabwe	552	April 18th	0		The Herald	<a href="#">Source</a>