

A Puzzling Picture: The Tea Party, Minority Voting, and the 2010 Midterm Elections

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Even the most casual observer of American politics has heard of the Tea Party movement, a political force that emerged in late 2009 in response to perceived excessive government spending. Branded as a grassroots populist movement representing the interests of the working class with a commitment to reducing the “size and intrusiveness of government” and “repealing Obamacare”, the movement culminated in the 2010 midterm elections.² Bolstered by the support from the Tea Party movement, the Republican Party picked up a net 63 seats in the House of Representatives, their widest margin in over 50 years.³ The 2010 election signaled the beginning of the 112th Congress, which in its entirety passed only 561 bills, the fewest bills passed by any Congress on record at the time.⁴ This inactivity can be at least partially attributed to the presence of candidates groomed by the Tea Party movement, who have proven to be fierce opposition to policies championed by Democratic President Barack Obama. Whether the policies advocated by the Democratic Party have been attempts to reform the immigration system, deficit spend, or increase the debt ceiling, the Tea Party movement members of Congress have remained unified in their opposition to Democratic Party policymaking.

But who are the supporters of the Tea Party movement? Are they precisely who they assert themselves to be—the grassroots, working class segment of the population sincerely concerned about America’s economy stability? Polling data compiled by the American National Election Study (ANES) suggests that supporters of the Tea Party in the 2012 election were 91%

² <http://www.teapartyexpress.org/mission>

³ <http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/house/big-board>

⁴ http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/07/vital-statistics-congress-mann-ornstein/Vital-Statistics-Chapter-6--Legislative-Productivity-in-Congress-and-Workload_UPDATE.pdf?la=en

white, whereas the entire electorate was 72%. Further, 57% of Tea Party Republicans were male, and 58% were aged 50 or more, whereas the overall electorate was 48% male and 47% were over the age of 50. Religious preference is also an area where supporters of the Tea Party differ sharply from the rest of the electorate, with 40% of Tea Party movement supporters identifying as “Strongly Religious”, in comparison to 26% of the overall electorate.⁵ Older, whiter, and more male, and slightly wealthier than the rest of the electorate, it is doubtful that supporters of the Tea Party movement provide a representative sample of the entire United States population. Not only is the current profile of the United States population starkly different from supporters of the Tea Party movement, but also it is becoming an increasingly diverse mixture of ethnicities and religions.

Many of the ideas promoted by the Tea Party movement such as photo voter identification laws and an increased emphasis on punishing illegal immigrants disproportionately target minorities. An emphasis on having English as the official language of the United States is another example of rhetoric and policy that could be interpreted as anti-immigrant and anti-minority.⁶ Political campaign ads depicting colored individuals scaling chain-linked fences sporting bandanas and baggy clothing perhaps provides reason for minorities to be further agitated with Tea Party movement bombast.⁷ However, determining whether or not the perceived antipathy towards minorities affects the voting behavior of minorities is unknown. In light of this, it is worth examining the effect of a Tea Party candidate on the turnout of prospective minority voters. To better understand the effects of minority voter behavior in response to Tea

⁵ <http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/not-their-cup-of-tea-the-republican-establishment-versus-the-tea-party/>

⁶ <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr997>

⁷ <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/10/one-week-out-angle-runs-racially-charged-ad/65180/>

Party movement rhetoric, this study will attempt to answer the following question: Does the presence of a Tea Party candidate diminish or encourage minority turnout?

Literature Review

What compels citizens in democracies to vote has long been the subject of political science literature. Stated broadly, citizens participate in elections and government because they go to politics and also because politics comes to them. Politicians mobilize prospective voters in two distinct ways: direct mobilization consisting of door-to-door canvassing, and indirectly, which leaders employ through means such as utilizing mutual friends and social networks (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). When people do participate in politics, it occurs not because of who they are, but because of the attainable benefits and incentives that voting offers (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Downs (1957) rational choice model predicts that a person will vote when the benefits of voting outweigh the costs. Acquiring sufficient information in order to make an informed vote is costly, and because politics is rarely the chief concern in most people's lives, the average person remains rationally ignorant (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Empirical research has consistently proven that individuals with high levels of education and ample financial resources are much more likely to be involved in the political process than people lacking in education and wealth (Wong et al. 2011; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

Most citizens are lacking in education and wealth, however, which leads political teams to pursue strategies for mobilizing these voters through indirect and direct means, key ingredients of social networks. Properly utilizing social networks allows leaders to communicate with only a select number of powerful individuals as focal points, since family, friends, and peers will often echo the prominent leaders' calls to mobilize (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Choosing the correct individuals to disseminate information also presents a challenge for

perspective leaders, as these individuals become champions for their policies and largely determine who participates. Recruiting a corrupt individual to assist with mobilization can be detrimental to one's election prospects, making due diligence for all close associates imperative. Therefore, the campaign messages of political leaders combined with campaign slogans and the media appearances they attend play an instrumental role in the voter turnout equation (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993).

Racial attitudes and issues are a significant factor in mobilizing African American voters, especially at the local level (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Piven and Cloward 1978). The African American coalition has remained the most cohesive voting bloc for the Democratic Party's New Deal coalition (Stanley and Niemi 1995). African Americans enfranchised through the civil rights movement led to substantial gains for the black community, as many seized an opportunity to promote their own interests (Hajnal 2010). This is not specific to African Americans, as the primary reason most individuals choose to participate in politics is to promote their own interests. After the civil rights movement, the Democratic Party made efforts to integrate black leadership into its ranks, although the sincerity of these efforts has been scrutinized (Walters 1988). The period since the civil rights movement has seen African American voters become more loyal to the Democratic Party in contrast to declining attempts by the Republican Party to appeal to the black vote (Tate 1994). Parties view the African American vote as a crucial untapped resource, as many African Americans are located in metropolitan areas where additional black turnout rates can swing elections (Walters 1988). Even with this in mind the Democratic Party has made considerable efforts to contact and mobilize black voters, while the Republican Party has made minimal attempts to do so (Wielhouwer 2000). Clearly, there are a

multitude of reasons why the black vote has remained a reliable voting bloc for the Democratic Party.

Ethnicity is also a salient political issue for Latino voters because of the shared feeling of discrimination, and the prevalence of a familiar language in Spanish, among other factors (Barreto 2010). Another key ingredient in the social group identification equation for Latino participants is the shared immigrant experience (Barreto 2010). This is especially prevalent for voter mobilization, as immigrant families confront unique challenges in interacting with the native citizenry and often times depend on immigrant-based community networks for assistance (Barreto 2010; Jones-Correa 1998). Many of these immigrant-based community networks have not facilitated relationships with political leaders, and the typical candidate will attempt to mobilize likely voters rather than bring new voters into the mix, causing many Latinos to remain unregistered and disengaged (Barreto 2010). De la Garza, Menchaca, and DeSipio (1994) have found that traditional campaigns tended to ignore chiefly Latino neighborhood because voter turnout was low and campaigns assumed that most residents were ineligible to vote because they were not citizens. Barreto (2010) found that in 2000 political campaigns began to alter the method in which they targeted voters, as George W. Bush made a determined push to incorporate Latinos into the Republican Party electorate. Unlike African Americans, Barreto (2010) has found that Latinos show a comparatively diminished loyalty to a political party as do blacks, but rather vote much more along ethnic lines.

As previously stated, the standard voting model predicts that individuals with higher degrees of education and income will vote at higher rates than those lacking in resources. While this finding has been backed on numerous occasions (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), the voting equation for Asian American voters is precisely the

opposite—the ethnic group exhibits lower levels of participation despite relatively high levels of education and income (Wong et al. 2011; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). An early study of Asian American political participation by Uhlaner (1989) found that the high levels of education amongst Asian Americans does not translate to political activity, and the findings in this study were corroborated by Aoki and Nakanishi (2001) twelve years later. Political participation increases within Asian American social circles as they spend more time in the United States, and they become more likely to develop partisan attitudes towards the American political system (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). Ideologically, Asian Americans identify themselves more often liberal or very liberal instead of moderately or very conservative (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). Because roughly 65% of Asian Americans are foreign-born, a key component to Asian American political participation is the extent to which a foreign-born Asian American immigrant has integrated into their respective city (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). Indeed, Asian Americans face bigger language barriers than Latinos, which stifles the building of political coalitions and prevents assimilation into political networks. Similar to the voting tendencies of Latinos and African Americans, Asian Americans are partial to the Democratic Party, with a trend showing an increasing loyalty to Democrats. While Asian Americans may be the most difficult minority group to judge because of their mixed relationship with political parties, it is clear that they align more closely with their fellow minority groups rather than their white counterparts.

How the aforementioned minority groups' participation rates are affected by threatening or racist campaign innuendo in American politics has not been rigorously documented in political science literature. Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura (2000) found that Proposition 187, which was aimed at curbing illegal immigration in California through denying public services to

illegal immigrants and reporting undocumented immigrants, prompted Latinos to become politicized. Similarly, strident campaign rhetoric targeting Latino mayors in Houston and San Francisco emphasized their opponents' ethnicity as "Mexican" or "Latin", sparking a sharp growth in support for both candidates from Latinos (Barreto 2010). While Uhlaner (1991) and Lien (1997) have found that minorities who have experienced personal discrimination have an increased likelihood to participate politically to challenge racial inequality, it is unclear how blacks have supported other African American candidates that have been subject to racist public rhetoric. A similar unknown exists for the Asian electorate.

Tea Party organizations have sought to portray immigration as a threat to America and have repeatedly utilized rhetoric that is both racist and xenophobic (Parker and Barreto 2014). Further, Skocpol and Williamson (2013; 68) have found that Tea Party members frequently designate poor people as having a "plantation mentality" that entrenches "some people" on welfare. Tea Party endorsed candidates such as Senate candidate Sharron Angle claimed that "Illegals [are] sneaking across our borders", with campaign videos of dark skinned men hurdling chain-linked fences (Parker and Barreto 2014). Angle was not the only Tea Party candidate who sought this method of campaigning, as J.D. Hayworth utilized similar scare tactics in his unsuccessful bid to unseat Republican Senator John McCain in Arizona (Parker and Barreto 2014). Barreto and Parker (2014) have also shown that Tea Party movement proposals to increase restrictions on voting through photo identification requirements disproportionately affect minorities. In light of this, one could argue that the Tea Party represents a nativist faction that has mobilized support by targeting minority and other out-group members. One scholar has found that Tea Party sympathies helped to stimulate voting amongst older, whiter, and more conservative individuals who were mostly opposed to President Barack Obama from the

beginning of his tenure (Jacobson 2011). This study will attempt to bridge the gap in literature that has detailed the voter behavior of each aforementioned minority subgroup with how these subgroups respond to a potential enemy group on the ballot.

Hypothesis and Theory

The theory that I propose is straightforward: minority groups settled in areas where there is a Tea Party movement candidate will vote at higher rates than minority groups absent a Tea Party candidate. Because of the Tea Party's vocal opposition to comprehensive immigration reform and support of strict voter identification laws, both of which disproportionately affect racial minorities, I believe that the average minority voter views the Tea Party as hostile towards them and their fellow minority group members as a whole. Also, because the Tea Party movement is over 90 percent white, minorities view the Tea Party as a formally aligned, racially homogenous coalition of individuals determined to maintain their own interests. This view amongst minority voters compels them to vote in elections that would have otherwise gone unnoticed, voting for the candidate opposite the Tea Party to maintain their own interests. Indeed, minorities that galvanize in opposition to a Tea Party member politician, regardless of the formal party affiliation of a Tea Party endorsed candidate, preserve their own interests.

Data and Methodology

This study uses an original dataset to evaluate the voter turnout rates of minorities settled in Tea Party movement territory. One valuable component of this dataset is the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a 55,000-person survey that spans across every district in the House of Representatives. Unlike other reputable studies such as the National Election Studies (NES), the CCES surveys race at the district level before and after the election occurs.

The Cook Political Report has an extensive archive of House and Senate races that has been utilized to determine which races were competitive. The Cook Report also releases a measurement referred to as the Partisan Voting Index (PVI), which evaluates how strongly a particular district leans towards the Democratic or Republican Party in comparison to the nation as a whole.⁸ Moreover, the American Fact Finder website has been used to acquire race statistics and the size of the citizen populations in each Congressional district. This data has been useful in tandem with the Voting Eligible Population (VEP) data compiled by Dr. Michael McDonald for each state,⁹ with VEP data at the Congressional district level being calculated by the author utilizing the same method as Pew Research.¹⁰ The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut is the leading educational archive in the field of public opinion, and its invaluable polling data has been utilized to evaluate support for the Tea Party movement.

While the Tea Party may have had its own Congressional Caucus, it is not a formal political party, and thus identifying its members is not an entirely transparent process; “tax reform” and “economic freedom” are hardly unique policy positions.¹¹ To determine which members of Congress are supported by the Tea Party, The New York Times has compiled a list of Tea Party supported candidates and Tea Party-backed political action committees and SuperPACs. Freedom Works (FW), a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization headed by former Republican House Majority Leader Dick Armey played an instrumental role in assisting Tea Party movement groups organize.¹² The Tea Party Express (TPX), a California-based group of Republican consultants helped Tea Party candidates oust moderate conservatives in the 2010 primaries. TPX refers to itself as “The most aggressive and influential national Tea Party group

⁸ <http://cookpolitical.com/story/5604>

⁹ <http://www.electproject.org/2010g>

¹⁰ <http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/mapping-the-latino-electorate-by-congressional-district/>

¹¹ <http://www.teapartypatriots.org/ourvision/>

¹² <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/10/15/us/politics/tea-party-graphic.html>

in the political arena.”¹³ Tea Party Nation (TPN) is a social-networking site for Tea Party movement members and sympathizers, providing a platform for all people in agreement with the Tea Party movement to blog, communicate, and exchange information with one another.¹⁴ A questionnaire that has been used to evaluate potential Tea Party movement candidates was developed by the Independence Caucus (IC), which has endorsed a select number of candidates based upon their questionnaire answers.¹⁵ If a candidate has been endorsed by any of these four groups, I have designated them a Tea Party movement candidate. Elections where a Tea Party candidate ran in a deeply blue district with nearly a zero percent chance of winning, such as California’s 8th District in 2010 when a Tea Party challenger received an embarrassing 17.5% of the vote,¹⁶ have not been included in this study. PVI scores have been invaluable in determining which districts to study, as a +5 PVI score indicates a deeply blue or deeply red Congressional district. Thus, a district that has received a +5 Democratic Party PVI score by The Cook Report has not been studied, because many of these races were frivolous Tea Party movement challenges to safe Democratic seats.

I have kept Republican seats that received +5 PVI scores because the Tea Party movement is much closer aligned ideologically with the Republican Party than the Democratic Party, and its current members in Congress are Republicans. If a Tea Party candidate was running in an election where the PVI score was more Democratic than +4, their seat was not considered for this study with nine exceptions. For the remaining nine exceptions that had PVI scores of Democratic leanings higher than +4, all candidates finished within a 5-point swing on Election Day and also were not outspent greater than two-to-one by their Democratic counterpart

¹³ <http://www.teapartyexpress.org/mission>

¹⁴ <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/10/15/us/politics/tea-party-graphic.html>

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2010/2010house.pdf>

in the General Election. For the individual-level voting models, this brings the entire count of Tea Party district seats to 67. In the Senate, there were 9 total Tea Party candidates that had their names on the General Election ballot, but Alaska was not used because Republican incumbent and write-in candidate Lisa Murkowski bested Tea Party candidate Joe Miller.¹⁷

I compare turnout percentage data from the 2006 and 2010 General Election and perform two-sample dependent t tests on the difference between the districts where Tea Party candidates ran and those that did not. To assess the effect of the Tea Party on minority voters and other political groups at the individual level I use the 2010 CCES dataset. The model used to determine the likelihood of voting in a state where a Tea Party movement candidate is running holds constant age, education, income, and sex. The binary dependent variable is a uniquely accurate assessment of an individual's vote; respondents who have voted have had their votes validated with state voter files by the CCES. Virginia is the only state that does not keep state voter file records, thus there are no respondents from Virginia in this study for the individual level models.¹⁸

The baseline model is the following with all controls:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Logit} = & \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Valid Vote} \\ \text{Dependent Variable} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Sex} \\ \text{Control 1} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Age} \\ \text{Control 2} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Age}^2 \\ \text{Control 3} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Education} \\ \text{Control 4} \end{array} \right) \\ & + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Income} \\ \text{Control 5} \end{array} \right) + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

The unconditional model is the following with variables of interest:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Logit} = & \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Valid Vote} \\ \text{Dependent Variable} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Sex} \\ \text{Control 1} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Age} \\ \text{Control 2} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Age}^2 \\ \text{Control 3} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Education} \\ \text{Control 4} \end{array} \right) + \\ & \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Income} \\ \text{Control 5} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Tea Party Location} \\ \text{Dummy Variable} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Racial Subgroup} \\ \text{Dummy Variable} \end{array} \right) + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

¹⁷ <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2010/2010senate.pdf>

¹⁸ The omission of all Virginia respondents brings the total number of Tea Party House districts to 67 for the individual-level models.

The full model with the interacted variables of interest:

$$\text{Logit} = \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Valid Vote} \\ \text{Dependent Variable} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Sex} \\ \text{Control 1} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Age} \\ \text{Control 2} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Age}^2 \\ \text{Control 3} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Education} \\ \text{Control 4} \end{array} \right) + \\ \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Income} \\ \text{Control 5} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Tea Party Location} \\ \text{Dummy Variable} \end{array} \right) * \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Racial Subgroup} \\ \text{Dummy Variable} \end{array} \right) + \varepsilon$$

All variables of interest were dummy variables, including the variables used to restrict the subsample for any specific regression. Four variants of the full model have been run for each racial subgroup, with the first an interaction between that subgroup and all Tea Party regions, the second an interaction between the subgroup and Tea Party regions where there is a leaning election, the third an interaction between the subgroup and Tea Party regions where there is a leaning or tossup election, and finally an interaction between the minority subgroup and tossup Tea Party regions. Dummy variables have been created for states and districts with a Tea Party movement candidate on the General Election ballot and for African American, Latino, and Asian minority subgroups. Competitiveness is based upon the ratings published by the Cook Political report the day before the election to prevent against an endogenous error. Different dummy variables have been created for each varying level of Tea Party competitiveness.¹⁹ The baselines for the dummy variable minority subgroups are white respondents, and the dummy variable for white voters has a baseline of nonwhite respondents. Standard errors are represented using robust standard errors to account for unobserved heteroskedasticity.²⁰ I will be testing the following hypotheses to observe the possible effect of a Tea Party movement candidate on political behavior:

¹⁹ Competitiveness levels ranging from safe to very competitive are as follows: solid, likely, leaning, and tossup.

²⁰ In the regression tables, robust standard errors are shown in parentheses directly beneath the coefficients.

Null Hypothesis: The presence of a Tea Party candidate will have no additional effect on minority vote turnout.

Hypothesis #1: The presence of a Tea Party candidate will have a stimulating effect on minority vote turnout

Hypothesis #2: The presence of a Tea Party candidate will have a dampening effect on minority vote turnout

Hypothesis #3: The presence of a Tea Party candidate will have a stimulating effect on minority vote turnout, but only in races that are competitive.

Hypothesis #4: The presence of a Tea Party candidate will have a dampening effect on minority vote turnout, but only in races that are competitive.

Because I am testing a binary dependent variable—vote or non-vote—I will be examining minority vote turnout using a logistical regression as opposed to an ordinary least squares regression estimator (OLS). A logistical regression captures a binary variable much better than an OLS regression because the curved shape of the fitted line is superior for categorical variables that contain only 2 values. Moreover, the Cook Political Report's archive of competitive Congressional races allows me to test for all of my hypotheses. I will not examine an additional election year for the Senate, 2012, because the Presidential Election year alters turnout in unpredictable ways compared to a midterm year.

Chapter 2 Minority Voters and the Tea Party

The Tea Party and the 2010 Senate Elections, Weighted Samples

Of the nine Senate candidates endorsed by the Tea Party movement in the 2010 general election, five emerged victorious on Election Day.²¹ Tests run for minority voters settled in states where a Tea Party movement candidate was running showed no clear voting trend with very few statistically significant regression coefficients.

Table 1: African American voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.488 (11.29)***	-0.487 (11.27)***	-0.488 (11.29)***	-0.489 (11.32)***
Education	0.229 (14.56)***	0.229 (14.54)***	0.229 (14.56)***	0.229 (14.53)***
Income	0.111 (16.24)***	0.111 (16.21)***	0.111 (16.24)***	0.111 (16.22)***
Age	0.073 (7.82)***	0.073 (7.85)***	0.073 (7.82)***	0.073 (7.89)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.43)**	-0.000 (2.45)**	-0.000 (2.43)**	-0.000 (2.49)**
Black voter, Tea Party state	0.120 (0.76)			
Black voter, Tea Party leaning state		0.271 (1.60)		
Black voter, Tea Party leaning or tossup state			0.130 (0.81)	
Black voter, Tea Party tossup state				-0.707 (2.04)**
Constant	-3.220 (13.14)***	-3.211 (13.11)***	-3.217 (13.13)***	-3.243 (13.28)***
<i>N</i>	28,834	28,834	28,834	28,834

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Tests that examined Latino voters settled in states with a Tea Party Senate candidate running for office returned no statistically significant coefficients, as shown in Table 2.

²¹ Courser, Zachary (2010) "The Tea Party at the Election," *The Forum*: Vol. 8: Iss. 4, Article 5

Regression coefficients suggest that Latinos settled in Tea Party states are demobilizing across all levels of competitiveness, but ascribing this trend to the Tea Party without statistical significance would be incorrect.

Table 2: Latino Voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.545 (12.25)***	-0.544 (12.22)***	-0.545 (12.25)***	-0.545 (12.24)***
Education	0.234 (14.45)***	0.233 (14.41)***	0.234 (14.45)***	0.233 (14.37)***
Income	0.117 (16.66)***	0.117 (16.63)***	0.117 (16.65)***	0.117 (16.66)***
Age	0.069 (7.14)***	0.069 (7.14)***	0.069 (7.14)***	0.069 (7.21)***
Age squared	-0.000 (1.93)*	-0.000 (1.92)*	-0.000 (1.92)*	-0.000 (1.98)**
Latino voter, Tea Party state	-0.210 (1.18)			
Latino voter, Tea Party leaning state		-0.088 (0.45)		
Latino voter, Tea Party leaning or tossup state			-0.203 (1.14)	
Latino voter, Tea Party tossup state				-0.515 (1.64)
Constant	-3.110 (12.24)***	-3.094 (12.18)***	-3.106 (12.23)***	-3.132 (12.37)***
<i>N</i>	27,530	27,530	27,530	27,530

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

As illustrated in Table 3, Asian voters in Tea Party states showed no clear direction of mobilization or demobilization, as the coefficients for Asian voters settled in all Tea Party states and in ones determined to be tossups or leaning Democratic or Republican were positive, but negative in states where the Tea Party candidate was engaged in a tossup only race. There were no statistically significance coefficients and thus little if any can be drawn from the results below.

Table 3: Asian Voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.500 (12.39)***	-0.499 (12.39)***	-0.500 (12.39)***	-0.498 (12.35)***
Education	0.243 (16.50)***	0.243 (16.48)***	0.243 (16.50)***	0.243 (16.45)***
Income	0.112 (17.39)***	0.112 (17.37)***	0.112 (17.39)***	0.112 (17.36)***
Age	0.076 (8.86)***	0.076 (8.85)***	0.076 (8.86)***	0.077 (8.89)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.88)***	-0.000 (2.87)***	-0.000 (2.87)***	-0.000 (2.90)***
Asian in Tea Party state	0.496 (1.31)			
Asian in Tea Party leaning state		0.661 (1.57)		
Asian in Tea Party leaning or tossup state			0.527 (1.38)	
Asian in Tea Party tossup state				-0.079 (0.12)
Constant	-3.437 (15.36)***	-3.424 (15.30)***	-3.434 (15.35)***	-3.451 (15.46)***
<i>N</i>	32,983	32,983	32,983	32,983

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

With three out of four regression coefficients negative, one positive, and none statistically significant, Table 4 suggests that white voters were not further mobilized at the state level in Tea party Senate races at the individual level. Because the Tea Party is vastly whiter than the overall American electorate, this is a peculiar null result.

Table 4: White Voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.503 (12.45)***	-0.502 (12.43)***	-0.503 (12.45)***	-0.503 (12.44)***
Education	0.231 (15.67)***	0.230 (15.63)***	0.231 (15.67)***	0.230 (15.61)***
Income	0.108 (16.85)***	0.108 (16.81)***	0.108 (16.84)***	0.108 (16.85)***
Age	0.079 (9.22)***	0.080 (9.23)***	0.079 (9.22)***	0.080 (9.27)***
Age squared	-0.000 (3.32)***	-0.000 (3.33)***	-0.000 (3.32)***	-0.000 (3.36)***
White in Tea Party state	-0.025 (0.22)			
White in Tea Party leaning state		-0.090 (0.73)		
White in Tea Party leaning or tossup state			-0.038 (0.34)	
White in Tea Party tossup state				0.187 (0.81)
Constant	-3.683 (16.33)***	-3.683 (16.34)***	-3.682 (16.32)***	-3.689 (16.44)***
<i>N</i>	32,983	32,983	32,983	32,983

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

When the subsample is restricted to respondents in Tea Party movement states who have identified themselves as moderate, liberal, or very liberal, there appears to be Latino demobilization, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Latino voting in Tea Party states, Moderate, Liberal, and Very Liberal subsample, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.454 (7.70)***	-0.452 (7.67)***	-0.454 (7.69)***	-0.451 (7.65)***
Education	0.261 (12.32)***	0.260 (12.27)***	0.261 (12.31)***	0.258 (12.21)***
Income	0.090 (9.90)***	0.090 (9.87)***	0.090 (9.89)***	0.091 (9.90)***
Age	0.072 (5.83)***	0.072 (5.81)***	0.072 (5.83)***	0.072 (5.84)***
Age squared	-0.000 (1.80)*	-0.000 (1.78)*	-0.000 (1.80)*	-0.000 (1.81)*
Latino in Tea Party state	-0.548 (2.37)**			
Latino in Tea Party leaning state		-0.598 (2.32)**		
Latino in Tea Party leaning or tossup state			-0.531 (2.29)**	
Latino in Tea Party tossup state				-0.113 (0.30)
Constant	-3.274 (10.02)***	-3.243 (9.92)***	-3.265 (10.00)***	-3.273 (10.05)***
<i>N</i>	14,095	14,095	14,095	14,095

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Amongst moderates, liberals, and very liberals, Latino voters showed a clear trend of demobilization, but without statistically significant results in Tea Party tossup states—Nevada, Colorado, and Utah.

When the subsample is again restricted to voters who have identified themselves as liberal or very liberal, there is demobilization for Latino voters once again. Amongst people identifying themselves as liberal and very liberal—people only on the opposite side of the spectrum as the Tea Party—the demobilization is much more pronounced, as shown in Table 6.

**Table 6: Latino voting in Tea Party states, Liberal and Very Liberal subsample, 2010
CCES**

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.458 (5.13)***	-0.452 (5.06)***	-0.457 (5.12)***	-0.457 (5.13)***
Education	0.191 (6.22)***	0.190 (6.20)***	0.191 (6.22)***	0.193 (6.27)***
Income	0.096 (7.24)***	0.096 (7.24)***	0.096 (7.23)***	0.097 (7.26)***
Age	0.082 (4.62)***	0.081 (4.56)***	0.081 (4.61)***	0.079 (4.49)***
Age squared	-0.000 (1.87)*	-0.000 (1.82)*	-0.000 (1.86)*	-0.000 (1.74)*
Latino in Tea Party state	-0.933 (2.97)***			
Latino in Tea Party leaning state		-0.833 (2.50)**		
Latino in Tea Party leaning or tossup state			-0.906 (2.87)***	
Latino in Tea Party tossup state				-0.787 (1.19)
Constant	-3.003 (6.69)***	-2.980 (6.64)***	-2.993 (6.67)***	-2.993 (6.71)***
<i>N</i>	6,946	6,946	6,946	6,946

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Tea Party Senate Elections Summary Analyses, Racial Subgroups

Table 7: Summary of African American voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	53	55	-2	0.448
Lean or Tossup seat	53	55	-2	0.418
Lean only seat	56	52	+4	0.109
Tossup seat	43	53	-10	0.042
Very Liberals	69	52	+17	0.191
Lean or tossup seat	69	52	+17	0.176
Lean only seat	69	53	+16	0.266
Tossup seat	73	56	+17	0.171
Liberals	61	56	+5	0.382
Lean or tossup seat	61	56	+5	0.382
Lean only seat	62	56	+6	0.262
Tossup seat	54	57	-3	0.654
Moderates	56	52	+4	0.810
Lean or tossup seat	57	52	+5	0.639
Lean only seat	57	52	+5	0.459
Tossup seat	59	53	+6	0.738
Conservatives	52	61	-9	0.293
Lean or tossup seat	51	61	-10	0.236
Lean only seat	51	61	-10	0.385
Tossup seat	49	59	-10	0.310
Very Conservative	42	51	-9	0.630
Lean or tossup seat	41	51	-10	0.542
Lean only seat	40	51	-11	0.509
Tossup seat	63	49	+14	0.606
Tea Party Negative	68	68	0	0.592
Lean or tossup seat	68	68	0	0.673
Lean only seat	68	68	0	0.943
Tossup seat	71	68	+3	0.645
Tea Party Positive	46	59	-13	0.227
Lean or tossup seat	47	59	-12	0.268
Lean only seat	44	60	-16	0.175
Tossup seat	72	56	+16	0.292

The single statistically significant regression coefficient found for all African American voters was for those settled in Tea Party tossup states—Nevada, Colorado, and Utah—which all

have very low black populations.²² In these three states, the likelihood of an African American casting a validated vote was reduced 10 percentage points. This is substantial demobilization, but it cannot be ascribed to the presence of a Tea Party candidate for two reasons. First, there is no trend of mobilization amongst African Americans settled in Tea Party states, as the likelihood of voting when living in Tea Party states vacillates between increasing and decreasing. Second, the fact that many of these African Americans are isolated in their respective communities certainly plays a role in their demobilization. Voting choices are seldom made in isolation, so an African American in a vastly white state such as Utah may have a reduced likelihood of mobilizing because he or she is not amongst fellow blacks. All told, the findings illustrated in Table 7 are largely null results that do not reveal any additional effect on African American voting at the individual level caused by a Tea Party Senate candidate.

²² <http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf>. According to the 2010 Census, Utah was 1.6% black, Colorado was 5% black, and Nevada was 9.4% black. The entire United States population in 2010 was 13.6% black or African American.

Table 8: Summary of white voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	57	57	0	0.825
Lean or Tossup seat	57	58	-1	0.736
Lean only seat	56	58	-2	0.465
Tossup seat	61	57	+4	0.420
Very Liberals	63	68	-5	0.206
Lean or tossup seat	62	68	-6	0.171
Lean only seat	63	67	-4	0.234
Tossup seat	61	67	-6	0.558
Liberals	58	58	0	0.366
Lean or tossup seat	57	58	-1	0.441
Lean only seat	56	59	-3	0.703
Tossup seat	62	58	+4	0.368
Moderates	56	53	+3	0.848
Lean or tossup seat	56	53	+3	0.990
Lean only seat	54	54	0	0.741
Tossup seat	62	53	+9	0.559
Conservatives	70	72	-2	0.915
Lean or tossup seat	70	72	-2	0.859
Lean only seat	70	72	-2	0.501
Tossup seat	74	71	+3	0.083
Very Conservatives	77	80	-3	0.879
Lean or tossup seat	78	80	-2	0.786
Lean only seat	78	80	-2	0.527
Tossup seat	79	80	-1	0.436
Tea Party Negative	69	66	+3	0.213
Lean or tossup seat	69	67	+2	0.289
Lean only seat	67	67	0	0.515
Tossup seat	74	67	+7	0.494
Tea Party Positive	76	77	-1	0.770
Lean or tossup seat	76	77	-1	0.748
Lean only seat	76	77	-1	0.819
Tossup seat	76	77	-1	0.280

The single statistically significant finding for white respondents settled in states where a Tea Party candidate was on the General Election ballot was observed for self-identified conservatives in tossup only seats. The Tea Party is a coalition that certainly trends conservative

rather than liberal, so this finding does not come at any surprise. What is perplexing, however, is that white conservatives settled in tossup Tea Party movement states is the only value that suggests mobilization amongst self-identified conservatives and very conservatives. The lack of strongly significant regression coefficients coupled without any clear pattern for white individual-level voting in Tea Party Senate races provides further null results and does not suggest there is any additional Tea Party movement effect on mobilization.

Table 9: Summary of Latino voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	43	48	-5	0.238
Lean or Tossup seat	43	48	-5	0.256
Lean only seat	44	47	-3	0.652
Tossup seat	41	47	-6	0.101
Very Liberals	62	53	-11	0.697
Lean or tossup seat	53	62	-9	0.824
Lean only seat	61	60	1	0.661
Tossup seat	53	62	-9	0.155
Liberal	35	57	-22	0.002
Lean or tossup seat	34	57	-23	0.002
Lean only seat	32	56	-24	0.003
Tossup seat	43	52	-9	0.418
Moderates	44	47	-3	0.343
Lean or tossup seat	44	48	-4	0.357
Lean only seat	40	48	-8	0.207
Tossup seat	46	61	-15	0.524
Conservatives	58	56	2	0.668
Lean or tossup seat	57	56	1	0.685
Lean only seat	69	54	15	0.017
Tossup seat	26	58	-32	0.012
Very Conservatives	62	67	-5	0.892
Lean or tossup seat	62	67	-5	0.831
Lean only seat	62	67	-5	0.886
Tossup seat	63	65	-2	0.951
Tea Party Negative	57	65	-8	0.119
Lean or tossup seat	57	65	-8	0.136
Lean only seat	56	65	-9	0.228
Tossup seat	62	63	-1	0.483
Tea Party Positive	72	69	+3	0.640
Lean or tossup seat	71	70	+1	0.683
Lean only seat	73	69	+4	0.514
Tossup seat	65	70	-5	0.754

Unlike the summary tables that detailed individual-level voting for African Americans and whites in Tea Party states, Table 9 shows a trend of demobilization for Latino respondents. Of the five statistically significant findings, four of them suggest a reduced likelihood of voting

when a Tea Party Senate candidate is on the ballot. Amongst Latinos who have self-identified themselves as liberal, the trend of demobilization is strongest with high statistical significance in three of the four tests performed. While the liberal subsample amongst Latinos may have shown the strongest trend towards demobilization, the entire summary table also suggests demobilization across all tests. Few of the tests have statistical significance, but many of the p-values that are lower than .16 suggest demobilization, and there are four of these values as well. However, this does not mean that a Tea Party candidate ultimately caused this trend of demobilization amongst Latino voters. The 2010 General Election saw a multitude of individuals concerned about the economy and jobs flock to the polls,²³ which could have dampened the likelihood of voting for Latino individuals because of widespread antipathy towards illegal immigrants, which are mostly Latino in ethnicity. Perhaps widespread strident rhetoric aimed at illegal immigrants chilled the likelihood of Latino voting in states where a Tea Party candidate was running, as a key issue for Tea Party coalitions is illegal immigration.²⁴ Another plausible barrier to building social capital in the Latino community are language barriers that prevent many Latinos from assimilating into English-speaking political networks. In contrast to the summary state tables for African Americans and white respondents, Latino voting at the individual level provided a trend of demobilization that lacked strong enough statistical significance to suggest a Tea Party Senate candidate was the sole cause.

²³http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/ipoll/questionDetail.cfm?keyword=2010%20AND%20%20election%20AND%20%20important%20AND%20%20issues&keywordoptions=1&exclude=&excludeOptions=1&topic=Any&organization=Any&label=&fromdate=1/1/1935&toDate=&stitle=&sponsor=New%20Models&studydate=01-JAN-34&sample=1000&qstn_list=&qstnid=1794447&qa_list=&qstn_id4=1794447&study_list=&lastSearchId=9164070&archno=&keywordDisplay=

²⁴ <http://www.teaparty.org/about-us/>

Table 10: Summary of Asian voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	51	41	+10	0.169
Lean or Tossup seat	51	41	+10	0.146
Lean only seat	53	41	+12	0.096
Tossup seat	44	42	+2	0.872
Very Liberals	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lean or tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lean only seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Liberals	67	45	+22	0.109
Lean or tossup seat	67	45	+22	0.102
Lean only seat	63	46	+17	0.192
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Moderates	43	45	-2	0.640
Lean or tossup seat	44	45	-1	0.716
Lean only seat	42	45	-3	0.751
Tossup seat	47	45	+2	0.701
Conservatives	51	39	+12	0.542
Lean or tossup seat	51	39	+12	0.542
Lean only seat	56	39	+17	0.349
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Very Conservatives	70	63	+7	0.663
Lean or tossup seat	70	63	+7	0.685
Lean only seat	74	62	+12	0.570
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tea Party Negative	66	59	+7	0.752
Lean or tossup seat	68	59	+9	0.609
Lean only seat	67	60	+7	0.586
Tossup seat	73	61	+12	0.852
Tea Party Positive	35	50	-15	0.357
Lean or tossup seat	35	50	-15	0.351
Lean only seat	42	50	-8	0.676
Tossup seat	13	50	-37	0.119

The single most important detail to note when examining Table 10 is that there was not one single significant regression coefficient for Asian respondents in Tea Party states regardless of subsample. No regression coefficients were available for very liberal respondents, liberal

respondents in tossup Tea Party states, conservative respondents in tossup Tea Party states, and very conservative respondents in tossup Tea Party states because there were too few observations. In the entire 55,400 person CCES sample, the number of Asian respondents was only 668, which is partially why there are no statistically significant regression coefficients and multiple missing values. Very liberal respondents are the ideological group with the fewest number of individuals, causing there to be no results for Asian very liberal respondents. There is a general trend of mobilization bordering on statistical significance amongst Asian liberal respondents, but data limitations prevent the author from extracting any meaningful pattern from those values.

The Tea Party and the 2010 House Elections, Weighted Samples

Of the nearly 130 Tea Party movement candidates that ran for US House Congressional District seats, as many as 42 were victorious.²⁵ All variables used, with the exception of the location of the Tea Party candidate are identical to the ones used previously in the Senate elections.

Similar to the Senate elections, tests examining the likelihood of a minority individual voting while settled in a district where a Tea Party candidate is running suggest demobilization for certain racial subgroups, but without a clear trend.

Table 11: African American voting in Tea Party districts, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.519 (13.60)***	-0.521 (13.63)***	-0.521 (13.62)***	-0.520 (13.61)***
Education	0.240 (17.17)***	0.240 (17.18)***	0.240 (17.18)***	0.240 (17.16)***
Income	0.109 (18.06)***	0.109 (18.05)***	0.109 (18.04)***	0.109 (18.03)***
Age	0.073 (8.85)***	0.073 (8.86)***	0.073 (8.87)***	0.073 (8.86)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.87)***	-0.000 (2.88)***	-0.000 (2.88)***	-0.000 (2.87)***
Black in Tea Party state	-0.281 (1.69)*			
Black in Tea Party leaning state		-0.415 (1.48)		
Black in Tea Party leaning or tossup state			-0.466 (2.12)**	
Black in Tea Party tossup state				-0.513 (1.52)
Constant	-3.281 (15.03)***	-3.283 (15.05)***	-3.282 (15.04)***	-3.268 (14.99)***
<i>N</i>	37,051	37,051	37,051	37,051

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

²⁵ Courser, Zachary (2010) "The Tea Party at the Election," *The Forum*: Vol. 8: Iss. 4, Article 5.

African American voters were the one racial subgroup that provided the clearest trend of demobilization results. As shown in Table 11, African Americans settled in Tea Party Congressional districts were demobilized at a significance rate of 10%, but were further demobilized at a more statistically significant level of 5% in Tea Party Congressional districts that were labeled either a leaning or tossup seat. Further, the coefficient for African American voters living in districts with a Tea Party House candidate engaged in a tossup election is more negative than for Models 1 and 2, but it is not statistically significant. While all the regression coefficients were not significant, they all trend in the same direction and suggest demobilization for African American citizens settled in districts where a Tea Party candidate ran in the General Election in 2010.

Unlike the Tea Party movement Senate elections, Latino voters did not clearly demobilize or mobilize in any particular type of Congressional race, as noted in Table 12. The results, none of which are significant, all suggest a small rate of mobilization for Latino voters that were settled in Tea Party congressional districts.

Table 12: Latino voting in Tea Party districts, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.580 (14.80)***	-0.581 (14.82)***	-0.581 (14.80)***	-0.580 (14.80)***
Education	0.244 (17.01)***	0.244 (17.02)***	0.244 (17.01)***	0.244 (17.00)***
Income	0.114 (18.32)***	0.113 (18.31)***	0.113 (18.32)***	0.113 (18.29)***
Age	0.072 (8.48)***	0.072 (8.52)***	0.072 (8.49)***	0.072 (8.48)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.65)***	-0.000 (2.68)***	-0.000 (2.66)***	-0.000 (2.64)***
Latino in Tea Party district	0.124 (0.62)			
Latino in Tea Party leaning district		0.215 (0.58)		
Latino in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			0.171 (0.71)	
Latino in Tea Party tossup district				0.128 (0.44)
Constant	-3.206 (14.28)***	-3.211 (14.34)***	-3.206 (14.30)***	-3.192 (14.24)***
<i>N</i>	35,594	35,594	35,594	35,594

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

The coefficients appear to be trending towards mobilization, but with all 4 tests having p-values above .5, it is likely random noise.

Asian voters settled in Tea Party districts showed no voting trends, as depicted in Table 13. Although the coefficients were all positive suggesting mobilization, the remarkably high p-values render these findings inconclusive.

Table 13: Asian voting in Tea Party districts, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.597 (14.74)***	-0.598 (14.76)***	-0.597 (14.74)***	-0.596 (14.73)***
Education	0.239 (16.22)***	0.239 (16.22)***	0.239 (16.22)***	0.239 (16.21)***
Income	0.109 (17.10)***	0.109 (17.10)***	0.109 (17.10)***	0.109 (17.05)***
Age	0.073 (8.39)***	0.073 (8.42)***	0.073 (8.39)***	0.073 (8.40)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.75)***	-0.000 (2.78)***	-0.000 (2.76)***	-0.000 (2.76)***
Asian in Tea Party district	0.174 (0.47)			
Asian in Tea Party leaning district		0.309 (0.47)		
Asian in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			0.250 (0.61)	
Asian in tossup district				0.167 (0.40)
Constant	-3.159 (13.58)***	-3.163 (13.62)***	-3.158 (13.59)***	-3.148 (13.55)***
<i>N</i>	33,097	33,097	33,097	33,097

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

White voters, similar to Latinos and Asians, showed no general trend of mobilization after running tests. As shown in Table 14, white voters show a pattern of demobilization but without any statistical significance.

Table 14: White voting in Tea Party districts, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.536 (15.04)***	-0.536 (15.04)***	-0.536 (15.03)***	-0.535 (15.02)***
Education	0.244 (18.62)***	0.243 (18.60)***	0.243 (18.61)***	0.243 (18.61)***
Income	0.106 (18.73)***	0.106 (18.71)***	0.106 (18.73)***	0.106 (18.70)***
Age	0.081 (10.65)***	0.082 (10.67)***	0.081 (10.65)***	0.081 (10.65)***
Age squared	-0.000 (4.11)***	-0.000 (4.13)***	-0.000 (4.12)***	-0.000 (4.11)***
White in Tea Party district	-0.070 (0.59)			
White in Tea Party leaning district		0.180 (0.90)		
White in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			-0.025 (0.18)	
White in Tea Party tossup district				-0.224 (1.13)
Constant	-3.814 (18.99)***	-3.797 (18.98)***	-3.805 (19.00)***	-3.805 (19.03)***
<i>N</i>	42,487	42,487	42,487	42,487

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

When the subsample is restricted to individuals who have identified as moderate, liberal, or very liberal, I am able to better pinpoint the subgroup of African Americans who are demobilized. As shown in Table 15, African Americans who identified themselves as moderate, liberal or very liberal appear to become more demobilized based upon the competitiveness of the Tea Party House race. It is worth noting that the coefficient for the interaction between African Americans and all Tea Party districts is .11, which narrowly escapes statistical significance.

Table 15: African American voting in Tea Party districts, Moderate, Liberal, and Very Liberal respondents, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.397 (7.86)***	-0.398 (7.87)***	-0.400 (7.91)***	-0.400 (7.91)***
Education	0.263 (14.52)***	0.264 (14.55)***	0.264 (14.53)***	0.263 (14.52)***
Income	0.086 (10.91)***	0.086 (10.92)***	0.085 (10.90)***	0.086 (10.91)***
Age	0.081 (7.32)***	0.081 (7.33)***	0.081 (7.34)***	0.081 (7.30)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.83)***	-0.000 (2.84)***	-0.000 (2.85)***	-0.000 (2.82)***
Black in Tea Party district	-0.309 (1.59)			
Black in Tea Party leaning district		-0.352 (1.14)		
Black in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			-0.648 (2.56)**	
Black in Tea Party tossup district				-1.108 (2.75)***
Constant	-3.586 (12.37)***	-3.588 (12.42)***	-3.595 (12.43)***	-3.575 (12.36)***
<i>N</i>	19,409	19,409	19,409	19,409

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Amongst individuals who have identified themselves as moderate, liberal, or very liberal, African Americans show a demobilization trend that strengthens as the Tea Party House race becomes more competitive.

Restricting the subsample further to only self-identified moderate voters provides a more accurate picture of which African Americans were demobilized, as shown in Table 16.

Table 16: African American voting in Tea Party districts, Moderate respondents, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.404 (6.05)***	-0.404 (6.05)***	-0.408 (6.10)***	-0.407 (6.09)***
Education	0.279 (10.99)***	0.279 (11.01)***	0.280 (11.00)***	0.279 (10.98)***
Income	0.085 (7.89)***	0.084 (7.87)***	0.084 (7.85)***	0.084 (7.85)***
Age	0.097 (6.29)***	0.097 (6.31)***	0.097 (6.31)***	0.097 (6.28)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.99)***	-0.000 (3.00)***	-0.000 (3.00)***	-0.000 (2.97)***
Black voter in Tea Party district	-0.367 (1.50)			
Black voter in Tea Party leaning district		-0.406 (1.09)		
Black voter in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			-0.710 (2.26)**	
Black voter in Tea Party tossup district				-1.241 (2.29)**
Constant	-4.147 (9.95)***	-4.142 (9.98)***	-4.140 (9.97)***	-4.118 (9.92)***
<i>N</i>	10,047	10,047	10,047	10,047

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Clearly, African American moderate voters were considerably demobilized in the closest Tea Party district races, and this effect strengthened as the districts became more competitive.

Tea Party House Elections Summary Analyses, Racial Subgroups

Table 17: Summary of African American voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	46	51	-5	0.092
Lean or Tossup seat	43	51	-8	0.034
Lean only seat	45	51	-6	0.139
Tossup seat	40	51	-10	0.128
Very Liberals	48	56	-8	0.928
Lean or tossup seat	49	56	-7	0.911
Lean only seat	48	56	-8	0.813
Tossup seat	57	56	1	0.965
Liberals	53	56	-3	0.678
Lean or tossup seat	49	56	-7	0.251
Lean only seat	54	55	-1	0.711
Tossup seat	42	56	-14	0.137
Moderates	47	52	-5	0.133
Lean or tossup seat	40	52	-12	0.024
Lean only seat	47	51	-4	0.274
Tossup seat	29	52	-23	0.022
Conservatives	59	57	2	0.972
Lean or tossup seat	47	58	-9	0.344
Lean only seat	48	58	-10	0.374
Tossup seat	47	58	-11	0.645
Very Conservatives	64	43	+21	0.096
Lean or tossup seat	63	43	+20	0.266
Lean only seat	57	45	+12	0.647
Tossup seat	65	44	+21	0.291
Tea Party Negative	60	67	-7	0.166
Lean or tossup seat	59	66	-7	0.131
Lean only seat	53	66	-13	0.044
Tossup seat	73	66	+7	0.566
Tea Party Positive	54	56	-2	0.848
Lean or tossup seat	66	55	+11	0.344
Lean only seat	59	56	+3	0.881
Tossup seat	73	56	+17	0.296

Amongst all the racial subgroups, African Americans settled in Tea Party Congressional districts displayed the clearest trend of demobilization. As shown in Table 17 above, the vast majority of African American respondents regardless of ideological subsample were

demobilized, and all statistically significant regression coefficients pointed in the same direction towards demobilization. A key part of the above table is the high rate of demobilization for moderate African Americans in Tea Party tossup congressional districts. A plurality of all CCES respondents identify themselves as moderate, and thus this is the largest subsample of African American voters in this dataset. Moreover, the largest subgroup of African Americans contained in the CCES exhibited a strong trend of demobilization when a Tea Party candidate was running in hotly contested races. Very conservative respondents and respondents who held a positive view of the Tea Party had an expected pattern of mobilization, although without statistical significance. Ascribing this trend to the presence of a Tea Party candidate is a difficult task, however, as Tea Party congressional districts examined in this study were much whiter and contained fewer African Americans than the nation at large.²⁶ Similar to the demobilization trend found in states where a Tea Party candidate was running, the effect of social isolation probably played a larger role in the demobilization equation than the presence of a Tea Party candidate. One way social capital is built is through constructive dialogue, and individuals who are members of the out-groups in their respective communities often fail to interact and subsequently acquire knowledge of politics.

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http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_10_1YR_B02001&prodType=table

Table 18: Summary of white voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	56	55	+1	0.554
Lean or Tossup seat	57	55	+2	0.860
Lean only seat	58	55	+3	0.367
Tossup seat	55	56	-1	0.259
Very Liberals	68	65	+3	0.345
Lean or tossup seat	61	66	-5	0.273
Lean only seat	55	66	-11	0.512
Tossup seat	68	65	+3	0.345
Liberals	56	56	0	0.599
Lean or tossup seat	59	55	+4	0.654
Lean only seat	59	55	+4	0.781
Tossup seat	59	56	+3	0.748
Moderates	54	52	+2	0.473
Lean or tossup seat	55	52	+3	0.108
Lean only seat	55	52	+3	0.452
Tossup seat	54	52	+2	0.124
Conservatives	71	69	+2	0.812
Lean or tossup seat	70	69	+1	0.667
Lean only seat	74	69	+5	0.697
Tossup seat	66	70	-4	0.369
Very Conservatives	79	79	0	0.384
Lean or tossup seat	80	79	+1	0.969
Lean only seat	81	79	+2	0.661
Tossup seat	80	79	+1	0.728
Tea Party Negative	66	65	+1	0.746
Lean or tossup seat	69	65	+4	0.682
Lean only seat	71	65	+6	0.167
Tossup seat	67	65	+2	0.314
Tea Party Positive	75	75	0	0.529
Lean or tossup seat	74	75	-1	0.168
Lean only seat	75	75	0	0.699
Tossup seat	73	75	-2	0.063

With the exception of white voters who possessed a positive view of the Tea Party movement in tossup seat districts, there were no statistically significant regression coefficients. The vastly white composition of the Tea Party and its' supporters helps to provide context for the small trend of mobilization shown above in Table 18. Regression coefficient p-values that

approach statistical significance mostly point towards a small degree of mobilization. It is doubtful that these values, which suggest mobilization, are due to the presence of a Tea Party House candidate. Many of these white individuals are settled in milieus where they are among individuals of the same racial and social group. The fact that the rate of mobilization did not increase as the districts became more competitive provides further evidence against the notion that a Tea Party House candidate affected individual-level voting. Being among individuals of the same political creed stimulates turnout in comparison to being isolated in a given community, as noted in the previous summary analysis for African Americans. While white voters certainly displayed a trend of mobilization in Tea Party congressional districts, attributing this effect to the Tea Party would be an error in judgment because of the scarcity in statistical significance.

Table 19: Summary of Latino voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	47	43	+4	0.537
Lean or Tossup seat	48	43	+5	0.477
Lean only seat	51	43	+8	0.564
Tossup seat	45	44	+1	0.657
Very Liberals	47	57	-10	0.945
Lean or tossup seat	48	57	-9	0.701
Lean only seat	45	57	-12	0.966
Tossup seat	55	56	-1	0.810
Liberals	47	49	-2	0.705
Lean or tossup seat	39	50	-11	0.101
Lean only seat	22	50	-28	0.002
Tossup seat	50	49	+1	0.821
Moderates	51	42	-9	0.431
Lean or tossup seat	50	42	-8	0.545
Lean only seat	62	42	+20	0.223
Tossup seat	43	43	0	0.824
Conservatives	51	55	-4	0.463
Lean or tossup seat	59	54	+5	0.610
Lean only seat	72	54	+18	0.280
Tossup seat	50	55	-5	0.975
Very Conservative	66	65	+1	0.948
Lean or tossup seat	67	65	+2	0.948
Lean only seat	83	65	+18	0.274
Tossup seat	62	66	-4	0.683
Tea Party Negative	62	60	+2	0.913
Lean or tossup seat	58	61	-3	0.484
Lean only seat	60	60	0	0.652
Tossup seat	56	61	-5	0.589
Tea Party Positive	70	68	+2	0.761
Lean or tossup seat	69	68	+1	0.857
Lean only seat	73	68	+5	0.667
Tossup seat	66	68	-2	0.986

Latino respondents settled in Tea Party Congressional districts displayed one statistically significance regression coefficient, as shown in Table 19. Latinos that have also identified themselves as liberal settled in districts that were leaning only races showed a strong demobilization effect. However, this effect does not carry over to the tossup district races and

thus we cannot extract any clear trend from the data. Unlike the tests that were run for African Americans and whites, tests for Latino respondents did not suggest demobilization or mobilization. Roughly half of all the above values suggest demobilization, and the other half suggests mobilization, and nearly all lack statistical significance, which leads us to conclude that these are null results.

Table 20: Summary of Asian voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	42	38	+4	0.639
Lean or Tossup seat	44	38	+6	0.543
Lean only seat	47	38	+9	0.636
Tossup seat	41	38	+3	0.688
Very Liberals	78	52	+26	0.100
Lean or tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lean only seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Liberals	49	42	+7	0.714
Lean or tossup seat	57	41	+16	0.536
Lean only seat	81	40	+41	0.111
Tossup seat	43	25	+28	0.268
Moderates	39	43	-4	0.490
Lean or tossup seat	41	42	-1	0.718
Lean only seat	33	43	-10	0.420
Tossup seat	48	42	+6	0.717
Conservatives	35	35	0	0.947
Lean or tossup seat	24	36	-12	0.429
Lean only seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tossup seat	24	36	-12	0.631
Very Conservatives	65	58	+7	0.703
Lean or tossup seat	62	59	+3	0.970
Lean only seat	77	57	+20	0.473
Tossup seat	36	61	-25	0.326
Tea Party Negative	69	55	+14	0.415
Lean or tossup seat	78	55	+23	0.214
Lean only seat	55	56	-1	0.669
Tossup seat	90	55	+35	0.078
Tea Party Positive	54	43	+11	0.425
Lean or tossup seat	44	45	-1	0.993
Lean only seat	32	45	-13	0.448
Tossup seat	53	44	+9	0.452

Similar to Table 10, which summarizes Asian voting in Tea Party states, Table 20 shown above contains missing values because of the scarcity of Asian respondents in the CCES sample. The two significant values suggest that Asian voters mobilized substantially when settled in Tea Party House districts. Other values shown in Table 20 provide a puzzling picture of the

mobilization equation as it pertains to Asian voters, as most values are positive but very few are statistically significant and there are also eight that are negative. The rates of mobilization do not increase as the districts become more competitive, nor do they become more statistically significant. Because there is no trend regarding mobilization combined with the very small number of Asian respondents, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and thus the Tea Party did not have an additional effect on Asian voting in House districts.

Chapter 3 Conservatives, Liberals, Moderates and the Tea Party

The Tea Party's influence on various political groups, 2010 Senate Elections

One of the goals of the Tea Party movement was to mobilize political neophytes that would otherwise remain disengaged from the political process. A Gallup poll taken in October 2010 showed 73% of those surveyed thought that the Tea Party had “energized more people to get involved in the political process.”²⁷ While this may be true, it is still unclear how many of these newly mobilized individuals identify themselves politically. More importantly, it is worth investigating if the effect of the Tea Party movement extends beyond minority subgroups. There was not one Tea Party Senate or House candidate who was a Democrat, but this still doesn't mean that all Tea Party movement supporters are far right—many individuals who call themselves conservatives have a negative view of the Tea Party.²⁸ In this chapter I discuss the Tea Party movement effect, or lack thereof, on various ideological groups such as liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Holding constant the same controls as the previous chapter—age, education, income, and sex—I have created dummy variables for individuals who have self-identified themselves as either very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, or very conservative. The baseline for these binary variables is respondents who responded anything but the ideological classification of interest. The only variable that has been changed is the variable interacted with the type of Tea Party movement Congressional seat.

Logistical regression results for very liberals and liberals settled in states with a Tea Party movement candidate showed few statistically significant coefficients and no clear trend of demobilization or mobilization, either. However, in states with Tea Party candidates in all phases of competitiveness, moderate voters appear to have mobilized. Table 21 displays voting

²⁷ <http://www.gallup.com/poll/147635/tea-party-movement.aspx>

²⁸ <http://www.people-press.org/2013/10/16/tea-partys-image-turns-more-negative/>

trends for moderate voters in states where a Tea Party candidate was on the General Election ballot.

Table 21: Moderate voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.498 (12.34)***	-0.497 (12.32)***	-0.498 (12.34)***	-0.498 (12.34)***
Education	0.237 (16.11)***	0.237 (16.10)***	0.237 (16.12)***	0.237 (16.07)***
Income	0.111 (17.25)***	0.111 (17.23)***	0.111 (17.24)***	0.111 (17.22)***
Age	0.080 (9.33)***	0.080 (9.30)***	0.080 (9.33)***	0.081 (9.38)***
Age squared	-0.000 (3.26)***	-0.000 (3.24)***	-0.000 (3.26)***	-0.000 (3.31)***
Moderate in Tea Party state	0.192 (2.01)**			
Moderate in Tea Party leaning state		0.120 (1.18)		
Moderate in Tea Party leaning or tossup state			0.197 (2.04)**	
Moderate in Tea Party tossup state				0.452 (2.04)**
Constant	-3.461 (15.48)***	-3.452 (15.43)***	-3.458 (15.47)***	-3.484 (15.62)***
<i>N</i>	32,983	32,983	32,983	32,983

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Moderate voters settled in states with Tea Party Senate candidates show a strong trend of mobilization with statistically significant results at the 95% level. All four tests ran for moderate voters in Tea Party states point in the same direction towards mobilization, and three of the four tests ran yield significant results.

When the subsample is restricted to white respondents only, there appears to be a trend of mobilization amongst self-identified moderates in Tea Party states, as shown in Table 22 below. Two of the tests ran had regression coefficients significant at the 95% level, and similar to Table 21, all four regression coefficients suggested a small mobilization effect.

Table 22: Moderate voting in Tea Party states, white subsample, 2010 CCES

	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote
Sex	-0.563 (12.10)***	-0.562 (12.07)***	-0.563 (12.10)***	-0.563 (12.11)***
Education	0.229 (13.63)***	0.229 (13.59)***	0.230 (13.63)***	0.229 (13.57)***
Income	0.116 (15.94)***	0.116 (15.91)***	0.116 (15.94)***	0.116 (15.90)***
Age	0.068 (6.82)***	0.068 (6.81)***	0.068 (6.82)***	0.069 (6.88)***
Age squared	-0.000 (1.85)*	-0.000 (1.83)*	-0.000 (1.84)*	-0.000 (1.91)*
Moderate in Tea Party state	0.221 (2.05)**			
Moderate in Tea Party leaning state		0.178 (1.56)		
Moderate in Tea Party tossup or leaning state			0.219 (2.02)**	
Moderate in Tea Party tossup state				0.311 (1.21)
Constant	-2.961 (11.10)***	-2.950 (11.05)***	-2.958 (11.09)***	-2.999 (11.27)***
<i>N</i>	25,293	25,293	25,293	25,293

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Although tossup alone and leaning alone Tea Party states did not return statistically significant regression coefficients, the combination of Tea Party leaning and tossup states provided significance at the 95% level.

Table 23: Liberal voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote
Sex	-0.502 (12.46)***	-0.502 (12.45)***	-0.502 (12.45)***	-0.502 (12.44)***
Education	0.232 (15.69)***	0.232 (15.68)***	0.232 (15.69)***	0.232 (15.64)***
Income	0.110 (17.22)***	0.110 (17.18)***	0.110 (17.21)***	0.110 (17.21)***
Age	0.081 (9.43)***	0.081 (9.42)***	0.081 (9.43)***	0.081 (9.44)***
Age squared	-0.000 (3.32)***	-0.000 (3.32)***	-0.000 (3.32)***	-0.000 (3.33)***
Liberal in Tea Party state	-0.071 (0.62)			
Liberal in Tea Party leaning state		-0.087 (0.70)		
Liberal in Tea Party leaning or tossup state			-0.077 (0.67)	
Liberal in Tea Party tossup state				-0.032 (0.13)
Constant	-3.562 (15.91)***	-3.549 (15.86)***	-3.560 (15.90)***	-3.565 (15.97)***
<i>N</i>	32,983	32,983	32,983	32,983

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Liberal voters in Tea Party states shown above in Table 23 yielded zero statistically significant regression coefficients for any level of race competitiveness, but all interaction coefficients did suggest demobilization. The presence of a Tea Party candidate on the General Election ballot for liberal respondents provided more null results, which means we cannot say with confidence that the Tea Party movement had an effect on liberal voting behavior.

Table 24: Liberal voting in Tea Party states, Latino subsample, 2010 CCES

	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote
Sex	-0.332 (2.11)**	-0.320 (2.05)**	-0.332 (2.12)**	-0.339 (2.16)**
Education	0.287 (5.04)***	0.283 (4.94)***	0.286 (5.03)***	0.292 (5.16)***
Income	0.130 (4.82)***	0.133 (4.93)***	0.130 (4.82)***	0.131 (4.94)***
Age	0.085 (2.25)**	0.083 (2.21)**	0.085 (2.25)**	0.079 (2.06)**
Age Squared	-0.000 (0.74)	-0.000 (0.71)	-0.000 (0.74)	-0.000 (0.58)
Liberal in Tea Party state	-1.104 (2.81)***			
Liberal in Tea Party leaning state		-1.295 (3.11)***		
Liberal in Tea Party tossup or leaning state			-1.108 (2.81)***	
Liberal in Tea Party tossup state				-0.077 (0.09)
Constant	-4.812 (5.67)***	-4.801 (5.70)***	-4.811 (5.67)***	-4.673 (5.50)***
<i>N</i>	2,237	2,237	2,237	2,237

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

When the subsample is restricted to Latinos, there is a clear trend of demobilization amongst liberal respondents with strong statistical significance for three of the four tests run. The fourth test which examines the most competitive Tea Party races did not yield significant regression coefficients, but it still suggests demobilization for liberal Latinos in those states. Rather than the presence of a Tea Party candidate being the cause of the demobilization, these coefficients suggest that isolated partisans are less likely to engage in the voting process. When the sample is further restricted to Latino respondents the demobilization trend becomes clearer with statistical significance.

Table 25: Conservative voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote
Sex	-0.466 (11.51)***	-0.465 (11.50)***	-0.466 (11.51)***	-0.465 (11.48)***
Education	0.242 (16.38)***	0.242 (16.37)***	0.242 (16.38)***	0.241 (16.33)***
Income	0.105 (16.36)***	0.105 (16.34)***	0.105 (16.36)***	0.105 (16.33)***
Age	0.080 (9.23)***	0.080 (9.22)***	0.080 (9.23)***	0.080 (9.25)***
Age squared	-0.000 (3.37)***	-0.000 (3.36)***	-0.000 (3.37)***	-0.000 (3.38)***
Conservative in Tea Party state	-0.116 (1.13)			
Conservative in Tea Party leaning state		-0.053 (0.48)		
Conservative in Tea Party leaning or tossup state			-0.109 (1.05)	
Conservative in Tea Party tossup state				-0.279 (1.27)
Constant	-3.644 (16.24)***	-3.625 (16.15)***	-3.641 (16.22)***	-3.648 (16.28)***
<i>N</i>	32,983	32,983	32,983	32,983

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 25 shown above suggests that conservative respondents were demobilized in Tea Party states across all levels of competitiveness. This is a finding that was unexpected, as most Tea Party movement supporters identify themselves as either conservative or very conservative.²⁹ The mixture of counter-intuitive negative regression coefficients combined with zero statistical significance renders these results null, and thus we cannot say that the presence of a Tea Party candidate influenced individual level turnout for conservative respondents.

²⁹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/politics/15poll.html>

Tea Party Senate Election Summary Analyses, Ideological Subgroups

Table 26: Summary of Very Liberal voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	64	65	+1	0.757
Lean or Tossup seat	64	65	+1	0.653
Lean only seat	64	65	-1	0.979
Tossup seat	61	65	+4	0.337
Whites	66	71	-5	0.258
Lean or tossup seat	65	71	-6	0.186
Lean only seat	66	70	-4	0.437
Tossup seat	63	70	-7	0.265
African Americans	64	43	+21	0.338
Lean or tossup seat	64	43	+21	0.340
Lean only seat	63	44	+19	0.472
Tossup seat	65	48	+17	0.103
Latinos	41	51	-10	0.696
Lean or tossup seat	41	50	-9	0.754
Lean only seat	49	48	+1	0.746
Tossup seat	21	50	-29	0.102
Asians	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lean or tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lean only seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tea Party Negative	80	75	+5	0.342
Lean or tossup seat	80	75	+5	0.380
Lean only seat	81	75	+6	0.124
Tossup seat	75	76	-1	0.261
Tea Party Positive	49	39	+10	0.333
Lean or tossup seat	49	39	+10	0.342
Lean only seat	42	40	+2	0.815
Tossup seat	74	39	+35	0.079

Respondents who identified themselves as very liberal were the smallest ideological subgroup in the entire CCES sample, which explains the empty values for Asian respondents seen above in Table 23. There was only one statistically significant regression coefficient, very liberal voters who had a positive view of the Tea Party movement apparently mobilized at a large rate, but this is random noise and does not make intuitive sense. Perhaps very liberal voters see the Tea Party movement as an insubordinate coalition under the Republican Party umbrella and

wish to see Tea Party candidates succeed because it adds turmoil to the Republican caucus. Still, it is more likely that this is random noise and nothing can truly be drawn from it. Other regression coefficients that approached statistical significance saw voting trends move in separate directions—mobilization for African Americans settled in tossup Tea Party states, and demobilization for Latinos living in tossup Tea Party states—thus it is difficult to determine a cause for this trend. In summary, Table 23 contributes to the pattern found throughout this study of null results that suggest the presence of a Tea Party candidate did not have an additional effect on individual voting behavior.

Table 27: Summary of Liberal voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	58	58	0	0.535
Lean or Tossup seat	57	59	-2	0.506
Lean only seat	57	59	-2	0.481
Tossup seat	61	58	+3	0.900
Whites	61	62	-1	0.989
Lean or tossup seat	61	62	-1	0.923
Lean only seat	60	62	-2	0.846
Tossup seat	65	61	+4	0.985
African Americans	52	48	+4	0.851
Lean or tossup seat	52	48	+4	0.904
Lean only seat	53	48	+5	0.998
Tossup seat	44	49	-5	0.782
Latinos	24	44	-20	0.005
Lean or tossup seat	24	44	-20	0.005
Lean only seat	22	43	-21	0.002
Tossup seat	33	39	-6	0.925
Asians	59	42	+17	0.592
Lean or tossup seat	59	42	+17	0.614
Lean only seat	57	42	+15	0.928
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tea Party Negative	69	70	-1	0.144
Lean or tossup seat	69	70	-1	0.149
Lean only seat	68	71	-3	0.173
Tossup seat	74	70	-4	0.543
Tea Party Positive	40	50	-10	0.352
Lean or tossup seat	40	50	-10	0.326
Lean only seat	43	48	-5	0.630
Tossup seat	12	48	-36	0.077

Liberals that were settled in Tea Party districts displayed no clear trend of mobilization or demobilization, but with the subsample of Latino respondents there was strong statistical significance. This can be at least partially attributed to language barriers within the Latino community who are settled in states where political networks have not made a substantial effort to absorb Latino members. Illegal immigration being a topic of heated social discussion only compounds the isolation effect, as many Latinos look similar and thus do not want to be labeled or associated with illegal migrants. The results displayed above in Table 27 provide evidence

that suggests many Tea Party Senate candidates were settled in areas where liberals were the political minority, and the Latino subsample intensified the potent effect of political isolation. The other statistically significant regression coefficient belonged to liberals who had a positive view of the Tea Party, which unexpectedly suggested strong demobilization in Tea Party tossup seats. Above all, tests that examined liberal voters in Tea Party states returned largely null results with the exception of Latino respondents who showed a trend towards demobilization.

Table 28: Summary of Moderate voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	55	53	+2	0.045
Lean or Tossup seat	55	53	+2	0.041
Lean only seat	54	53	+1	0.238
Tossup seat	63	53	+10	0.041
Whites	59	56	+3	0.041
Lean or tossup seat	58	56	+2	0.044
Lean only seat	57	56	+1	0.118
Tossup seat	64	56	+8	0.225
African Americans	47	43	+4	0.834
Lean or tossup seat	48	43	+5	0.653
Lean only seat	48	43	+5	0.977
Tossup seat	49	44	+5	0.113
Latinos	31	33	-2	0.700
Lean or tossup seat	31	33	-2	0.703
Lean only seat	27	34	-7	0.423
Tossup seat	47	32	+15	0.003
Asians	36	35	+1	0.314
Lean or tossup seat	37	35	+2	0.348
Lean only seat	38	35	+3	0.412
Tossup seat	34	35	-1	0.964
Tea Party Negative	70	65	+5	0.056
Lean or tossup seat	70	65	+5	0.040
Lean only seat	68	66	+2	0.118
Tossup seat	78	66	+12	0.165
Tea Party Positive	67	68	-1	0.985
Lean or tossup seat	67	68	-1	0.957
Lean only seat	68	68	0	0.791
Tossup seat	64	68	-4	0.496

Of all the ideological groups, moderate respondents displayed the clearest trend of mobilization when a Tea Party Senate candidate was running in the General Election. While the rate of mobilization appears small, it is significant at the 95% level, and the rate of mobilization increases as the race becomes more competitive. This provides valuable information on the individuals who ultimately elected Tea Party members into the Senate. When the subsample is restricted to whites, the regression coefficients are significant for two of the four tests, and all

tests suggest mobilization. Moderates and more specifically, white moderates, were some of the individuals responsible for electing Tea Party Senators across the United States. Further, all statistically significant regression coefficients regardless of subsample point towards mobilization. Perhaps the strong mobilization effect for moderate Latinos in Tea Party tossup states—Utah, Colorado, and Nevada—is rooted in an antipathy towards illegal immigration; recent immigrants who have voted in federal elections are all citizens and thus may agree with strident Tea Party rhetoric aimed at illegal aliens. Moderates who held a negative view of the Tea Party mobilized possibly to combat the wave of Tea Party individuals entering Congress, but the reason for this remains unclear. Rather than attributing the mobilization of moderates to the presence of a Tea Party candidate, a more reasonable explanation would be discontent with President Barack Obama's policies. The handful of strongly significant regression coefficients provide reason to believe these are not null results, but instead they are caused by an outside force such as discontent with the incumbent government.

Table 29: Summary of Conservative voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	62	64	-2	0.259
Lean or Tossup seat	62	64	-2	0.292
Lean only seat	62	64	-2	0.630
Tossup seat	63	63	0	0.204
Whites	67	68	-1	0.349
Lean or tossup seat	67	68	-1	0.424
Lean only seat	66	68	-2	0.569
Tossup seat	69	68	+1	0.575
African Americans	39	46	-7	0.096
Lean or tossup seat	38	46	-8	0.068
Lean only seat	39	46	-7	0.060
Tossup seat	36	45	-9	0.980
Latinos	38	38	0	0.521
Lean or tossup seat	38	38	0	0.533
Lean only seat	48	36	+12	0.027
Tossup seat	16	40	-24	0.027
Asians	36	21	+15	0.665
Lean or tossup seat	36	21	+15	0.684
Lean only seat	40	21	+19	0.583
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tea Party Negative	59	63	-4	0.343
Lean or tossup seat	57	64	-7	0.255
Lean only seat	55	64	-9	0.226
Tossup seat	72	61	+11	0.849
Tea Party Positive	79	80	-1	0.787
Lean or tossup seat	79	80	-1	0.887
Lean only seat	79	80	-1	0.993
Tossup seat	81	79	+2	0.732

The results displayed in Table 29 suggest a pattern of demobilization for conservatives who are also African American, but every other subsample provides conflicting voting trends. A possible explanation for African Americans demobilizing in Tea Party states would be the vastly white composition of those states, but it cannot be applied to Tea Party tossup states because of the high p-value. Conservative Latinos appear intensely mobilized in leaning only Tea Party states, but then strongly demobilized in Tea Party tossup states. The conflicting nature of Latino

voting renders its findings null because there is no trend and thus we cannot conclude with confidence that the Tea Party influenced this phenomenon.

Table 30: Summary of Very Conservative voting in Tea Party states, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	67	71	-4	0.094
Lean or Tossup seat	68	71	-3	0.167
Lean only seat	67	71	-4	0.225
Tossup seat	70	70	0	0.520
Whites	71	75	-4	0.178
Lean or tossup seat	71	75	-4	0.304
Lean only seat	71	75	-4	0.469
Tossup seat	73	74	-1	0.373
African Americans	31	39	-8	0.204
Lean or tossup seat	31	39	-8	0.197
Lean only seat	30	39	-9	0.120
Tossup seat	52	38	+14	0.398
Latinos	43	46	-3	0.797
Lean or tossup seat	43	46	-3	0.788
Lean only seat	44	45	-1	0.732
Tossup seat	40	45	-5	0.948
Asians	61	40	+21	0.580
Lean or tossup seat	61	40	+21	0.594
Lean only seat	64	40	+21	0.568
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tea Party Negative	43	54	-11	0.454
Lean or tossup seat	43	54	-11	0.486
Lean only seat	34	57	-23	0.212
Tossup seat	88	47	+41	0.091
Tea Party Positive	80	84	-4	0.130
Lean or tossup seat	81	84	-3	0.209
Lean only seat	81	83	-2	0.363
Tossup seat	80	83	-3	0.400

Tests run examining very conservative respondents settled in Tea Party states returned only two statistically significant regression coefficients, both of which were significant at an alpha level of .10. One of the significant tests suggested very conservative respondents demobilized across all Tea Party states, while the other points toward a very high rate of mobilization for very conservative respondents who held a negative view of the Tea Party. Because there is a varied mixture of positive and negative coefficients with very few of them

significant, we cannot assume a trend of mobilization, and more importantly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the presence of a Tea Party candidate did not have an effect on individual voting.

The Tea Party's influence on various political groups, 2010 House elections

After running tests assessing the mobilization rates of individuals who identified themselves as either very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, or very conservative, only those who identified themselves as very liberal returned significant regression coefficients

Table 31: Very Liberal voting in Tea Party districts, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.527 (14.86)***	-0.528 (14.88)***	-0.527 (14.85)***	-0.527 (14.83)***
Education	0.246 (18.74)***	0.246 (18.72)***	0.246 (18.73)***	0.246 (18.71)***
Income	0.110 (19.38)***	0.109 (19.35)***	0.110 (19.36)***	0.110 (19.35)***
Age	0.083 (10.90)***	0.083 (10.92)***	0.083 (10.91)***	0.083 (10.90)***
Age squared	-0.000 (4.12)***	-0.000 (4.13)***	-0.000 (4.12)***	-0.000 (4.11)***
Very liberal	0.596 (6.74)***	0.575 (6.83)***	0.556 (6.47)***	0.516 (6.26)***
Very liberal in Tea Party district	-0.364 (1.68)*			
Very liberal in Tea Party leaning district		-0.700 (2.80)***		
Very liberal in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			-0.174 (0.68)	
Very liberal in Tea Party tossup district				0.419 (1.05)
Constant	-3.673 (18.50)***	-3.667 (18.50)***	-3.669 (18.49)***	-3.658 (18.44)***
<i>N</i>	42,487	42,487	42,487	42,487

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

As shown in Table 31, individuals who identify themselves as very liberal have a much higher rate of voting than groups who do not identify themselves as such, but the remainder of the coefficients do not point in any clear direction.

When the subsample is restricted to white respondents only, there is a demobilization effect for very liberal individuals in Tea Party Congressional districts that are leaning and for all Tea Party districts in aggregate, as shown in Table 32 below. The coefficient for mobilization in tossup Tea Party districts is positive and has no statistical significance, bucking the trend and making these results inconclusive.

Table 32: Very Liberal voting in Tea Party districts, white subsample, 2010 CCES

	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote	Validated Vote
Sex	-0.593 (14.48)***	-0.594 (14.51)***	-0.592 (14.47)***	-0.592 (14.46)***
Education	0.237 (15.80)***	0.237 (15.80)***	0.237 (15.82)***	0.236 (15.79)***
Income	0.112 (17.38)***	0.111 (17.35)***	0.112 (17.36)***	0.111 (17.33)***
Age	0.071 (8.08)***	0.072 (8.10)***	0.072 (8.08)***	0.072 (8.09)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.49)**	-0.000 (2.51)**	-0.000 (2.50)**	-0.000 (2.50)**
Very liberal	0.647 (6.38)***	0.599 (6.30)***	0.591 (5.98)***	0.538 (5.68)***
Very liberal in Tea Party district	-0.544 (2.43)**			
Very liberal in Tea Party leaning district		-0.819 (2.78)***		
Very liberal in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			-0.364 (1.51)	
Very liberal in Tea Party tossup district				0.200 (0.60)
Constant	-3.168 (13.42)***	-3.170 (13.44)***	-3.168 (13.42)***	-3.155 (13.37)***
<i>N</i>	32,594	32,594	32,594	32,594

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 33: Liberal voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote
Sex	-0.532 (14.97)***	-0.532 (14.99)***	-0.532 (14.97)***	-0.532 (14.96)***
Education	0.246 (18.67)***	0.246 (18.66)***	0.246 (18.67)***	0.246 (18.65)***
Income	0.109 (19.30)***	0.109 (19.26)***	0.109 (19.27)***	0.109 (19.26)***
Age	0.083 (10.86)***	0.083 (10.88)***	0.083 (10.88)***	0.083 (10.86)***
Age squared	-0.000 (4.09)***	-0.000 (4.11)***	-0.000 (4.11)***	-0.000 (4.09)***
Liberal in Tea Party district	0.007 (0.05)			
Liberal in Tea Party leaning district		0.037 (0.19)		
Liberal in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			0.118 (0.84)	
Liberal in Tea Party tossup district				0.179 (0.179) (0.99)
Constant	-3.652 (18.38)***	-3.647 (18.40)***	-3.648 (18.39)***	-3.637 (18.34)***
<i>N</i>	42,487	42,487	42,487	42,487

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Tests run for liberals settled in Tea Party House districts, shown above in Table 33, returned no significant coefficients for any test regardless of race competitiveness. However, all tests did suggest a small amount of mobilization, but without any statistical significance the above results remain inconclusive.

Table 34: Moderate voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote
Sex	-0.528 (14.84)***	-0.529 (14.86)***	-0.528 (14.84)***	-0.528 (14.83)***
Education	0.250 (19.09)***	0.250 (19.07)***	0.250 (19.07)***	0.250 (19.07)***
Income	0.110 (19.34)***	0.109 (19.30)***	0.109 (19.32)***	0.109 (19.30)***
Age	0.082 (10.76)***	0.082 (10.79)***	0.082 (10.77)***	0.082 (10.76)***
Age squared	-0.000 (4.02)***	-0.000 (4.04)***	-0.000 (4.03)***	-0.000 (4.01)***
Moderate in Tea party district	0.030 (0.30)			
Moderate in Tea Party leaning district		-0.036 (0.23)		
Moderate in Tea Party leaning or tossup district			-0.031 (0.27)	
Moderate in Tea Party tossup district				-0.040 (0.26)
Constant	-3.574 (18.01)***	-3.572 (18.03)***	-3.573 (18.02)***	-3.561 (17.98)***
<i>N</i>	42,487	42,487	42,487	42,487

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Regression coefficients for moderate voters, displayed above in Table 34, yielded zero significant values. While there appears to be a weak trend of demobilization as the districts become more competitive, the lack of statistical significance renders these findings null and inconclusive.

Table 35: Conservative voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote	Valid Vote
Sex	-0.497 (13.95)***	-0.498 (13.97)***	-0.497 (13.94)***	-0.497 (13.94)***
Education	0.254 (19.37)***	0.254 (19.34)***	0.254 (19.36)***	0.254 (19.35)***
Income	0.103 (18.26)***	0.103 (18.23)***	0.103 (18.24)***	0.103 (18.23)***
Age	0.082 (10.74)***	0.082 (10.77)***	0.082 (10.76)***	0.082 (10.73)***
Age squared	-0.000 (4.21)***	-0.000 (4.23)***	-0.000 (4.22)***	-0.000 (4.19)***
Conservative in Tea Party district	0.050 (0.46)			
Conservative in Tea Party leaning district		0.156 (0.89)		
Conservative in Tea party leaning or tossup district			-0.040 (0.33)	
Conservative in Tea Party tossup district				-0.178 (1.09)
_cons	-3.749 (18.78)***	-3.744 (18.81)***	-3.749 (18.82)***	-3.736 (18.76)***
<i>N</i>	42,487	42,487	42,487	42,487

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Tests run for conservative respondents, similar to moderates and liberals, found no significant regression coefficients and no voting pattern. As shown above in Table 35, conservatives appear to be demobilizing further as the Tea Party House race becomes more competitive, but without statistical significance it is largely a null finding and thus we cannot conclude that the Tea Party had an effect on conservative voting behavior at the individual level.

Tea Party House Election Summary Analyses, Ideological Subgroups

Table 36: Summary of Very Liberal voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	59	64	-5	0.092
Lean or Tossup seat	62	64	-2	0.494
Lean only seat	54	64	-10	0.005
Tossup seat	71	63	+8	0.294
Whites	61	69	-8	0.015
Lean or tossup seat	63	68	-5	0.132
Lean only seat	57	68	-9	0.005
Tossup seat	71	68	+3	0.547
African Americans	38	48	-10	0.646
Lean or tossup seat	39	48	-9	0.977
Lean only seat	38	48	-10	0.714
Tossup seat	48	47	+1	0.671
Latinos	37	46	-9	0.209
Lean or tossup seat	37	46	-9	0.210
Lean only seat	35	46	-11	0.163
Tossup seat	42	45	-3	0.759
Asians	75	44	+29	0.178
Lean or tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lean only seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tossup seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tea Party Negative	71	76	-5	0.156
Lean or tossup seat	72	76	-4	0.130
Lean only seat	65	76	-9	0.005
Tossup seat	79	75	+4	0.794
Tea Party Positive	43	37	+6	0.666
Lean or tossup seat	42	37	+5	0.800
Lean only seat	31	39	-8	0.584
Tossup seat	50	37	+13	0.639

While there may be no clear trend of mobilization for very liberal voters in Tea Party districts, all significant regression coefficients point towards demobilization. It should be noted that the scarcity of both Asian and very liberal respondents is responsible for the missing values above. Further, as shown above in Table 36, very liberals that were settled in leaning seats demobilized strongly, along with very liberals that identified themselves as white who were in leaning Tea Party House seats. Similar to other summary analyses in this study, this

demobilization effect can be largely attributed to being an isolated partisan in a respective community. Districts that have enough conservative individuals to advance a Tea Party candidate past the primary elections to the General Election usually were not in deeply blue districts, as indicated by the PVI scores in this study. Because so few people identify themselves as very liberal, many of these people are already political minorities even in communities where there is a diverse mixture of ideological groups. Without a strong trend of mobilization across all districts combined with the isolated social context of many very liberal respondents, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the presence of a Tea Party candidate has an effect on the voting behavior of very liberal individuals.

Table 37: Summary of Liberal voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	51	51	0	0.793
Lean or Tossup seat	52	51	+1	0.786
Lean only seat	54	51	+3	0.820
Tossup seat	51	51	0	0.793
Whites	57	54	+3	0.343
Lean or tossup seat	57	54	+3	0.382
Lean only seat	58	54	+4	0.981
Tossup seat	56	55	+1	0.275
African Americans	38	42	-4	0.809
Lean or tossup seat	33	43	-10	0.661
Lean only seat	38	42	-4	0.695
Tossup seat	23	42	-19	0.212
Latinos	37	29	+8	0.414
Lean or tossup seat	37	29	+8	0.628
Lean only seat	48	29	+19	0.243
Tossup seat	30	30	0	0.666
Asians	31	33	-2	0.678
Lean or tossup seat	35	32	+3	0.980
Lean only seat	23	33	-10	0.340
Tossup seat	46	32	+14	0.203
Tea Party Negative	68	64	+4	0.160
Lean or tossup seat	69	64	+5	0.559
Lean only seat	71	64	+7	0.354
Tossup seat	67	64	+3	0.806
Tea Party Positive	63	66	-3	0.229
Lean or tossup seat	62	66	-4	0.330
Lean only seat	60	66	-6	0.189
Tossup seat	64	66	-2	0.950

As shown above in Table 37 above, self-identified liberals showed no clear pattern of either mobilization or demobilization in Tea Party districts. The three statistically significant values suggest that Latino voting was dampened in certain districts, and Asian voting was stimulated substantially in others. Because these values lack a pattern, we cannot say it was the presence of a Tea Party candidate that ultimately caused the mobilization trends for self-

identified liberal Latinos and Asians. Table 37 provides further evidence that the Tea Party does not have any measurable effect on voting trends for individuals regardless of political persuasion.

Table 38: Summary of Moderate voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	51	51	0	0.793
Lean or Tossup seat	52	51	+1	0.786
Lean only seat	54	51	+3	0.820
Tossup seat	51	51	0	0.793
Whites	57	54	+3	0.343
Lean or tossup seat	57	54	+3	0.382
Lean only seat	58	54	+4	0.981
Tossup seat	56	55	+1	0.275
African Americans	38	42	-4	0.809
Lean or tossup seat	33	43	-10	0.661
Lean only seat	38	42	-4	0.695
Tossup seat	23	42	-19	0.212
Latinos	37	29	+8	0.414
Lean or tossup seat	37	29	+8	0.628
Lean only seat	48	29	+19	0.243
Tossup seat	30	30	0	0.666
Asians	31	33	-2	0.678
Lean or tossup seat	35	32	+3	0.980
Lean only seat	23	33	-10	0.340
Tossup seat	46	32	+14	0.203
Tea Party Negative	68	64	+4	0.160
Lean or tossup seat	69	64	+5	0.559
Lean only seat	71	64	+7	0.354
Tossup seat	67	64	+3	0.806
Tea Party Positive	63	66	-3	0.229
Lean or tossup seat	62	66	-4	0.330
Lean only seat	60	66	-6	0.189
Tossup seat	64	66	-2	0.950

Table 38 provides further evidence that the presence of a Tea Party candidate had no additional effect on voting behavior at the individual level, as there is not one single significant regression coefficient. African Americans appear to show a trend of demobilization, while white moderates appear to show a trend towards mobilizing, but without any significance these results are not enough to reject the null hypothesis and thus the findings remain inconclusive.

Table 39: Summary of Conservative voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	63	61	+2	0.648
Lean or Tossup seat	63	61	+2	0.745
Lean only seat	67	61	+6	0.373
Tossup seat	59	62	-3	0.277
Whites	67	65	+2	0.681
Lean or tossup seat	66	66	0	0.610
Lean only seat	70	65	+5	0.512
Tossup seat	62	66	-4	0.256
African Americans	44	43	+1	0.494
Lean or tossup seat	32	44	-12	0.693
Lean only seat	34	43	-9	0.757
Tossup seat	31	44	-13	0.854
Latinos	34	37	-3	0.224
Lean or tossup seat	40	37	+3	0.747
Lean only seat	54	37	+17	0.502
Tossup seat	32	37	-5	0.361
Asians	19	21	-2	0.799
Lean or tossup seat	11	22	-11	0.225
Lean only seat	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tossup seat	11	22	-11	0.102
Tea Party Negative	61	58	+3	0.905
Lean or tossup seat	68	58	+10	0.505
Lean only seat	64	58	+6	0.919
Tossup seat	71	58	+13	0.396
Tea Party Positive	79	77	+2	0.295
Lean or tossup seat	78	77	+1	0.759
Lean only seat	80	77	+3	0.275
Tossup seat	76	78	-2	0.577

Similar to the summary analysis for moderate voters in Table 38, Table 39 shown above displays no significant regression coefficients for conservative voters in Tea Party districts. Most of the values appear to suggest mobilization, but without any significance the results remain null and inconclusive.

Table 40: Summary of Very Conservative voting in Tea Party House districts, 2010 CCES

	Tea Party	No Tea Party	Difference	P-Value
All Seats	71	69	+2	0.870
Lean or Tossup seat	72	69	+3	0.598
Lean only seat	73	69	+4	0.733
Tossup seat	71	69	+2	0.710
Whites	74	73	+1	0.919
Lean or tossup seat	76	73	+3	0.637
Lean only seat	76	73	+3	0.881
Tossup seat	75	73	+2	0.644
African Americans	51	32	+19	0.046
Lean or tossup seat	50	33	+17	0.083
Lean only seat	37	34	+3	0.674
Tossup seat	55	33	+22	0.068
Latinos	46	46	0	0.924
Lean or tossup seat	50	46	+4	0.983
Lean only seat	65	46	+19	0.520
Tossup seat	46	46	0	0.924
Asians	46	38	+8	0.712
Lean or tossup seat	43	39	+4	0.917
Lean only seat	59	37	+22	0.474
Tossup seat	21	41	-20	0.284
Tea Party Negative	54	45	+9	0.627
Lean or tossup seat	50	46	+4	0.983
Lean only seat	65	46	+19	0.520
Tossup seat	46	46	0	0.924
Tea Party Positive	82	82	0	0.918
Lean or tossup seat	83	82	+1	0.642
Lean only seat	83	82	+1	0.901
Tossup seat	84	82	+2	0.607

African Americans settled in leaning or tossup seats and tossup seats displayed the only two significant regression coefficients for tests evaluating very conservative voters. The cause of this mobilization is puzzling, and the lack of a trend across all levels of district competitiveness further complicates interpreting the results. A possible explanation could be that many far right African Americans agreed with Tea Party antipathy towards President Obama's policies and mobilized substantially to display their support. Still, this effect is sparse and is not seen for any

other subgroup that identified itself as very conservative, and thus the findings listed above in Table 40 are inconclusive and null.

Chapter 4 Did the Tea Party change turnout?

How the Tea Party affected voter turnout, 2010 Senate Elections.

The 2010 General Election will be most remembered for the 63 seats the GOP picked up in the House of Representatives, their strongest showing in over 50 years. As previous chapters have suggested, it is plausible that Tea Party House and Senate candidates helped stimulate voting for certain groups and demobilized others at the individual level. In this chapter, I examine the percentage of the voting eligible population that voted in 2006—the last Midterm election—and in 2010.³⁰ I perform a two-sample dependent t-test with unequal variances to see if Tea Party States and House districts had a significantly different percentage of individuals that voted. Two tests were performed for each level of competitiveness, as there is both a mean increase and/or decrease in voting percentage from 2006 to 2010, and a total mean difference in voting percentage. Tests were first performed on Tea Party candidates in all competitive and uncompetitive races, then Tea Party candidates engaged in leaning elections, and then Tea Party candidates engaged in tossup elections.

After examining the difference in turnout percentage utilizing Michael McDonald's highest office³¹ as a method of counting all statewide ballots, the percentage in turnout between states where a Tea Party candidate ran for Senate and states without a Tea Party Senate candidate were not statistically significant. The mean increase in turnout percentage for states without a Tea Party Senate candidate was 1%, and the mean increase in highest office ballots cast for states with a Tea Party candidate was 1.7%. Also, the mean difference in turnout percentage for states

³⁰ Dr. Michael McDonald has the best estimate of the VEP because the data he compiled includes the incarcerated population, which is only released by the Department of Justice at the state level. The VEP estimates that have been calculated by the author at the Congressional district level have been performed using the American Fact Finder and have been defined as citizens 18 years and older. There is systematic error with the VEP data for Congressional districts because the incarcerated population is not accounted for.

³¹ Rather than use total ballots, which were used for turnout data evaluating House district turnout, I have used the highest office measure of counting statewide ballots because not all states examined released the total number of ballots in 2006 and 2010. For more information on highest office ballots, see <http://www.electproject.org/2010g>

without a Tea Party Senate candidate was 2.5%, and 2.9% in states where there was a Tea Party Senate candidate. Because the p-values for all alternative hypotheses for both tests were above .05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that Tea Party Senate candidates did not stimulate or dampen turnout in a statistically significant fashion.

T-tests performed on Tea Party states where the candidate was engaged in only a leaning election found one significant difference in means between the two groups' difference in turnout between 2006 and 2010. The mean decrease in turnout percentage between 2006 and 2010 for Tea Party leaning Senate races was .4%, and the mean increase in turnout percentage for all other Senate races was 1.7%. Further, the mean overall difference in turnout percentage from 2006 to 2010 was 2.8% for states without a Tea Party Senate candidate on the ballot and 1.8% for states with a Tea Party movement Senatorial candidate, a difference in means that was significant at an alpha level of .10. For the second test, we did not receive enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses that the mean difference in turnout percentage is different at a .10 alpha level, but the second test found sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis and thus we can conclude that states with a Tea Party Senate candidate engaged in a leaning election had reduced turnout with 90% confidence.

Tests evaluating the change in turnout percentage in states where a Tea Party candidate was engaged in a leaning or tossup election returned no significant results. States without a Tea Party candidate engaged in a leaning or tossup election had a 1.4% increase in turnout, whereas states with a Tea party candidate engaged in a tossup or leaning election had a 1% increase in turnout. Total difference in turnout percentage for states with a Tea Party candidate involved in a leaning or tossup election had an average difference of 2.8% in turnout, whereas states without a Tea Party candidate engaged in a tossup or leaning election had an average difference of 2.5% in

turnout. Neither test was significant at an alpha level of .10, and thus we fail to reject the null hypothesis that states with a Tea Party Senate candidate running in a tossup or leaning election experienced significant change in turnout.

Identical tests performed on Tea Party states where the candidate was engaged in only a tossup election found significant increase in turnout percentage between 2006 and 2010, but not significant difference overall. The mean increase in turnout percentage for states without a Tea Party Senate candidate engaged in a tossup election was 10%, and 34% for states where a Tea Party candidate was engaged in a tossup election, although there are only two tossup Tea Party states, Utah and Nevada. The mean overall difference in turnout percentage for states without a Tea Party Senate candidate engaged in a tossup election was 26%, and 34% in states where a Tea Party Senate candidate was running in a tossup election. The p-value for the first test for turnout percentage increase had a p-value under .10, but the second test performed for absolute turnout percentage difference did not. Therefore, we can conclude with 90% confidence that states with a Tea Party Senate candidate engaged in a tossup election experienced a 24% increase in turnout, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overall difference in turnout for states with a Tea Party Senate candidate running in a tossup election is different from zero.

How the Tea Party affected voter turnout, 2010 House Elections.

Using the difference in percentage turnout between the 2006 and 2010 General Elections, two-sample dependent t-tests found no significant increase in the turnout for districts with the Tea Party treatment. The total increase in turnout from 2006 to 2010 in districts without a Tea Party House candidate was 1.3%, and 1.5% in districts where a Tea Party candidate was present. Tests also found that the mean difference between 2006 and 2010 for districts without a Tea Party candidate was 5.2% and 4.4% for districts with a Tea Party House candidate. All told,

neither t-test found enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the presence of a Tea Party candidate altered district-level turnout.

T-tests examining the turnout percentage increase between 2006 and 2010 for Tea Party House candidates engaged in leaning elections found that the average increase for a district without a Tea Party candidate engaged in a leaning election was 1.3%, and for districts where a Tea Party House candidate was engaged in a leaning election was 2.3%. Further, identical tests examining the overall difference turnout percentage between 2006 and 2010 was 5.1% in districts without a Tea Party candidate engaged in a leaning election, and 5.5% in districts where a Tea Party House candidate was running in a leaning election. Neither t-test found sufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses that the difference in means between the two groups was different than zero, thus we are unsure if a Tea Party candidate engaged in a leaning election changes voter turnout.

Tests that measured the increase or decrease and overall difference in turnout percentage for Tea Party districts that fielded candidates engaged in a leaning or tossup election yielded no significant results. The average increase in turnout for a district that nominated a Tea Party candidate in a leaning or tossup election was 1.4%, and in all other districts this increase was 0.9%. When examining overall percentage difference in turnout for districts with a Tea Party candidate engaged in a leaning or tossup election the overall percentage difference was 4.1%, and 5.2% in districts without a Tea Party candidate engaged in a tossup or leaning election. Neither test yielded results that were significant at an alpha level of .10, thus we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the presence of a Tea Party candidate in a leaning or tossup election has no effect on turnout.

Lastly, t-tests were performed examining the increase in percentage between 2006 and 2010 for a Tea Party House candidate running in a tossup election. For districts where there was no Tea Party candidate engaged in a tossup election, the average decrease in turnout percentage from 2006 to 2010 was .04%, and in districts where there was a Tea Party candidate engaged in a tossup election the average increase in ballots was 1.5%. This difference in means received a p-value under the alpha level of .05, and thus we can conclude with 95% confidence that the difference in means is statistically different from 0, and that the increase in turnout percentage was more pronounced in districts where there was no Tea Party candidate engaged in a tossup election than in districts with a tossup Tea Party House race. Moreover, in districts where there was no Tea Party candidate engaged in a tossup election, the average turnout percentage difference from 2006 to 2010 was 5.2%, and the average overall percentage change in turnout where there was a Tea Party candidate engaged in a tossup election was 2.7%. The difference in means between the two groups was below the alpha level of .01, and thus we can conclude with 99% confidence that turnout changed more in districts without a Tea Party candidate running in a tossup election than those where a Tea Party candidate was engaged in a tossup election.

Chapter 5 Tying it All Together

Discussion

This study began with a straightforward theory about how a candidate from an extreme political coalition affects the voting behavior of individuals who probably view that group as hostile towards them. Because the Tea Party is an extreme coalition of individuals who are vastly whiter, older, and more conservative than the average American, I examined minority voting in places where the Tea Party ran competitive candidates to gauge this effect. After running logistical regressions that threw light on individual level voting, the results I have found leave much to be answered.

However, if anything can be truly drawn from the results contained in this study, it was that my theory was proved wrong and African Americans and Latinos were demobilized in Tea Party states and House districts. At the state level, African Americans living where there was a hotly contested Tea Party race demobilized substantially. However, in these tossup states—Utah, Colorado, and Nevada—African Americans represented only 1.6%, 5%, and 9.4%, respectively, of each state's population in 2010.³² Thus, it is unclear if the decline in voting can be ascribed to a Tea Party candidate or the fact that these individuals are isolated racial and/or political minorities. What further complicates this finding is that African American voters in states where there was no Tea Party candidate engaged in a tossup election had a positive regression coefficient, albeit without significance, which suggests mobilization. Perhaps African Americans in states with larger black populations that had a Tea Party Senate candidate engaged in a leaning election were compelled in places like Pennsylvania and Florida to mobilize in greater numbers, but we cannot say with confidence.

³² <http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf>

As for Latinos voters at the state level, there appears to be demobilization across all levels of Tea Party race competitiveness. All regression coefficients were negative in the models that were run, which certainly suggests a pattern of demobilization, but without statistical significance this trend must be taken with skepticism. Although it cannot be said with confidence that Latinos demobilized in Tea Party states, the evidence certainly points toward that conclusion. After restricting the subsample to only respondents who had identified as moderate, liberal, or very liberal, Latino turnout showed a much clearer trend of demobilization with much larger regression coefficients and statistical significance. Moreover, when I restricted the subsample further to only those Latinos who identify as liberal or very liberal, negative regression coefficients were confident at the 99% level rather than 90% level. While Latinos in states where the Tea Party candidate was settled in a tossup district did not return statistical significance, it still returned a negative regression coefficient of similar value to the other tests run for liberal and very liberal Latinos. For minorities at the state level, it appears as though liberal and very liberal Latinos were heavily demobilized, as well as African Americans in what were both tossup Tea Party Senate seats and areas of vastly white composition. Indeed, at the state level it appears as though individuals who had the most to gain from participating in the political process remained disengaged and failed to cast ballots in many states with Tea Party candidates.

Data limitations prevent any meaningful conclusions to be drawn from Asian individual-level voting trends in Tea Party states because of a scarcity in respondents and statistically significant coefficients.

Examining the Tea Party effect on self-identified liberals, moderates, and conservatives irrespective of race for Senate elections also provided valuable context to the individual voting

equation. With the exception of moderate respondents settled in Tea Party leaning only states, moderate voters mobilized with 95% confidence in Senate races. When the subsample was restricted to only white respondents, moderate voters again showed a pattern of mobilization. Although regression coefficients were not statistically significant for two of the four models run, the highest p-value was .22. This is a key finding because it shows which group, if any, were mobilized at the state level in Tea Party Senate races. White moderates may not have shown an extremely strong trend of mobilization, but it certainly proves that they did not withdraw from voting.

The effect of the Tea Party on Congressional districts was not faultlessly aligned with the results for the Senate, but there were many similarities. African Americans settled in Tea Party districts of all competitiveness were demobilized with 90% confidence, and African Americans living in districts where there was a Tea Party candidate engaged in a leaning or tossup election saw demobilization at the 95% confidence level. While the demobilization for African Americans in leaning only and tossup only districts was strong, it was not statistically significant. The highest p-value for African Americans settled in Tea Party districts was .13—a number that certainly approaches significance, but leaves much to be desired. The trend of demobilization in Tea Party congressional districts amongst African Americans cannot be attributed to the Tea Party, as the districts used for this study had vastly white populations similar to that of the Tea Party tossup states. Thus, it is unclear if the Tea Party is contributing to African American demobilization or if their residential isolation is the most important factor. Still, it was a moderately strong trend that was observed at both the state and district level and proves that, if anything, African Americans in Tea Party districts experienced demobilization more so than mobilization.

House district findings for Latinos returned a preponderance of null results that ultimately do not point to any particular direction of mobilization or demobilization. This same phenomenon was present for Asian voters, although the null results for Asian respondents, similar to the tests performed at the state level, can be at least partially accredited to an extremely small survey sample.

Restricting the subsample to moderate, liberal, and very liberal respondents showed precisely which members of the African American community were demobilized by Tea Party candidates. However, when the subsamples were restricted to liberal, moderate, and very liberal individually, the only subsample that returned statistically significant coefficients was the moderate subsample. In this subgroup, African American voters were substantially demobilized if they were settled in districts where a Tea Party candidate was engaged in a tossup election. Similar to the trends of demobilization for African Americans and Latinos at the state level, this indicates that the very individuals who had the most to gain from participating ultimately did not.

Examining turnout data for Tea Party districts and states yielded few results, but the results that were found proved to be enlightening. In the tossup Tea Party congressional districts, there was a clear reduction in turnout percentage compared to districts without a Tea Party congressional candidate, and states that had a Tea Party candidate engaged in a leaning election on the General Election ballot saw a small but significant amount of mobilization. Still, this reduction in turnout cannot be solely contributed to the presence of a Tea Party candidate, as many factors ultimately influenced the demobilization of these individuals. Anger towards the policies of President Barack Obama and incumbent members of Congress certainly contributed to this trend. A poll taken by Fox News in June of 2010 showed a majority of respondents were

either most angry with incumbent members of Congress or President Obama.³³ Riding this wave of anger against the incumbent government after a slow recovery period following a catastrophic economic downturn in 2008 prompted many individuals to sympathize themselves with the Tea Party movement's commitment to halting careless spending and small government.³⁴

All told, the Tea Party movement that culminated in 2010 contributed to mobilizing many moderate voters while simultaneously demobilizing leftists, African Americans, and perhaps Latinos at the state level. The multitude of endorsements and campaign contributions coordinated by Freedom Works, the Tea Party Nation, the Tea Party Express, and other conservative groups made their candidates visible to everyone they would presumably represent once elected. Combining the demobilization that occurred in locations where Tea Party candidates emerged in the General Election with a large portion of populist moderates concurring with the Tea Party message made for a bloody Election Day for Democrats. Anger towards President Obama's policies expanded the mobilization efforts, providing the Republican Party with the massive reward of 63 House seats.

It is important to remember that there is not one single group that represents the Tea Party; it is a loosely aligned coalition of individuals who have banded together under a smattering of conservative-leaning issues. The Tea Party alone certainly did not cause the massive seat swing in 2010, but it surely contributed to the fervor that ultimately mobilized moderate and other conservative individuals while simultaneously disengaging many leftists and minorities that were settled in racially and culturally homogenous milieus. A painfully slow

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<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/ipoll/questionDetail.cfm?keyword=2010%20AND%20%20election%20AND%20%20angry%20AND%20%20obama&keywordoptions=1&exclude=&excludeOptions=1&topic=Any&organization=Any&label=&fromdate=1/1/1935&toDate=&stitle=&label=&sponsor=Fox%20News&studydate=01-JAN->

[34 http://www.teapartyexpress.org/mission](http://www.teapartyexpress.org/mission)

recovery for much of the United States population lead to intense anger towards the incumbent government, and although the incumbent party is expected to lose seats during a midterm, the 2010 election was truly historic for the number of seats gained by the Republican Party, many of which were aligned with the Tea Party.

To further this research and expand upon the Tea Party effect, I would see if this effect is true for far right voters settled in very liberal districts and states regardless of formal party affiliation. How an individual identifies him or herself politically may be much different than how they vote and the candidates and policies they support. Another possible advance of this study would be to see how individuals belonging to Green or Constitutional parties behave when an extreme candidate emerges from their respective milieu in the General Election. Social capital and knowledge of government and politics is much more difficult to cultivate when an individual is isolated and unwilling to express their beliefs openly, which this author believes was the driving force behind any possible effect of mobilization. Waiting for the next Tea Party movement to spawn from the left end of the political spectrum would be an ideal extension of this study, but not even Dick Armey can predict when that'll happen.

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