

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA – SAN DIEGO

# An Examination of the Effect of Permanent Absentee Voting on Voter Mobilization and Retention

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Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the Department of  
Political Science at the University of California San Diego

**Thomas Morales**

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# Chapter One

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## Summary

Convenience voting has been a staple of political science research since states and counties first began easing administrative rules which, in effect, allowed voters to cast their ballot before Election Day and at locations other than the traditional polling place. And as research abounds, it is not surprising that academics have continued to focus their attention on this particular aspect of electoral behavior. The theoretical mechanism motivating the steady trend towards voting reforms centers around the foundational rational-choice models first theorized over sixty years ago (Downs 1957, Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). Because these reforms are aimed at easing the systematic costs of registration and voting on the electorate, rational-choice theory would suggest, quite logically, that voter turnout will increase. However, as will become clear in further sections, the results of over twenty years' research into effect of convenience reforms have been mixed.

Convenience reforms have almost all revolved around some aspect of mail voting, which is known by many names, permanent absentee voting, vote-by-mail, at-will absentee voting, etc., all of which are designed to make voting easier and, in turn, increase voter turnout. Until recently, studies of the effects of permanent absentee voting have been subject to the confounding effect of voters 'self-selecting' into treatment groups. These voters, who choose to permanently vote by mail, have consistently been shown to be high-propensity voters. Specifically, these voters are shown to be more politically engaged and more educated than the traditional polling place or non-convenience voter (Alvarez et al. 2012, Berinsky 2005, and Sled 2008). Therefore, early research may give too much credit to voting reforms' contribution to

voter turnout. By studying these self-selected individuals, those who had taken it upon themselves to re-register as a permanent absentee voter, researchers were measuring the electoral turnout of a group who has already proven themselves as a more motivated voter.

Recent manifestations of these voting reforms have provided researchers with a way around these selection issues, including the institutional adoption of mail voting in Washington, Oregon (Gerber 2012 and Southwell 2004) and most recently Colorado, although the latter was only put into practice months before this study began. Additionally, researchers have been able to find natural experiments within the county determined exclusively mail voting districts of California (Arceneaux et al. 2012 and Kousser et al. 2007). And while this research has begun to find a firm theoretical footing in their results, there is still more to be examined, especially with regard to states and counties which have not fully institutionalized all-mail voting.

I will examine the effects of this optional mail voting registration within San Diego County. In an effort to avoid the previously mentioned selection effects, the study will focus on newly registered voters who are registering to vote for the first time or have just moved to the county. Upon registration, these voters are given the option to register to vote by mail in all future elections. Whether they are registering online or with a pen at the DMV or library, each one of these new voters is presented with a single checkbox which will place them into one of two groups in this study: newly registered permanent absentee voter (PAV) or newly registered polling place voter. While the voter is, of course, self-assigning themselves into a group within this study, this comes at little expense to the integrity of the primary measurement. In the familiar language of the rational choice theory, the ‘cost’ to the voter is effectively the same in either scenario. These two groups of voters will then be tracked over each subsequent election,

up to eight years' worth for the first groups, to measure the two dynamic aspects of voter behavior: mobilization and retention (Berinsky 2001).

This study will aim to track the mobilization effects of permanent absentee voting as compared to the traditional polling place voters in a non-institutionalized setting, that is, where they are free to choose their preferred method of voting. Examining eight years of data on an election by election basis, I will compare the electoral behavior of the two new voter groups to measure the mobilization effects of permanent absentee voting. I believe this study will show that permanent absentee voting will have negative impact on mobilization as compared to traditional polling place voting. As an auxiliary examination, this study will track these two groups through each subsequent election and continue to measure their turnout to measure the effect permanent absentee voting has on active voter retention. I believe the data will also show that permanent absentee status results negative impact on retention over time.

As states continue to adopt these measures, it is clear that the nature of elections is changing. But public opinion on these reforms is tied to the logical assumption that making voting easier will result in increased electoral participation. As will become clear in later sections, research has shown that this assumption cannot be made as broadly as has been in the past. If this research shows that California's optional permanent absentee status is, in fact, detrimental to voter turnout, legislators and electoral reformers would do well to consider an all-mail election system, like Washington, Oregon and Colorado.

# Literature Review

## A Explanation of Convenience Reforms

Since the earliest enfranchisement movement there has been an impetus toward making voting more accessible in the United States. Convenience reforms, or early voting reforms, are concisely described as administrative changes to a state or county's electoral law which are aimed at permitting voters to cast their ballots, without excuse, at a time before Election Day and a place other than a traditional polling place (Burden et al. 2014). The foundation of these reforms is based on the absentee ballot or mail ballot, which was first provided to servicemen and women overseas and to the elderly who could not easily get to their local polling place (Karp and Banducci 2001). The first extension of mail balloting to the general electorate was in 1977 in California's Monterrey County (Sled 2008) but since then has steadily been adopted by states and counties in one form or another. Today six states and the District of Columbia allow voters to register permanently as a mail ballot voter and three states have switched exclusively to mail voting for every member of the electorate.

With each state adopting its own rules, there are many different manifestations of these reforms, each differing with regard to registration dates, mail ballot due date, excuse for requesting a mail ballot, and early in-person voting regulations. For the scope of this research I will study San Diego County, where mail ballots are distributed one to three weeks before an election, and those ballots may be submitted by mail or dropped off at a polling location until 8 p.m. on Election Day (National Conference of State Legislatures 2014). As will become evident later in this literature review, the administrative construct of a state's election reforms have

shown to have a significant effect on those reforms effectiveness in boosting turnout (Burden 2014, Gerber et al. 2013, Southwell 2000).

## The Logic Motivating Convenience Reforms

The motivating force behind these reforms is the logic that administrative changes to electoral rules make voting easier and, as a result, more people will be inclined to participate in the electoral process. The theory of rational choice (Downs 1957) and the calculus of voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968), foundational works of political science, confirm this thinking. Generally, the theories suggest that voters are rational individuals and the decision to vote is based on a rational choice, one which weighs the costs of a decision against the benefits that will potentially stem from that choice.

For modern voters the incremental costs can add up quickly. Taking time to familiarize one's self with the ballot, paying attention to the dizzying campaign ads and news coverage leading up to an election, taking time off of work or school to get to the polling place, waiting in line to vote, the list of potential costs is vast. Paradoxically, Riker's model describes a voter's total benefit as the product of benefit a voter would receive if her desired candidate wins and the probability that her vote would bring about that result. If this were the actual scenario voter turnout would be effectively nil but political scientists have explained this seemingly contradictory phenomenon with the experiential gains a voter receives with the social act of voting (Funk 2008, Gerber 2008). These social gains include wearing the "I Voted" sticker to work or the grocery store, showing the community that you've fulfilled your civic duty, seeing your neighbor at the polling place down the road, or even talking (or arguing) about election results Wednesday morning with friends and coworkers. The net reward, ultimately the deciding



factor for the rational voter's decision, is the difference between the potential benefit and the cost of voting.

Kousser and Mullin (2007) examine these mechanisms within the context of convenience reforms. They note that convenience reforms, including voting by mail, are aimed at reducing the cost of voting for the electorate, which follows the popular assumption. However, they stress that these reforms may inadvertently reduce social voting's experiential gains. By taking the community aspect out of voting, eliminating the need for polling place, both the cost and the reward is reduced.

The competing theoretical results of convenience reforms along with the vast landscape of varying degrees of reforms have enticed many researchers to explore the real world results of these changes. As will become clear in the following sections, the state of the research has shown varying results when studying the impact on turnout. But while academically the debate over the effectiveness of these changes continues, in the public realm "the continued expansion of these convenience reforms suggests a perception that they are successful" (Gerber, Huber, and Hill 2013) and subsequently policymakers and voters continue to implement these reforms.

## The State of Research

Some of the earliest research into the effects of convenience voting had found only limited increases in turnout. With nearly all of those noting that the individuals taking advantage of the convenience reforms were not the low propensity voters many reformers had intended to bring into the electorate. Examining survey data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Election Studies (NES), Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci (2001) found that voters who would opt vote by mail tended to be higher educated and more active in politics. Additional

research would show that mail voters in Oregon were older, more urban, and less partisan than their poll voting counterparts (Southwell and Burchett 2000). Notably, that same Oregon study concluded that mail voters were equally as informed, educated, and politically involved as traditional voters. Berinsky, Burns and Traugott (2001) also conducted a telephone survey of Oregon voters and found a modest increase in aggregate turnout but warned that mail voting had tipped the scales in favor of the “resource-rich” through selective retention and did little to motivate the resource poor to the polls. This early research would set the dialog for many of the studies which would follow over the next fifteen years. While their conclusions varied, they framed the debate over the effectiveness of convenience voting asking: ‘are these reforms effective?’ and ‘if so, for whom?’

In the years following these initial survey based examinations, studies have utilized the burgeoning electoral data from select districts which have implemented some form of mail balloting while not fully implementing all-mail voting for each member of their electorate. In the absence of an ideal natural experiment in which researchers can randomly assign individuals to vote by mail, researchers have utilized a method of precinct matching to create a natural experiment. First implemented by Kousser and Mullin (2007), this model matches California’s administratively determined mail ballot precincts with similar electorally significant attributes. Their results showed that voting by mail can, in fact, decrease voter turnout in some elections. Finding a -2.7% turnout in general elections, yet a +7.6% turnout in special elections, introduced a surprising relationship into the academic narrative. Specifically, Kousser and Mullin’s research would show an inverse relationship between an election’s salience and the turnout effects of mail balloting.

This experimental model was later adopted by Sled (2008) when she matched mail voting districts to traditional voting districts for over 3000 elections in 7 states. Contrary to the previous matching experiment in California, Sled would find that voting by mail resulted in an overall increase in turnout of ten percentage points across all elections. Although, her results did confirm Kousser and Mullin's finding that the magnitude of the turnout effects of mail voting was higher in low salience elections, +15%, than in high salience elections +3.4%. While these matching studies, like the early survey based predecessors, don't seem to find common ground, it is worth noting that the Sled study's wide-net aggregate over seven states may have resulted in some of the adversely affected states being overlooked. As we will see, much of the research into convenience voting has been centered on Washington and Oregon, two states which have switched to all-mail elections. Like Sled, researchers who have studied these two states researchers have found the most positive effect in the institutionalized mail balloting systems (Gerber et al. 2013, Gronke et al. 2007, Sled 2008, Southwell 2004). In effect, by aggregating data from Washington and Oregon along with other states, like California, which have not fully adopted a vote by mail system, Sled's report may have missed adverse effects for some voters.

## Oregon, Washington, and the Results of All-Mail Voting

The most promising evidence for proponents of convenience reforms has come from the Pacific Northwest. Two states, Washington and Oregon, have been leading the national push toward all-mail elections. Not surprisingly, researchers have focused their efforts on these two states to examine the effects of these reforms.

In an extensive survey of election data spanning 24 years, from 1980 through 2004, Gronke, Rosenbaum, and Miller (2007) found mixed results while exploring the turnout effects

of mail voting. Their study compiled survey results and election returns from every state and found that only Oregon, which had fully implemented an all vote by mail system in 1998, showed a significant increase in turnout. Gronke and his colleagues would find that the magnitude of the turnout effect was greater in high-salience elections, contrary to other research (Kousser 2007, Sled 2008). While Gronke, Rosenbaum, and Miller note the “modest” increase in turnout from convenience reforms nationwide, the larger turnout seen in Oregon is likely due, in part, to the institutional implementation of all-mail voting, and the informational campaigns associated with a state-wide change in electoral rules.

The confounding effect of a state’s process of implementation—how and when the convenience reforms are introduced to the electorate—are affirmed by Gerber, Gregory, and Hill (2013). Their study, which explored county-level election data in Washington State, showed an overall increase in electoral participation of 2-4% from 2004 to 2008, the first year the state had implemented an all-mail presidential election. The study also shows promising evidence for proponents of convenience reforms with regard to low propensity voter turnout, finding that the increase in turnout was more pronounced among “non-habitual” and younger voters.

If the goal of mail voting is to motivate an increase in electoral participation among the traditionally moderate to low-propensity voters, the evidence from Oregon and Washington is promising. Nationwide, studies have shown varying effects on turnout as a result of mail voting but notably positive impact in the two states which have fully implemented imply that an institutional change in electoral rules are a prominent factor in a reform’s effectiveness. With the recent institutional implementation of all-mail voting in Colorado, researchers have another laboratory to explore these effects.


# Statement of Research

## Overcoming Selection Issues

This study will continue the previous research into the electoral effects of permanent absentee voting on electoral turnout, specifically with regard to voter mobilization and retention of individuals who have the option to either vote by mail exclusively or vote traditionally at a precinct polling place. I will examine these effects in California's San Diego County by utilizing voter history provided by the San Diego County Registrar of Voters. There have been many efforts to explore the effects of convenience voting on electoral turnout over the past twenty years, many of which have differed in their results. To the best of my knowledge, researchers have yet to examine the individual level, longitudinal effects of this mail voting option on newly registered voters. By choosing to study these 'new voters,' whom I will define as voters who are registering to vote for the first time, or voters who have just moved to, and re-registered within, the county, I aim to avoid the selection issues that have plagued early research into convenience reforms.

The individuals examined in this study have already committed the effort to register to vote, online or by hard copy form, and it is only after this decision that they come across the option to register as a permanent absentee voter or a traditional voter. Neither decision poses any additional cost. With regard to the online application specifically, we see that this question is mandatory and the registrants are forced to make decision before proceeding. The paper application does not offer such a case and, according to the office of the California Secretary of State, if an applicant does not choose yes or no to this question they will be registered as a polling place voter. This may, of course, slightly skew the study's pool of new voters but I believe the effect on results will be effectively nil.

**Figure 1** California State Voter Registration Application



## Measuring Mobilization

I will measure the two dynamic aspects of voter turnout Berinsky (2001) describes, mobilization and retention, by tracking the behavior of these new voters over several elections. The voter history will allow me to study the individual level turnout of each voter in San Diego County from the presidential general election of 2008 through the most recent election available: the gubernatorial general election of 2014.

I will pool each individual who has registered leading up to an election together into a ‘class’ identified by their first eligible election and within these classes will be two groups, those who have registered to vote by mail and those who have not. For example, the first class of new voters will be labeled: “Class 1: Presidential General 2008” and within the class two groups will be assembled for traditional voters and mail voters. The comparison of each class' turnout in the election immediately following their registration will allow me to measure the effects of this optional permanent absentee voting on mobilization. By measuring this mobilization effect over several elections, each with a new class of voters, I will be able to hold constant several

variables, including overall salience of election, age, gender, and party affiliation. I expect to see a statistically significant depression of voter mobilization by 3 to 4 percentage points for new registrants who have opted to vote by mail. There are several factors I believe will contribute to this depressive effect, including the loss of the motivating experiential gains of voting as a social behavior (Arceneaux et al. 2012, Funk 2005, Gerber et al. 2013), the fact that a mail ballot can get lost in a junk drawer or the backseat of a messy car (Kousser et al. 2007), or the seemingly common case of a voter who puts off buying a stamp until it's too late to mail the ballot.

This aspect of voting behavior and electoral turnout has, to the best of my knowledge, remained untested with regard to new voters with this mail voting option. These new voters will undoubtedly be more motivated than those who have already been registered, the 'voting veterans' of San Diego, but this effect will be the same across each group and should not hinder the measurement of mobilization for my purposes.

## Measuring Retention

To measure retention, the second dynamic aspect of voter behavior, I will utilize the years' worth of electoral data the San Diego voter file holds. Retention, the phenomenon of inactive voters remaining registered in the electorate (Berinsky et al. 2001), will give valuable insight into the lasting effects of this mail voting option on the electorate. The individual level scale and eight year span will allow me to measure this retention behavior of each 'graduating class' of voters. Specifically, after each new voter class has passed their first election, they will fall into the retention phase of measurement. I will offer several measurements to show different aspects of this behavior, first by comparing the summed figure of each group's turnout for each

election after their first. Secondly, I will compare each group's turnout for different types of elections, each with varying degrees of salience.

I expect the effects of mail voting on active voter retention be even more depressive than mobilization, with an overall retention rate (aggregate total votes cast/registered voters) which is 5 to 6 percentage points lower than the polling place voting groups. The depressive effects mentioned in the mobilization section will be compounded by the fact that, as these mail voters move, they may not re-register with their new address. While these voters can, of course, visit their nearest polling place on Election Day and fill out a provisional ballot, I believe some will not understand this technicality of California elections. For others, who rely on their ballot as an indicator of an upcoming election, they may miss the election altogether.

The measurement of retention itself will be a valuable indicator of the effects of permanent absentee voting on the San Diego electorate. It can be assumed that the key motivation behind these voting reforms is to build a more participatory electorate, one that continues to turnout election after election. The electoral behavior measured in this study may serve as a guideline for future convenience reforms and may, with the help of previous research, help these reforms meet their admirable goal.

## Why San Diego?

California, home to the first county in the nation to experiment with mail voting (Sled 2008) has yet to fully institutionalize mail balloting. While the voters of Washington, Oregon, and now Colorado are automatically mailed their ballot before each election and benefit from widespread informational campaigns, Californians remain in this 'test phase,' an electoral grey



area. As research has shown, states who have fully committed to all-mail elections have seen more positive effects than in California (Gerber 2012, Southwell 2004). It follows that this mail ballot option, while convenient to high propensity voters (Alvarez et al. 2012, Berinsky et al. 2001, Sled 2008, Monroe et al. 2011) and may lead to confusion medium propensity voters (Arceneaux et al. 2012). Studying the effects of this mail voting option on the California electorate will provide valuable insight for future electoral administrators as they determine how to implement convenience reforms.

San Diego County can serve as an electoral testing ground for California politics. According to US Census Bureau, the county closely matches the California population in several demographic categories including gender, age, race, home ownership rates, median household income, and education (Table 1). These factors, many of which contribute to voter behavior, are close enough that researchers may find it worthwhile to project these findings beyond the counties borders, to the state as whole. With regard to party affiliation, San Diego is slightly less Democratic than California and more independent. However, it is worth noting that the near even distribution of the two major parties and those who show no party preference make San Diego an ideal laboratory of measuring electoral effects (Table 2).

**Table 1** San Diego County Voter Registration Statistics

	<i>Eligible</i>	<i>Registered</i>	<i>Democratic</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>No Party Preference</i>
San Diego	2,077,257	1,457,399	516,535	512,537	357,138
Percent		70.16%	35.44%	35.17%	24.51%
California	23,645,811	17,028,290	7,429,684	5,170,592	3,617,466
Percent		72.01%	43.63%	30.36%	21.24%

**Table 2** San Diego County Census Data

	<i>San Diego</i>	<i>California</i>
Persons under 18 years	22.60%	23.90%
Persons 65 years and over	12.30%	12.50%
Female Persons	49.70%	50.30%
White alone	76.60%	73.50%
Black or African American alone	5.60%	6.60%
American Indian and Alaska native alone	1.30%	1.70%
Asian alone	11.70%	14.10%
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone	0.60%	0.50%
Two or More Races	4.20%	3.70%
Hispanic or Latino	32.90%	38.40%
White alone, not Hispanic or Latino	47.20%	39.00%
High school graduate or higher, person age 25+	85.40%	81.00%
Bachelor's degree or higher, persons age 25+	34.40%	30.50%
Homeownership rate	54.50%	56.00%
Median household income	\$63,373.00	\$61,400.00

# Chapter Two

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## Data Collection and Modeling

### Initial Comparisons of Voter Data

This dataset, consisting of the entire voting history of all registered residents of San Diego over the last twenty elections consisted of 1,562,011 cases. The initial truncation of the cases limited the dataset to those individuals who had registered no later than one year before the first election in the study, the presidential primary of June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2008. While the full voter file included twenty elections over a nearly a decade, I have chosen to evaluate only general and primary elections. On the next page is an excerpt from the initial dataset, provided by the San Diego Registrar of Voters, with the aforementioned truncations:

**Table 3** County of San Diego Registrar of Voters Voter File Sample (Raw Data)

<i>Last Name</i>	<i>Zip Code</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Precinct</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Birthdate</i>	<i>PAV</i>	<i>Latest Registration Date</i>	<i>Original Registration Date</i>	<i>Gubernatorial General 2014</i>	<i>Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Presidential Primary 2008</i>
THOMAS	91934	JACUMBA	576070	NPP	F	10/3/1949	Y	10/18/2010	10/18/2010	N	N	A	A	A	A	A	N
WHITE	91934	JACUMBA	576070	DEM	F	4/6/1950	Y	9/25/2007	8/5/1996	A	N	A	A	A	A	A	N
HOY	91934	JACUMBA	576070	DEM	M	6/3/1950	Y	10/2/2014	10/2/2014	A	A						
BARNETT	91934	JACUMBA	576070	REP	F	8/11/1952	Y	9/5/2012	9/5/2012	A	A	A	A				
HIGGINS	91934	JACUMBA	576070	DEM	F	10/25/1952	Y	10/15/2014	7/14/2004	N	N	N	N	N	N	V	N

N = No Vote, A = Absentee Vote, \_ = Ineligible

I then grouped the cases into the registration class. Each class was defined by the date range beginning on the first day after registration closes for the previous class' election and ending on the last day of registration available for the current class' first election. For example, registration class five begins on October 19<sup>th</sup>, 2010 which immediately follows the last day of election for the California Gubernatorial General Election of 2010. The last registration date grouped into registration class five is the last date to register to vote in the Presidential Primary of 2012. Therefore, registration class five will be grouped together for the entirety of this study and their first eligible election is the Presidential Primary held on June 5<sup>th</sup>, 2012.

**Table 4** Registration Class Assignments

<i>Registration Class</i>	<i>Begin</i>	<i>End</i>	<i>First Eligible Election</i>	<i>First Election Date</i>
1	6/3/2007	5/19/2008	Presidential Primary 2008	6/3/2008
2	5/20/2008	10/20/2008	Presidential General 2008	11/4/2008
3	10/21/2008	5/22/2010	Gubernatorial Primary 2010	6/6/2010
4	5/23/2010	10/18/2010	Gubernatorial General 2010	11/2/2010
5	10/19/2010	5/21/2012	Presidential Primary 2012	6/5/2012
6	5/22/2012	10/22/2012	Presidential General 2012	11/6/2012
7	10/23/2012	5/19/2014	Gubernatorial Primary 2014	6/3/2014
8	5/20/2014	10/20/2014	Gubernatorial General 2014	11/4/2014


My first model for this study aimed to measure the percentage turnout for each class by permanent absentee and traditional polling place voter, comparing their first eligible election to measure mobilization and each subsequent election to measure retention. However, the initial interpretations of the San Diego Registrar of Voters Voter File Dataset indicated that the study's two groups "VBM voter" and "traditional voter" were not as identical as I had hoped. As seen below, the raw comparison of the two voting classes shows enough of dissimilarity to suggest a simple one to one comparison of aggregate turnout would be subject to systematic error.

Specifically, the VBM group of voters proved to be noticeably older, more female, and more conservative than their traditional voting counterparts, suggesting that a multivariate regression model would be more statistically valuable than comparing aggregate turnout.


**Table 5** Age Distribution of Newly Registered Voters

	<i>Median</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>N</i>
Polling Place Voter	43.00	44.40	16.43	409812
VBM Voter	52.00	51.18	18.93	493963
Total	48.00	48.11	18.15	903775

**Figure 2** Gender Distribution of Newly Registered Voters




**Figure 3** Party Affiliation of Newly Registered Voters




Additional comparisons across the newly grouped registration classes also confirmed the necessity for additional analytical controls. While gender distribution remains relatively steady over the eight registration classes, party distribution of each subsequent class has become increasingly independent (NPP). Additionally, the proportion of VBM voter in each registration class has increased over time indicating the increasing popularity of permanent absentee voting in San Diego County.

**Figure 4** Gender Distribution by Registration Class




**Figure 5** Party Distribution by Registration Class





**Figure 6** Registration Status by Registration Class



In summary, the preliminary method proposed, comparing aggregate turnout in both mobilization and retention, would need to be adapted to control for the variability between the two classes of voter. In turn the statistical method utilized for this study, binary logistic regression, would require additional manipulation of the raw dataset. The sample voter file data first introduced in table three is shown below after the recoding for the binary regression.

**Table 6** Binary Voter File Data

Last Name	Zip Code	City	Precinct	Party	Binary Republican	Binary NPP	Binary Other	Binary Active Military	Binary Age	Binary 26-35	Binary 36-45	Binary 45-55	Binary 56-65	Binary 66+	Binary PAV	Registration Class	Binary Gubernatorial General 2014	Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014	Binary Presidential General 2012	Binary Presidential Primary 2012	Binary Gubernatorial General 2010	Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010	Binary Presidential General 2008	Binary Presidential Primary 2008	
THOMAS	91934	JACUMBA	576070	NPP	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
WHITE	91934	JACUMBA	576070	DEM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
HOY	91934	JACUMBA	576070	DEM	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
BARNETT	91934	JACUMBA	576070	REP	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	6	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
HIGGINS	91934	JACUMBA	576070	DEM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

1 = yes or voted

# Results

## Discussion

This study set out to measure the effect of permanent absentee registration status on voter turnout, specifically with regard to voter mobilization and retention. My preliminary examination of past studies and experiments, which aimed to evaluate the effects of convenience reforms on voter turnout, indicated that a prevailing issue with studying convenience voters lie in their inherent tendency to vote more often than those voters who chose not to participate in convenience voting. To alleviate the confounding selection effects posed by studying the turnout of voters who, by definition, are more electorally motivated than their non-convenience voting counterparts, I designed this study to evaluate the turnout of newly registered voters. These newly registered voters were all given the option to vote traditionally at a polling place, or by mail. This option was available on both the online and paper form and required no additional time, effort, or motivation and thus created a pool of registrants who were, arguably, equally motivated in their electoral tendencies.

Using the voter data from San Diego County I was able to measure voter mobilization and active voter retention. The dataset allowed me to control for common electoral predictors including party affiliation, age, gender, and military status to measure the direct effect of permanent absentee status holding all else constant. In Chapter One, I estimated that this study would show permanent absentee status would depress voter mobilization and retention of newly registered voters because of the increased likelihood of a ballot being lost, never sent, and the loss of the experiential gains of traditional voting. However, I have found the opposite to be true. Permanent absentee status has shown an increase in mobilization and active voter retention, with the magnitudes of both effects showing an inverse relationship to election salience.

## The Effect of Permanent Absentee Voting on Voter Mobilization

In this section, I present the findings on the effect of permanent absentee status on mobilization which, for the scope of this study, has been defined as the turnout in a voter's first eligible election after registering to vote. Table 7 summarizes these mobilization effects, with the eight registration classes included in the study listed included in each row and each of the eight elections measured included in each column. Originally measured as binary logistic regression coefficients, all of which can be found in the appendix (Tables 11-18), the effect of permanent absentee status on each registration class' turnout was then run through CLARIFY Statistical Software (King, Tomz, Wittenburg) which ultimately provides a simple result, the percent increase in turnout as a direct result of a voter's permanent absentee status.

Each cell of Table 7 lists the percent increase in voter turnout as a direct effect of permanent absentee status for each election eligible to the eight registration classes. The bottom row, labeled mobilization, lists the mobilization effect measured for each election measured in this study, which is simply the percent increase in turnout of that election's newly eligible registration class. For example, for the Gubernatorial Election of 2010, whose newly eligible class of voters is registration class four, I measured an increase of 6.7 percent in turnout for mail voters over their traditional voting counterparts. Holding all else constant, I found this increase in mobilization across all registration classes and all elections throughout the study.

**Table 7** Mobilization and Retention Effect of PAV Status

<i>Registration Class</i>	<i>Presidential Primary 2008</i>	<i>Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Gubernatorial General 2014</i>	<i>Retention</i>
One	20.0%	17.9%	25.4%	27.0%	24.3%	29.3%	19.3%	25.8%	5.8%
Two		3.2%	16.6%	20.5%	17.9%	23.1%	13.9%	20.1%	16.9%
Three			19.1%	20.5%	18.4%	25.1%	15.1%	20.2%	1.1%
Four				6.7%	13.2%	15.7%	12.7%	14.8%	8.1%
Five					22.8%	22.3%	19.5%	25.0%	2.2%
Six						2.4%	10.3%	10.9%	8.5%
Seven							13.2%	13.9%	0.7%
Eight								15.1%	-
Mean	20.0%	10.6%	20.4%	18.7%	19.3%	19.7%	14.9%	18.2%	6.2%
Mobilization	20.0%	3.2%	19.1%	6.7%	22.8%	2.4%	13.2%	15.1%	12.8%

**Table 8** Aggregate Mobilization Effect of PAV Status


<i>Election</i>	<i>Mobilization Effect (2008-2014)</i>	<i>Mobilization Effect (2008-2012)</i>
Primary	18.8%	20.6%
General	6.9%	4.1%
All	12.8%	12.4%

Overall, I found that in their first election, each registration class showed a statistically significant increase in turnout, with a mean increase of 12.8 percent over all eight elections studied. The magnitude of this effect was found to be more prevalent in primary elections, which showed mean increase of 18.8 percent in turnout compared to general elections with only 6.9 percent as shown in Table 8. For 2008, 2010, and 2012, Table 7 shows a distinct decrease in mobilization effect from a primary to the following general election, with a net change in mobilization effect of -16.8, -12.4, and -20.4, respectively. This is consistent with the past

research cited earlier in this study (Kousser and Mullin, Sled) which noted the inverse relationship between magnitude of the turnout effect and election salience.

However one noticeable outlier, the 2014 election cycle, runs contrary to these previous observations, showing a net *increase* in mobilization effect from primary to general. Figure 7 shows this outlier graphically, as a roughly periodic trend in mobilization effect is observed from primary to general election from 2008 through 2012, consistent with previous academic findings. This periodicity is maintained until 2014 when the inverse relationship between turnout effect magnitude and election salience is reversed. Specifically, for registration class seven I measured a 13.2 percent increase in turnout due to permanent absentee status for their first election, the 2014 Gubernatorial Primary. Registration class eight, however, recorded a 15.2 percent increase in turnout due to voting status, an increase of 1.9 percent over the election cycle, contrary to previous findings as well as the two other election cycles measured within this study.

**Figure 7** Mobilization Effect of PAV Status



## The Effect of Permanent Absentee Voting on Voter Retention

The last column of Table 8 displays the net change in turnout effect from each registration class' first election through the last election in the study, the 2014 Gubernatorial General. This measurement, as I've defined as active voter retention for the scope of the study, is summarized below in Table 9. A net increase in turnout effect is seen for all registration classes from their first election through their last election, with an overall increase in retention of 6.2 percentage points. Specifically, this shows that holding all else constant, voters registered as permanent absentee are 6.2 percent more likely to remain as active members of the electorate than their traditional voting counterparts.

**Table 9** Retention Effect of PAV Status


<i>Registration Class</i>	<i>First Election</i>	<i>Retention Effect</i>
One	Presidential Primary 2008	5.8%
Two	Presidential General 2008	16.9%
Three	Gubernatorial Primary 2010	1.1%
Four	Gubernatorial General 2010	8.1%
Five	Presidential Primary 2012	2.2%
Six	Presidential General 2012	8.5%
Seven	Gubernatorial Primary 2014	0.7%
Eight	Gubernatorial General 2014	-
Mean		6.2%

However, this specific measurement shows a range of over 16 percentage points over all eight registration classes suggesting specific controls for election salience would contribute to the statistical significance of my measurement of retention. Specifically, there is a clear increase in active voter retention effect for those registration classes whose first eligible election was a general election which again supports the inverse relationship between PAV turnout effect and




election salience. Figure 8 shows the change in turnout effect as a result of PAV status for each registration class over all eight elections incorporated in this study. The figure highlights the net increase in the turnout effect of permanent absentee status for each registration class, in other words, showing an overall increase in voter retention for each group in this study.

**Figure 8** Change in Retention Effect over Time



As an additional measurement of voter retention, I tracked the turnout effect of permanent absentee status over a voter’s second through seventh elections. The mean effect for each registration class is shown in Figure 9. A steady increase in retention effect is seen over time showing that the overall turnout gap between permanent absentee voters and polling place voters continues to increase after their first election.

**Figure 9** Direct Effect of PAV Status on Voter Turnout



# Conclusion

This study set out to measure the effect of permanent absentee voting status on electoral turnout by measuring both mobilization effect in a voter's first election, and retention effect in each subsequent election. To avoid the potential confound posed by studying the self-selected, traditionally high-propensity voter who chooses to reregister to vote by mail, I focused on newly registered voters. Measuring these effects over eight elections from 2008 through 2014 in San Diego County, I controlled for the common predictors of voting behavior available in the San Diego Registrar of Voters Master Voter File which included age, gender, party and active military status. This study has shown that permanent absentee voting status increases voter turnout in both mobilization and retention and confirming that the effect increases in magnitude for traditionally lower salience elections.

These results suggest that the hypothesized depressive effects of mail voting proposed in my introduction, the potential loss of mail ballots, change of address concerns and loss of the experiential gains of traditional voting, are either negated by the increased convenience of voting by mail or are not as depressive to turnout as I had considered. As a result, this study should contribute to the gathering academic evidence that has helped motivate vote by mail and other convenience reforms around the county.

There are however, key factors which contribute to voter behavior that remain missing from these models which I'd like to incorporate into future manifestations of this study. Including controls for average income level, average education level, and race on a precinct level would greatly benefit the accuracy of these models and may help to answer another question posed by academics regarding convenience reforms, "who is voting by mail?" In the future, by merging with United States Census data I would like to investigate the characteristics of these

newly registered voters as well as revisit the proposed depressive factors of vote by mail with these additional controls.

In closing, this study should contribute to the prevailing notion that convenience reforms are making voting easier and more accessible for voters. With the growing number of states incorporating some aspect of vote by mail, either through optional systems like in California or automatic systems like recently instituted in Oregon, the national trend shows that voting by mail is here to stay. As some studies have noted, these reforms may not be increasing turnout as they've been advertised it is important that researchers continue to study their true effects. While this study shows that mail voting in San Diego increases voter turnout, there are still questions to be answered concerning who is actually using these reforms. In an effort to answer these questions, academics should continue to explore the true effects of these reforms in the hopes that policymakers and voters can make the best informed decisions.

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# Appendix

**Table 10** Direct Effect of PAV Status on Voter Turnout

Registration Class	Binary Presidential Primary 2008	Binary Presidential General 2008	Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010	Binary Gubernatorial General 2010	Binary Presidential Primary 2012	Binary Presidential General 2012	Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014	Binary Gubernatorial General 2014
One	0.200 (.005)	0.179 (.005)	0.254 (.005)	0.270 (.006)	0.243 (.006)	0.293 (.005)	0.193 (.005)	0.258 (.006)
Two		0.032 (.002)	0.166 (.002)	0.205 (.003)	0.179 (.003)	0.231 (.003)	0.139 (.002)	0.201 (.003)
Three			0.191 (.005)	0.205 (.006)	0.184 (.005)	0.251 (.006)	0.151 (.004)	0.202 (.006)
Four				0.067 (.004)	0.132 (.004)	0.157 (.004)	0.127 (.003)	0.148 (.004)
Five					0.228 (.005)	0.223 (.004)	0.195 (.004)	0.250 (.004)
Six						0.024 (.002)	0.103 (.002)	0.109 (.003)
Seven							0.132 (.004)	0.139 (.005)
Eight								0.151 (.005)

**Table 11** Registration Class One Logistic Regression

	Binary Presidential Primary 2008	Binary Presidential General 2008	Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010	Binary Gubernatorial General 2010	Binary Presidential Primary 2012	Binary Presidential General 2012	Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014	Binary Gubernatorial General 2014
Intercept	-2.06 (.06)***	0.619 (.05)***	-2.36 (.06)***	-0.976 (.05)***	-2.38 (.06)***	-0.262 (.05)***	-3.00 (.07)***	-2.06 (.06)***
Republican	0.206 (.04)***	0.170 (.04)***	0.578 (.04)***	0.344 (.03)***	0.355 (.04)***	0.194 (.04)***	0.360 (.04)***	0.308 (.03)***
No Party Preference	-0.393 (.04)***	-0.360 (.04)***	-0.271 (.04)***	-0.263 (.03)***	-0.345 (.04)***	-0.320 (.03)***	-0.319 (.04)***	-0.268 (.03)***
Other Party	-0.286 (.07)***	-0.363 (.07)***	-0.354 (.07)***	-0.149 (.06)**	-0.025 (.07)**	-0.250 (.06)***	-0.240 (.08)**	-0.176 (.07)**
Active Military	-0.314 (.80)	-0.070 (.70)	-0.605 (.80)	-0.939 (.63)	omitted	-0.532 (.60)	omitted	-1.76 (1.1)
Male	0.12 (.03)***	-0.229 (.03)***	0.092 (.03)**	0.100 (.03)***	0.121 (.03)***	-0.183 (.03)***	0.152 (.03)***	0.112 (.03)***
Age 26-35	-0.587 (.07)***	0.044 (.05)	-.249 (.07)***	-0.044 (.05)	-0.209 (.07)**	-0.023 (.05)	-0.313 (.08)***	-0.019 (.06)
Age 36-45	0.082 (.06)	0.684 (.05)	0.343 (.06)***	0.565 (.05)***	0.486 (.06)***	0.696 (.05)***	0.381 (.08)***	0.728 (.06)***
Age 45-55	0.470 (.06)***	0.662 (.06)***	0.826 (.06)***	0.793 (.05)***	0.893 (.06)***	0.818 (.05)***	0.856 (.07)***	1.09 (.06)***
Age 56-65	0.917 (.06)***	0.862 (.06)***	1.21 (.06)***	1.14 (.05)***	1.39 (.06)***	1.03 (.06)***	1.36 (.07)***	1.48 (.06)***
Age 66+	1.58 (.06)***	1.09 (.07)***	1.88 (.03)***	1.63 (.06)***	1.95 (.06)***	1.15 (.06)***	2.01 (.07)***	1.93 (.06)***
PAV	1.14 (.03)***	1.25 (.04)***	1.34 (.03)***	1.12 (.03)***	1.28 (.03)***	1.45 (.03)***	1.39 (.04)***	1.16 (.03)***
N	28414	28457	28458	28460	28462	28473	28479	28479
R <sup>2</sup>	0.167	0.108	0.198	0.140	0.191	0.146	0.205	0.167

\*p < .05 \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001

**Table 12** Registration Class Two Logistic Regression

	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2008</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2014</i>
Intercept		1.38 (.03)***	-2.69 (.03)***	-1.10 (.02)***	-2.71 (.03)***	-0.336 (.02)***	-3.49 (.04)***	-2.38 (.03)***
Republican		-0.073 (.02)**	0.626 (.02)***	0.363 (.02)***	0.302 (.02)***	0.175 (.02)***	0.299 (.02)***	0.348 (.02)***
No Party Preference		-0.232 (.02)***	-0.151 (.02)***	-0.120 (.02)***	-0.293 (.02)***	-0.169 (.02)***	-0.212 (.02)***	-0.125 (.02)***
Other Party		-0.126 (.04)**	-0.000179 (.04)	0.103 (.03)***	-0.051 (.04)	-0.118 (.03)***	-0.0420 (.05)	0.00746 (.04)
Active Military		-1.13 (.20)***	-1.40 (.37)***	-1.53 (.24)***	-0.690 (.28)*	-1.30 (.20)***	-0.555 (.32)	-1.47 (.31)***
Male		-0.126 (.02)***	0.130 (.02)***	0.176 (.02)***	0.120 (.02)***	-0.073 (.01)***	0.160 (.02)***	0.164 (.01)***
Age 26-35		0.351 (.03)***	-0.282 (.03)***	0.014 (.02)	-0.092 (.04)**	0.085 (.02)***	-0.104 (.05)*	0.0904 (.03)**
Age 36-45		0.770 (.03)***	0.240 (.03)***	0.467 (.02)***	0.454 (.03)***	0.760 (.02)***	0.452 (.04)***	0.713 (.03)***
Age 45-55		0.752 (.03)***	0.682 (.03)***	0.719 (.02)***	0.843 (.03)***	0.954 (.02)***	0.943 (.04)***	1.06 (.03)***
Age 56-65		0.700 (.04)***	1.06 (.03)***	0.961 (.03)***	1.28 (.04)***	1.05 (.03)***	1.41 (.04)***	1.40 (.03)***
Age 66+		0.607 (.04)***	1.55 (.02)***	1.20 (.03)***	1.72 (.04)***	1.05 (.03)***	1.93 (.04)***	1.70 (.03)***
PAV		0.287 (.02)***	1.16 (.03)***	0.834 (.01)***	1.21 (.02)***	1.07 (.01)***	1.40 (.02)***	1.04 (.01)***
N		113513	113619	113637	113576	113660	113676	113679
R <sup>2</sup>		0.017	0.144	0.080	0.143	0.091	0.167	0.122

\*p < .05 \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001

**Table 13** Registration Class Three Logistic Regression

	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2008</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2014</i>
Intercept			-2.10 (.04)***	-1.05 (.04)***	-2.35 (.05)***	-0.586 (.04)***	-3.08 (.06)***	-2.28 (.05)***
Republican			0.673 (.03)***	-0.509 (.03)***	0.398 (.03)***	0.368 (.04)***	0.323 (.04)***	0.420 (.03)***
No Party Preference			-0.228 (.03)***	-0.259 (.03)***	-0.380 (.04)***	-0.318 (.03)***	-0.280 (.04)***	-0.196 (.03)***
Other Party			-0.0183 (.05)	0.137 (.05)**	-0.0500 (.06)	-0.103 (.05)*	-0.132 (.06)*	-0.0012 (.05)
Active Military			-0.686 (.51)	-0.439 (.40)	0.138 (.44)	-0.850 (.40)*	-1.85 (1.0)	-1.15 (.55)*
Male			0.121 (.03)***	0.0672 (.02)**	0.0446 (.02)	-0.180 (.03)***	0.119 (.03)***	0.0637 (.03)*
Age 26-35			-0.380 (.05)***	0.0709 (.04)	-0.0589 (.05)	0.138 (.04)***	0.0166 (.06)	0.285 (.05)***
Age 36-45			0.275 (.04)***	0.603 (.04)***	0.594 (.05)***	0.842 (.04)***	0.629 (.06)***	0.864 (.05)***
Age 45-55			0.799 (.05)***	0.970 (.04)***	1.08 (.05)***	1.04 (.04)***	1.18 (.06)***	1.36 (.05)***
Age 56-65			1.23 (.05)***	1.30 (.05)***	1.54 (.05)***	1.30 (.05)***	1.71 (.06)***	1.83 (.05)***
Age 66+			1.90 (.05)***	1.99 (.05)***	2.28 (.05)***	1.81 (.06)***	1.13 (.04)***	2.43 (.05)***
PAV			0.978 (.03)***	0.837 (.03)***	1.01 (.03)***	1.11 (.03)***	1.13 (.04)***	0.955 (.03)***
N			31473	31502	31517	31519	31521	31522
R <sup>2</sup>			0.174	0.136	0.185	0.149	0.199	0.178

\*p < .05 \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001



**Table 14** Registration Class Four Logistic Regression

	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2008</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2014</i>
Intercept				-0.288 (.03)***	-2.13 (.03)***	-0.346 (.03)**	-2.98 (.04)***	-2.02 (.03)***
Republican				-0.0249 (.02)	0.0563 (.02)*	-0.0198 (.02)	0.0912 (.02)***	0.0972 (.02)***
No Party Preference				0.0752 (.03)**	-0.171 (.03)*	-0.0500 (.03)	0.0912 (.03)**	-0.0333 (.03)
Other Party				0.322 (.04)***	-0.0539 (.04)	0.115 (.04)**	-0.0843 (.05)	0.0294 (.04)
Active Military				-0.265 (.20)	-0.242 (.23)	-0.192 (.22)	0.172 (.24)	-0.446 (.22)*
Male				0.0944 (.02)***	-0.0136 (.02)	-0.335 (.03)***	0.0395 (.02)	0.0189 (.02)
Age 26-35				0.289 (.03)***	0.248 (.03)***	0.335 (.03)***	0.249 (.04)***	0.461 (.03)***
Age 36-45				0.764 (.03)***	0.784 (.03)***	1.03 (.03)***	0.860 (.04)***	1.08 (.03)***
Age 45-55				1.08 (.03)***	1.24 (.03)***	1.34 (.03)***	1.32 (.04)***	1.51 (.03)***
Age 56-65				1.54 (.03)***	1.72 (.03)***	1.68 (.04)***	1.89 (.04)***	1.99 (.04)***
Age 66+				1.99 (.04)***	2.27 (.04)***	1.95 (.04)***	2.43 (.04)***	2.42 (.04)***
PAV				0.310 (.02)***	0.656 (.02)***	0.750 (.02)***	0.878 (.02)***	0.646 (.02)***
N				61388	61468	61522	61537	61539
R <sup>2</sup>				0.077	0.127	0.110	0.149	0.136

\*p < .05 \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001

**Table 15** Registration Class Five Logistic Regression

	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2008</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2014</i>
Intercept					-2.02 (.03)***	-0.288 (.03)***	-3.19 (.04)***	-2.35 (.03)***
Republican					0.565 (.03)***	0.474 (.03)***	0.330 (.03)***	0.391 (.03)***
No Party Preference					-0.667 (.03)***	-0.541 (.02)***	-0.572 (.03)***	-0.507 (.03)***
Other Party					-0.234 (.04)***	-0.293 (.04)***	-0.282 (.05)***	-0.188 (.04)***
Active Military					-0.405 (.38)	-0.341 (.36)	-2.28 (1.0)*	-1.02 (.43)*
Male					0.0793 (.02)***	-0.208 (.02)***	0.0878 (.02)***	0.0463 (.02)*
Age 26-35					-0.0718 (.04)*	0.248 (.03)***	0.0184 (.02)***	0.365 (.04)***
Age 36-45					0.405 (.04)***	0.775 (.03)***	0.645 (.05)***	0.950 (.04)***
Age 45-55					0.821 (.04)***	0.931 (.03)***	1.18 (.05)***	1.38 (.04)***
Age 56-65					1.45 (.03)***	1.37 (.04)***	1.92 (.04)***	2.01 (.04)***
Age 66+					2.46 (.03)***	2.21 (.04)***	2.78 (.04)***	2.75 (.04)***
PAV					1.06 (.02)***	1.14 (.02)***	1.36 (.03)***	1.14 (.02)***
N					60387	60473	60497	60500
R <sup>2</sup>					0.265	0.203	0.298	0.267

\*p < .05 \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001

**Table 16** Registration Class Six Logistic Regression

	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2008</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2014</i>
Intercept					1.37 (.02)***	-3.08 (.03)***	-1.93 (.02)***	
Republican					0.0100 (.02)	0.278 (.02)***	0.265 (.02)***	
No Party Preference					-0.553 (.02)***	-0.272 (.02)***	-0.255 (.02)***	
Other Party					-0.260 (.03)***	-0.0772 (.03)*	-0.0646 (.03)*	
Active Military					-0.841 (.07)***	-0.800 (.11)***	-1.18 (.08)***	
Male					-0.193 (.02)***	0.165 (.02)***	0.153 (.01)***	
Age 26-35					0.578 (.02)***	0.173 (.03)***	0.526 (.02)***	
Age 36-45					0.844 (.02)***	0.561 (.03)***	0.930 (.02)***	
Age 45-55					0.888 (.03)***	0.993 (.03)***	1.19 (.02)***	
Age 56-65					1.13 (.03)***	1.53 (.03)***	1.62 (.02)***	
Age 66+					1.19 (.04)***	2.08 (.03)***	1.97 (.02)***	
PAV					0.202 (.02)***	0.920 (.02)***	0.515 (.01)***	
N					131219	131364	131380	
R <sup>2</sup>					0.044	0.125	0.093	

\*p < .05 \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001

**Table 17** Registration Class Seven Logistic Regression

	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2008</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2014</i>
Intercept							-2.42 (.04)***	-1.83 (.03)***
Republican							0.289 (.03)***	0.276 (.03)***
No Party Preference							-0.524 (.03)***	-0.517 (.03)***
Other Party							0.00638 (.05)	0.0332 (.04)
Active Military							-0.224 (.26)	-0.0539 (.21)
Male							-0.0895 (.03)***	-0.0819 (.02)***
Age 26-35							0.111 (.04)***	0.556 (.03)***
Age 36-45							0.501 (.04)***	0.930 (.04)***
Age 45-55							0.975 (.04)***	1.29 (.04)***
Age 56-65							1.51 (.04)***	1.79 (.04)***
Age 66+							2.17 (.04)***	2.43 (.04)***
PAV							.905 (.03)***	0.653 (.02)***
N							44884	44917
R <sup>2</sup>							0.146	0.142

\*p < .05 \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001

**Table 18** Registration Class Eight Logistic Regression

	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2008</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2008</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2010</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2010</i>	<i>Binary Presidential Primary 2012</i>	<i>Binary Presidential General 2012</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial Primary 2014</i>	<i>Binary Gubernatorial General 2014</i>
Intercept								-1.01 (.02)***
Republican								0.173 (.02)***
No Party Preference								-0.608 (.02)***
Other Party								-0.199 (.03)***
Active Military								-0.134 (.14)
Male								0.0743 (.02)***
Age 26-35								0.441 (.02)***
Age 36-45								0.701 (.03)***
Age 45-55								0.933 (.03)***
Age 56-65								1.38 (.03)***
Age 66+								1.89 (.04)***
PAV								0.618 (.02)***
N								63502
R <sup>2</sup>								0.100

\*p < .05 \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001