

Greece and the Case of the 2012 Open and Closed List Elections

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## **Chapter 1**

### **An Introduction to the Significance of Electoral Systems**

The two parliamentary elections held in Greece during 2012 on May 7<sup>th</sup> and June 17<sup>th</sup> were the front-page story of every major paper worldwide. Everyone, especially those belonging to countries of the EU, breathlessly awaited the results of the June elections after the Greek members of parliament were unable to form a government following the May election. Ever since the Greek government revealed the true depth of its gargantuan debt after the global financial crisis hit in 2008, there was increasing concern regarding Greece's ability to remain in the Euro zone. The implications of Greece exiting the Euro zone due to economic failure were catastrophic not only for Greece, but for the EU and all of its major trading partners as well. Greece desperately needed a government formed quickly in order to tackle the economic problems the country faced before these issues increased in magnitude. With political parties such as Syriza, otherwise known as the Coalition of the Radical Left, refusing to agree to any austerity measures if elected to parliament, the situation leading up to the June elections became extremely dire.

However, even with minute-by-minute coverage of the Greek elections, a very important facet of the election process barely received any attention: the type of electoral system used for the elections. News sources failed to mention that the type of electoral system used for the June election differed from the standard Greek election method used in the May elections. Greece has a unique electoral system and one distinctive rule of this system states: if an election is held within 18 months of

the previous election the electoral system in place changes from an open list system to a closed list system. This is a very unique system in comparison to electoral systems worldwide and this situation rarely arises even in Greek elections, thus it is a situation worth analyzing because it could provide an interesting addition to our understanding of electoral systems.

A country's electoral rules can shape the outcome of elections; therefore, social scientists have been able to use electoral systems theory to predict the potential dynamics of a government based on the type of electoral system used by a country. In addition to determining how many parties will share power, the type of electoral system can also determine how much power voters possess when it comes to choosing their representatives. Every facet of a country's electoral system, from district magnitude to ballot design, affects the composition of the resulting government, the types of policies it enacts, and its overall ability to function. The electoral rules a country chooses are the basic building blocks to construct a successful or unsuccessful government, therefore analysis of electoral systems is needed to confirm whether these electoral theories behave as social scientists have predicted. Electoral systems theorists have made great strides in improving our knowledge of the effects of these systems, but much more research is needed to better understand electoral systems and their potential to impact the structure of governments.

### **Central Puzzle of the Greek Case**

In order to contribute to our understanding of electoral systems, this study will focus on two types of proportional electoral systems: open list systems and closed list systems. List systems are the most popular types of proportional representation in the world with 29 out of 59 democracies using some form of list system as of 2001 (Farrell, 2001). List system countries fall under an electoral category called proportional representation, which attempts to translate votes into a proportional number of seats in contrast to a majoritarian system, which tends to over represent the majority parties (Lijphart, 1999). Open and closed list systems are not binary; countries can also use a “flexible list” meaning their form of electoral system falls somewhere in the spectrum between open and closed, for example certain countries such as Austria, Belgium, and the Czech Republic use a system which allows voters to overturn party created list orders if votes exceed a certain percentage (Gallagher, 2005) However, Greek electoral law mandates a completely open list elections as the standard method of elections and a completely closed list elections when there is a failure to form a government. This study will only examine the results of the Greek open list elections of May 2012 and the Greek closed list elections of June 2012 in order to better understand the differences in outcomes and party strategy between the two ends of the open and closed list spectrum.

The general consensus regarding open lists is that this type of election favors the voters’ preference and should in theory keep members of parliament closer to their constituency’s wishes. Closed lists favor the parties’ preference for selection of

its parliament members and are in theory expected to yield tighter party cohesiveness. These theories predict that in an open list election, candidates must align themselves closer with their district voters' needs or some personal constituency in districts with magnitudes greater than 1 (Cary and Shugart, 1995). In order to get elected while in a closed list election, candidates must align themselves more closely with the national party platform.

The June closed list election came at a crucial time of heavy disagreement within Greek parties as to how to solve the economic crisis and could have served as an advantage for these Greek parties. Because voters cannot select an individual candidate, it was the perfect opportunity for parties to tighten party cohesiveness on this issue by placing candidates adhering closer to party lines higher up on the lists and thus displacing disagreeing party members. In addition, the closed list election provided a rare opportunity for Syriza, which was a coalition of loosely associated groups in the first election then decided to run as a party in the second election. Syriza is a mixed party, with some middle of the road members and some very left extremists. The closed list election gave Syriza the opportunity to exchange candidates for new ones to appease all of the different groups within the party; therefore this study will provide information as to whether Syriza's shift from coalition to party set their party strategy apart from previously established parties.

Not only will the Greek 2012 elections provide information about changes in general party strategy, it will also provide data regarding female representation under both an open and closed list system. Much of the costs and benefits of open

and closed list elections focus on each system's effectiveness in getting women elected to parliament. The Greek 2012 elections will provide insight into whether gender ratios of candidates and the resulting election winners are affected by moving from open to closed list election rules.

My research will analyze whether this expected shift in party strategy occurred in the Greek elections. By observing whether party strategy followed these predictions when faced with an open and then closed list election I can determine whether parties behaved as electoral theory predicted. This analysis will provide insight as to whether open and closed list systems affect party behavior and can thus assist in better understanding the consequences of each system. The analysis of the Greek elections will focus on three main areas: the effect of open and closed lists on party strategy, the number of women chosen for lists and elected to parliament, and the effect of open and closed lists on Syriza as it moved from a coalition to a party.

In Greece, over 20 parties ran in both elections however, this analysis will focus on the following seven parties: Pasok (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement), New Democracy, Syriza (the Coalition of the Radical Left), KKE (Communist Party of Greece), Chrysi Agyi (Golden Dawn), Anexartitioi Ellines (Independent Greeks) and the Dimokratiki Aristera (Democratic Left). I have restricted my research to these seven parties because they are the ones who successfully obtained enough votes in the May elections to secure seats in Parliament while the remaining parties did not succeed in surpassing the 3% threshold. The research is restricted to parties that



won seats in the open list election because this will allow me to observe whether party strategy changed between the winning and losing candidates on these district lists.

The short four-week timeframe between the May and June elections creates two hypotheses to predict potential party strategy when faced with a change from open to closed list electoral system rules. Electoral systems theory assumes that electoral systems determine candidate selection. Therefore electoral theory predicts the Greek political parties will alter their party strategy when facing a shift from open to closed lists despite the short interval between elections. If this hypothesis holds true, my data will show changes to the order of candidates from the May to June election party lists. The alternative hypothesis states that no change in party strategy will be observed because of the time constraint on the political parties. Instead party leaders will use the percentage of votes candidates won in the May election to decide the order of district lists for the June election. Essentially the May election will be used as a primary to decide list order for the June elections. If the second hypothesis holds true, my data will show no change in the order of a party's candidates.

Theory regarding open list elections and closed list elections predicts that parties should place candidates closer to party values higher on closed lists while their lists during open list elections would consist of candidates with higher voter preference. These theories predict a change in party strategy for the 2012 Greek elections because of this shift in election rules. However in the Greek case, I expect

that with only four weeks between elections, parties would use the May election results as a primary, meaning they would base their closed lists off the results of voter preference during the open list elections that took place in May. The time constraint should prevent me from seeing the trend predicted by open list and closed list electoral theory.

### **The Greek Electoral System**

In Greece, typical elections are held using an open list system, meaning each party produces a list of eligible candidates for each district then voters are allowed to select the specific candidate they want to represent them by placing a cross next to their name from the list of candidates. Each party submits a different list of candidates for each district ranging from three to forty-six candidates depending on the district magnitude. However, Greek electoral law states that if another election is held within 18 months of the previous election, the country will hold a closed list election (Ministry of the Interior, 2012). In a closed list election, voters are only able to select a party from a list of all Greek parties running in the election instead of an individual candidate. In this system, the party chooses the candidate list order for these closed list elections and candidates are awarded seats based on how many votes the party receives as a whole for that district.

In total, Greek Parliament has 300 seats; 238 are allocated to the 56 districts where candidates campaign in hopes of winning enough votes to secure one of these seats. Twelve of the remaining seats are national seats awarded to parties based on

their overall national percentage of votes. In order to determine how many district seats a party will receive, Greece uses a formula called the Largest Remainder System, which uses a two-step process to allocate seats to each party. A quota of votes is determined by the size of the district by using the Droop quota formula  $(\text{total valid poll}/\text{seats}+1)+1$ . Once the quota is decided for a district, each party that meets this vote quota is awarded seats and then those votes are subtracted from the party total. The party with the largest remainder receives the next remaining seat then this process repeats itself until all of the seats in a district have been distributed.

Since the establishment of this electoral system in 1974, Greece has maintained a two-party dominant system despite using a proportional electoral system, with Pasok representing the center-left, New Democracy representing the right, and parties such as Syriza on the fringe of the government. This two-party tendency is the result of a Greek election rule called "bonus-adjusted proportional representation" which states that the party who wins the most votes in an election will receive an additional 50 seats in Parliament. This rule enables the country to use an open list system in standard elections, which should result in a proportional system based on the high district magnitudes, and yet elections have historically resulted in a two-party system where the two strongest parties alternate winning the majority of seats in parliament. In addition, all parties must win at least 3% of votes nationally to participate in the government, which also historically limited the number of parties able to secure seats in Parliament.

Greek political parties are allowed to run more candidates in each district than there are seats available. According to the Ministry of the Interior “each list may contain as many candidates as there are parliamentary seats in the constituency augmented by two in constituencies where between one and seven Parliamentary Deputies are elected, by three in constituencies where between eight and twelve are elected, and by four in constituencies where more than thirteen are elected” (Ministry of the Interior, 2012). All of the parties who won seats in the May election took advantage of running the maximum number of candidates allowed with the exception of Chrysi Agyi, in a few districts; therefore even if these parties managed to win all of the seats in a district some of their candidates still would not have a chance of securing a seat. The 12 nationwide seats in addition to the 50 seat bonus for the winning party encourages parties to run the maximum allowance of candidates in every district because any additional votes brought in by running the maximum number of candidates will help secure these national seats.

Pasok has historically been the dominant party in Greece with New Democracy alternating power, starting in 1974 after a junta interrupted democratic rule for seven years beginning in 1967. However, in the last few years, Greece’s two-party system has undergone a massive upheaval starting with Syriza winning the second-most votes behind New Democracy in the May 2012 elections. In addition, many smaller parties that have existed for decades have begun to gain more seats in Parliament as well by finally overcoming the 3% threshold, such as the KKE, which was established in 1918 yet has never secured many seats in Parliament. Chrysi

Agyi, a Neo-Nazi party, was established in 1993 but did not gain any seats until the May 2012 elections, when it won 21 seats in Parliament. The current debt crisis also resulted in the creation of many new splinter parties as politicians from the larger parties disagreed over solutions and left to establish their own parties such as Anexartitoi Ellines, which was established by a former New Democracy member who was thrown out of the party for voting against a coalition government and Dimokratiki Aristera, which was established by former Syriza and Pasok members.

In addition to recent changes to the balance of party power in Greece, there have been changes to dynamics within parties as well. Greek political parties from all sides of the spectrum have become divided over the current economic crisis and experienced fluctuations of party members even in the short time between the May and June elections. For example, members of the Democratic Alliance suspended their party to run for New Democracy in the June elections, in addition to some members of the LAOS party defected to run for New Democracy and one former New Democracy member left to join a smaller party, Drassi, just as one leading member of Drassi left to join New Democracy (radiobubble.gr, 2012). These defections show that parties struggled to create a platform that all of their candidates were willing to campaign under and further, the economic crisis has created a lack of party cohesion that Greece had never experienced before. Because of this, open and closed list electoral theory predicts that parties would move these disloyal party members lower on the party lists for the closed list election in order to ensure higher levels of party cohesion in the rough upcoming year. However, I

expected that with the four-week time constraint, the parties would not have enough time to alter their lists and would instead use the May elections as a primary to determine the list orders for the closed elections and therefore there would be no changes within the party lists.

Another interesting arena in which politics are changing in Greece is the percentage of female participation in the Greek government. Women won the right to vote in 1952 and in the elections following the creation of the modern government in 1974, only 2.6% of Parliament was female and this number remained within a few percentages of this until the 1980's. Prior to 1985, the female vote went predominantly to the right wing parties in power during 1952 when women were finally given the right to vote (Maloutas, 2006). However, this gender gap reversed itself in 1985 when Pasok, the predominant socialist party in Greece, managed to attract the most female voters of all the parties through its new campaign to promote equality for women and minority groups. As part of its campaign for women's rights, Pasok declared a 40% female candidate quota, meaning the party pledged to have at least 40% of their candidates be female in every election. Other parties such as the KKE also adopted gender quotas for brief periods of time but then abandoned them, "as they did not yield any significant increases in female participation in government" (Maloutas, 2006). Pasok is the only party still pledging to uphold its quota. However, in Pasok's case there are no repercussions if they do not uphold the 40% pledge, therefore increases in female participation in the government have been very slow. As of 2004, Pasok's district lists consisted of 16%

female candidates (Maloutas, 2006), which was still significantly below its 40% goal more than twenty years since its establishment of the quota.

New Democracy, Syriza, and Pasok were the top contenders going into the June elections, with New Democracy and Syriza neck and neck in the predictions. The smaller parties such as the KKE, Anexartitioi Ellines, Chrysi Agyi and Dimokratiki Aristera were not expected to suddenly jump ahead to win percentages similar to the three large parties. However, with predictions that either Syriza or New Democracy would win the elections by a minuscule margin, there was a very likely possibility of a coalition government (something extremely rare in the Greek system) so the smaller parties strived to gain enough of the votes in the June election to become a viable option as a coalition partner. My research design will allow me to analyze party strategy and compare whether the large well-established parties altered their lists more or less than the smaller newer parties and whether their differing goals possibly resulted in different list strategies in the closed list elections. I will also be able to analyze whether party ideology and size affects the number of female candidates a party has on its lists.

### **The Rare Opportunity of the Greek 2012 Elections**

Most of the research on the predicted outcomes of open and closed lists are only able to make cross-national comparisons of multiple countries because it is rare for a country to change electoral systems once they have established a functioning system or for a country to include a shift in the system as part of the

standard electoral procedure. While cross-national comparisons provides valuable insight into the differences between open and closed systems, it also creates many variables that cannot be controlled for which can impact the findings of these studies. The circumstances surrounding the workings of an electoral system are unique to every country from party dynamics to voter strategy, which makes it difficult to compare open and closed list systems across multiple states because these factors can affect electoral results.

The case of the 2012 Greek elections is an extremely rare opportunity to examine the effects of open and closed list elections free from the constraints of a cross-national comparison. Political science does not have the luxury of lab tests at the national scale; instead political scientists are often forced to use real-life observations such as election results to reach conjectures about how party behavior is affected by different electoral systems. Often real world data creates so many variables external to the research question that it can be difficult to make conjectures regarding the data. However, the May and June Greek elections of 2012 are as close to a natural experiment as possible. The two elections were nearly identical with the exception of the list type used.

The Greek elections took place within six weeks of each other, which effectively controls for many variables that previously barred political scientists from drawing conclusions about the effects of both systems. The six-week time frame meant the same pool of voters voted in two elections focused on the same political and economic issues. The main issue for both elections was the failing



Greek economy and the proposed EU bailout, with very few other issues in contest between the two elections. Often if a country changes their election rules, so much time will pass that the issues voters are contemplating change dramatically thus impacting the election results and skewing the comparisons of the two systems. In addition, parties often have months or years of preparation when switching to another electoral system, which can lead to merging and splitting of parties and other changes in party dynamics. Another advantage of examining two elections within the same country is that all other electoral rules are controlled for as well. The 3% threshold that parties must achieve in order to obtain seats in parliament and 50 bonus seats are awarded to the party with the most overall votes in order to create “bonus-adjusted proportional representation” system were all maintained for both the open and closed list elections. Except for the type of list used, all other electoral rules such as these were held constant between the two elections, which further increases the strength of this study.

In addition to differences in political circumstances, every country has a varying spectrum of cultural values, which must also be controlled for when analyzing open and closed lists, especially in regards to female participation. Melody Ellis Valdini states, “we cannot determine the effects of this institution in isolation; we must consider the cultural context in which the preference vote operates in order to correctly predict and understand its effect on candidate selection” (Valdini, 2012). It is difficult to control for these variables when all comparisons of open and closed lists must be conducted across vastly diverse countries, which was a major

constraint on Valdini's study of female representation in governments. An examination of the number of women elected into parliaments is difficult to analyze across multiple nations, which is why my analysis of the Greek elections will be an important contribution to the analysis of electoral systems and their effect on the number of women elected to parliaments. Examining the effect of open and closed systems on the number of women elected to parliament is difficult to assess when examining elections taking place across multiple countries because of cultural differences regarding gender roles (Kittilson, 2006). Previous studies struggled to control for the variation of gender roles in the countries they used to compare females elected through open and closed lists. Certain countries have higher levels of female participation in the government than others because more women are receiving educations and job training that sets them up to become potential candidates while other countries still struggle with encouraging women to obtain jobs that could propel them into government positions. Comparing the number of females elected based on open and closed lists becomes extremely difficult when two countries with completely different cultural values must be compared.

By analyzing Greece exclusively, I am effectively controlling for cultural differences that could impact comparisons of open and closed lists on females elected to parliament. Therefore by solely analyzing the Greek electoral system, I can analyze data unclouded by these extraneous factors caused by cross-national studies. Gender roles in Greece are unlikely to have shifted within the short six-week period between elections so this variable is controlled for. Essentially the

same Greek voters voted within the same time period on the same issues within the same cultural context, which holds all of the major variables constant except for the type of election system used.

Another unique opportunity Greece provides is insight into party strategy when moving from a coalition to a party. Syriza participated in the open list elections as a coalition of loosely related parties. However, Greek electoral rules give incentives to groups who run in elections as parties rather than coalitions: in order to be eligible to receive the 50 seat bonus, a group must run as a party rather than as a coalition. With the predictions of such close election results between the top three parties, Syriza decided to become an official party for the June 17<sup>th</sup> elections in order to be eligible for the bonus seats. This transition will enable me to study the effects of open and closed lists on the composition of the Syriza's candidates. The transition from open to closed coinciding with the transition from coalition to party means that Syriza had the opportunity to alter their candidate lists to place candidates from different groups in order to appease each group within its party. Prior to the May elections, Syriza was made up of a scattering of groups with a wide spectrum of ideologies, so the composition of the lists for the June elections could have served as negotiations to ensure that each group received a satisfactory number of candidate rankings on each list. The research design allows me to investigate whether parties are willing to move candidates on the lists in order to create party lists designed to the party leader's liking or whether parties will use voter preference from the May election to determine the list order in the closed list election.

## Chapter 2

### Electoral Theory of Open and Closed List Systems

According to electoral systems theory, there are anticipated costs and benefits to using an open or closed list system. Michael Marsh (1985), states that an open list election gives the voters the most amount of freedom and enables the members of parliament to most accurately represent the voters. However, open lists create higher levels of competition between candidates of the same parties and could possibly reduce party cohesion and therefore negatively affect the ability of the ruling parties to govern cohesively. In contrast, closed list elections reduce levels of competition between candidates of the same parties because voters will choose the list as a whole rather than choosing individual candidates. However, voters do not receive the same amount of freedom as they would with an open list, thus reducing the power allotted to voters because they have no control over which candidates from their selected party will obtain a seat.

One question raised by electoral system theorists is whether an open list system better promotes democratic representation than a closed list system.

Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchel explain the two opposing theories behind open and closed list electoral systems as follows:

According to one concept, the purpose of elections is to enable the direct representation of the people, and consequently preferential list systems [i.e. open list systems], allowing people to choose their own representatives, are more appropriate. According to the other, representation takes place through the political parties and the purpose of elections is to enable the parties to secure their proper share of representation consequently, closed lists are more appropriate than open ones because the parties' candidate selectors

are better judges than the voters of who is best able to realize the ideas and goals of the parties (Gallagher and Mitchel, 2005).

In other words, open list electoral theory implies that voters should be the determining force in deciding who represents them in their government in order to achieve as close to direct representation as possible. According to Gallagher and Mitchel, closed list electoral theory approaches the problem of which entity should decide the composition of government differently. The reasoning behind closed list electoral theory deems political parties more effective decision makers when choosing parliament representatives while open list electoral theory believes voters are more effective at choosing parliament representatives. These two theories of representation assume that parties and voters will differ in their choices of parliament members, and thus two different types of list systems have been created to accommodate these differences.

Due to the lack of direct power of voters to choose candidates, closed list elections are criticized for distancing parties away from voter choice. According to Taagapera and Shugart (1989) closed list systems also enable political parties to keep their candidates closer to party lines. In order to gain a premium position on a party list, candidates must adhere more closely to party ideologies in order to remain in good standing with party leaders. In an open list system, candidates have more freedom when choosing to adhere to party ideology because their party has less power over whether that candidate will win a seat. Therefore, in closed elections it is expected that party loyalty will determine the order of candidate lists while in open list elections popularity amongst the voters will weigh more heavily

when ordering lists of candidates. Open lists provide “less incumbent security” than closed list systems “despite the fact that incumbents attract the most votes”; this is because voters are more easily able to oust an incumbent and select a new parliament member in an open list election (Marsh, 1985). In closed list elections, parties have the power to maintain incumbents at the top of the lists, therefore making it extremely difficult for newer candidates who are often lower on the lists to obtain a seat.

### **Open and Closed List Electoral Theory and Female Representation**

Open list systems allow voters to choose specific candidates, which gives voter preference a higher priority than in closed list elections where parties select the list order. One criticism of the open list system is that it makes it difficult for women and minorities to be elected to office. The type of electoral system affects the percentage of women running in an election and “fewer women tend to be nominated as candidates in states where voters are given an opportunity to select a specific person from within a party” (Valdini, 2000). Valdini’s research shows that cultural gender norms influence voter’s preferences and decrease the chances that voters will select a female candidate in an open list election. Many cultures retain a stigma with regards to women and leadership roles sometimes long after the establishment of a democratic government. Voters tend to use information shortcuts to decide between candidates and gender is the easiest identifier to discern between

candidates, which can prevent capable female candidates from being elected members of parliament.

However, placing women on candidate lists can “broaden the appeal” of a party without unseating male candidates, (Kittilson, 2006) which is why countries using list electoral systems have seen more success in getting female candidates nominated to run for office; parties find it easy to add more female candidates to their lists without upsetting the balance of candidates winning seats. While list systems enable parties to elect more female candidates than other types of electoral systems, list systems do not inherently get more women elected to office. However, list systems have seen more success than other systems in this respect because additional laws can be added to increase female and minority representation in parliament. For example, closed lists have experienced higher success in increasing female representation because a government can order parties to “zip” their lists by placing a woman or minority individual as every second candidate or require a certain number of seats to be set aside for an ethnic minority (Farrell, 2001). This can increase the number of seats in parliament going to females or minority groups. For example, South Africa’s first post-Apartheid election in 1994 employed this zipping law in order to ensure equal representation of women and minorities in the new government and its success can be seen by the fact that 42% of its Parliament members are female, one of the highest percentages in the world.

This practice can also be used in open list systems but tends to have little impact because voters can choose any candidates on the list so the list order does

very little to affect voting choices. While this tactic increases the diversity within parliament, it also prevents voters from having direct control over who represents them in closed list elections. Therefore all of this power is concentrated with the party leaders who construct the lists, as is the practice in Greece when a closed list election occurs. List systems may increase the odds that women will be placed on candidate lists but it does not guarantee that female candidates will win seats. Based on these theories, I argue the placement of women on the lower levels of candidate lists in Greece is intended as a party tactic to increase votes for the party rather than an effort to increase the number of women actually elected to Parliament.



## Chapter 3

### Party Strategy Research Design

To compare the results of the May and June elections, this analysis will focus on the candidate lists of the top seven parties in both elections for every district in which the party won at least one seat. I will examine these list orders of the top seven parties and record two occurrences: whether candidates moved up or down the list order in the closed list election compared to the open list election and whether candidates were added or omitted from the closed list election compared to the open list election. I will aggregate the number of candidates moved or changed on each district list for each party in order to observe possible trends at the national level. My independent variables are the open and closed lists while my dependent variables are whether candidates moved in rankings within the lists and whether candidates were added or removed from the lists.

I will observe only parties that won seats in the open list election because it will allow me to create relative rankings of their lists based on the voters' rankings of these candidates in the May election. This relative ranking approach was created by Nemoto and Shugart (Electoral Studies, 2013) for their study on the effects of localness under open and closed list electoral systems and has been modified to fit the needs of this study of the Greek elections. Relative ranking categories will help show what type of candidates are being altered going into the closed elections. I have created four relative ranking categories. Candidates can be in the "sure winner" category, meaning they were high enough on the list relative to the number

of seats their party won that they safely won a seat in the May elections. The next relative ranking category is the “marginal winner” category; candidates who fall into this category just barely won a seat in the May elections. The next relative ranking category is the “marginal loser” category; these candidates just barely lost a seat in parliament in the May election and similarly to the marginal winners, they are likely to barely win or barely lose a seat in the closed list election if they remain in the same position on their party list. The final relative rank category is the “sure loser” category; these candidates did very poorly in the open list elections and if they remain in the same position in the closed list rankings, it is extremely unlikely they will win a seat. Many who fall into this category could not win a seat even in the extremely unlikely event that their party wins 100% of the seats in the district because parties are allowed to run more candidates than there are seats.

The relative rank categories will also allow me to analyze the party lists regardless of how many seats a party won or how many candidates they chose to include on a district list. For example, in the district of Attikis, all of the top seven parties ran 15 candidates except for Chrysi Agyi, which only ran 9. In addition, each of these parties won between one and four seats. This makes comparison very difficult without the relative rankings because each district does not require a uniform list length and each party is receiving varying percentages of the votes, which prevents accurate analysis if the lists were just split into fourths for example. The relative rankings allow me to see whether the closed list elections are impacting candidates who are sure to win, likely to win, likely to lose, and sure to lose, which

will offer much more insight as to how the parties will adjust their strategy with the different electoral rules.

Categories are calculated by dividing each candidate's placement on the list by the number of seats the party won. Each category was then assigned a range. If a candidate's relative rank was from 0 to 0.5, they were a sure winner, from 0.5 to 1.0 was a marginal winner, from 1.0 to 2.0 was a marginal loser, and candidates receiving a rank above 2.0 fell into the sure loser category. The marginal winner cutoff of 1.0 is a clear dividing line because a candidate receiving a rank of 1.0 was the last candidate on that list to win a seat. The dividing point of 0.5 between sure and marginal winners is designed to estimate where winners who safely won a seat separate from the winning candidates who barely won a seat. The dividing point of 2.0 between marginal and sure loser categories provides an estimate of where losing candidates transition from having a small chance of winning a seat to almost no chance of winning a seat. The range of marginal loser and sure loser are larger categories because in every district parties add a great deal more candidates than are likely to be elected so these loser rankings have far more candidates to sort than the winner rankings.

Sample of Relative Rank Formula	District: Attikis M=12	New Democracy: Won 4 Seats
Rank Categories		List of Candidates for New Democracy in District Attikis
Sure Winner (0-0.5)	1/4= 0.25	1. Voridis Maryroudis tou Christou
	2/4= 0.5	2. Martinou Georgia tou Athanasiou
Marginal Winner (0.5-1.0)	3/4= 0.75	3. Vlachos Georgios tou Theodorou
	4/4= 1.0	4. Bouras Athanasios tou Konstantiou
Marginal Loser (1.0-2.0)	5/4= 1.25	5. Kanteres Nikolaos tou Eyaggelou
	6/4= 1.50	6. Doukas Petros tou Georgiou
	7/4= 1.75	7. Katsigiannis Athanasios tou Christou
	8/4= 2.0	8. Rapti Dimitra tou Eyaggelou
Sure Loser (>2.0)	9/4= 2.25	9. Louka Ismini tou Stayrou
	10/4= 2.50	10. Chaskos Panagiotis tou Nikiforou
	11/4= 2.75	11. Ioannidou-Mouzaka Lydia tou Lazarou
	12/4= 3.0	12. Agiasoglou Stefanos tou Theodorou
	13/4= 3.25	13. Leivadas Panagiotis tou Vasileiou
	14/4= 3.5	14. Gakis Adamantios tou Anastasiou
	15/4= 3.75	15. Mayroeidi Vasiliki tou Vasileiou

Figure 1: Sample of Relative Rank Formula

The figure above displays a sample of the how candidates on the party list for New Democracy were divided into the four relative rank categories based on the formula of: (rank of candidate on the list/number of seats won by the party) in the district. I then repeated the process of dividing the lists for every party list for the winning parties in each district.

For example, New Democracy won four seats in the May election in the district of Attikis. Therefore, I divided each candidate's rank by four. Starting with the candidate first on the list, I divided their rank (1) by the number of seats won (4), which gives the first candidate a relative rank of 0.25. This would place them in the sure winner category. Then I divided the next candidate's place on the list (2) by the number of seats New Democracy won (4) which gives this person a rank of 0.5. Based on this formula, the top two candidates on this list were sure winners, the next two were marginal winners, the next four were marginal losers and the next seven were sure losers. After going through each party list for each district, I then aggregated all of the changes to the candidates of each relative rank category by party to see if there was a pattern of change based on where a candidate started out in the May lists, which was decided by a district's voters.

#### Number of Candidates Changing Rank in New Democracy Party Lists Between May and June 2012

New Democracy	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total
Districts								
A Athinon	0	4	0	4	7	8	3	5
A Thessaloniki	0	2	0	4	0	6	0	8
Achaïas	0	1	0	1	0	2	6	8
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	7
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	0	3
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Artas			0	1	0	1	0	3
Attikis	0	2	0	2	0	4	1	7
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion	1	1	2	2	2	3		
Chiou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Dodekanisou	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	1
Dramas			0	1	0	1	0	3

Evrou	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Erytaniais			0	1	0	1	0	1
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	0	1	0	2
Fokidas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Grevenon			0	1	0	1	0	1
Ileias	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	4
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Irakleiou	0	1	2	2	3	3	4	5
Kardistas	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Kastorias			0	1	0	1	0	2
Kavalas	0	1	0	2	0	3		
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	0	3
Kilkis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Korinthias	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	0	5
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	3	3
Lakonias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Larisas	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	7
Lasithiou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	0	3
Leykadas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Magnisias	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	5
Messinias	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Pellas	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Pierias			0	1	0	2	0	3
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	4	9
Prevezas			0	1	0	1	0	2
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	0	1	0	2	0	3	1	3
Thesprotas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Trikalon	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	2	7
V Athinon	0	7	0	7	0	14	0	18
Voiotias	0	1	0	2	0	3		
Xanthis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Zakynthou			0	1	0	1	0	1
Totals	1	33	5	70	14	104	29	183
		3%		7%		13%		16%

Figure 2: Sample Dataset of Candidates Exchanged on New Democracy District Lists

The dataset above shows a sample of the data I collected for the number of candidates moved within the district lists for New Democracy. In addition to replicating this chart for all

seven parties, I created an identical chart to track the number of candidates who were added or deleted from each district list for every party. The far left column lists each district; the up/down column records how many candidates moved up or down from the May to June elections in the sure winner, marginal winner, marginal loser and sure loser categories. The total category on the far right shows how many candidates in total were in each category for that district. The percentages at the bottom show the total percentage of candidates that moved within the given party's list from the May to June election.

This research design enabled me to make comparisons across lists of varying lengths. For example, in Athens District B, which has a district magnitude of 42, each of the seven parties ran a list of 46 candidates with the top parties winning 6 to 14 seats. However, in a smaller district such as Imathias, which has a district magnitude of 4, parties only ran six candidates and the top parties only won one seat. A candidate third on the list in Athens is much more likely to win a seat than a candidate ranked third in Imathias, therefore the relative ranking formula allows me to equalize these varying list lengths and district magnitudes in order to see how party strategy differs with candidates who are likely or unlikely to be elected. Examining this data by party should provide insight into whether different types of parties, whether large and well established or small and relatively new, used differing strategies when switching to the closed list system in June.

### **Female Representation Research Design**

The research design will also allow me to compare the numbers of female candidates who ran for each party and the numbers of women who were elected in the May and June elections. This was accomplished by reviewing the lists for both the May and June elections and tallying how many women ran for office by examining the names of the candidates. In Greece, women's names end in e, i, or a,

and there are no names that are ambiguously male or female so which enabled me to easily identify female candidates. Then I compared the May and June results to determine whether the open and closed lists had an affect on the number of females on the lists. The relative ranking system established above will also allow me to observe how many women not only ran for office for the top parties, but also how many of them were sure winners, marginal winners, marginal losers, and sure losers in the open list elections and how many shifted positions in the closed list election.

### Number of Female Candidates on District Lists for New Democracy in May 2012 Election

May New Democracy	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
District								
A Athinon	2	4	0	4	3	8	5	5
A Thessaloniki	0	2	1	4	0	6	7	8
Achaias	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	8
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	7
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	4	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	1	3
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Artas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Attikis	1	2	0	2	1	4	3	7
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Chanion	0	1	0	2	1	3		
Chiou			0	1	0	1	2	2
Dodekanisou	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	1
Dramas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Evrou	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	2
Erytanias			0	1	0	1	0	1
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Fokidas			1	1	0	1	0	1
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	2	5
Grevenon			0	1	0	1	1	1
Ileias	0	1	1	1	0	2	2	4
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	3
Irakleiou	0	1	0	2	0	3	3	5
Kardistas	0	1	1	1	0	2	1	3



Kastorias			1	1	0	1	0	2
Kavalas	0	1	0	2	2	3		
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	1	3
Kilkis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Korinthias	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	2
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	1	5
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	2	3
Lakonias			0	1	1	1	2	3
Larisas	0	1	0	1	1	2	4	7
Lasithiou			0	1	0	1	2	2
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	2	3
Leykadas			0	1	0	1	1	1
Magnisias	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	5
Messinias	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Pellas	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	2
Pierias			0	1	0	2	2	3
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	4	9
Prevezas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	0	1	1	2	1	3	1	3
Thesprotas			0	1	1	1	0	1
Trikalon	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	3
V Thessaloniki			1	1	0	1	3	7
V Athinon	1	7	2	7	3	14	15	18
Voiotias	0	1	0	2	2	3		
Xanthis			0	1	1	1	0	3
Zakynthou			0	1	0	1	1	1
Totals	4	33	9	70	19	104	97	183
		12%		13%		18%		53%

**Figure 3: Sample Dataset of Percentage of Female Candidates on New Democracy District Lists**

The dataset above shows the numbers of female candidates who ran in the open list election for New Democracy. I created an identical chart for the June election and then replicated the two charts for all seven political parties. The blank spaces on the chart indicate the party did not win enough seats to merit a sure winner based on the formula I devised. For example, New Democracy only won one seat in the district of Argolidos, meaning this winner's ranking was 1/1 and therefore a marginal winner. The female column indicates how many female candidates fell into each category and the total column indicates how many candidates (male and female) fell into each category in total for New Democracy. The totals at the bottom of the chart show the percentage of female candidates nationally for New Democracy in each category: sure winner, marginal winner, marginal loser and sure loser. The far right column is the total number of female candidates who ran for office in each district in which New Democracy won at least one seat.

Pasok has a self-initiated quota system, which mandates that at least 40% of their candidates must be female, however the party specifies no order of female candidates. By comparing changes in rank of female candidates from the May to June elections, I will be able to determine if this party indeed follows its own mandate and whether more women ran for parliament through Pasok than parties without the 40% quota. The relative rankings will also provide insight into whether these quotas are successful in getting females elected to office. For example, even if Pasok achieves the quota it might not help more women get elected if they fall into a lower ranking in the closed list elections.

The study will also compare the percentage of female candidates who ran for office to the number who were elected in order to observe any differences between the open and closed list elections. I will also look at the size of each district in order to observe if district magnitude affects the percentage of female candidates and female parliament members.

## Chapter 4

### Party Strategy Results

The datasets in the study were reported by party and then aggregated at the national level in order to observe any evident patterns of party behavior. The results starting with Pasok found the party did not move any of its sure winner candidates up or down the closed list, nor did they add or delete any sure winners. Pasok also did not alter the list in any way for candidates who fell into the marginal winner category or the marginal loser category. However, 24% of Pasok's candidates in the sure loser category were moved up or down the lists and 8% were added or deleted from the lists. Only candidates who were at the bottom of the candidate lists were changed in any way. Similar trends were found in all seven parties.

National Data	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total
Candidates Moved								
Syriza	0	9	0	40	0	49	30	202
		0%		0%		0%		15%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6	0	28	0	35	83	196
		0%		0%		0%		42%
KKE	0	3	3	23	8	26	64	185
		0%		13%		31%		35%
New Democracy	1	33	5	70	14	104	29	183
		3%		7%		13%		16%
Chrysi Agyi	0	3	0	18	0	21	15	78
		0%		0%		0%		19%
Pasok	0	3	0	38	0	41	57	240
		0%		0%		0%		24%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	0	17	0	19	57	175
		0%		0%		0%		33%
National Totals	1	59	6	234	22	295	335	1260

Totals:                                    2%                                    3%                                    7%                                    27%

National Data	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total
Candidates Changed								
Syriza	0	9	0	40	0	49	13	202
		0%		0%		0%		6%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6	0	28	4	35	27	196
		0%		0%		11%		14%
KKE	0	3	0	23	0	26	4	185
		0%		0%		0%		2%
New Democracy	0	33	0	70	10	104	34	183
		3%		0%		10%		19%
Chrysi Aygi	0	3	0	18	0	21	11	78
		0%		0%		0%		14%
Pasok	0	3	0	38	0	41	19	240
		0%		0%		0%		8%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	0	17	0	19	17	175
		0%		0%		0%		10%
National Totals	0	59	0	234	14	295	125	126
		0%		0%		5%		10%

**Figure 4: National Dataset Displaying Percentage of Change in Candidates for Top Seven Parties from May to June Elections 2012**

The chart above displays the percentage of change in the Sure Win, Marginal Win, Marginal Loss and Sure Loss categories for each of the seven parties at the national level. The top of the chart shows the national total percentage of candidates moved within a party's list in each relative rank category. The bottom portion of the chart shows the national total percentage of candidates added or deleted from a party's list.

Chrysi Aygi did not alter any of its candidates in the sure winner, marginal winner, or marginal loser categories; only the sure loser category saw any changes with 19% of candidates moved up or down the lists and 14% of these candidates added or deleted from the lists for the closed list election.

Dimokratiki Aristera also had similar findings, with no change to the first three categories, but 33% of sure losers were moved up or down the lists and 10% were added or deleted from the lists.


Syriza followed the same trend with 0% of its candidates altered in the sure winner, marginal winner, and marginal loser categories. Syriza had a slightly lower percentage of change in the sure loser category than Dimokratiki Aristera; only 15% moved up or down and 6% were added or deleted. Syriza had no change in candidates in positions to win seats and very little change in the sure loser category. Based on the electoral systems theory hypothesis, Syriza was expected to use take advantage of the opportunity to change winning candidates more so than the other parties because Syriza had the added burden of appeasing all of the former coalition parties within its new party structure. However, Syriza not only followed the same trend as all the other parties, it had the lowest percentage of change within its district lists.

The remaining parties, Anexartitoi Ellines, the KKE, and New Democracy had slightly different results but still followed the same trend as the other parties. Anexartitoi Ellines and the KKE followed the same trend as the other parties and did not move any candidates in the sure winner category. However, New Democracy moved one candidate that was a sure winner down the list in all of its candidates nationwide, creating a 3% change in the sure winner category nationally. New Democracy also moved 7% of its marginal winner candidates up or down but did not add or delete any of them. Of the marginal loser category, New Democracy

moved 13% up or down and added or deleted 10% of the candidates nationwide. In the sure loser category, the percentages get higher with 16% of candidates moved up or down and 19% of candidates added or deleted.


The KKE also altered candidates in the marginal winner, marginal loser, and sure loser categories. In the marginal winner category, the KKE moved 13% of its candidates up or down but did not add or delete any candidates. In the marginal loser category 31% of candidates were moved up or down but none were added or deleted. In the sure loser category 35% of candidates were moved up or down and 2% were added or deleted.

Anexartitoi Ellines altered candidates only in the marginal loser and sure loser categories with 11% of their marginal losers added or deleted and no candidates moved up or down. In the sure loser category, 42% of candidates moved up or down and 14% were added or deleted. My research was limited to parties who won seats in the open elections in order to create the relative rank categories, but as I analyzed each district I also observed similar trends in smaller parties who did not receive enough votes to overcome the 3% threshold.



**Figure 5: % Change in Candidates Moved and Exchanged within the Top Seven Parties at National Level**

The graph above shows the percentage of candidates moved within their lists between the two elections in blue and the percentage of candidates exchanged for new candidates between the two elections in red. This graph shows the percentage of change increases as the likelihood of a candidate winning a seat decreases.



**Figure 6: Overall Changes in Candidates for Top Seven Parties from May to June Elections 2012**

The graph above combines the changes in the number candidates exchanged and moved within the lists show the total percentage of change in the list of all seven parties. The graph

**depicts the increase in changes of candidates on party lists within the marginal and sure loss categories compared to the sure and marginal win categories, which experienced minimal changes in candidates: only a 2% and 3% change compared to the 12% and 38% change in the marginal and sure loser categories.**

Overall, every party had a similar trend of few to no candidates changing in the sure winner category, a small number of candidates changing in the marginal winner category, a larger number of candidates changing in the marginal loser category, and the largest number of candidates changing in the sure loser category from the May to June elections. This trend is seen in both candidates moving up or down the lists and being added or deleted, however candidates were moved within the lists at a higher percentage than the number of candidates being added or deleted from the district lists. Of all of the candidates who won seats, only 2% changed in rank by party leaders for the closed list election in June. However, of all the candidates who lost in the open election 32% of them were shifted in the order or exchanged completely. Regardless of party size or party goals going into the closed election, all parties left their winning candidates intact and made changes to their losing candidates. The farther down the list a candidate fell in the open elections, the more likely the candidate shifted rank or was removed from the list for the closed elections. In conclusion, the parties did not behave as predicted through open and closed list electoral theory. In addition, the time constraint hypothesis stating that such a short time lapse between elections would have prevented parties from altering their lists was false. Instead, the data shows a trend in party strategy across all seven parties based on the performance of candidates in the May elections. The parties used the open list election as a primary for the



winning candidates and ranked them from best May election performance to worst for the June list orders. But, 32% of candidates who lost the election in May were changed; either their rank changed on the list or they were exchanged for a new candidate. Parties choose to leave the winning candidates alone yet altered the losing candidates who fell into the marginal and sure loser categories.

My data indicates that candidates were shifted lower on the lists as part of a party's strategy to gain more votes. For example, candidate Sotirios Vahaviolos was added as the ninth candidate for Pasok on a party list that only had a chance of winning one or two seats. Vahaviolos is an American citizen and the CEO of a highly successful company based out of New Jersey. According to WNYC news, he was added as a candidate for the closed election as a "symbolic" gesture as an attempt to convince Greeks living abroad in the United States that Pasok cares about their needs and is willing to run candidates who represent them. Another candidate selected to run for New Democracy in the closed list election, Artemis Papadatou of New York, claims she was selected to run because New Democracy wanted her to "represent the young generation, to bring in the new and out with the old." (Alcorn, 2012). The claims made by these parties stating they were trying to represent citizens abroad and the younger generations was simply a party strategy to gain votes they might not have normally secured by using the closed list elections to their advantage. The parties placed these candidates low on the lists, knowing they did not have a chance of securing a seat. The parties would not employ this strategy during an open list election because these candidates could be selected directly by

voters and win a seat. The closed list elections allowed parties to use the lower list candidates to gain voters without making any changes to their parliamentary makeup.

Evidence for this type of party strategy is supported by the voter turnout statistics for the May elections. Voting is mandatory in Greece, yet many people abstained from voting in the May elections as a protest against the major parties decisions when dealing with the debt crisis. Voter turnout hit a record low of 65% in the May elections; this is a huge drop in voter participation for a country that has routinely seen turnout levels above 75% since the 1950's (Dahlerup, 2005). The large parties knew their chances of winning were going to come down to a small percentage of voters and small parties faced a similar challenge with their odds of securing the extremely likely coalition partnership, therefore it became imperative for these parties to employ every strategy necessary to gain these voters they lost. While the parties used the May elections as a primary for winning candidates, they did not need to employ this strategy for the losing candidates. Instead, they replaced nearly one third of these candidates as a tactic to pull in unlikely voters such as Greeks of the Diaspora or younger generations. The changes in marginal and sure loser candidates were intended as a get-out-the-vote tactic more than anything else. These new candidates were asked to campaign for their party and encourage voters to make the trip to the polls in order to regain many voters who refused to vote in May (Alcorn, 2012). These symbolic candidates were intended to show that while the parties are not prepared to alter their established candidates and completely

overhaul the composition of Parliament, they are willing to show these new voter demographics that their interests are of concern to the party. However, this party tactic was unsuccessful in regaining voter turnout as it decreased to 62.5% for the June election.

### **Female Representation Results**

In order to analyze the numbers of female candidates and any changes from the open to closed list elections, I created a dataset using a similar method to my previous dataset. Each party list was broken down in every district into sure winner, marginal winner, marginal loser and sure loser categories. Then I went through each list and calculated how many women fell into each relative rank category. I also calculated how many women in total each party ran on the lists they submitted for every district.

At the national level during the open list election in May, female candidates made up 14% of candidates who were sure winners, 18% of marginal winners, 31% of marginal losers, and 40% of sure losers. In the closed elections, female candidates made up 14% of sure winners, 18% of marginal winners, 30% of marginal losers, and 41% of sure losers. Overall parties generally followed the trend of a few female candidates in the sure winner and marginal winner categories and an increase in female candidates when moving to the marginal loser and sure loser categories. All of the parties had 33% to 40% of their lists consisting of female candidates, however, that number is deceptive considering a majority of those female

candidates have little to no chance of winning a seat. The numbers of female candidates increased as the likelihood of winning a seat decreased.

May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
Syriza	1	9	13	40	25	49	60	202
		11%		33%		51%		30%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6	8	28	14	35	74	196
		0		29%		40%		38%
KKE	2	3	5	23	8	26	81	185
		67%		22%		31%		44%
New Democracy	4	33	9	70	19	104	97	183
		12%		13%		18%		53%
Chrysi Aygi	1	3	0	18	8	21	32	78
		33%		0%		38%		41%
Pasok	0	3	3	38	10	41	103	240
		0%		8%		24%		43%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	6	17	8	19	60	175
		0%		35%		42%		34%
National Totals	8	59	44	234	92	295	507	1260
		14%		18%		31%		40%

June	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
Syriza	1	9	13	40	25	49	57	202
		11%		33%		51%		30%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6	8	28	14	35	75	196
		0%		29%		40%		38%
KKE	2	3	4	23	8	26	82	185
		67%		17%		31%		44%
New Democracy	4	33	10	70	17	104	99	183
		12%		13%		16%		54%
Chrysi Aygi	1	3	0	18	7	21	34	78
		33%		0%		33%		44%
Pasok	0	3	3	38	10	41	99	240
		0%		8%		24%		41%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	6	17	8	19	65	175
		0%		35%		42%		37%

National Totals	8	59	44	234	89	295	511	1260
		14%		18%		30%		41%

**Figure 7: National Totals by Party of Female Candidates in May and June Elections 2012**

The dataset above displays the total percentages of female candidates who ran for each of the top seven parties in both the May and June elections. The dataset also shows how many female candidates fell into the relative ranks of Sure Win Marginal Win, Marginal Loss, and Sure Loss for each party nationally.

In the sure winner category, the KKE had the highest percentage of female candidates at the national level at 67% and this did not change going into the closed list elections. However, their percentage of female candidates decreases from 22% in the marginal winners category to 17% in the closed list elections. Their marginal loser category was 31% female and remained that way for the closed election, as did their sure loser category with 44% female candidates. Overall, in both the open and closed list elections the KKE's lists were 40% female, which is the highest percentage of female representation of all seven parties.

The party with the next highest percentage of female candidates in the sure winner category was Chrysi Agyi with 33%. However, no candidates in the marginal winner category were female in either election. Then the percentages for the marginal loser category are 38% female participation in the open list election and decrease to 33% in the closed list election. The sure loser category had the highest percentage of women, with 41% in the open list election and 44% in the closed list election. Overall, Chrysi Agyi's candidates were 33% female in both the open and closed list elections.

Only two other parties had any female candidates in the sure winner category: New Democracy and Syriza. Twelve percent of New Democracy's sure


winner categories. In the open election, 13% of winners were female, and the percentage did not change in the closed list election. New Democracy had slightly higher percentages of female candidates in the marginal winner category with 13% in both elections and 16% in both elections in the marginal loser category. There was a huge increase in female candidate percentage from the marginal loser to sure loser category, with 53% female candidates in the open election and 54% in the closed election. In total, Chrysi Agyi had 33% female candidates in both the open and closed list elections.

In the sure winner category for Syriza, 11% of candidates were female in both the open and closed list elections. Syriza did not alter the percentage of female candidates in any category for the closed list election. 33% of candidates were female in the marginal winner category for both elections. There was a large increase in female candidates from the marginal winner to marginal loser category, with 51% female candidates. The sure loser category had a lower percentage of female candidates with only 30%. In total, Syriza's candidates were 33% female in the open and closed list elections.

Anexartitoi Ellines had no female candidates in the sure winner column. The candidates in the marginal winner category were 29% female in both elections. There was a 10% increase in female candidates from the marginal winner category to the loser categories. 40% of Anexartitoi Ellines' marginal losers were female in both elections and this percentage stays relatively consistent in the sure loser category with 38% female candidates. In total, the party ran lists that were 36% female in both the open and closed list elections.

Dimokratiki Aristera had similar statistics to Anexartittoi Ellines, with no females in the sure winner category for either election. This percentage jumps to 35% in the marginal winner category and is consistent in both elections. There is a 7% increase in female candidates from the marginal winner to marginal loser categories, with 42% females in the marginal loser category. There is an increase in female candidates in the sure loser category from the open to closed list election, with 34% female candidates in the open election and 37% female candidates in the closed election. Overall, 35% of the candidates Dimokratiki Aristera ran in the open election were female and this increased slightly to 37% female candidates in the closed election.

Pasok did not have any female candidates in the sure winner category. In the marginal winner category, 8% of their candidates were female in both elections. There was a 16% increase in female candidates from the marginal winner category to the marginal loser category, which had 24% female representation. This number increases again by 19% from the marginal loser category to the sure loser category, with 43% of the candidates being female in the sure loser category in the open election. There is a slight decrease in female candidates in the sure loser category for the closed election with 41% of Pasok's candidates being female in this category. In total, 36% of Pasok's candidates were female in the open election and 35% of its candidates were female in the closed elections.



**Figure 8: Percentage of Female Candidates by Relative Rank Category**

The graph above depicts the percentage of female candidates in each category for the open list election in May and the closed list election in June. The graph shows the percentage of female candidates increased as the likelihood of the candidate winning a seat decreased. The graph also shows there was little change in the percentage of female candidates from the open to closed list election in any of the rank categories and no change in the percentage of female candidates overall.

The percentage of female participation from the May to June elections was not affected by the change from open list elections to closed list elections. Even though candidates lower on district lists were more likely to be either moved or added or deleted, the percentage of female candidates remained constant even in the marginal and sure loser categories where there was a 32% shift in these candidates overall. A few parties had only a few percentage points difference in the open to closed lists when it came to female participation even though they had a large change in candidates at the lower rank categories. For example, Pasok only had a 2% decrease in female candidates in the sure loser category from the open to closed list election, yet 24% of the sure loser candidates had been added or deleted



from the list going into the closed list election. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that every party made sure to replace a female candidate with another female candidate if they chose to remove the candidate from the May election from the list.

Even though there was a high percentage of candidate turnover in the loser categories, every party made sure to keep the percentages of female candidates consistent. The same held true for male candidates; if a party chose to replace a male candidate, another man replaced him. While parties were willing to change candidates for other purposes, perhaps for ideology or ability to reach new voter demographics, they were not willing to change the ratio of female to male candidates for the closed list election. If a female candidate won a seat in the open list election, she was essentially guaranteed the same position on the closed lists. If a female candidate lost in the open list elections, she was not guaranteed security of her place on the closed list but the party made sure that even if this candidate was removed, another female candidate would replace her. Therefore, the data shows that while female candidates were not helped by the change in electoral rules, they were not hurt by them either, even though parties could have taken advantage of the closed list and replaced the female candidates with male candidates.

### **Female Candidate Results: Winning and Losing Parties**

For this portion of my research I used every district list for the top seven parties regardless of whether they won seats in that district. I wanted to compare each party's total female candidate percentage including districts in which they did

not win at least one seat to the percentage of female candidates in the districts in which they won at minimum of one seat to see if there was a difference in the percentage of females on the winning and non-winning lists. Because I used data from non-winning lists, this comparison does not use the ranking categories I created for my previous results.

The results are as follows, beginning with Pasok, which is the only party that was affected by a quota in the May and June elections. However, according to my data Pasok did not meet its own 40% quota on the national level. In total, 35% of Pasok's candidates were female in the open list election, which includes data from all districts, not only districts where Pasok won seats. The percentage decreased to 33% of Pasok's candidates for the closed list election. This is almost double the percentage of female candidates recorded in 2004, however Pasok was still not successful in achieving its 40% quota thirty years after it became the leading party in the fight for women's rights.

At the district level, Pasok only met the 40% quota in 11 of the 56 districts in the open list election. In the closed list election only 12 district lists of the 56 districts contained over 40% female candidates. In five districts Pasok did not run a single female candidate in either election. Pasok's national total of female candidates and individual district lists fell short of their 40% goal in both elections. Ironically, despite Pasok being the lone party in pledging to a quota to raise female participation in these elections and parliament, Pasok was not the party with the highest percentage of female candidates or the second highest. Both New

Democracy and the KKE had much higher percentages of female candidates on their lists in both elections. In addition, Pasok had the lowest percentage of women falling into the sure winner and marginal winner categories of all the parties. Even Syriza, which had the lowest overall percentage of female candidates, still had a higher percentage of women in the sure winner and marginal winner categories than Pasok. Despite their quota pledge, they have not made any more significant progress than any other party. Not only do they have similar overall percentages of female candidates in comparison to other parties, Pasok does not have any more women elected to Parliament than the other parties.

In total, 1,061 of 3,087 candidates were female in the open list election, while 1,072 of 3,088 candidates were female in the closed list election, which comes to 34% in the open list election and 35% in the closed list election. According to the Greek ministry election results, 19% of Parliament after the May elections was female and this number increased slightly to 21% of Parliament after the June elections.

The Greek government has recognized these party initiated quotas have not produced the results they hoped for. In early 2012, a new law was approved stating that 30% of candidates on every district list must be female. However, this law did not go into effect in time to impact the elections later that year, so it will take effect during the next round of elections. My data shows that on a national average, every one of the top seven parties meets this 30% quota. However, this law clearly states that every party must run enough female candidates in every district to consist of

30% of each district list. However this study shows that many parties fall desperately short of this quota at the district level, with many parties failing to run even a single female candidate in some of the smaller districts.

In addition to observing trends in female candidates by party, I also analyzed the percentages of female candidates in each district in total in order to determine if geographical differences affected the numbers of women running for parliament in addition to their party affiliation. For this data, I observed the percentages of females running in each district on every party list for the top seven parties regardless of whether the party won seats. The average percentage of female candidates in a district was 28% during the open list election while the average percentage was 33% in the closed list election. I identified districts with outlier female percentages in order to determine whether there was a demographic pattern connecting districts with the lowest and highest percentages of female participation. Districts with the lowest percentages of female candidates were primarily one and three seat districts where a party's list consists of a maximum of three and five candidates respectively. Districts with the highest percentages of female candidates included the three largest districts: Athens District A, Athens District B, and Thessaloniki District A which have magnitudes of 42, 17 and 16 respectively. However this group also consisted of small one to five seat districts as well so the data did not show conclusive evidence for a connection between district magnitude and the number of female candidates.

## Chapter 5

### Conclusions

According to the conventional theories regarding open and closed list electoral systems, an open list election is designed to give more voting power to individual voters since they are allowed to directly select a candidate on a party list, while a closed list election is designed to give more power to parties and increase party cohesiveness because the party chooses the order of the lists. Based on this electoral theory, the open lists for the May election and the closed lists for the June election should have consisted of a different ordering of candidates or new candidates who did not run in the May elections. In contrast, the time constraint hypothesis predicted no change in the list orders from the May to June elections.

In the Greece case, these theories did not predict the outcomes observed. From the open list to closed list elections, only 2% of candidates elected to parliament in the open list election were moved on the closed lists during the closed list election; this statistic resulted from a total of seven winning candidates moving list positions and no removal of winning candidates from the lists. However, 32% of candidates who lost in the open list election either changed list placement or were exchanged for a new candidate, which shows that political parties had enough time to alter their lists and chose not to change candidates that voters chose in the open list election. In total 569 candidates in the marginal and sure loser categories were moved within the lists and 139 candidates were exchanged from the May to June elections. My data shows that these political parties were not willing to completely

disregard the opinions of voters, even when they had a legal pathway to do so for the sake of creating a more cohesive government. Instead, these parties used the open list election as a primary of sorts in order to determine which candidates should be highly ranked in the closed list election. The parties' cost-benefit analysis indicated that a change in winning party candidates could be too risky in a time of crisis; they could not risk losing any more voters than they already had in the May elections.

Every party, regardless of political orientation or size all used the same party strategy when faced with a change in electoral rules. Winning candidates were left untouched and many losing candidates were replaced with new candidates to be used as a get-out-the-vote strategy. It will be interesting to observe whether these "symbolic" candidates inserted low on the June district lists will become substantial members of these parties in the future. Greece is experiencing a huge change in party power balance and in party identity because of the economic crisis. With such disillusionment with the current politicians due to their mishandling of the debt crisis, there could be an opportunity for these former symbolic candidates to move up in party rankings and become the forefront of these parties.

Scholars argue that closed list elections benefit women because parties can move them up the lists in order to get elected, while in open list elections the decision is completely up to the voter as to how many female candidates get elected to Parliament. My data shows the closed list election did not affect the percentages of female candidates as electoral theory indicates it would. In both elections 35% of

candidates were women and in the open election 19% of Parliament was made up of women and after the closed list election this percentage only increased to 21% which is not enough of an increase to prove that a closed list election can help increase equality in Parliament. While the time constraint could have explained why there was no shift in female candidates and only a small shift in female parliament members, parties did have enough time to change the lower portions of their lists. It was part of their party strategy to leave winning candidates untouched for the closed list election, thus resulting in only a small change the percentage of female parliament members.

The research indicates that closed list elections alone are not sufficient to increase female participation in Parliament. The only way a closed list election would increase the numbers of female candidates elected to office is to pair it with quotas that mandate a certain number of females must run for office for each party or that lists must be “zipped” meaning that every other candidate must be a woman. However, Greece does not have these mandates in place and they bring up an array of dilemmas regarding voter preference. If the closed lists are intended to improve female representation in Parliament, these additional laws must be implemented in order to see any improvement. In addition my data at the party level shows as of this election, Greek political parties are not prepared to meet the new 30% female candidate quota to be installed in the next round of elections. No party was successfully over the 30% quota in every district, and all parties had districts where they did not run a single female candidate. These top political parties need to begin

planning for this change now if they are to successfully achieve this quota because it will require recruiting a large number of new female candidates.

The same principles learned from the female representation data in the case of the Greek May and June 2012 elections can also be applied to using closed list electoral systems to increase other types of minority groups. Without additional incentives, parties will have no reason to increase the numbers of minority candidates. The female representation data also shows that even in areas with high numbers of female participation in the elections, parties have no incentive to place these female candidates high up on closed lists. Participation seemed high on paper but in reality none of these women had a chance of being elected. This is another obstacle to consider when creating supplementary rules to increase female and minority representation in Parliament. Not only must these laws create incentive for parties to run women and minority groups at a percentage representing the greater populace, but they must also create incentive for parties to place these candidates high enough on their district lists so they have an opportunity to be elected to office.

However, the data also shows that parties ensured that women who won a seat in the open list election had the same placement on the closed lists in June. In addition parties took meticulous care to ensure that if they decided to remove a losing female candidate from the list, another female candidate replaced her. This party strategy was a consistent pattern amongst all seven parties regardless of the variation in female candidate percentages between the parties. Parties could have replaced female candidates with male candidates however, the cost-benefit analysis



indicated that the female vote was too valuable to the parties to risk alienating female voters. This is an important step for Greece, a country where women have only had the right to vote for 61 years and opinion polls show that up until recent generations became of age to vote, women considered voting and politics strictly a man's pastime and thus very little attention was paid to the needs of female voters (Maloutas, 2006). However, now that men and women of younger generations are becoming more equal in their interest in political issues, parties are now taking this shift into account and paying more attention to female voters. While Greece still falls short of equal representation of both genders in Parliament, the attention to maintaining the percentages of female candidates from the open to closed list election shows parties are beginning to realize how important the female vote could be for their party's success.

Countries looking to improve their percentages of female parliamentary representatives must understand that a closed list electoral system needs additional laws equipped with disciplinary action if they are not enforced in order to see quick improvement. The case of Pasok and its 40% quota shows that these types of mandates are extremely slow to yield results unless there are consequences if the quotas or other laws are not met. Pasok knew it would not suffer any consequences if it did not meet the 40% quota so it used this quota pledge to gain female votes without having upheld its promise. In addition, Greece outsources its election results data to an outside company. The data that is not imperative to determining seat winners is not collected, therefore the odds of Pasok being held accountable to

its quota was very slim. Similar occurrences will take place in other countries looking to increase female participation if there are no consequences for failing to uphold these types of laws or if there is a weak ability to monitor election data. While the Greek closed list elections did not increase female representation, it did indicate that political parties do take female voter preference into account when creating party strategy, which is a positive indication that Greece has the potential to make great strides toward equality in a short span of time if this effort to keep female voters engaged in politics continues.

My research shows the outcomes of both elections were extremely similar and the supposed benefits of a closed list election did not occur. Therefore, the costs of switching the election rules could be higher than the benefits for the Greek government. The only other time Greece has used a closed list election was in 1989, so voters were not familiar with the closed list process, thus the government would most likely need to take the time to educate voters as to how to vote using these new election rules amidst a crisis. The only benefit a closed list election still offers over an open one is that tallying votes is a much quicker process because voters only selected a party rather than the vast array of candidates available to them in an open list election. However, Greece did not struggle with tallying votes for the open list election so the problem is not great enough to completely alter the voting system if elections must take place within 18 months of each other.

The findings of this study are important for Greece because its desperate need to create a strong, cohesive government in its time of need could be affected by

its electoral system decisions. Choosing an electoral system that fits the needs of a country is crucial to creating a government that can give its country what it needs. If the theories behind the logic of choosing one electoral system over another are incorrect, this could lead to an inability of a government to function as designed or failure to even form a government. The Greece case provides interesting insight into shifts in party strategy when faced with a transition from an open list to a closed list system. A country needs to not only consider the logic behind all electoral system theories before choosing a new electoral system but also take real life applications of these electoral systems as well, such as the case of Greece.

The Greek case shows that seemingly stark differences in where the power lays in open and closed list systems may not be as we assumed. Theorists such as Gallagher and Mitchell state that closed list elections leave the power with the parties while open list elections gives more power to the voters (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005). However, this theory does not take into account the ease in which voters can abstain from voting or select another party in a closed list election if the party does not put candidates to their liking high on their district list. The ultimate decider of winners and losers in a functioning democratic system is the voter, regardless of an open list or closed list configuration and parties know that they must appease their constituency in order to gain seats regardless of the electoral system.

The Greek case cannot be taken as the only evidence needed to change how we look at open and closed list systems. While many variables were held constant

between the two elections, Greece is amidst a crisis of historically unprecedented proportions, which could have affected the data. However, this is unavoidable in order to conduct research such as this because in order to have two elections so close together, the Greek government would need to experience some sort of turmoil, which caused a failure to form a government. While I did observe a change in party behavior based on the type of electoral system used, Greece will return to the open list system for its next election in four years, so parties do not have incentive to completely change their party strategy for only one election, which also could have affected my data.

While closed list elections are extremely rare in Greece, they may become more common if the debt crisis continues to create instability within the government. This research can be helpful in observing patterns of party behavior in the future during closed list elections in Greece and help perhaps pinpoint the causes of these patterns. In addition, the female participation data will become crucial once the 30% quota comes into effect in the next round of elections in 2016. It will provide baseline data to test whether these quotas are effective in increasing the number of female candidates and the number of female parliament members. The data by district can also provide information as to whether certain districts will have an easier time increasing levels of female participation in elections based on district demographic. The Greek Ministry of the Interior website has minimal statistics regarding the results of the May 2012 election and absolutely no statistical analysis of the June 2012 election. In addition, the International Organization of

Parliaments, an organization that maintains statistics of all parliamentary democracies worldwide, is also missing all of this data in its database. Hopefully my data and research will provide insight as to how parties react to changes in their electoral system and perhaps provide a baseline for observation of the changes in percentage of female candidates and party strategy in open and closed list elections in the future.

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## Appendix A

### Dataset by Party

Anexartitoi Ellines	Sure Win		Anexartitoi Ellines Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss		
	Moved	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total
A Athinon				0	1	0	1	16	19
A Thessaloniki		0	1	0	1	0	2	6	16
Achaias				0	1	0	1	1	10
Aitoloakarnanias				0	1	0	1	5	9
A Peiraos				0	1	0	1	2	6
Argolidos		No Seats							
Arkadias		No Seats							
Artas		No Seats							
Attikis		0	1	0	1	0	2	0	11
Chalkidis		No Seats							
Chanion		No Seats							
Chiou		No Seats							
Dodekanisou				0	1	0	1	2	5
Dramas				0	1	0	1	2	3
Evroi		0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Erytanas		No Seats							
Evyoias				0	1	0	1	0	6
Florinas		No Seats							
Fokidas		No Seats							
Fthiotidas				0	1	0	1	3	5
Grevenon		No Seats							
Ileias				0	1	0	1	5	6
Imathias				0	1	0	1	3	4
Ioanninon		No Seats							
Irakleiou				0	1	0	1	9	9
Kardistas		No Seats							
Kastorias				0	1	0	1	2	2
Kavalas		No Seats							
Kefallinias		No Seats							
Kerkyras		No Seats							
Kilkis		No Seats							
Korinthias		No Seats							
Kozanis				0	1	0	1	1	5
Kykladon				0	1	0	1	0	3
Lakonias		No Seats							
Larisas				0	1	0	1	0	9
Lasithiou		No Seats							



Lesvou	No Seats								
Leykadas	No Seats								
Magnisias			0	1	0	1	1	3	
Messinias	No Seats								
Pellas			0	1	0	1	0	4	
Pierias	0	1	0	2	0	4			
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	0	9	
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou	No Seats								
Serron			0	1	0	1	0	7	
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon	No Seats								
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	0	7	
V Athinon	0	2	0	3	0	5	25	36	
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals	0	6	0	28	0	35	83	196	
		0%		0%		0%		42%	

Anexartitoi Ellines	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Add/Delete	Total	Add/Delete	Total	Add/Delete	Total	Add/Delete	Total
A Athinon	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	19
A Thessaloniki			0	1	0	2	1	16
Achaias			0	1	0	1	1	10
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	4	9
A Peiraos	No Seats		0	1	0	1	1	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	0	1						
Attikis	No Seats		0	1	0	2	1	11
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou								
Dodekanisou			0	1	0	1	1	5
Dramas	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	3
Evrou	No Seats		0	1	0	2	0	2

Erytania									
Evyoias	No Seats		0	1	0	1	0	6	
Florinas	No Seats								
Fokidas									
Fthiotidas	No Seats		0	1	0	1	1	5	
Grevenon									
Ileias			0	1	0	1	1	6	
Imathias	No Seats		0	1	1	1	1	4	
Ioanninon									
Irakleiou	No Seats		0	1	1	1	0	9	
Kardistas									
Kastorias	No Seats		0	1	1	1	0	2	
Kavalas	No Seats								
Kefallinias	No Seats								
Kerkyras	No Seats								
Kilkis	No Seats								
Korinthias									
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	3	5	
Kykladon	No Seats		0	1	0	1	1	3	
Lakonias									
Larisas	No Seats		0	1	0	1	0	9	
Lasithiou	No Seats								
Lesvou	No Seats								
Leykadas									
Magnisias	No Seats		0	1	0	1	2	3	
Messinias									
Pellas		0	1	0	1	0	1	0	4
Pierias				0	2	0	4		
V Peiraios	No Seats		0	1	0	1	1	9	
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou									
Serron	No Seats		0	1	0	1	0	7	
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon									
V									
Thessaloniki		0	2	0	1	0	1	1	7
V Athinon	No Seats			0	3	1	5	5	36
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou									
Totals		0	6	0	27	4	35	27	196
			0%		0%		11%		14%

Female Rep May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon			1	1	0	1	9	19
A Thessaloniki	0	1	1	1	1	2	6	16
Achais			0	1	1	1	2	10
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	1	1	3	9
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	2	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis	0	1	1	1	0	2	2	11
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou			1	1	1	1	1	5
Dramas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Evrou	0	1	0	1	2	2	0	2
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	1	1	1	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	3	5
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			0	1	0	1	2	6
Imathias			0	1	1	1	0	4
Ioanninon	No Seats							
Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	5	9
Kardistas	No Seats							
Kastorias			0	1	0	1	2	2
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias	No Seats							
Kozanis			1	1	0	1	2	5
Kykladon			0	1	1	1	0	3
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larisas			0	1	0	1	4	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou	No Seats							
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias			1	1	0	1	2	5
Messinias	No Seats							
Pellas			0	1	1	1	1	4
Pierias	0	1	0	2	2	4		

V Peiraos				0	1	0	1	3	9
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou	No Seats								
Serron				1	1	0	1	2	7
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon	No Seats								
V Thessaloniki				1	1	0	1	1	7
V Athinon	0	2		0	3	2	5	19	36
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals	0	6		8	28	14	35	74	198
		0%			29%		40%		38%

Female Rep June	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon			1	1	0	1	9	19
A Thessaloniki	0	1	1	1	1	2	6	16
Achais			0	1	1	1	2	10
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	1	1	3	9
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	3	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis	0	1	1	1	0	2	2	11
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou			1	1	1	1	1	5
Dramas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Evrou	0	1	0	1	2	2	0	2
Erytanias	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	1	1	1	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	3	5
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			0	1	0	1	3	6
Imathias			0	1	0	1	1	4
Ioanninon	No Seats							

Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	5	9
Kardistas	No Seats							
Kastorias			0	1	1	1	1	2
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias	No Seats							
Kozanis			1	1	0	1	1	5
Kykladon			0	1	1	1	0	3
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larissas			0	1	0	1	4	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou	No Seats							
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias			1	1	0	1	2	5
Messinias	No Seats							
Pellas			0	1	1	1	1	4
Pierias	0	1	0	2	2	4		
V Peiraos			0	1	0	1	3	9
Prevezas	No Seats							
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis	No Seats							
Samou	No Seats							
Serron			1	1	0	1	2	7
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon	No Seats							
V Thessaloniki			1	1	0	1	1	7
V Athinon	0	2	0	3	2	5	19	36
Voiotias	No Seats							
Xanthis	No Seats							
Zakynthou	No Seats							
Totals		6	8	28	14	35	75	198
		0%		29%		40%		38%

Chrysi Aygi Moved	Chrysi Aygi							
	Sure Win Up/Down	Total	Marginal Win Up/Down	Total	Marginal Loss Up/Down	Total	Sure Loss Up/Down	Total
A Athinon	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	11
A Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	0	7
Achaias			0	1	0	1	0	5
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	0	3
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	2	3

Argolidos	No Seats						
Arkadias	No Seats						
Artas	No Seats						
Attikis		0	1	0	1	0	7
Chalkidis	No Seats						
Chanion	No Seats						
Chiou	No Seats						
Dodekanisou	No Seats						
Dramas	No Seats						
Evrou	No Seats						
Erytanas	No Seats						
Evyoias		0	1	0	1	1	4
Florinas	No Seats						
Fokidas	No Seats						
Fthiotidas		0	1	0	1	0	3
Grevenon	No Seats						
Ileias		0	1	0	1	0	2
Imathias	No Seats						
Ioanninon	No Seats						
Irakleiou	No Seats						
Kardistas	No Seats						
Kastorias	No Seats						
Kavalas	No Seats						
Kefallinias	No Seats						
Kerkyras	No Seats						
Kilkis	No Seats						
Korinthias		0	1	0	1	0	2
Kozanis	No Seats						
Kykladon	No Seats						
Lakonias	No Seats						
Larisas		0	1	0	1	0	2
Lasithiou	No Seats						
Lesvou	No Seats						
Leykadas	No Seats						
Magnisias		0	1	0	1	2	3
Messinias		0	1	0	1	2	5
Pellas	No Seats						
Pierias	No Seats						
V Peiraios		0	1	0	1	0	3
Prevezas	No Seats						
Rethymnis	No Seats						
Rodopis	No Seats						
Samou	No Seats						
Serron		0	1	0	1	2	2
Thesprotas	No Seats						
Trikalon	No Seats						
V Thessaloniki		0	1	0	1	2	3
V Athinon	0	2	0	2	0	4	13

Voiotias No Seats  
 Xanthis No Seats  
 Zakynthou No Seats

Totals 3 0 18 0 21 15 78  
 0% 0% 0% 19%

	Sure Win Add/Del	Total	Marginal Win Add/Del	Total	Marginal Loss Add/Del	Total	Sure Loss Add/Del	Total
A Athinon	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	11
A Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	1	7
Achaïas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	1	3
A Peiraos			0	1	1	1	1	3
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis			0	1	0	1	0	7
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	1	4
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	0	3
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			0	1	0	1	0	2
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	No Seats							
Irakleiou	No Seats							
Kardistas	No Seats							
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias			0	1	0	1	1	2
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon	No Seats							

Lakonias	No Seats								
Larisas			0	1	0	1	1	2	
Lasithiou	No Seats								
Lesvou	No Seats								
Leykadas	No Seats								
Magnisias			0	1	0	1	0	3	
Messinias			0	1	1	1	2	5	
Pellas	No Seats								
Pierias	No Seats								
V Peiraos			0	1	0	1	1	3	
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou	No Seats								
Serron			0	1	0	1	0	2	
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon	No Seats								
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	0	3	
V Athinon	0	2	0	2	0	4	1	13	
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals		0	3	0	18	2	21	11	78
			0%		0%		1%		14%

Female Rep May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss		Total
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female		
A Athinon	0	1	0	1	1	2	5	11	
A Thessaloniki			0	1	1	1	2	7	
Achaias			0	1	0	1	2	5	
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	1	3	
A Peiraos			0	1	1	1	1	3	
Argolidos	No Seats								
Arkadias	No Seats								
Artas	No Seats								
Attikis			0	1	1	1	3	7	
Chalkidis	No Seats								
Chanion	No Seats								
Chiou	No Seats								
Dodekanisou	No Seats								
Dramas	No Seats								
Evrou	No Seats								
Erytanas	No Seats								



Evyoias			0	1	0	1	3	4
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			0	1	1	1	0	2
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	No Seats							
Irakleiou	No Seats							
Kardistas	No Seats							
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias			0		0	1	1	2
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon	No Seats							
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larissas			0		0	1	1	2
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou	No Seats							
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias			0	1	0	1	2	3
Messinias			0	1	0	1	1	5
Pellas	No Seats							
Pierias	No Seats							
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	2	3
Prevezas	No Seats							
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis	No Seats							
Samou	No Seats							
Serron			0	1	0	1	1	2
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon	No Seats							
V Thessaloniki			0	1	1	1	1	3
V Athinon	1	2	0	2	2	4	4	13
Voiotias	No Seats							
Xanthis	No Seats							
Zakynthou	No Seats							
Totals	1	3	0	18	8	21	32	78
		33%		0%		33%		41%

Female Rep June	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon	0	1	0	1	1	2	5	11
A Thessaloniki			0	1	1	1	3	7
Achaias			0	1	0	1	2	5
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	1	3
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	2	3
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis			0	1	1	1	3	7
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanias	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	3	4
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			0	1	1	1	0	2
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	No Seats							
Irakleiou	No Seats							
Kardistas	No Seats							
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias			0	1	0	1	1	2
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon	No Seats							
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larisas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou	No Seats							
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias			0	1	0	1	2	3
Messinias			0	1	0	1	1	5

Pellas	No Seats								
Pierias	No Seats								
V Peiraos				0	1	0	1	2	3
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou	No Seats								
Serron				0	1	0	1	1	2
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon	No Seats								
V Thessaloniki				0	1	1	1	1	3
V Athinon	1	2		0	2	2	4	4	13
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals	1	3		0	18	7	21	34	78
		33%			0%		33%		44%
	May		June						
	41	120	42	120					
		34%		35%					

## Dimokratiki Aristera

Dimokratiki Aristera	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total
A Athinon			0	1	0	1	0	19
A Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	2	18
Achaias			0	1	0	1	0	10
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	0	1	0	2	5	7
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis			0	1	0	1	2	13
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytaniais	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	0	6
Florinas	No Seats							

Fokidas	No Seats								
Fthiotidas	No Seats								
Grevenon	No Seats								
Ileias	No Seats								
Imathias	No Seats								
Ioanninon	No Seats								
Irakleiou			0	1		0	1	5	9
Kardistas	No Seats								
Kastorias	No Seats								
Kavalas	No Seats								
Kefallinias	No Seats								
Kerkyras	No Seats								
Kilkis	No Seats								
Korinthias	No Seats								
Kozanis			0	1		0	1	4	5
Kykladon	No Seats								
Lakonias	No Seats								
Larisas			0	1		0	1	0	9
Lasithiou	No Seats								
Lesvou	No Seats								
Leykadas	No Seats								
Magnisias			0	1		0	1	2	5
Messinias	No Seats								
Pellas	No Seats								
Pierias	No Seats								
V Peiraios			0	1		0	1	0	9
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou	No Seats								
Serron			0	1		0	1	2	7
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon			0	1		0	1	3	5
V Thessaloniki			0	1		0	1	0	7
V Athinon	0	1	0	2		0	3	32	40
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals	0	2	0	17		0	19	57	175
		0%		0%			0%		33%

Dimokratiki      Sure Win                      Marginal Win      Marginal Loss      Sure Loss

## Aristera

	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total
A Athinon			0	1	0	1	2	19
A Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	1	18
Achaias			0	1	0	1	0	10
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	7
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis			0	1	0	1	3	13
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	0	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	No Seats							
Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	0	9
Kardistas	No Seats							
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias	No Seats							
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	0	5
Kykladon	No Seats							
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larisas			0	1	0	1	0	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou	No Seats							
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias			0	1	0	1	2	5
Messinias	No Seats							
Pellas	No Seats							
Pierias	No Seats							
V Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	9
Prevezas	No Seats							

Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou	No Seats								
Serron				0	1	0	1	1	7
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon				0	1	0	1	1	5
V Thessaloniki				0	1	0	1	0	7
V Athinon		0	1	0	2	0	3	5	40
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals		0	2	0	17	0	19	17	175
			0%		0%		0%		10%

Female Rep May	Sure Win Female	Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss		
		Total	Female	Total	Female	Female	Total	
A Athinon			0	1	0	1	7	19
A Thessaloniki			1	1	1	1	5	18
Achaïas			0	1	1	1	3	10
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	1	1	0	2	3	7
A Peiraos			1	1	0	1	2	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis			0	1	0	1	6	13
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	1	1	2	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	No Seats							
Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	4	9

Kardistas	No Seats								
Kastorias	No Seats								
Kavalas	No Seats								
Kefallinias	No Seats								
Kerkyras	No Seats								
Kilkis	No Seats								
Korinthias	No Seats								
Kozanis				1	1	1	1	0	5
Kykladon	No Seats								
Lakonias	No Seats								
Larisas				0	1	0	1	4	9
Lasithiou	No Seats								
Lesvou	No Seats								
Leykadas	No Seats								
Magnisias				0	1	1	1	1	5
Messinias	No Seats								
Pellas	No Seats								
Pierias	No Seats								
V Peiraios				1	1	0	1	2	9
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou	No Seats								
Serron				0	1	0	1	3	7
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon				0	1	0	1	2	5
V Thessaloniki				1	1	1	1	1	7
V Athinon		0	1	0	2	2	3	15	40
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals		0	2	6	17	8	19	60	175
			0%		35%		42%		34%

Female Rep June	Sure Win Female	Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss		
		Total	Female	Total	Female	Female	Total	
A Athinon			0	1	0	1	8	19
A Thessaloniki			1	1	1	1	5	18
Achaias			0	1	1	1	3	10
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	1	1	0	2	3	7
A Peiraos			1	1	0	1	2	6

Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis		0	1	0	1	8	13	
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias		0	1	1	1	2	6	
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	No Seats							
Irakleiou		0	1	0	1	4	9	
Kardistas	No Seats							
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias	No Seats							
Kozanis		1	1	1	1	0	5	
Kykladon	No Seats							
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larisas		0	1	0	1	4	9	
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou	No Seats							
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias		0	1	1	1	2	5	
Messinias	No Seats							
Pellas	No Seats							
Pierias	No Seats							
V Peiraios		1	1	0	1	2	9	
Prevezas	No Seats							
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis	No Seats							
Samou	No Seats							
Serron		0	1	0	1	3	7	
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon		0	1	0	1	2	5	
V Thessaloniki		1	1	1	1	1	7	
V Athinon	0	1	0	2	2	3	16	40



Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals		0	2	6	17	8	19	65	175
			0%		35%		42%		37%
Overall	May	73	213	June	78	213			
			34%			37%			

KKE	KKE							
	Sure Win Up/Down	Total	Marginal Win Up/Down	Total	Marginal Loss Up/Down	Total	Sure Loss Up/Down	Total
A Athinon			0	1	0	1	1	19
A Thessaloniki	0	1	2	2	2	3	11	14
Achaïas			0	1	0	1	9	10
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	1	1	6	9
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis			0	1	0	1	2	13
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanias	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	4	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias			0	1	1	1	4	4
Ioanninon			0	1	1	1	4	5
Irakleïou			0	1	1	1	3	9
Kardistas			0	1	1	1	5	5
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							



Attikis			0	1	0	1	0	13
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytaniais	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	1	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Ioanninon			0	1	0	1	0	5
Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	0	9
Kardistas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	0	3
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias	No Seats							
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	0	5
Kykladon	No Seats							
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larissas			0	1	0	1	0	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	0	3
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias			0	1	0	1	0	5
Messinias	No Seats							
Pellas	No Seats							
Pierias	No Seats							
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	0	9
Prevezas	No Seats							
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis	No Seats							
Samou			0	1	0	1	0	1
Serron	No Seats							
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon			0	1	0	1	0	5
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	0	7
V Athinon	0	2	0	2	0	4	0	38
Voiotias	No Seats							
Xanthis	No Seats							
Zakynthou	No Seats							

Totals	0	3 0%	0	23 0%	0	26 0%	4	185 2%
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May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon			1	1	0	1	10	19
A Thessaloniki	1	1	0	2	1	3	7	14
Achaias			0	1	0	1	4	10
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	4	9
A Peiraos			1	1	0	1	3	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis			0	1	0	1	3	13
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	1	1	2	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias			1	1	0	1	2	4
Ioanninon			0	1	1	1	2	5
Irakleiou			0	1	1	1	3	9
Kardistas			0	1	0	1	2	5
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	1	3
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias	No Seats							
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	3	5
Kykladon	No Seats							
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larisas			0	1	1	1	3	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							

Lesvou				0	1	0	1	2	3
Leykadas	No Seats								
Magnisias				0	1	0	1	2	5
Messinias	No Seats								
Pellas	No Seats								
Pierias	No Seats								
V Peiraios				0	1	1	1	3	9
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou				0	1	0	1	0	1
Serron	No Seats								
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon				0	1	0	1	4	5
V Thessaloniki				1	1	0	1	2	7
V Athinon	1	2		1	2	2	4	19	38
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals	2	3	5	23	8	26	81	185	
		67%		22%		31%		44%	

June	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon			1	1	0	1	10	19
A Thessaloniki	1	1	0	2	1	3	7	14
Achaias			0	1	0	1	4	10
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	4	9
A Peiraos			1	1	0	1	3	6
Argolidos	No Seats							
Arkadias	No Seats							
Artas	No Seats							
Attikis			0	1	0	1	3	13
Chalkidis	No Seats							
Chanion	No Seats							
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	1	1	2	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							

Fthiotidas	No Seats								
Grevenon	No Seats								
Ileias	No Seats								
Imathias			1	1	0	1	2	4	
Ioanninon			0	1	0	1	3	5	
Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	4	9	
Kardistas			0	1	0	1	2	5	
Kastorias	No Seats								
Kavalas	No Seats								
Kefallinias	No Seats								
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	1	3	
Kilkis	No Seats								
Korinthias	No Seats								
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	3	5	
Kykladon	No Seats								
Lakonias	No Seats								
Larisas			0	1	1	1	3	9	
Lasithiou	No Seats								
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	2	3	
Leykadas	No Seats								
Magnisias			0	1	0	1	2	5	
Messinias	No Seats								
Pellas	No Seats								
Pierias	No Seats								
V Peiraios			0	1	1	1	3	9	
Prevezas	No Seats								
Rethymnis	No Seats								
Rodopis	No Seats								
Samou			0	1	0	1	0	1	
Serron	No Seats								
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon			0	1	1	1	3	5	
V Thessaloniki			1	1	0	1	2	7	
V Athinon		1	2	0	2	3	4	19	38
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis	No Seats								
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals		2	3	4	23	8	26	82	185
			67%		17%		31%		44%
Overall	May	95	235	June	95	235			
			40%			40%			

New Democracy	New Democracy							
	Sure Win Up/Down	Total	Marginal Win Up/Down	Total	Marginal Loss Up/Down	Total	Sure Loss Up/Down	Total
A Athinon	0	4	0	4	7	8	3	5
A Thessaloniki	0	2	0	4	0	6	0	8
Achaïas	0	1	0	1	0	2	6	8
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	7
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	0	3
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Artas			0	1	0	1	0	3
Attikis	0	2	0	2	0	4	1	7
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion	1	1	2	2	2	3		
Chiou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Dodekanisou	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	1
Dramas			0	1	0	1	0	3
Evrou	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Erytanias			0	1	0	1	0	1
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	0	1	0	2
Fokidas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Grevenon			0	1	0	1	0	1
Ileias	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	4
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Irakleïou	0	1	2	2	3	3	4	5
Kardistas	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Kastorias			0	1	0	1	0	2
Kavalas	0	1	0	2	0	3		
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	0	3
Kilkis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Korinthias	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	0	5
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	3	3
Lakonias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Larisas	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	7
Lasithiou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	0	3
Leykadas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Magnisias	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	5
Messinias	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Pellas	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2

Pierias			0	1	0	2	0	3
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	4	9
Prevezas			0	1	0	1	0	2
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	0	1	0	2	0	3	1	3
Thesprotas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Trikalon	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	2	7
V Athinon	0	7	0	7	0	14	0	18
Voiotias	0	1	0	2	0	3		
Xanthis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Zakynthou			0	1	0	1	0	1
Totals	1	33	5	70	14	104	29	183
		3%		7%		13%		16%

	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total
A Athinon	0	4	0	4	1	8	2	5
A Thessaloniki	0	2	0	4	0	6	2	8
Achaias	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	8
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	7
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	0	3
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Artas			0	1	0	1	1	3
Attikis	0	2	0	2	0	4	5	7
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion	0	1	0	2	1	3		
Chiou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Dodekanisou	0	1	0	2	1	3	1	1
Dramas			0	1	0	1	1	3
Evrou	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Erytanias			0	1	1	1	1	1
Evyoias	No Seats		0					
Florinas			0	1	0	1	0	2
Fokidas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Grevenon			0	1	0	1	0	1
Ileias	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	4
Imathias	No Seats							



Ioanninon	0	1	0	1	0	2	3	3
Irakleiou	0	1	0	2	0	3	1	5
Kardistas	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Kastorias			0	1	0	1	0	2
Kavalas	0	1	0	2	0	3		
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	0	3
Kilkis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Korinthias	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	0	5
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	0	3
Lakonias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Larisas	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	7
Lasithiou			0	1	0	1	1	2
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	1	3
Leykadas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Magnisias	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	5
Messinias	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	3
Pellas	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	2
Pierias			0	1	0	2	0	3
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	3	9
Prevezas			0	1	0	1	0	2
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis			0	1	1	1	0	3
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	0	1	0	2	0	3	1	3
Thesprotas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Trikalon	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	1	7
V Athinon	0	7	0	7	3	14	2	18
Voiotias	0	1	0	2	0	3		
Xanthis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Zakynthou			0	1	0	1	0	1
Totals	0	33	0	70	10	104	34	183
		3%		0%		10%		19%

May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon	2	4	0	4	3	8	5	5
A Thessaloniki	0	2	1	4	0	6	7	8
Achaias	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	8

Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	7
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	4	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	1	3
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Artas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Attikis	1	2	0	2	1	4	3	7
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Chanion	0	1	0	2	1	3		
Chiou			0	1	0	1	2	2
Dodekanisou	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	1
Dramas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Evrou	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	2
Erytanias			0	1	0	1	0	1
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Fokidas			1	1	0	1	0	1
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	2	5
Grevenon			0	1	0	1	1	1
Ileias	0	1	1	1	0	2	2	4
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	3
Irakleiou	0	1	0	2	0	3	3	5
Kardistas	0	1	1	1	0	2	1	3
Kastorias			1	1	0	1	0	2
Kavalas	0	1	0	2	2	3		
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	1	3
Kilkis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Korinthias	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	2
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	1	5
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	2	3
Lakonias			0	1	1	1	2	3
Larissas	0	1	0	1	1	2	4	7
Lasithiou			0	1	0	1	2	2
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	2	3
Leykadas			0	1	0	1	1	1
Magnisias	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	5
Messinias	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	3
Pellas	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	2
Pierias			0	1	0	2	2	3
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	4	9
Prevezas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	0	1	1	2	1	3	1	3
Thesprotas			0	1	1	1	0	1
Trikalon	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	3

V Thessaloniki			1	1	0	1	3	7
V Athinon	1	7	2	7	3	14	15	18
Voiotias	0	1	0	2	2	3		
Xanthis			0	1	1	1	0	3
Zakynthou			0	1	0	1	1	1
Totals	4	33	9	70	19	104	97	183
		12%		13%		18%		53%

June	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon	2	4	0	4	2	8	4	5
A Thessaloniki	0	2	1	4	0	6	7	8
Achaias	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	8
Aitoloakarnanias	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	7
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	4	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	1	3
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Artas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Attikis	1	2	0	2	0	4	5	7
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Chanion	0	1	0	2	1	3		
Chiou			0	1	0	1	2	2
Dodekanisou	0	1	0	2	0	3	1	1
Dramas			0	1	0	1	2	3
Evrou	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	2
Erytanas			0	1	0	1	0	1
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Fokidas			1	1	0	1	0	1
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	2	5
Grevenon			0	1	0	1	1	1
Ileias	0	1	1	1	0	2	2	4
Imathias	No Seats							
Ioanninon	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	3
Irakleiou	0	1	0	2	0	3	3	5
Kardistas	0	1	1	1	0	2	1	3
Kastorias			1	1	0	1	0	2
Kavalas	0	1	0	2	2	3		
Kefallinias	No Seats							
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	1	3
Kilkis			0	1	0	1	1	3

Korinthias	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	2
Kozanis			0	1	0	1	1	5
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	2	3
Lakonias			0	1	1	1	2	3
Larisas	0	1	0	1	1	2	4	7
Lasithiou			0	1	0	1	1	2
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	2	3
Leykadas			0	1	0	1	1	1
Magnisias	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	5
Messinias	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	3
Pellas	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	2
Pierias			0	1	0	2	2	3
V Peiraios			0	1	0	1	3	9
Prevezas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Rethymnis	No Seats							
Rodopis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	0	1	1	2	1	3	1	3
Thesprotas			0	1	1	1	0	1
Trikalon	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	3
V Thessaloniki			1	1	0	1	4	7
V Athinon	1	7	2	7	3	14	15	18
Voiotias	0	1	0	2	2	3		
Xanthis			0	1	1	1	0	3
Zakynthou			0	1	0	1	1	1
Totals	4	33	10	70	17	104	99	183
		12%		13%		16%		54%

Overall	May	June
	129	129
	390	390
	33%	33%

Pasok	Pasok							
	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total
A Athinon			0	1	0	1	3	19
A Thessaloniki	0	2	0	2	0	4	17	37
Achaias	No Seats							
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	0	9
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	13
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	2	9

Arkadias			0	1	0	1	3	10
Artas			0	1	0	1	0	3
Attikis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Dramas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Evrou			0	1	0	1	0	3
Erytanas			0	1	0	1	0	4
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	0	1	0	6
Fokidas			0	1	0	1	0	2
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon			0	1	0	1	0	5
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias			0	1	0	1	0	6
Ioanninon			0	1	0	1	0	4
Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	4	5
Kardistas	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	7
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	0	5
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larisas			0	1	0	1	1	3
Lasithiou			0	1	0	1	0	9
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias	No Seats							
Messinias	No Seats							
Pellas			0	1	0	1	3	5
Pierias			0	1	0	1	0	4
V Peiraios	No Seats							
Prevezas			0	1	0	1	0	2
Rethymnis			0	1	0	1	0	2
Rodopis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Samou	No Seats							
Serron			0	1	0	1	3	7
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon			0	1	0	1	9	18
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	6	7
V Athinon			0	1	0	1	3	5
Voiotias	No Seats							

Xanthis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Zakynthou	No Seats							
Totals		0	3	0	38	0	41	57
			0%		0%		0%	24%

Pasok	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total
A Athinon			0	1	0	1	1	19
A Thessaloniki	0	2	0	2	0	4	4	37
Achaïas	No Seats							
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	0	9
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	13
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	1	9
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	3	10
Artas			0	1	0	1	0	3
Attikis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Dramas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Evrou			0	1	0	1	0	3
Erytanias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	0	1	0	6
Fokidas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon			0	1	0	1	0	5
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias			0	1	0	1	0	6
Ioanninon			0	1	0	1	0	4
Irakleïou			0	1	0	1	1	5
Kardistas	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	7
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias			0	1	0	1	1	3
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	0	5

Lakonias	No Seats								
Larissas		0	1	0	1	1	3		
Lasithiou		0	1	0	1	0	9		
Lesvou		0	1	0	1	0	2		
Leykadas	No Seats								
Magnisias	No Seats								
Messinias	No Seats								
Pellas		0	1	0	1	1	5		
Pierias		0	1	0	1	0	4		
V Peiraios	No Seats								
Prevezas		0	1	0	1	0	2		
Rethymnis		0	1	0	1	0	2		
Rodopis		0	1	0	1	0	3		
Samou	No Seats								
Serron		0	1	0	1	1	7		
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon		0	1	0	1	1	18		
V Thessaloniki		0	1	0	1	1	7		
V Athinon		0	1	0	1	1	5		
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis		0	1	0	1	1	3		
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals		0	3	0	38	0	41	19	240
			0%		0%		0%		8%

Female Rep May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon			0	1	1	1	10	19
A Thessaloniki	0	2	0	2	1	4	20	37
Achais	No Seats							
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	3	9
A Peiraos			1	1	0	1	4	13
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	4	9
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	4	10
Artas			0	1	0	1	3	3
Attikis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion			0	1	0	1	1	3
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou			0	1	1	1	0	2

Dramas			0	1	0	1	2	5
Evrou			0	1	1	1	0	3
Erytania			0	1	1	1	1	4
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	1	1	1	6
Fokidas			0	1	1	1	1	2
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon			0	1	1	1	3	5
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias			0	1	0	1	3	6
Ioanninon			0	1	0	1	3	4
Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	2	5
Kardistas	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	7
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias			0	1	0	1	2	4
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias			0	1	0	1	1	3
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	2	5
Lakonias	No Seats							
Larissas			0	1	0	1	1	3
Lasithiou			0	1	0	1	4	9
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	0	2
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias	No Seats							
Messinias	No Seats							
Pellas			1	1	0	1	1	5
Pierias			1	1	1	1	0	4
V Peiraios	No Seats							
Prevezas			0	1	0	1	1	2
Rethymnis			0	1	0	1	0	2
Rodopis			0	1	0	1	2	3
Samou	No Seats							
Serron			0	1	0	1	3	7
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon			0	1	1	1	10	18
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	3	7
V Athinon			0	1	0	1	2	5
Voiotias	No Seats							
Xanthis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Zakynthou	No Seats							
Totals	0	3	3	38	10	41	103	240
		0%		8%		24%		43%



Female Rep June	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon			0	1	1	1	10	19
A Thessaloniki	0	2	0	2	1	4	20	37
Achaïas	No Seats							
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	3	9
A Peiraos			1	1	0	1	4	13
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	3	9
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	3	10
Artas			0	1	0	1	3	3
Attikis			0	1	0	1	1	3
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion			0	1	0	1	1	3
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou			0	1	1	1	0	2
Dramas			0	1	0	1	2	5
Evroú			0	1	1	1	0	3
Erytanias			0	1	1	1	1	4
Evyoias	No Seats							
Florinas			0	1	1	1	1	6
Fokidas			0	1	1	1	1	2
Fthiotidas	No Seats							
Grevenon			0	1	1	1	3	5
Ileias	No Seats							
Imathias			0	1	0	1	3	6
Ioanninon			0	1	0	1	3	4
Irakleïou			0	1	0	1	2	5
Kardistas		0 1	0	1	0	2	4	7
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias			0	1	0	1	2	4
Kerkyras	No Seats							
Kilkis	No Seats							
Korinthias			0	1	0	1	1	3

Kozanis	No Seats								
Kykladon		0	1	0	1	2	5		
Lakonias	No Seats								
Larissas		0	1	0	1	1	3		
Lasithiou		0	1	0	1	4	9		
Lesvou		0	1	0	1	0	2		
Leykadas	No Seats								
Magnisias	No Seats								
Messinias	No Seats								
Pellas		1	1	0	1	1	5		
Pierias		1	1	1	1	0	4		
V Peiraios	No Seats								
Prevezas		0	1	0	1	1	2		
Rethymnis		0	1	0	1	0	2		
Rodopis		0	1	0	1	2	3		
Samou	No Seats								
Serron		0	1	0	1	3	7		
Thesprotas	No Seats								
Trikalon		0	1	1	1	10	18		
V Thessaloniki		0	1	0	1	3	7		
V Athinon		0	1	0	1	1	5		
Voiotias	No Seats								
Xanthis		0	1	0	1	1	3		
Zakynthou	No Seats								
Totals		0	3	3	38	10	41	100	240
			0%		8%		24%		42%
	May	116	322	June	113	322			
			36%			35%			

Syriza                      Sure Win                      Syriza                      Marginal Win                      Marginal Loss                      Sure

							Loss	
	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total
A Athinon	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	15
A Thessaloniki	0	1	0	2	0	3	3	14
Achaïas	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	6
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	5	9
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	0	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	0	3
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Artas			0	1	0	1	0	3
Attikis	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	11
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion			0	1	0	1	0	4
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanias	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	0	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			0	1	0	1	0	6
Imathias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Ioanninon			0	1	0	1	0	5
Irakleïou			0	1	0	1	3	9
Kardistas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias			0	1	0	1	0	1
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	0	3
Kilkis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Korinthias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	0	3
Lakonias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Larisas			0	1	0	1	0	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	0	3
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias	No Seats							
Messinias			0	1	0	1	2	5
Pellas	No Seats							
Pierias	No Seats							
V Peiraïos	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	7
Prevezas	No Seats							

Rethymnis			0	1	0	1	0	2
Rodopis	No Seats							
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	No Seats							
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon	No Seats							
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	0	7
V Athinon	0	4	0	5	0	9	15	28
Voiotias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Xanthis			0	1	0	1	2	3
Zakynthou	No Seats							
Totals	0	9	0	40	0	49	30	202
		0%		0%		0%		15%

Syriza	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total
A Athinon	0	1	0	2	0	3	2	15
A Thessaloniki	0	1	0	2	0	3	3	14
Achaïas	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	6
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	0	1	1	9
A Peiraos			0	1	0	1	1	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	0	3
Arkadias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Artas			0	1	0	1	0	3
Attikis	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	11
Chalkidis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion			0	1	0	1	0	4
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	0	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			0	1	0	1	0	6
Imathias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Ioanninon			0	1	0	1	0	5
Irakleiou			0	1	0	1	1	9

Kardistas			0	1	0	1	0	5
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias			0	1	0	1	0	1
Kerkyras			0	1	0	1	0	3
Kilkis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Korinthias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	0	3
Lakonias			0	1	0	1	0	3
Larissas			0	1	0	1	0	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou			0	1	0	1	0	3
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias	No Seats							
Messinias			0	1	0	1	1	5
Pellas	No Seats							
Pierias	No Seats							
V Peiraios	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	7
Prevezas	No Seats							
Rethymnis			0	1	0	1	0	2
Rodopis	No Seats							
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	No Seats							
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon	No Seats							
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	0	7
V Athinon	0	4	0	5	0	9	4	28
Voiotias			0	1	0	1	0	4
Xanthis			0	1	0	1	0	3
Zakynthou	No Seats							
Totals	0	9	0	40	0	49	13	202
		0%		0%		0%		6%

Female Rep May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon	0	1	1	2	1	3	5	15
A Thessaloniki	0	1	1	2	3	3	3	14
Achaias	0	1	1	2	1	3	2	6
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	1	1	4	9
A Peiraos			0	1	1	1	3	6

Argolidos			0	1	0	1	1	3
Arkadias			0	1	1	1	0	3
Artas			1	1	0	1	1	3
Attikis	0	1	0	1	0	2	5	11
Chalkidis			1	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion			0	1	1	1	0	4
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytaniais	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	2	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	3	5
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			1	1	0	1	2	6
Imathias			0	1	1	1	0	4
Ioanninon			0	1	1	1	1	5
Irakleiou			0	1	1	1	2	9
Kardistas			0	1	0	1	1	5
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias			1	1	0	1	0	1
Kerkyras			0	1	1	1	1	3
Kilkis			1	1	0	1	0	3
Korinthias			1	1	0	1	1	4
Kozanis	No Seats							
Kykladon			0	1	0	1	1	3
Lakonias			0	1	1	1	1	3
Larisas			1	1	0	1	3	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou			0	1	1	1	0	3
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias	No Seats							
Messinias			0	1	1	1	1	5
Pellas	No Seats							
Pierias	No Seats							
V Peiraios	0	1	1	1	2	2	1	7
Prevezas	No Seats							
Rethymnis			0	1	0	1	2	2
Rodopis	No Seats							
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	No Seats							
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon	No Seats							
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	2	7
V Athinon	1	4	2	5	5	9	10	28

Voiotias			0	1	1	1	1	4
Xanthis			0	1	1	1	1	3
Zakynthou	No Seats							
Totals	1	9	13	40	25	49	60	202
		11%		33%		51%		30%

Female Rep June	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
A Athinon	0	1	1	2	1	3	5	15
A Thessaloniki	0	1	1	2	3	3	3	14
Achaias	0	1	1	2	1	3	2	6
Aitoloakarnanias			0	1	1	1	1	9
A Peiraos			0	1	1	1	3	6
Argolidos			0	1	0	1	1	3
Arkadias			0	1	1	1	0	3
Artas			1	1	0	1	1	3
Attikis	0	1	0	1	0	2	5	11
Chalkidis			1	1	0	1	0	3
Chanion			0	1	1	1	0	4
Chiou	No Seats							
Dodekanisou	No Seats							
Dramas	No Seats							
Evrou	No Seats							
Erytanas	No Seats							
Evyoias			0	1	0	1	2	6
Florinas	No Seats							
Fokidas	No Seats							
Fthiotidas			0	1	0	1	3	5
Grevenon	No Seats							
Ileias			1	1	0	1	3	6
Imathias			0	1	1	1	0	4
Ioanninon			0	1	1	1	1	5
Irakleiou			0	1	1	1	2	9
Kardistas			0	1	0	1	1	5
Kastorias	No Seats							
Kavalas	No Seats							
Kefallinias			1	1	0	1	0	1
Kerkyras			0	1	1	1	1	3
Kilkis			1	1	0	1	0	3
Korinthias			1	1	0	1	1	4
Kozanis	No Seats							

Kykladon			0	1	0	1	1	3
Lakonias			0	1	1	1	1	3
Larisas			1	1	0	1	3	9
Lasithiou	No Seats							
Lesvou			0	1	1	1	0	3
Leykadas	No Seats							
Magnisias	No Seats							
Messinias			0	1	1	1	1	5
Pellas	No Seats							
Pierias	No Seats							
V Peiraios	0	1	1	1	2	2	1	7
Prevezas	No Seats							
Rethymnis			0	1	0	1	2	2
Rodopis	No Seats							
Samou	No Seats							
Serron	No Seats							
Thesprotas	No Seats							
Trikalon	No Seats							
V Thessaloniki			0	1	0	1	2	7
V Athinon	1	4	2	5	5	9	10	28
Voiotias			0	1	1	1	1	4
Xanthis			0	1	1	1	1	3
Zakynthou	No Seats							
Totals	1	9	13	40	25	49	58	202
		11%		33%		51%		29%
	May		June					
	99	300	97	300				

## Appendix B

### National Dataset

Dist. Finals	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total	Up/Down	Total
Syriza	0	9 0%	0	40 0%	0	49 0%	30	202 15%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6	0	28	0	35	83	196



			0%		0%		0%	42%
KKE	0	3	3	23	8	26	64	185
		0%		13%		31%		35%
New Democracy	1	33	5	70	14	104	29	183
		3%		7%		13%		16%
Chrysi Aygi	0	3	0	18	0	21	15	78
		0%		0%		0%		19%
Pasok	0	3	0	38	0	41	57	240
		0%		0%		0%		24%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	0	17	0	19	57	175
		0%		0%		0%		33%
National Totals	1	59	6	234	22	295	335	1260
Totals:		2%		3%		7%		27%

		Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
		Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total	Add/Del	Total
Syriza		0	9	0	40	0	49	13	202
			0%		0%		0%		6%
Anexartitoi Ellines		0	6	0	28	4	35	27	196
			0%		0%		11%		14%
KKE		0	3	0	23	0	26	4	185
			0%		0%		0%		2%
New Democracy		0	33	0	70	10	104	34	183
			3%		0%		10%		19%
Chrysi Aygi		0	3	0	18	0	21	11	78
			0%		0%		0%		14%

Pasok	0	3 0%	0	38 0%	0	41 0%	19	240 8%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2 0%	0	17 0%	0	19 0%	17	175 10%
National Totals	0	59 0%	0	234 0%	14	295 5%	125	1260 10%
Totals:								
Winning Changes	7	292 2%						
Losing Changes	506	1558 32%						

May	Sure Win		Marginal Win		Marginal Loss		Sure Loss	
	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total
Syriza	1	9 11%	13	40 33%	25	49 51%	60	202 30%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6 0	8	28 29%	14	35 40%	74	196 38%
KKE	2	3 67%	5	23 22%	8	26 31%	81	185 44%
New Democracy	4	33 12%	9	70 13%	19	104 18%	97	183 53%
Chrysi Aygi	1	3 33%	0	18 0%	8	21 38%	32	78 41%

Pasok	0	3 0%	3	38 8%	10	41 24%	103	240 43%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2 0%	6	17 35%	8	19 42%	60	175 34%
National Totals	8	59 14%	44	234 18%	92	295 31%	507	1260 40%
Total Female Candidates	645	1856 35%						

June	Sure Win Female	Total	Marginal Win Female	Total	Marginal Loss Female	Total	Sure Loss Female	Total
Syriza	1	9 11%	13	40 33%	25	49 51%	57	202 30%
Anexartitoi Ellines	0	6 0%	8	28 29%	14	35 40%	75	196 38%
KKE	2	3 67%	4	23 17%	8	26 31%	82	185 44%
New Democracy	4	33 12%	10	70 13%	17	104 16%	99	183 54%
Chrysi Aygi	1	3 33%	0	18 0%	7	21 33%	34	78 44%
Pasok	0	3 0%	3	38 8%	10	41 24%	99	240 41%
Dimokratiki Aristera	0	2	6	17	8	19	65	175

			0%		35%		42%		37%
National Totals	8	59	44	234	89	295	511	1260	
		14%		18%		30%		41%	
Total Female Candidates	654	1856		35%					

## Appendix C

### District Female Participation

	% Women Running in May			% Women Running in June		
	Women	Total Candidates		n	Total Candidates	
A Athinon	61	141	43%	60	141	43%
V Athinon	139	342	40%	144	342	42%
A Peiraios	24	61	39%	24	61	39%
V Peiraios	29	82	35%	28	82	34%
Attikis	36	114	32%	38	114	33%
Aitoloakarnanias	28	83	34%	28	80	35%
Archaia	29	91	32%	29	91	32%
Argolidos	13	38	34%	13	38	34%
Arkadias	8	38	21%	7	38	18%
Artas	8	38	21%	8	38	21%
Chalkidis	12	38	32%	12	39	31%
Chanion	14	46	30%	11	43	26%
Chiou	11	30	37%	11	30	37%
Dodekanisou	14	54	26%	17	54	31%
Dramas	13	38	34%	13	39	33%
Evrou	19	45	42%	20	46	43%
Erytania	5	22	23%	5	21	24%
Evyoias	19	62	31%	19	62	31%
Florinas	17	30	57%	11	29	38%
Fokidas	8	21	38%	11	21	52%
Fthiotidas	21	54	39%	21	54	39%
Grevenon	7	21	33%	7	22	32%

Ileas	20	60	33%	21	60	35%
Imathias	15	46	33%	22	46	48%
Ioanninon	17	54	31%	16	54	30%
Irakleiou	28	80	35%	26	79	33%
Karditsas	16	53	30%	17	52	33%
Kastorias	11	30	37%	11	30	37%
Kavalas	17	46	37%	15	45	33%
Kefallinias	9	22	41%	10	24	42%
Kerkyras	13	38	34%	13	38	34%
Kilkis	13	38	34%	13	39	33%
Korinthias	15	46	33%	16	46	35%
Kozanis	18	54	33%	17	53	32%
Kykladon	12	38	32%	13	39	33%
Lakonias	12	38	32%	13	39	33%
Larisas	30	81	37%	30	81	37%
Lasithiou	9	30	30%	9	29	31%
Lesvou	13	38	34%	15	38	39%
Leykadas	8	22	36%	9	21	43%
Magnisias	19	54	35%	20	54	37%
Messinias	12	56	21%	13	55	24%
Pellas	12	46	26%	12	46	26%
Pierias	15	46	33%	16	47	34%
Prevezas	9	30	30%	9	30	30%
Rethymnis	9	30	30%	9	30	30%
Rodopis	11	37	30%	9	36	25%
Samou	5	21	24%	5	25	20%
Serron	22	67	33%	22	67	33%
Thesprotas	4	22	18%	6	22	27%
A Thessaloniki	60	149	40%	59	150	39%
V Thessaloniki	20	68	29%	21	69	30%
Trikalon	20	52	38%	18	53	34%
Voitias	15	46	33%	14	46	30%
Xanthis	11	38	29%	11	38	29%
Zakynthou	6	22	27%	5	22	23%

Totals

308  
1061 7

1072

3088

Totals

In May 34% of candidates  
were femaleIn June 35% of candidates were  
female

Male candidates in May

Male candidates in June

Totals

2026 3087

2016 3088

In May, 66% of candidates

In June, 65% of candidates were

were male

male

Winners  
In May, Parliament was  
17% female

Winners  
In June, Parliament was 19%  
female

In May, Parliament was  
83% male

In June, Parliament was 81% male