

Russian Foreign Policy Shift and Its Sources

by

Yuki Naruoka

Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to
Department of Political Science,
University of California San Diego

March 28, 2016

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Background	7
Chapter 2: Comparison of Two Periods	18
Chapter 3: Man Chapter	32
Chapter 4: State Chapter	49
Chapter 5: War Chapter	71
Conclusion	99
List of References	106

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the most dramatic moments in world history. The collapse of a great power, that competed with the United States as a bipolar power for decades, was a shock to not only politicians and scholars that are naturally more interested in the issue of government and statehood, but also to people in the general public. People all over the world gazed at the images of tanks rolling through Moscow and the iconic red flag being lowered from the parliamentary building with mixture of shock and apprehension. Many viewed the collapse of Soviet Union as a triumph of Western democracy and capitalism over socialism, and end of an era that the world was on the brink of complete destruction with a nuclear war between two super powers. With the collapse, Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen separate states and a considerable chunk of its territory was transferred to the newly formed Russian Federation. The nuclear war that people feared would happen with the transition of power to Russian Federation did not occur. There was a general sense of hope that relation between Russia and the United States will take a better turn.

Although the tension between the two states were not as high as during the Cold War, it certainly did not get better as many had hoped. Although there was a period that Russia moved away from their former confrontational approach during Yeltsin's presidency, "Boris-Bill" relation seemed have been unable to counter the diverging

strategic differences¹. Their relation started to worsen throughout the late 1990s, and the NATO involvement in Kosovo had a critical consequence². This trend continued into the Presidency of Putin after the resignation of Yeltsin in 1999. Since then, Russia-U.S. relations had its ups and downs. However, now in 2016, many experts seems believe that Russia-U.S. relations is at a lowest point in the history of Russian Federation. In spite of the mending of Russia-U.S. relations that had occurred in 2009 between the two states, their relation has taken a worse turn.

Comparing two time periods, the “reset period” and the period from 2012 to 2015, there seems to be a drastic shift in Russian foreign policy. After the reset in 2009, Russia and the United States seemed to have a significant alignment in their national interests, whether that was their policy towards combating terrorism or non-proliferation. However, complementarity in their foreign policy seems to have declined significantly sometime between 2009 and 2014 considering Putin’s current confrontational approach against the West. Given the shift in Russia’s foreign policy, two questions arise. One is when did the shift occur, and another is what explains the shift in Russian foreign policy.

This thesis will explain the time-period that the shift in Russian foreign policy had occur through providing background information of Russia-U.S. relations, and the following chapters will explain the timing of the shift through a three-tiered analysis in the style of “Man, the State, and War”. In “Man, State, and War,” Kenneth Waltz attempts to explain causes of war through three levels of analysis, which are individuals, state, and international system. In the first image, the individual, Waltz maintains that the

¹ Gvosdev, Nikolas K., and Marsh, Christopher. *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*. Thousand Oaks: CQ, 2014. Print. P.23

² Mankoff, Jeffrey. *Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012. P.98

causes of wars are often an individuals', such as states leaders, selfish nature. Waltz argues that their selfishness and aggressive compulsion that often dictates those leaders often cause conflicts to occur³. The second image that Waltz lists is the state. He argues that internal affairs of the state are the cause of wars. Waltz's argument is that eliminating flaws of the state will create a basis of peace, and conflicts will be less likely to occur⁴. The third image is the international system. Waltz claimed that each states' grievances and ambitions combined with the anarchic nature of the international system inevitably drives states war⁵.

This thesis will be employ the method of Kenneth Waltz's "Man, State and War," since, as Waltz claims, explaining actions taken by a political actor often cannot be explained by focusing on one image. In many cases, focusing on only one of the image to explain an action is inadequate due to the fact that often understanding one image will depend on understanding other images as well⁶. For example, in the case of understanding factors that compelled a political leader to engage in war, although there is a possibility that it was entirely due to the individual's personal preference, often there are international pull and a domestic push factor that drove the individual to making that particular decision. Hence, this thesis will analyze the shift in Russian foreign policy through all three images, man, state, and war for a comprehensive analysis.

The First chapter will be the background chapter, which will cover developments from beginning of Putin's presidency in 1999, up to the intervention in

³ Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia UP, 2001. Print. P.16

⁴ Ibid. P.81

⁵ Ibid. P.159

⁶ Ibid. P.14

Syria in 2015. This chapter will provide a backdrop on how Russia-U.S. was shaped over the years since President Putin took office, and layout the foundation for explaining the shift that has occurred in 2011. Through examining incidents between Russia and the United States, I argue that the event that caused the start of the shift in Russian foreign policy was the 2011 Western intervention in Libya. The first chapter will include the comparison between two periods, the reset period from 2009 to 2011 and the period from the intervention in Libya to 2015, in order to highlight the shift in Russian foreign policy.

The second chapter will cover the difference in Russian foreign policy towards the United States through discussing treaties that were signed and Russian government's attitude towards cooperating with the United States government with international issues. For some treaties, such as the START treaty, the discussion for the treaty was resumed after the reset and discontinued after the Libyan military intervention. Through those shift in foreign policy on both sides, I will attempt to establish evidences of the shift. The following three chapters will explain the shift in 2011 from three different perspectives, through a three-tiered analysis.

The third chapter will focus on the first image the "Man", how Putin explains the shift of Russian foreign policy. In this chapter, I will analyze how Putin's fear of domestic unrest has caused the shift in Russian foreign policy. This will be done through examining statements that have been made by Putin, accounts of United States officials in Russia, the shift in narrative conveyed by Putin. Through the series of revolutions that have occurred between 2004 and 2008 during the Color Revolution, and the Arab Spring, Putin's fear for losing power has grown over the years. Furthermore, series of demonstration against Putin's third term as a President that has occurred in Russia

between 2011 and 2012 have caused him to suspect that the United States is trying to remove him from power through the means of democratic revolution. Those incidents have caused a shift in his domestic narrative, which led to a shift in foreign policy.

The second chapter will focus on the “State,” how the domestic environment effected Russia’s foreign policy shift. Due to the autocratic nature of the Russian government, it is hard to distinguish the first and second image. However, this chapter will focus on the Russian government to explain the shift in the Russian foreign policy. In this chapter, I will attempt to analyze shift in domestic policies that were adopted in this period, and the trends of political rhetoric that are being used. Similar to the first image, the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring, and the concerns for domestic unrest have caused them to adopt a policy that tries to oppress political oppositions and the general public. Moreover, the United States’ democracy promotion policies have created great concerns for the Russian government, and the Libyan intervention has caused them to believe that the United States government’s aim is not purely to promote democracy for the people, but it is to promote their national interest overseas. Evidences of the mistrust towards the West were manifested in crack down on foreign NGOs and the medias with Western influence. Their fear for domestic unrest have caused them to adopt a domestic policy that focuses on nationalism and great power politics, which is often inherently anti-West.

The third chapter will focus on the third image “War.” This chapter will discuss how the international system has influenced Russia’s foreign policy. I will analyze policies adopted by the Western states that seem to have undermined Russian efforts to expand their international influence. One of the core aspects of Russian foreign policy

was the establishment of the Eurasian Union, and the inclusion of Ukraine, which is one of the biggest economies in Eastern Europe. However, with the revolution in Ukraine and the collapse of the pro-Russian regime, the idea of Ukraine's inclusion became highly unlikely. Moreover, Russia's demographic issues, low prospect for further economic development, and expansion of their military power do not paint a bright future. In addition to the hard power aspects such as the economy and the military, Russia is struggling with their soft power aspects as well. The low prospect for economic development and the lack of civil and political development contributes to the relative decline of Russian soft power to the EU and the United States. They are currently struggling to retain their standing in their near abroad, the post-Soviet space. This decline in their standing in the international system has led them to adopt a more assertive policy in order to prevent further decline.

Through my research, I came to conclude that the event that the shift in Russia's foreign policy has occurred was the year 2011, and factors that led to the shift are increasing concern for Putin's concern for maintaining his regime, increasing fear for domestic unrest, and Russia's decline in their international standing. Those interconnected factors, individual, state, and international system, have collectively contributed towards the shift in Russian foreign policy. The demonstrations that occurred domestically and Libyan military intervention in 2011 acted as an internal push and an external pull for the shift in Russian foreign policy. I argue that the soaring mistrust for the United States' democracy promotion combined with the Putin's declining domestic and international standing have limited Russia's foreign policy options, and impel them to adapt a more assertive policy in order to avoid domestic unrest and further decline.

Chapter 1: Background

1.1 Beginning of Putin's Presidency (1999-2009)

New Year's Eve of 1999, then Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced his surprise resignation, leaving the presidency under his Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. After serving as an Acting President for three months, Putin was officially elected as the second President of the Russian Federation winning 53 percent of the votes. Although Yeltsin and Bill Clinton forged a strong personal relationship, holding 18 bilateral meetings (which was far more than any American and Russian leaders)⁷, Putin made it clear that he was not interested in continuing the nature of relationship his predecessor had forged. Putin further made it clear that he will not be a convenient instrument of the West as often Yeltsin was view to be⁸. Similarly, the newly elected United States President George W. Bush, who assumed office in January 2001, was trying to distance himself from the former administration's approach with Russian foreign relations⁹. Despite the poor prospective on U.S.-Russia relations, President Putin and President Bush ended up forging a strong personal relationship due to their similar worldviews¹⁰.

The relationship between Putin and Bush grew even stronger after 9/11, through strengthened cooperation on anti-terror policies. Putin went as far as ignoring his

⁷ Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Marsh, Christopher. P.80

⁸ Rutland, Peter. "Putin's Path to Power." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16.4 (2000): 313-54. *Taylor & Francis Online*. Web. 3 Feb. 2016.

⁹ Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Marsh, Christopher. P.85

¹⁰ Wyatt, Caroline. "Bush and Putin: Best of Friends." *BBC News*. BBC, 16 June 2001. Web. 03 Feb. 2016. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1392791.stm>>

senior advisors' recommendation and aid the U.S. force's deployment in Central Asia for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This led the United States to perceive Russia more positively and to create a ground for more cooperation¹¹. During this period, Putin and Bush seemed to have common interests in many areas, such as non-proliferation of nuclear arms and anti-terrorism campaign. Moreover, the United States was an invaluable partner in Russia's effort to modernize its economy. Both Presidents seemed to believe that the strategic partnership in the degree of Yeltsin and Clinton was something within their reach¹². However, this strong personal relationship started to take a turn after with the United States' war on Iraq.

The United States decided to take a unilateral action despite the fact that their resolution on military action against Iraq was not able to gain the support of the United Nations Security Council. Two days before the Security Council meeting to discuss the Iraqi government's compliance with the Security Council Resolution 1441, France, Germany, and Russia released a joint declaration stating their intention to veto the resolution that will authorize Security Council's military intervention in Iraq. Those three states maintained that regardless of the circumstances, they would not allow the United States to invade Iraq¹³. After the United States' unilateral military action against Iraq had started in March 2003, Putin made a statement harshly criticizing the United States' action. Putin stated, "Nothing can justify this military action – neither accusations of Iraq of supporting international terrorism (we have never had and do not have information

¹¹ Talbott, Strobe. *The Russia Hand a Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*. New York, NY: Random House, 2003. Print. P. 405

¹² Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Marsh, Christopher. P.85

¹³ Tagliabue, John. "France, Germany and Russia Vow to Stop Use of Force Against Iraq." *New York Times*. 5 Mar. 2003. Web. 3 Feb. 2016.

<<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/05/international/europe/05CND-PARI.html?pagewanted=all>>

of this kind) nor the desire to change the political regime in that country which is in direct contradiction to international law and should be determined only by the citizens of this or that state.”¹⁴ This incident was a strain to the relation between Russia and the United States. However, the actual turning point of Putin and Bush’s relationship was in 2004.

In 2004, there were two incidents that contributed to the deterioration of the Putin-Bush relations, which was the expansion of NATO and the schools siege in Beslan. In March 2004, with its fifth expansion, NATO admitted seven new states, which included the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Combined with the plan to expand the missile defense system in Poland, Putin perceived Bush’s policy as threatening to Russian national interests, and started to question Bush’s intentions¹⁵. In addition, when the schools siege in Beslan had occurred, many U.S. government officials criticized Russian counterinsurgency policies, along with sympathetic comments validating the Chechen cause. Those comments by the United States government cultivated the suspicion that the United States is not committed in aiding Russia with counterterrorism¹⁶. From this incident in 2004, Putin-Bush relations started to deteriorate, leading to a less cooperative policies on both sides. Since their relation took a turn, the situation continued to worsen with the ongoing expansion of NATO and the United States’ support for Color Revolutions.

Between 2004 and 2008, leading up to the invasion of Georgia, Putin and Bush’s relation continued to worsen over the course of four years. On numerous

¹⁴ Putin, Vladimir. "Statement On Iraq At a Kremlin Meeting." *President Of Russia*. 20 Mar. 2003. Web. 03 Feb. 2016. <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/21942>>.

¹⁵ Mearsheimer, John J. "Why The Ukraine Crisis Is The West's Fault." *Foreign Affairs* 93.5 (2014): 77-89. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 4 Feb. 2016. P.78

¹⁶ Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Marsh, Christopher. P.89

occasions, the United States seemed to be working against Russian interest, whether it was democracy promotion in Central Asia through the support for Color Revolutions or it was the support for a pro-Western authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan. In the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, NATO members issued a statement stating, “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”¹⁷ This was due to Bush’s push for integration, in spite France and Germany’s apprehension for Russian national security. As those two states had expected, Putin perceived this eastward NATO expansion as a threat to Russian national security, which contributed to the increased mistrust against the Bush administration and the West.

On the night of August 7, 2008, large-scale offensive begun in Tskhinvali with an artillery fire followed by a ground assault by the Georgian force. The chief of peacekeeping operations at the Georgian Defence Ministry, Brigadier-General Mamuka Kurashvili, stated that the action taken by the Georgian government was to “restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia¹⁸. On August 8, Russian forces were already advancing to Tskhinvali through Roki tunnel. Through series of ground offensives and airstrikes, Russian forces successfully drove Georgian forces out of Tskhinvali by August 10. The Russian force attacked Georgian forces in Gori, Vaziani, Senaki and Poti, destroying numerous military installations and most of the Georgian Naval force facilities. Five days after the conflict had started, a ceasefire agreement was signed with the effort

¹⁷ "Bucharest Summit Declaration - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008." *NATO*. 3 Apr. 2008. Web. 04 Feb. 2016. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm>

¹⁸ "Georgia Decided to Restore Constitutional Order in S.Ossetia' – MoD Official." *Civil.Ge*. 8 Aug. 2008. Web. 04 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18941>>

of the French President Nicholas Sarkozy¹⁹. On August 15, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili first signed the agreement, and Medvedev signed the agreement the following day. With the introduction of monitoring by the EUMM (European Union Monitoring System), the conflict between Russia and Georgia was officially over²⁰.

Although the conflict was resolved quickly and resulted in a relatively small number of casualties, it had a devastating consequence on the relationship between the Bush and Putin. Bush's push for Georgia's NATO membership had to be put on hold since the push for Georgia's admission was seemed to be at least one of the factors that led to Russian aggression, as France and Germany have feared. What Putin was signaling through the Georgian conflict and the temporary shut down of the gas supply to Ukraine was that he was no willing to put the relationship with Bush before Russian national interest. Although Barak Obama strongly condemned Putin's action against Georgia during his presidential campaign in 2008, he also maintained that he would turn away from the confronting rhetoric if he were elected as the President²¹.

1.2 U.S. Russia relations (Reset in 2009 and up to 2011 Libya)

The "Russian reset" in 2009 was an effort by the Obama administration to reset US-Russia relations, which continued to worsen over the course of George W. Bush's presidency. Then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and Sergei Lavrov met in Geneva to

¹⁹ Schroder, Hans-Henning. "The Caucasus Crisis. International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe." *German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Research Paper N 9* (2008). P.54

²⁰ Cheterian, Vicken. "The August 2008 War In Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict To Border Wars." *Central Asian Survey* 28.2 (2009): 155-170. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 4 Feb. 2016. P.160

²¹ Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Marsh, Christopher. P.91

discuss the prospective of their bilateral relations on March 6. Hillary Clinton brought a red button with the word “reset” written on it as a symbol of the reset of their bilateral relations. Although the Russian word written on the button turned out to be “overcharge” in Russian, they pushed the button together as a symbol of the reset of their relations. Since the reset, the tension between U.S. and Russia appeared to have loosened significantly. The U.S.-Russia relation seemed to be improving with the reset; there seemed to be an alignment of interests and both states were willing to cooperate²².

1.3Libyan Military Intervention

The event that started the shift in Russian foreign policy was the military intervention in Libya. Following the wave of protest that swept through the Middle East, the Libyan citizens also rose up against the authoritarian government and its leader Moammar Gadhafi. The Libyan government immediately responded by brutally suppressing the protesters. Numerous NGOs reported the use of snipers, tanks, and machine guns against the protestors by the Libyan government²³. In February 2011, UN Secretary General Ban-Ki-moon made a statement regarding the act of violence committed by the Libyan government, which he accused the Libyan government of “indiscriminate killings, arbitrary arrests, shooting of peaceful demonstrators, the

²² Shuster, Simon. "U.S.-Russia Relations: In Need of a New Reset." *Time*. Time Inc., 16 Mar. 2010. Web. 06 Feb. 2016. <<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1971651,00.html>>

²³ "Libya: Commanders Should Face Justice for Killings." *Human Rights Watch*. Human Rights Watch, 22 Feb. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/22/libya-commanders-should-face-justice-killings>>

detention and torture of the opposition and the use of foreign mercenaries.”²⁴ Following Ban-Ki-moon’s statement, Security Council issued its own statement expressing their concern about the crisis in Libya and condemning Libyan government’s act of violence against peaceful protestors²⁵. Other human rights monitoring bodies within the United Nations, such as the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council, along with many states also condemned Libyan government’s action. The UN General Assembly suspended Libya’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council in an effort to change the course of the government’s action on March 1st 2011²⁶.

In response to the Libyan government’s atrocity and their inability to change their course of action, the United Nations Security Council decided to step directly in for further retribution. First of the two resolutions that were adopted was the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970. This Resolution was adopted on February 26th 2011, with a unanimous of all 15 states including the non-permanent members. The resolution condemned the systematic attacks against civilians taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and further stated that the government’s action will amount to crimes against humanity. The resolution included the referral to the International Criminal Court, arms embargo, asset freeze, and travel ban on officials in the Gadhafi government²⁷.

In spite of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the threat of

²⁴ Ki-moon, Ban. "Secretary-General Tells Security Council Time to Consider Concrete Action in Libya, as Loss of Time Means More Loss of Lives." *Meeting Coverage and Press Releases*. United Nations, 25 Feb. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13418.doc.htm>>.

²⁵ "Security Council Press Statement on Libya." *Meeting Coverage and Press Releases*. United Nations, 22 Feb. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm>>.

²⁶ United Nations. General Assembly. 65/265, Suspension of the rights of membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Human Rights Council. A/RES/65/265. 3 Mar. 2011. Available undocs.org/A/RES/65/265

²⁷ United Nations. Security Council. 1970, Resolution 1970. S/RES/1970. 26 February 2011. undocs.org/S/RES/1970.

criminal prosecution through the International Criminal Court, the violence continued and the Security Council finally decided to intervene to provide humanitarian support and protection for the Libyan citizens. In response to the rebel forces' advance and capture of the city of Benghazi and the establishment of the National Transitional Council, the Libyan government responded with further indiscriminate airstrikes and hard artillery fire. The chairman of the National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, warned that the recapture of the city by the Gadhafi force would lead to the death of half-million people²⁸. Upon Mustafa Abdul-Jalil's request for establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, the Security Council Resolution 1973 was voted on and ratified with 10 in support and 5 abstentions, Russia being one of the states that abstained, from the vote on March 17th 2011²⁹. Although they were not in favor of the intervention, due to their long-standing relationship with the Libyan president Muhammad Gadhafi, Medvedev decided to abstain from vetoing the resolution.

The resolution was adopted under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, and legal basis for military intervention in Libya was formed. As a result of Resolution 1973, a no-fly zone and a ceasefire was established over Libya and the intervention by the West has begun. This resolution's intention was to protect the civilians from the violence of the Libyan government and to use any means necessary short of foreign occupation to carry out that objective. Short after the ceasefire was declared, the Libyan government violated the agreement by initiating an attack on Benghazi. The Western coalition force began a

²⁸ McGreal, Chris. "Gaddafi's Army Will Kill Half a Million, Warn Libyan Rebels." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 12 Mar. 2011. Web. 25 Mar. 2016.

<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/12/gaddafi-army-kill-half-million>>

²⁹ "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions." *Meeting Coverage and Press Releases*. United Nations, 17 Mar. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>>.

military intervention in Libya, with missiles attacking air defense systems and airstrikes aimed at the Gadhafi force outside of Benghazi³⁰. NATO forces conducted military operations alongside the Western coalition force, and eventually they took over the command of military operations in Libya³¹.

Thanks to the aid of NATO and Western coalition force, rebel forces successfully took over the capital Tripoli in August 2011, and Sirte, the last city held by the Gadhafi regime, in October. Gadhafi was killed during the fight in Sirte³², and the international community broadly recognized the new government formed by rebel forces as the legitimate transitional government³³. On October 23rd, three days after the victory, the National Transitional Council declared the liberation of Libya and the civil war was finally over. The Security Council adopted Resolution 2016 and the military intervention in Libya was finally over. This resolution marked the end of the authorization for the use of force and the no-fly zone over Libya³⁴.

Although the military intervention was largely deemed to be a success among Western states, NATO's action raised some questions regarding the legitimacy of Security Council-mandated military interventions in relations to the right to sovereignty. Many are critical of the fact that the military intervention that was initiated as an operation to protect civilians turned into a military operation led by NATO, using rebel

³⁰ Payandeh, Mehrdad. "The United Nations, Military Intervention, And Regime Change In Libya." *Virginia Journal Of International Law* 52.2 (2012): 355-403. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 29 Jan. 2016. P.378

³¹ Payandeh, Mehrdad. P.379

³² Fahim, Kareem, Anthony Shadid, and Rick Gladstone. "Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 20 Oct. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-libyan-forces-take-surt.html>>.

³³ "Libya's New Rulers Declare Country Liberated - BBC News." *BBC News*. BBC, 23 Oct. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15422262>>.

³⁴ Payandeh, Mehrdad. P.380

forces, to overthrow the Gadhafi regime³⁵. This pro-democratic military intervention in a civil war sparked sharp criticism from the two Security Council members, Russia, and China. Russian Foreign Ministry maintained that the use of force by the Western coalition force went beyond the scope that was stated in the resolution. In addition, then Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin claimed that the intervention was illegitimate interference in the internal affairs of another state and that it was in the vain of a “medieval call for a crusade.”³⁶ Furthermore, Putin castigated the United State’s eagerness and habit to resort immediately to force as a solution to issues in the international world³⁷.

1.4 Shift in Russian Foreign Policy (2011-2015)

Since the military intervention in Libya led by Western states, the U.S.-Russia relation seems to have changed its course. The reset in 2008 has improved the U.S.-Russia relations, which has deteriorated over the past decade; however, the military intervention and the active pursuit of a pre-democratic regime in Libya has caused the relationship between the United States and Russia to exacerbate once again. The sense of threat for domestic instability that the Russian government was feeling due to Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring was getting increasingly bigger due to the West’s willingness to intervene with force. In addition, combined with the suspicion the Russian government had with the United States’ effort to construct a military base in Afghanistan,

³⁵ Ibid. P.380

³⁶ Blank, Stephen, and Carol R. Saivetz. "Playing to Lose? Russia and the" Arab Spring"." *Problems of Post-Communism* 59.1 (2012): 3-14. P.6

³⁷ Ibid. P.6

the Russian government increasingly started to believe that the United States were using democracy as merely a tool to promote their national interest. This view has caused the Russian government to be more critical of the United States' intentions and behaviors and be more assertive in their foreign policy. From the Libyan military intervention, the Russian government has reverted back to criticizing the United State's position as a unipolar power, and the conflict of their interests between the United States and Russia has become increasingly evident.

Chapter 2: Comparison of the Two Periods

2.1 Reset Period

Measuring the well-being of relationship between states could be difficult since no formula could be used to quantify the nature of the relation. However, it could be estimated through enumerating high-level visits and deliverables it produces. In other words, when states are signing new agreements or collectively undertaking global issues, or each states' senior officials are meeting more frequently, their relations could be understood as improving³⁸. During the "Russian Reset" period, the U.S.-Russia seemed to be improving, compared to the period from 2004 to 2008. There were more bilateral talks between the United States and Russia and actual deliverable being produced³⁹. I argue that the period between 2009 reset and 2011 up to the military intervention in Libya is the period that the U.S.-Russian relation was at its high point since Putin came into power.

The evidence of the effective working relationship could be seen in policies like the Northern Distribution Network agreement in 2009. The United States needed a transport route to support the United States and NATO missions in Afghanistan. Firstly, the United States was transporting goods through Pakistan, from the Port of Karachi,

³⁸ Orav, Aivo. *Measuring Foreign Relations*. Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006. Print.

³⁹ Charap, Samuel. "Beyond The Russian Reset." *National Interest* 126 (2013): 39-48. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 8 Feb. 2016. P.39

since the war up to 2009. However, transporting goods and personnel through this route was highly risky with the Taliban in the area. The U.S. convoys were repeatedly attacked throughout the time they used the Pakistani route. In February 2009, President Medvedev signed Northern Transit Route agreement, and this agreement allowed the United States to transport not only food and supplies but also military personnel and equipment through Russian territory⁴⁰.

It was extremely rare for the Russian government to allow United States military to pass through their territory due to the general distrust they have for the West. However, Russia signed an agreement to allow the transport of both equipment and military personnel through their territory. Throughout 2010, the Russian government authorized almost 4500 U.S. flights over Russia, carrying military equipment and personnel. The Northern Transit Route allowed the United States to establish a reliable transport route for their missions in Afghanistan. In addition, the United States also showed their willingness to cooperate with Russia through a military equipment contract for Afghanistan during this period⁴¹.

The United States Defence Department decided to purchase 21 Mi-17V5 helicopters from the Russian Arms exporter Rosoboronexport for the Afghan Armed Force, in spite of the lobbying effort by the domestic weapons manufacturers. Although the United States has purchased military equipment for the Afghan force from Russian manufacturers before through intermediaries, this was the first time that the United States purchased military equipment from a Russian manufacturer directly. Moreover, President

⁴⁰ Gvosdev, Nikolai. "U.S.-Russia Reset On Display In Afghanistan." *World Politics Review (Selective Content)* (2011): 1. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 6 Feb. 2016.

⁴¹ Ibid.

Obama went as far as ignoring the lobbying effort by domestic manufactures for this 300 million dollar contract. Although part of the reason was that the Afghans were more familiar with Soviet-style technology and that Russian-made helicopters would be a better fit for the harsh conditions of Afghanistan, it was mainly a signal that Obama was willing to sacrifice some political capital to promote their relations with Russia⁴².

The second example is the New START treaty, signed on April 8, 2010, that was built up on the previous nuclear control treaty START I. The START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), first of the three proposed treaties within the START framework, was signed on July 31, 1991 between President George H.W. Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev⁴³. This treaty restricted the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicle to 1600, and the number of warheads to 6000. This was almost a 50 percent decrease in deployed warheads on both the Soviet Union and the United States. The START Treaty also obligated two states to notify each other in the case of an ICBM or SLBM flight test, and this included tests into the upper atmosphere or space. In addition, this treaty adopted a verification process similar to the INF Treaty, which included data exchanges, inspections, launch notification, and technical means of verification⁴⁴. After the START Treaty was signed, President George H.W. Bush and President Boris Yeltsin signed a follow-on treaty, START II⁴⁵.

The START II aimed to reduce the number of strategic arms from START I. With the START II number of arms were to be reduced from 6000 of START I to 3500,

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Schenck, Lisa M., and Robert A. Youmans. "From Start To Finish: A Historical Review Of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties And Starting Over With The New Start." *Cardozo Journal Of International & Comparative Law* 20.2 (2012): 399-435. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 6 Feb. 2016. P.428

⁴⁴ Ibid. P.428

⁴⁵ Ibid. P.429

and also Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) were to be banned. However, START II never came into effect, since Russia's condition for ratifying the treaty was the update of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. With the United State's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia correspondingly announced the withdrawal from the START II⁴⁶.

The START Treaty expired on December 4, 2009, although the new START treaty was yet to be signed. In fact, it was not until April 8 of 2010 that the New START Treaty was signed. This new treaty further reduced the number of deployed strategic arms from 6000 of START I to 1550, and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 700 from 1600. The New START Treaty, similar to START I, has provisions for on-site inspections, data exchanges, and notifications⁴⁷. However, in many aspects, the verification procedures were not as meticulous as the process in START I. This reflected the new nature of the relationship between Russia and the United States⁴⁸.

Another example is Russian relations with Iran. Russian government and Iran's relations showed a shift in 2010 as a result of the "Russian Reset" in 2009. Prior to 2009, Russia had seen Iran as an ally against the common American adversary. They cooperated with Iran with their nuclear power plant development and tried to delay and water down sanctions against Iran in the United Nations Security Council. For instance, although they have voted in favor of the resolution, Russia worked to soften the harsh sanction that the West was seeking for in the 2008 Resolution 1803⁴⁹. A similar situation

⁴⁶ Ibid. P.430

⁴⁷ Ibid. P.432

⁴⁸ Ibid. P.433

⁴⁹ Katz, Mark N. "Russia And Iran." *Middle East Policy* 19.3 (2012): 54-64. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 7 Feb. 2016. P.57

arose in late 2008 when the Security Council passed Resolution 1835, a Russian-drafted resolution against Iran. Although Resolution 1835 was a new resolution adopted against Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the new resolution did not contain any additional sanctions and it was merely to encourage Iran's timely compliance with previous resolutions with the IAEA. Furthermore, Russia's Iran-watcher, Nina Mamedova maintained that, "The restrained nature of the new UN Security Council resolution on Iran can be considered a diplomatic victory for Russia."⁵⁰

Furthermore, after Putin's visit to Teheran in 2007, Russia delivered the enriched uranium required to enable operation of the plant in Bushehr. Regardless of the fear of the United States that Iran was using their nuclear energy program as a cover for their nuclear arms development, Putin decided to ignore their concern and supply Iran with the enriched uranium⁵¹. The clash of Russian and U.S. interests continued with the sales of the S-300 long-range surface to air missiles to Iran by Russia. In December 2008, state-run news agency RIA Novosti and Majles's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee reported that Russia and Iran reached an agreement with the sales of S-300 missiles⁵².

Although Russia's close relationship with Iran seem to have changed after the reset in 2009. In 2010, Russia joined the United States and other permanent members to impose a tougher sanction against Iran regarding non-compliance with previous UN Security Council resolutions. With the cooperation of Russia, the UN Security Council was able to adopt Resolution 1929. In addition, in September 2009, President Medvedev

⁵⁰ Ibid. P.57

⁵¹ Ibid. P.57

⁵² Ibid. P.59

announced that Russia would not be delivering the S-300 missiles to Iran, which they agreed to in 2008⁵³.

Some argued that the Obama administration's reset was not a significant change from the previous Bush administration's policy quoting President Bush's Sochi Declaration. The Sochi Declaration was a document that described a long list of issues that both states' interest overlaps, in which both states acknowledged that common interests prevail over disagreements⁵⁴. The bilateral statement declared,

“We intend to cooperate as partners to promote security, and to jointly counter the threats to peace we face, including international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are determined to build a lasting peace, both on a bilateral basis and in international fora, recognizing our shared responsibility to the people of our countries and the global community of nations to remain steadfast and united in pursuit of international security, and a peaceful, free world. Where we have differences, we will work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect.”⁵⁵

In spite of the reassuring words of the bilateral declaration, short after the statement was made, Russia invaded Georgia and war between two states broke out. Although President Putin and President Bush have issued statements regarding the rejection of the zero-sum thinking of the Cold War era, they were often merely a political statement. However, those shifts in policies regarding issues such as the Northern Distribution Route, START Treaty, and the foreign relations with Iran, are what actually suggest the improving

⁵³ Ibid. P.61

⁵⁴ Charap, Samuel. P.48

⁵⁵ "U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Council on Foreign Relations, 6 Apr. 2008. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
<<http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/us-russia-strategic-framework-declaration/p16193>>.

relationship between Russia and the United States. During the period after the reset, there were far more deliverables being produced as seen in the example above. It truly shows the improving relations between two states. On the other hand, after the 2011, the relationship seems to deteriorate, and Russian foreign policy correspondingly becomes more assertive.

2.2 Beyond the Rest

The relation between Putin and Obama took a turn after the Libyan military intervention in 2011. Since the military intervention, which initially was aimed to protect civilians that turned into a NATO intervention that consequently overthrew the Gadhafi regime, Russia and the United States seem to have less alignment with their interests. After series of military provocations and signs of displeasure towards the West in Russian foreign policy, the relationship between Russia and the United States are currently at a low point following the annexation of Crimea and Russian intervention in Syria.

First sign of their changed foreign policy is the naval exercise in April 2012, which was conducted in conjunction with the Chinese Navy. Although the Russian government often made an effort to avoid confrontational actions during the reset period, Russian and Chinese Navy had conducted their first official bilateral naval exercise in the Yellow Sea, near Qingdao⁵⁶. Through this joint military exercise, two states have exchanged the command control and communication techniques to improve their

⁵⁶ "China and Russia Launch Naval Exercises in Yellow Sea - BBC News." *BBC News*. 22 Apr. 2012. Web. 01 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17803624>>.

interoperability. Experts saw this exercise as a signal to third parties that Russia and China are able and willing operate collectively to advance their security interests in their near abroad. Furthermore, many analysts saw this as an effort by those two states to counter the United States' pivot to the Asia-Pacific region through strengthening security cooperation. Russia's aggressive behavior continued not only in Asia, but also in the Eastern end of their territory⁵⁷.

On January 22, 2013, Russia conducted the biggest military exercise in the Mediterranean Sea, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia gathered fleets from three different regions, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the North Sea, totaling 23 vessels⁵⁸. Although a similar exercise took place in 2012, 2013's exercise was larger in scale and the Russian Chief of Staff, Valery Gerasimov, was present on site to monitor the drill himself. Considering that this was not a routine exercise, it is likely that this exercise was conducted to demonstrate Russia's capability and willingness to act as a superpower in the region⁵⁹. Russian foreign affairs analyst, Fyodor Lukyanov, told Reuters that, exercises were "more likely part of a wider attempt to reconfirm that Russia's navy and military forces in the south are still able to play a political and geopolitical role."⁶⁰ In other words, this exercise was to bring up the stakes in its conflict

⁵⁷ Weitz, Richard. "Assessing the Sino-Russian Naval Exercise "Maritime Cooperation 2012" | SLDInfo." *Second Line of Defence*. Second Line of Defense. Web. 31 Jan. 2016. <<http://www.sldinfo.com/assessing-the-sino-russian-naval-exercise-“maritime-cooperation-2012”/>>.

⁵⁸ Magen, Zvi. "The Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean: Exercise or Military Operation?" *The Institute for National Security Studies*. The Institute for National Security Studies, 29 Jan. 2013. Web. 01 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2589>>.

⁵⁹ Magen, Zvi.

⁶⁰ ANISHCHUK, ALEXEI. "Putin Flexes Russian Military Muscle in Naval Exercise." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 28 Mar. 2013. Web. 20 Jan. 2016. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-exercises-idUSBRE92R0K320130328>>.

with the West in the region, given their deteriorating relations with the West⁶¹. Those increasingly hostile behaviors lead to the annexation of Crimea that occurred in 2014, which was a display of a critical shift of Russian foreign policy.

Russian annexation of Crimea was the decisive evidence that the relation between President Putin and Obama has significantly worsened since the reset in 2009. Series of protest broke out throughout Ukraine following the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's announcement to not sign the association agreement with the European Union. The Ukrainian government responded to the protest with violence and tried to put the movement to a halt. However, the government's action was met with further protest, which eventually led President Yanukovich to flee Ukraine to Russia on February 21, 2014. After the President had fled Ukraine, a new government was formed promising to sign the association agreement with the EU. This loss of an allied government drove the Russian government to annex Crimea in February 2014. The Russian government and Russian media maintained that the coup was led, and the new government was formed through the influence of the West⁶².

On the morning of February 27, Russian forces in plain green uniforms without an insignia surrounded government buildings and military installations across Ukraine. Although Putin claimed that they were local self-defense units, it was clear from their uniforms and advanced weaponry that they were representing Russian interests if not they were directly drawn from the Russian Special Forces⁶³. On March 16, 2014, the

⁶¹ Magen, Zvi.

⁶² Biersack, John, and Shannon O'Lear. "The Geopolitics of Russia's Annexation of Crimea: Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55.3 (2014): 247-69. Web. 6 Feb. 2016. P.248

⁶³ Ibid. P.249

Parliament of Crimea adopted the “All-Crimean Referendum,” which presented the public with two options: (1) Do you support the reunification of the Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation? (2) Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 and the status of the Crimea as a part of Ukraine?”⁶⁴ Even before the referendum was adopted, the Crimean Parliament declared independence of Crimea on March 16, 2014. Although Russian Federation Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights estimated individuals, who answered No.1 to be no more than 60 percent and voter turnout to be around 30 percent⁶⁵, the official result showed that 96.77 percent was in favor of the annexation and voter turnout to be 83.1 percent⁶⁶. In response to the Crimean referendum, acting President of Ukraine suspended the referendum and a question was submitted to the Ukrainian Constitutional Court. On March 14, 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the referendum to be unconstitutional, and maintained that only the Ukrainian Parliament has the authority to adopt a referendum in which Ukraine’s territory could be addressed⁶⁷.

In addition, the international community responded by condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea, arguing that there is no legal basis for Russia’s annexation. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution, General Assembly Resolution 68/262, declaring the denunciation of the Russian government-led succession referendum. The resolution stated that, “Noting that the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014 was not

⁶⁴ Grant, Thomas D. "Annexation of Crimea." *American Journal of International Law* 109.1 (2015): 68-95. P.69

⁶⁵ Ibid. P.69

⁶⁶ Biersack, John, and Shannon O’Lear. P.251

⁶⁷ Grant, Thomas D. P.69

authorized by Ukraine.”⁶⁸ Furthermore, the General Assembly made a statement stating that the General Assembly “calls upon all States, international organizations, and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status.”⁶⁹ Similarly, the United States submitted a draft resolution in an attempt to adopt a resolution in the UN Security Council condemning actions taken by the Russian government. This resolution aimed to reaffirm Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and invalidated Crimea’s succession to Russian Federation. Nevertheless, unsurprisingly, the resolution was vetoed by Russia⁷⁰. In spite of the international community’s effort to mediate the situation between Russia and Ukraine, Russia did not change its firm stance on claiming legitimacy of the annexation. This event further damaged the relation between Russia and the West and created a significant void that cannot be easily filled. Particularly with the on-going discussion between Ukraine and EU regarding the association agreement and the negotiation for NATO membership, the annexation of Crimea was a direct affront against the West.

Another example for the confrontational approach is their foreign policy regarding Syria. From the very beginning of the Syrian unrest, Putin immediately showed their support for the Assad regime and opposed any military intervention against the Syrian government. As the situation developed in Syria and then UN resolutions were submitted in the Security Council, Russia vetoed four draft resolutions, S/2011/612, S/2012/77, S/2012/538, and S/2014/348. Russia continuously acted as a political shield

⁶⁸ United Nations. General Assembly. 68/262, Territorial integrity of Ukraine. A/RES/62/262. 1 April. 2014. Available undocs.org/A/RES/62/262

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ "UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked." *UN News Center*. UN, 15 Mar. 2014. Web. 06 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47362#.VvYFo2QrJdg>>.

for Assad in spite of the global outcry for action against the Assad government from the beginning of the conflict until now in 2016. The Russian Foreign Minister stated that “the situation doesn’t present a threat to international peace and security,” and “It is not in the interests of anyone to send messages to the opposition in Syria or elsewhere that if you reject all reasonable offers we will come and help you as we did in Libya.”⁷¹ In addition to their effort to protect the Assad regime politically, they started providing military support in September 2015.

In September 2015, Russia started to expand its fleet in Syria, including jets with the capability to attack targets on the ground. On September 21, the United States Senior officials reported that Russia deployed dozen Su-24 Fencer and dozen Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack planes to their airbase near Latakia, Syria⁷². Following the increase in the number of their warplanes in Latakia, Putin requested authorization to deploy Russian military in Syria to the Federation Council. The Federation Council approved Putin’s request, and approved the use of force against terrorist groups in Syria⁷³. On September 30, 2015, Russia launched its first airstrike against terrorists groups in Syria. Although Russia claimed that their operations in Syria were to combat the expansion of ISIS, the United States responded by refuting their claim. The United States argued that the Russian military was targeting rebel groups that are threatening the Assad

⁷¹ Cook, Brad, Brad Meyer, and Ilya Arkhipov. "Russia Warns U.S., EU Not to Aid Syria Protests After Libya." *Bloomberg.com*. Bloomberg, 2 June 2011. Web. 06 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-01/russia-warns-u-s-nato-against-military-aid-to-syria-protests-after-libya>>.

⁷² Schmitt, Eric, and Neil Macfarquhar. "Russia Expands Fleet in Syria With Jets That Can Attack Targets on Ground." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 21 Sept. 2015. Web. 06 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/world/middleeast/russia-deploys-ground-attack-aircraft-to-syrian-base.html>>.

⁷³ "Russian Parliament Unanimously Approves Use of Military in Syria to Fight ISIS." *RT International*. RT, 30 Sept. 2015. Web. 06 Feb. 2016. <<https://www.rt.com/news/317013-parliament-authorization-troops-abroad/>>.

regime. In other words, they were arguing that the intervention was not to combat terrorists, but to prop the Assad regime up through targeting opposition forces⁷⁴. Moreover, some media sources claimed that some Russian airstrikes have targeted U.S. backed rebel's training ground based on the fact that one of the targets that Russian military targeted was in the outskirts of Kafr Nabl, which the local council in the town receives U.S. aid and a home to local rebel group supported by a covert CIA program. This allegation of Russian forces targeting U.S-backed rebel forces has created strong contentions between Russia and the United States, further damaging their relations⁷⁵.

Furthermore, Russia and the United States harshly criticized each other's actions in a back-to-back speech at the 2015 United Nations General Assembly. Putin criticized the United States' action of arming the rebels and contended that it will lead to further destabilization in the Middle East⁷⁶. On the other hand, President Obama criticized Putin for his support for the Assad regime, and stated, "In accordance with this logic, we should support tyrants like Bashar al-Assad, who drops barrel bombs to massacre innocent civilians because the alternative is surely worse."⁷⁷ The cooperative relationship that once proved to be beneficial for not only Russia and the United States,

⁷⁴ "Russia Begins Air Strikes in Syria as US Flags Concern over Targets." *ABC News*. 1 Oct. 2015. Web. 06 Feb. 2016.

<<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-30/russia-begins-air-strikes-in-syria-us-official-says/6818352>>

⁷⁵ Sly, Liz, and Andrew Roth. "Russia Defends Syria Airstrikes amid Claims of Blows to U.S.-backed Rebels." *Washington Post*. The Washington Post, 1 Oct. 2015. Web. 06 Feb. 2016.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-vehemently-defends-syrian-airstrikes-and-denies-targeting-us-backed-rebels/2015/10/01/cddada92-67af-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205_story.html>

⁷⁶ Putin, Vladimir. "Read Putin's U.N. General Assembly Speech." *Read Putin's U.N. General Assembly Speech*. The Washington Post, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.

<<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/>>.

⁷⁷ Obama, Barak. "Remarks by President Obama to the United Nations General Assembly." *The White House*. The White House, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.

<<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-united-nations-general-assembly>>.

but to the international community was deteriorating quickly. Compared to the years between 2009 and 2011, there was a significant divergence in foreign policy as it is shown in the number of vetoed UN Security Council resolutions and military actions that directly contradict interests of the West.

During 2009 to 2011, from the reset to up to the Libyan intervention, there were no UN resolutions that were vetoed by Russia or the United States. Conversely, from after the Libyan intervention and now in February 2016, there are seven resolutions that Russia has exercised their veto power⁷⁸. Moreover, unlike the period 2009 to 2011, Putin now does not hesitate to make statements that directly criticize the United States and the West, and to promote Russian national interests even though it goes directly against interests of the United States or other Western states. From those assertive policies and the inability of Putin and Obama to produce deliverables since the military intervention in Libya suggests that Putin is less willing to compromise and will not shy away from asserting Russia's national interest.

⁷⁸ "Security Council - Veto List." *Dag Hammarskjöld Library*. United Nations, 12 Jan. 2016. Web. 18 Mar. 2016. <<http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>>.

Chapter 3 Man Chapter

3.1 Introduction

The first image is the “man,” the individual/political leader as the cause of war. Russia has virtually become an authoritative state with centralized power to the state leader, President Vladimir Putin. Since President Putin has come into power in 1999, he has made numerous legislative and structural changes to concentrate power in the federation to himself. With the centralized power, we could assume anything the Russian government does is significantly influenced by his decision, including its foreign policy.

Since there is a considerable centralization of power to Putin, his personal perception towards Western states has a significant effect on Russian foreign policy. His view on the West has significantly deteriorated through the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring, particularly with the instance of Libya. Libyan military intervention has created a significant distrust towards the Western states, particular the United States, due to the military intervention that prioritized their national interest. Another perception of Putin was that Color Revolutions, the Arab Spring, and the demonstration against Putin in 2011 was a part of Western democracy promotion, and revolutions and attempted revolutions were orchestrated by the Western states. Those events were another factor that contributed to the increasing distrust towards the West. Due to the distrust towards the West and fear for his power created by incidents of unrest in Eastern Europe and the

Middle East, Putin has been using a rhetoric that speaks to Russia's historical heritage and anti-west sentiment in order to gain domestic support. Due to the authoritative nature of the Russian government, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between policies created by Putin and the government. However, this chapter will focus on things Putin has personally discussed and the source of changes in foreign policy specifically linked to Putin specifically. This chapter will discuss on Putin's effect on Russian foreign policy from the perspective of the Putin's perception of the West, and what he views as a threat to his power.

3.2 Background

The start of Putin's time in the government goes back to 1975, when the Soviet Union still existed, when he joined the KGB after graduating from college. His time in the KGB is important, since he met many of his current associates during this period. This includes Sergey Ivanov, an individual that has been in Putin's inner circle since Putin came into power. Ivanov has worked under Putin as the Minister of Defence, deputy prime minister, and in the presidential administration. Another two names that surface in Putin's circle around this times period are Matthias Warnig, and Sergey Chemezov. Warnig is the current director of the Nord Stream AG, a company that constructs gas pipelines between Russia and Germany, and Chemezov is the CEO of Rosoboronexport, which is a company in charge of Russian arms export⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ Dawisha, Karen. *Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?* New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015. Print. P.52

Putin resigned the KGB in 1991, and started working as an advisor to the City Council leader and Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak. Eventually, Putin becomes the deputy mayor under Sobchak, and the chairman of the Committee for Foreign Liaison in the early 1990s⁸⁰. During his time in the mayor's office, Putin also gathered individuals that he will work with during the 1990s and his time as the president. Those individuals in Putin's circle were from various backgrounds including the KGB, Main Intelligence Directorate, and some from legal and business. This includes Dmitry Medvedev, the current Prime Minister, who worked as one of the foreign policy advisor under Putin⁸¹. Putin started gathering influence using his position as the chairman of Committee for Foreign Liaison, and his connection to Bank of Russiya, materializing on his KGB ties. After the Mayor Sobchak was unable to be reelected, many believed that the influence of Putin in St. Pittsburg would dissolve. However, Putin was soon offered a position in Moscow, where he continued to retain influence through individuals in his inner circle he left in St. Pittsburg⁸².

Some of his associates moved to Moscow with Putin as some remained in St. Pittsburg. After moving to Moscow, Putin first started working as the deputy head of the Presidential Management Department⁸³. After working as the head of the Presidential Management Department position for few months, he assumed the position of chief of Main Control Directorate⁸⁴. Eventually, Putin assumes the position of the director of FSB with the appointment by President Yeltsin in 1998. During his time in FSB, he

⁸⁰ Ibid. P.80

⁸¹ Ibid. P.81

⁸² Ibid. P.94

⁸³ Ibid. P.165

⁸⁴ Ibid. P174

restructured the FSB significantly, bringing in his former colleagues in the KGB. One of the significant changes that Putin made was the elimination of Directorate of Economic Counter-Intelligence, and Directorate of Counter-Intelligence Protection of Strategic Sites. What is notable is that the Directorate of Economic Counter-Intelligence was a division that investigated high-level economic crimes such as those committed by oligarchs. Those two divisions were replaced with six new divisions, and subsequently filled with Putin's loyal from St. Petersburg, while the former agents were forced to retire⁸⁵. On August 9th 1999, Putin was appointed as Prime Minister by Boris Yeltsin, and right as Putin was appointed Boris Yeltsin expressed his intention of choosing Putin as his successor, out of the five-deputy prime minister⁸⁶. After Yeltsin's resignation in December 1999, Putin became acting president succeeding Yeltsin⁸⁷.

As he rose through the ranks, Putin was able to create a close circle of individuals, which he uses to create influence in various sectors of the state. Although Putin might not have been the most influential person in each of the group in different sectors, he was the only person who could connect different groups and exert influence throughout the entire web of relations. Putin was able to create a web of interpersonal relationship that other individuals could capitalize in return for providing support for Putin⁸⁸. In 2013, the Forbes's list of wealthiest individuals in Russia consisted of those who were closest to Putin, such as Roman Abramovich, Vladimir Kogan, and Gennadiy Timchenko. As Putin's close associates become millionaires, Putin himself has been enjoying significant amount of wealth as well. Although Putin's income has been

⁸⁵ Ibid. P.183

⁸⁶ Ibid. P.201

⁸⁷ Ibid. P.224

⁸⁸ Ibid. P.100

reported in a moderate amount, his lifestyle tells a different story. The presidential security is told to have control of more than 5 yachts staffed with full crews, which estimated to worth more than 110 million dollars. In addition, Putin has access to 26 official residences that are free to use⁸⁹.

Putin has supported his associates through providing them with large state contracts and legalizing their companies' activities while criminalizing their competitors, and in return, they supported Putin to rise up to and sustain his power as a political leader. They support Putin through financing his campaign, removing enemies of him, and shielding him from opposition forces. As was brought into presidency, following the resignation of Yeltsin, he immediately started the centralization of power. He maintained the ties with those oligarchs seized influence in many different sector of the society⁹⁰.

3.3 Vladimir Putin as President

As soon as Putin came into power, he focused on creating a completely different public image from his predecessor Boris Yeltsin. The 1990s was characterized with chaos caused by an economic down turn and other calamities in the society that followed. As Putin came into power, Miguel Vázquez Liñán maintains, he tried to portray his self as “the guarantor of stability, the constructor of ‘the vertical of power,’ the dictator of law and, therefore, assumed the role of the person called to put an end to the

⁸⁹ Ibid. P.102

⁹⁰ Ibid. P.103

chaos.”⁹¹ From the beginning, Putin has refused to debate his opponent or conducting rallies to meet the voters to gain their support. He refused to partake in the political campaign, which he viewed as impure and beneath him⁹².

In the Russian government, President has considerable amount of power, even compared to other presidential systems. The Russian constitution grants the president control over foreign and defence policy, and the president also is the commander and chief of the Armed Forces. The president is able to propose laws in the parliament. Moreover, he could issue decrees in order to control issues in which are not regulated by formal laws. The parliament is limited in its ability to limit the action of the president, since the parliament depends on the presidential administration for their budget. Similarly, the Federal Court also depends its budget on the presidential administration. Hence, it is hard for the other branches of the government to control the president’s actions⁹³. In the Russian government, the President already has significant power granted by the constitution. However, President Putin was able to further increase his power through cooperating and forming close ties with the oligarchs in the private sector.

Through the solidified standing as a president, Putin’s aim as a president was to restore order based on nationalism and a strong central government. As Putin mentions in his writing “Russia at the turn of the millennium,” Russian Federation was in an appalling condition when he assumed office. The state has lost its super power status at the end of the Cold War, and the economy has deteriorated so far that it shrunk to one

⁹¹ Liñán, Miguel Vázquez. "History as a propaganda tool in Putin’s Russia." *Communist and post-communist studies* 43.2 (2010): 167-178. P.167

⁹² Dawisha, Karen. P.266

⁹³ *RUSSIAN FEDERATION Presidential Election 26 March 2000 FINAL REPORT*. Rep. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2000. Print. P.2

tenth of the United States' economy. In resolving those issues, Putin believed that the key to restoring Russia's power was nationalism and a strong centralized government to promote stability and order⁹⁴. As well as carrying out social, political, and economic reform, Putin tried to portray himself in a particular manner as a strong head of the state.

In order to create a public image of a strong leader, Putin has crafted his public image from the very beginning of his presidency. In creating a public image, anything that Putin says or does could be assumed as an effort to cultivate a particular image, and in the case of Putin, the image that he has attempted to create was an image of a strong leader⁹⁵. Even things that are viewed as publicity stunts, whether that is tranquilizing a tiger or posing with massive guns, it is a deliberate effort to construct a particular image. What Putin did was made the Russian population proud of the state once again. Putin Shifted away from the public image of Yeltsin, and changed how Russia as a state is viewed domestically and internationally. Putin reinvented the image of Russia based on the principles of "sovereign democracy, economic power, and military power"⁹⁶. Through an image of a strong leader that he created, he took credits for the economic achievements and foreign policies that portrayed Russia as a rising power, and the centralization of power and his autocratic nature of governance were justified for those achievements⁹⁷. However, his power was starting to be threatened due to events of popular revolt, such as the Color Revolutions, Arab Spring, and the domestic

⁹⁴ Putin, Vladimir. "Putin on Russia & Millenium." *Putin on RUSSIA & MILLENNIUM*. University of Oregon, n.d. Web. 05 Mar. 2016.

⁹⁵ Bacon, Edwin. "Public political narratives: developing a neglected source through the exploratory case of Russia in the Putin-Medvedev era." *Political Studies* 60.4 (2012): 768-786. P.772

⁹⁶ Åslund, Anders. "Putin's lurch toward tsarism and neoimperialism: why the United States should care." *Demokratizatsiya* 16.1 (2008): 17. P.21

⁹⁷ Ibid. P.21

demonstrations in 2011.

3.4 Sources of Fear

Three events that had the most significant influence on Putin were the Color Revolution, and Arab Spring, and domestic demonstrations in 2011. All events were significant to Putin due to his belief of order as the most important aspect of the state. Color Revolutions were a series of revolutions that swept through the post-Soviet space that caused few regime changes through mass protest. This had a significant influence on Putin since order was what he prioritized in his state building, and his very first priority was coming under threat with those events. Moreover, the Color Revolutions had an effect on the perception of the West, since he viewed those regime changes were orchestrated by the Western states. Putin becomes increasingly concerned of a Color Revolution type effort to regime change occurring in Russia that could threaten his regime. This sense of threat that the Color Revolutions have created result in increased tension between Russia and the West around 2006⁹⁸.

In addition to the support for the Color Revolution, Putin's perception towards the West has worsened over the their criticism against Putin's regime. Putin viewed the West's criticism aimed at his regime as a support to his opposition forces that are calling for a more democratic government. He viewed the West's action as an effort to weaken his regime against the opposition force and turn the Russia population against the

⁹⁸ Shlapentokh, Vladimir. "Perceptions of foreign threats to the regime: From Lenin to Putin." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42.3 (2009): 305-324. P.311

government, and ultimately impose their interest to Russia⁹⁹. Moreover, the West's criticism was not only against the democratization that seemed to be backtracking, but also towards Russian government's protection of human rights. Putin viewed this criticism for human rights violation as a pretext for the West's intervention to Russia's internal affairs. The fear for Western led regime change in Russia has been reported in numerous occasions in pro-Putin medias. Although if Putin was genuinely concerned of a Western stated-led regime change in Russia is a question that only those who close to Putin know, it is most certain that the distrust towards the West was starting to develop during this period¹⁰⁰. Putin has also made statements urging the OSCE to stop interfering with states' internal affairs in numerous occasions¹⁰¹.

The Arab Spring had a similar implication in regards to the narrative by Putin that followed the series of revolutions. Putin often described the series of events using words such as turmoil, destabilization, and extremism. Although Russia does not have significant economic interest in the region, at least less than other Western states, due to the abundant domestic energy supply and increase in oil price which would have benefited the Russian economy, Russia had an extremely negative view to the series of events that were unfolding in the Middle East¹⁰². Putin again argued that the series of events were orchestrated by the West, and become increasingly concerned of the possibility of a similar event occurring in Russia. However, the Arab Spring was different from the Color Revolution in a sense that it involved direct military intervention by the

⁹⁹ Ibid. P.312

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. P.312

¹⁰¹ Ibid. P.316

¹⁰² Baev, Pavel K. "Russia's counter-revolutionary stance toward the Arab Spring." *Insight Turkey* 13.3 (2011): 11. P.11

West. In the case of Libya, the United States and NATO carried out a military intervention that resulted in a regime change by force¹⁰³.

The Libyan intervention was important for Putin for two points. One was the direct military intervention by the West, and second was Medvedev's leadership. The humanitarian intervention that quickly turned into a military operation that aimed to topple the Gadhafi regime was a realization of the extent that the Western states were willing to go to assert their national interest. This has created further mistrust towards the West, particularly the United States. Moreover, the abstention of from the Security Council vote for Resolution 1973, which allowed the pretext for military intervention in Libya, by Medvedev was a realization for Putin that Russia requires a stronger leader and an assertive foreign policy.

The last of the three events that had a significant effect to Putin was the series of domestic demonstrations that occurred in 2011 and 2012. The protestors took the street as a result of the state Duma election results, and the protest progressively became larger by December 24th. The biggest demonstration was the demonstration in Moscow, which mobilized over 40,000 people, and there were also demonstrations in over 90 other cities¹⁰⁴. Those demonstrations called for a reelection for the State Duma and other senior figures in the Russian government including Putin and Medvedev. As an individual that said, "The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century,"¹⁰⁵ this domestic unrest has a significant effect on Putin personally. Those

¹⁰³ Katz, Mark N. "Russia And The Arab Spring Analysis." *Eurasia Review*. Eurasia Review, 5 Apr. 2012. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.eurasiareview.com/05042012-russia-and-the-arab-spring-analysis/>>.

¹⁰⁴ Monaghan, Andrew. "The end of The PuTin era?." *The Carnegie Papers*(2012): 8-12.

¹⁰⁵ Putin, Vladimir. "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation." *President of Russia*. Kremlin.ru, 25 Apr. 2005. Web. 18 Mar. 2016.

events have created a fear for his power, and Putin's response was to shift the narrative from the reset period's narrative that often shied away from a confrontation to a more anti-West and nationalistic narrative.

3.5 Putin's Fear

Through events such as the Color Revolutions, the Arab Spring, and demonstration that have occurred domestically, Putin has become increasingly threatened by domestic instability that could lead to loss of his power. As a result of those instances, he was forced to shift the focus of his foreign policy in order to regain his popularity as the head of the state. One policy shift that occurred due to this fear was the stronger anti-West sentiment, especially towards the United States. Another policy shift was the narrative of Great Power politics that focused on the heritage of Russia and its fate of destined to become a great power. Putin has used those two aspects to isolate himself from oppositions in domestic politics.

Firstly, Putin has reinforced the anti-West narrative as the fear for his power increased. Putin's anti-West sentiment has a strong connection how Putin views those events. In many occasions, Putin has characterized those events such as the Color Revolutions and Arab Spring not as a dawn of a new democratic age, but as a political turmoil and disorder. Moreover, Putin has also harshly criticized the West's intervention officially in those events. In the case of the Color Revolutions, Putin argued that the Western states' actions were infringement on those states' sovereignty. Similarly, in the

case of the Arab Spring, Putin has publically denounced the West's military intervention in Libya, and even criticized President Medvedev for abstaining from the Security Council vote¹⁰⁶. Putin viewed those events as sources of domestic instability and a matter that could lead to instability within Russia.

As a result of his fear of losing power due to instances such as Color Revolutions, the Arab Spring, and demonstrations, Putin has strengthened the anti-West narrative in order to gain domestic support. His anti-West sentiment is often linked to matters such as maintaining order, sovereignty, and national interest. In addition to Putin's reproach of the events that have led to regime change, he also has criticized the West's action of supporting those revolutions. He claimed that those actions were against maintaining order, and it infringes up on state sovereignty. As Putin came into office in 1999, he ran on a platform of bringing back stability and order to Russia, and he justified the centralization of power for that reason¹⁰⁷. His agenda of bringing back the strong anti-Western rhetoric is for a similar reason. In addition to the criticism against the West, Putin has created a narrative, whether that is true or not, that the West is trying to take over Russia using similar means to the revolutions that occurred in recent years in the post-Soviet space and the Middle East.

Putin's use of the anti-Western narrative is one of his efforts to marginalize his political opponents. As well as portraying the West as an enemy that is trying to take over Russia, what Putin has done is that he portrayed his political opponents as the instruments

¹⁰⁶ Blank, Stephen J. *Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy*. ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2012. P.13

¹⁰⁷ Bacon, Edwin. "Public political narratives: developing a neglected source through the exploratory case of Russia in the Putin-Medvedev era." *Political Studies* 60.4 (2012): 768-786. P.772

of the West, claimed that they are working with the West to take power¹⁰⁸. This narrative is not only useful in creating support for himself since he could justify the need for a strong leader, but it is also useful in discrediting the opposition force's intentions. One example of Putin's effort is his criticism on the United States Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul. As soon as McFaul came into office in 2012, Putin started a propaganda campaign that portrayed McFaul as an individual sent by the United States government to orchestrate a revolution in Russia. Putin has also tied the opposition force to McFaul claiming that they are trying to topple his regime together, using an incident they visited Ambassador McFaul in the United States embassy¹⁰⁹.

Another policy shift was the revival of the narrative of Russia's historical heritage and its status as a Great Power by Putin. Putin started to focus on the history of Russia and the narrative that Russia is meant to be a great power in the international system. Putin has been using Russian history and cultural traditions in order to invoke nationalism among the Russian population. In his writing he stated, "Russian culture includes a longstanding tradition to respect the state, public interest and the nation's needs. An absolute majority of Russians wants to see their country strong and powerful and it respects national heroes who have given their lives for the greater good."¹¹⁰

Through rhetoric similar to the one stated above, Putin has been attempting to justify his

¹⁰⁸ Ambrosio, Thomas. "Insulating Russia from a colour revolution: How the Kremlin resists regional democratic trends." *Democratisation* 14.2 (2007): 232-252. P.237

¹⁰⁹ McFaul, Michael. "A New Cold War? Explaining Russia's New Confrontation with the West." 2015 Bartels World Affairs Lecture. Cornell University, Ithaca. 16 Mar. 2015. Lecture.

¹¹⁰ Putin, Vladimir. "Working Day." *ARCHIVE OF THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE 2008-2012 PRIME MINISTER OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION VLADIMIR PUTIN*. Prime.gov.ru, 16 Jan. 2012. Web. 18 Mar. 2016. <<http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/17755/>>.

position as a strong head of state¹¹¹. Furthermore, there seems to be an attempt by Putin to invoke politics of the Tsar era in recent years, which speaks to Russia's privileged position in the world. This narrative embraces the Russian identity from the past that is a mixture of democracy and autocracy. It also encompasses imperialistic ideas that drove the expansion of the Russian empire and antagonistic ideas towards the western liberal democracy¹¹².

Another example for the resurgence of a rhetoric that focuses on Russia's historical heritage is Putin's enhanced relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church. As a KGB agent and a government employee of the Soviet Union, Putin had to at least appear as an atheist. However, he has changed his stance on religion especially after he came into power, and the relation between Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church is seem to be getting stronger in recent years. One evidence is the endorsement of Putin by the Kiril I, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russians, during his presidential campaign¹¹³. Moreover, the state Duma has passed a bill that will add a new amendment in the Russian criminal code, which criminalizes insulting one's "religious feelings." This is the law that led to the arrest of the members of the punk rock band Pussy Riot for their unauthorized performance in the Christ the Savior Cathedral¹¹⁴.

Through rhetoric that promotes the anti-west and Russian historical heritage, Putin has been attempting to regain legitimacy as a strong head of state and the public's

¹¹¹ Blank, Stephen J. *Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy*. ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2012. P.13

¹¹² Ziegler, Charles E. "Russian-American relations: From Tsarism to Putin." *International Politics* 51.6 (2014): 671-692. P.688

¹¹³ Pryce, Paul. "Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?." *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 13.1 (2013). P.162

¹¹⁴ "Duma Approves Criminalization of Insulting Religious Feelings." *RT*. TV-Novosti, 13 June 2013. Web. 18 Mar. 2016. <<https://www.rt.com/politics/responsibility-insulting-feelings-believers-526/>>.

support. Foreign policy is something that cannot be differentiated from domestic policy, and the narrative that Putin is trying to convey in the domestic sphere also has an implication on foreign policy as well. As Putin attempts to portray himself as a strong leader that will bring order and stability to Russia by protecting them by standing up against the West's threat, the foreign policy will pivot towards a more confrontational one. This is especially true when state leaders are facing domestic pressure, since foreign policy is a political card that only the incumbent government could play. In addition, Putin has been attempting to use Russia's historical heritage as means to invoke nationalism, and justify his position as a strong head of state. As his initial platform, he is trying to portray himself as a grantor of order through Great Power politics in the international system.

3.6 Conclusion

Throughout his years as a bureaucrat and a politician, Putin has created a web of close associates that aids his retention of power. Therefore, his concern is not the unrest within the government or losing power through elections. However, what he fears is a regime change through mass protest we have seen in Color Revolutions and Arab Spring. Putin believes that those events were revolutions orchestrated by the West in order to promote their national interest. Putin believes that the criticism towards Russian democracy and human rights are the West's strategy of weakening Putin's regime and supporting the opposition force. Although Putin has a firm hold on political and economic institutions through legislative change and the oligarchs, the population is one thing that he cannot

completely control. As it will be discussed further in the next chapter, Putin and the Russian government has been using propaganda as a tool to unite the mass through nationalism and fear of the West. However, the population cannot be controlled, and observing incidents of upheaval in states that seemed unlikely causes Putin to be anxious regarding the stability of his regime.

In order to regain popular support of the people, Putin have shifted the domestic narrative to a more anti-West, and a one that focuses on Russia's historical heritage. Through the anti-West narrative, Putin has marginalized the opponents as instruments of the West. In addition, Putin seems to believe that these revolutions are caused by the intervention of the West. Former ambassador Mike McFaul claims that Putin actually believes that the Western states are behind the series of revolution that occurred in Color Revolutions, Arab Spring, and the demonstrations in Russia that occurred in 2011 to 2012. McFaul believes that Putin was using the rhetoric of the West as a threat for election purposes, although the same narrative continued after he won the election. According to Ambassador McFaul, Putin believes Ambassador McFaul to be the orchestrator of the revolution against Putin. In an interview McFaul claimed that Putin stated, "I know what you are doing here, and we are going to stop you."¹¹⁵ In addition to the anti-West narrative, the Putin has also shifted his domestic narrative of Russian heritage in order to gain popular support. Since 2011, Putin started to turn to the history and the heritage of Russia more than before. He strengthened his support for the Russian Orthodox Church, and showed inclination towards Great Power politics. He utilized those tools to invoke stronger nationalism among his population, and create support for his

¹¹⁵ *Michael McFaul on Vladimir Putin and Russia*. Perf. Michael McFaul. Hoover Institution, 2014. Film.

strong leadership that brought Russia order and economic growth.

What those domestic rhetoric leads to is a confrontational foreign policy against the West. In addition to the fact that Putin's trust towards the West has deteriorated through events such as the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring, the anti-West rhetoric that Putin is conveying to the domestic population leads to a more confrontational approach in order to maintain consistency. Moreover, the Russia's historical heritage that Putin is pushing towards the population in order to invoke nationalism, often has imperialistic characteristics that leads to a more confrontational foreign policy. Putin's attempt to maintain domestic support has drove Russian foreign policy to a more confrontational approach in order to regain his status as a strong leader and grantor or order as he stated in the beginning of his first presidency.

Chapter 4 State Chapter

4.1 Introduction

The second image is the “State,” the influence of domestic politics on conflicts. This chapter will focus on the influence of domestic politics on the shift of Russian foreign policy. Russia has been facing significant internal pressure since the early 2000s due to the Color Revolutions that took place in the post-Soviet space. Although there was no revolution or an eminent threat for revolution, the authoritative nature of the state makes them prone to regime change through mass protest similar to states that have actually experienced a revolution. Since the series of revolutions, the Russian government has been tightening up the restriction in order to lessen effect of Western democracy promotion within their state.

The Russian government responded to those threats through tightened control over NGOs and medias, and started a promotion of nationalism and Great Power politics. They have strengthened their control over the Internet through various legislations, including the blacklist law. Moreover, the government has tightened restrictions over foreign NGOs making them extremely hard to operate within Russian territory. Those restrictive policies were enhanced by the promotion of nationalism and Russian sovereignty through media outlets, and textbooks.

Domestic politics’ effect on foreign policy in this case is the enhanced promotion of nationalism and great power politics in the international world. In order to

cope with the possibility of internal instability, the Russian government has implemented an anti-West rhetoric in foreign policy as well. This has led to more assertive foreign policy that prioritizes Russian national interest over foreign relations with the West that could possibly appear as weakness to the domestic population.

4.2 Background

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian governmental institutions have undergone a radical change. The Russian government adopted a presidential parliamentary system with the new constitution adopted in 1993. The Russian legislative body is called the Federal Assembly, which is consisted of the Federation Council and State Duma. The chairman of the Federation council is considered the third powerful position in Russia after the President and the Prime Minister, since in absence of the both the President and Prime Minister the chairman will perform the duty of President as the acting president. The Prime Minister heads the Russian government, and the President has executive power over the entire structure.

In Russia's political system, the President has overwhelming power over the entire system. Moreover, with the current circumstance of the dominant political party being under the influence of the President Putin, the President possesses even more power. Under President Yeltsin, with the respect to the principal of the federalism, the federal subjects were given significant sovereignty¹¹⁶. However, under the leadership of

¹¹⁶ Konitzer, Andrew, and Stephen K. Wegren. "Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation: United Russia As the Party of Power." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 36.4 (2006): 503-22.

President Putin, Russian Federation has become increasingly centralized and autocratic. The regional political elites have come under the influence of the ruling party United Russia, and the federalist structure of the government has been significantly undermined in recent years. Some policy makers even characterized Putin's policy as anti-federalist. During his presidency, Putin was able to establish a ruling party that influences the state Duma as well as the local elites¹¹⁷.

Immediately after the election in 2000, President Putin started his effort to gain control over the regional elites. During the presidency of Yeltsin, regional politics were not in alignment with the federal government at all. Regional governments were pursuing their own foreign policy, introduction of their own currency, and various other individual policies. Nonetheless, once Putin came into power, the centralization of power started to begin through the establishment of a party of power. The central government utilized United Russia as a tool to further gain control over regional elites through providing with an advantage to be associated with Putin. Through out the early 2000s, Putin enjoyed an approval rating of 60-80 percent. Hence, being associated with the Putin through his party's backing gave a significant advantage in local elections¹¹⁸. The central government took advantage of this environment in further gaining power over the local elites.

As soon as Putin came into power, he implemented numerous institutional changes in furthering his control over regional elites. The change included, reform of the Federation Council, granting of the power to dismiss regional assemblies and governors to the president, and constant effort to create a parallel between legislation in the federal

Web. 01 Mar. 2016. P.503

¹¹⁷ Ibid P.504

¹¹⁸ Ibid P.509

and regional level.¹¹⁹ Moreover, Putin also seized control over administrative resources in regional elections, including media and election monitoring organizations. For the media, Putin confiscated the right to appoint regional media directors, creating an environment that he could have control over an effective campaign tool. For the election monitoring, Putin created new federal districts that he would send presidential envoys to monitor the election, and enforce standard that are set by the federal government¹²⁰. Those pressures by the president and federal government created an environment that forces individuals to be affiliated with United Russia.

Candidates were ultimately given a choice to choose between being affiliated with United Russia and gain access to those resources controlled by the federal government, or choose not to and losing access to resources that are crucial to winning an election. If they decided to align with United Russia, they were able to fully benefit from the use of resources, such as media coverage and support of the United Russia's regional structures. On the other hand, if they decided that they will not side with United Russia, not only that they were deprived of the resources that were formally available, there faced new legal restrictions since the electoral monitoring office was now under the control of the president¹²¹.

Due to those institutional changes that were being made, the fairness of Russian elections was starting to be questioned increasingly after 2004. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international community expected Russia's political institutions to become more democratic with fair elections and less corruption. Under Yeltsin, the

¹¹⁹ Ross, Cameron. 2004. Putin's federal reforms. In *Russian politics under Putin*, ed. Cameron Ross, 155–176. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

¹²⁰ Konitzer, Andrew, and Stephen K. Wegren. P.509

¹²¹ Konitzer, Andrew, and Stephen K. Wegren. P.509

West's prediction appeared to be accurate. The Russian government was conducting relatively fair and corruption free elections, and the government was making adequate progress on the adaptation of the democratic system. However, since President Putin came into power in 1999, that trend seems to have changed¹²². In the 2000 presidential election, the OSCE reported that the "presidential election was conducted under a constitutional and legislative framework that is consistent with internationally recognized democratic standards."¹²³ The report further stated that the election process were in compliance with the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document as well. The Russian citizens appeared to trust the election process by their government, which is reflected in the 69 percent voter turnout.¹²⁴ The improvement of their election process was also evident in the Freedom House rating of "partly free."¹²⁵ However, the presidential election for Putin's second term in 2004, trend for fair election seem to have taken a turn.

In the 2004 presidential election, the OSCE started to express their concern regarding the fairness of the election stating, "The election process failed to meet important commitments."¹²⁶ Following the 2004 presidential election, the Freedom House rating was lowered to "unfair" from the previous year's "partly fair."¹²⁷ Through the centralization of power to the federal government, the government has considerably undermined the fairness of Russian elections during his four years of presidency before

¹²² Mcallister, Ian, and Stephen White. "Public Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 63.4 (2011): 663-83. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.

¹²³ *RUSSIAN FEDERATION Presidential Election 26 March 2000 FINAL REPORT*. Rep. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2000. Print. P.3

¹²⁴ *Ibid* P.3

¹²⁵ "Russia." *Country Report*. Freedom House, 2001. Web. 01 Mar. 2016.

<<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/russia>>.

¹²⁶ *RUSSIAN FEDERATION Presidential Election 14 March 2004 FINAL REPORT*. Rep. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2004. Print. P.1

¹²⁷ "Russia." *Country Report*. Freedom House, 2005. Web. 01 Mar. 2016.

<<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/russia>>.

the 2004 election. The centralization of power continues through mainly three means, the amending of electoral laws, staffing the electoral commissions with individuals loyal to the incumbent government, and electoral fraud. In period between 2005 and 2012, alteration of Russian Parliament electoral law has happened 26 times, which is often altered in a way that will give an edge to the incumbents that are aiming for reelection. For the electoral commissions, in addition to the fact that the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, Vladimir Churov is a known affiliate of President Putin, individuals that are loyal to the regime disproportionately staff local offices. Moreover, there are number of electoral fraud reporting on Election Day, including pressuring individuals and cash payments to voters¹²⁸. As a result of those devious election processes, perceived fairness of the election by Russian citizens experienced a sharp decline between 2010 and 2011. Through those institutional changes and election processes, Russia has become increasingly centralized and autocratic.

After the 2003 Duma election, the United Russia had 305 out of the 405 seats in State Duma, allowing the President to conduct more radical reforms. Up to the election in 2003, President lacked support of the State Duma as well as the support of the regional elites. However, with the 2003 election, the president was able to gain majority in the State Duma (68 percent of the legislature), and create support of loyal regional elites. This loyal supporters in the regional offices ensured that the further implementation of electoral legislation change would be met with minimal resistance, which further ensures reelection of those incumbent members. Since the regional elections in 2003 to 2004, the

¹²⁸ White, Stephen, ed. *Russia's Authoritarian Elections*. Routledge, 2014.

resistance by the regional legislature has dramatically decreased creating a significant alignment in policies in the federal and regional level¹²⁹.

This centralization and concentration of power to the central government is why Russia is called an autocracy. Power in Russia was centralized to the president through changes in the legislative system and federal system, most visible two changes were the change to an appointment system from an election system to decide the regional governors of the 2004, and the extension of presidential terms from four years to six years. With the President being able to essentially appoint regional governors, even regional politics came under the control of the central government. The extension of the term, from four years to six years, required a constitutional change, which requires the approval of the federal assembly, both the Federation Council and the State Duma, shows the control Putin has over the entire political system.

4.3 Events

Due to the autocratic nature of the Russian government, they are acutely threatened by events of popular uprisings. Although it is unlikely that they will lose their power due to electoral results, unexpected events of popular uprising and domestic instability could lead to loss of their power. The three main events that Russia feared as a source of domestic instability are the Color Revolutions that occurred during 2002 and 2004, Arab Spring in 2011 to 2012, and the demonstration that followed the announcement of Putin's candidacy of the presidential election for his third term as a

¹²⁹ Konitzer, Andrew, and Stephen K. Wegren. P.510

president.

Color Revolutions was a series of revolutions that occurred during the early 2000s in post-Soviet States. During these five years, the popular uprisings have forced state leaders to resign, or reverse the result of rigged elections. The first of the three was the Rose Revolution in Georgia. After the rigged election by the incumbent President in 2003, the public took the streets protesting the result of the election. The incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze was removed after the public's non-violent civil disobedience protest for a re-vote, which was led by Mikheil Saakashvili¹³⁰. Similarly in Ukraine, the Orange Revolution took place in 2004. The outgoing president Leonid Kuchma appointed his successor Viktor Yanukovich. However, the public denied to accept Yanukovich as the new president, and displeasure of the public led to a widespread protest within Ukraine. The protest resulted in an order by the Ukraine Supreme Court for a re-vote, which led to the victory of Viktor Yushchenko as the new president¹³¹. Similarly, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan occurred as an outcome of an unjust election in 2005, which forced the President Askar Akaev to flee the country and seek asylum in Russia¹³². Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and Uzbekistan also faced extensive demonstrations, although they have failed in achieving regime change¹³³.

Another important aspect with the Color Revolution was the Western states' effort for democratization in those states that experienced a revolution. Although it is

¹³⁰ Wheatley, Jonathan. "Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution." *Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union*, Aldershot 41 (2005).

¹³¹ Karatnycky, Adrian. "Ukraine's orange revolution." *Foreign affairs* 84.2 (2005): 35-52.

¹³² Juraev, Shairbek. "Kyrgyz democracy? The tulip Revolution and beyond." *Central Asian Survey* 27.3-4 (2008): 253-264.

¹³³ Polese, Abel, and Donnacha Ó. Beacháin. "The color revolution virus and authoritarian antidotes: political protest and regime counterattacks in post-Communist spaces." *Demokratizatsiya* 19.2 (2011): P.112.

unclear if the Western governments were involved to an extent that Russian elites believed, it is true that there was a pull for democratization by the West. Many believe that the one of the factors that made the difference between revolutions that were successful and were not were the United States' democracy assistance after the collapse of the Soviet Union¹³⁴. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States have been assisting the post-Soviet states with their democratization through organizations such as State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)¹³⁵. Through the assistance of the United States, in the states that the revolutions were successful, there were oppositions' discourse in the media, a fairly free civil society, and rhetoric for democracy. Without this basis, the opposition would have not been able to utilize those resources mobilize the population and lead a successful revolution through peaceful civil disobedience¹³⁶. In addition, the electoral monitoring by the organization such as the OSCE played an important role in exposing the electoral fraud that went on in those elections, which gave the opposition force matters to exploit¹³⁷.

Another series of event that created significant concerns for the Russian government is the Arab Spring. Similar to the Color Revolutions, Arab Spring was a series of revolution that occurred between 2010 and 2012. The popular uprising resulted in regime change in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and in Libya as discussed in the background chapter. In this brief time period, three dictators, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia,

¹³⁴ Ibid. P.114.

¹³⁵ Sussman, Gerald, and Sascha Krader. "Template revolutions: Marketing US regime change in Eastern Europe." *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 5.3 (2008). P.92

¹³⁶ Polese, Abel, and Donnacha Ó. Beacháin. P.116.

¹³⁷ Hale, Henry E. "Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism." *Communist and post-communist studies* 39.3 (2006): 305-329.

Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya, have fell through popular protest. In other parts of the Arab world, many dictators, in Jordan, Algeria and Morocco, were pressured to carry out reforms due to pressures of their population. What this event did was exposed the vulnerability of those authoritative regimes to instability, and gave people of other states aspiration for popular uprising.

Those authoritative regimes fit the criteria for popular uprising, such as years in power of the incumbent, poor democratic condition, press freedom, and etc.¹³⁸, which Russia often falls under. Other important factor for the Arab Spring was the increased population of educated individuals within the state, and the poor economic condition. The theory that education encourages political change is a classic one, and in the Arab Spring, the dramatic increase in years of schooling is believed to be one of the crucial factors in bringing the series of revolutions¹³⁹. Russia scores much higher when comparing the education attainment level of younger generation compared to the Arab world. In Russia, population between 25 and 34 that attained upper secondary education is over 90 percent, which is well over the average of G20 states¹⁴⁰, and this further makes Russia even more susceptible to regime change.

Those revolutions shared several characteristics that distinguish them from former anti-authoritarian protests. First is the cause of the uprising. Those revolutions were caused as a result of a manipulated election results. The people of those states took then streets following the visibly rigged election results. Second is the use of non-violent

¹³⁸ Campante, Filipe R., and Davin Chor. "Why was the Arab world poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26.2 (2012): 167-187. P.167

¹³⁹ Ibid P.168

¹⁴⁰ *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators 2012 RUSSIAN FEDERATION*. Rep. Paris: OECD, 2012. Print.

means of protest. Third is the use of means of protest that maximizes the visibility of the protest. Fourth is that the protest was centered on the younger population, often students. And lastly, is the utilization of the Internet, especially the use of social media as means to organize protests. Those characteristics are easily applicable in the context of Russia due to the autocratic nature of governance¹⁴¹.

Those series of protests and revolutions in post-Soviet states and Middle East are what making Russia anxious about their internal stability. Those characteristics of the cause of revolutions in the post-Soviet space and the Middle East could be applied to the context of Russia's domestic protest that occurred in 2011 and it would make perfect sense. First of the five characteristics, election fraud, is something that Russia has being accused of in recent years as discussed in the former section. However, the most important aspect is the fifth characteristic, the use of the Internet. The use of Internet allowed the demonstrators to broadcast information bypassing the conventional network allowing them to be free from censorship, and in a more timely manner. What this allowed was accurate information to be broadcasted without the influence of the government, and to be able to organize protest in a swift manner.

This makes popular uprising an eminent threat, more so than other post-Soviet states, due to the relatively high Internet usage among adults in Russia. Other states in the post-Soviet space vary in the use of Internet ranging from less than 10 percent to 46 percent. In Ukraine, where they experienced the Orange Revolution, the Internet use is 34 percent. This number is lower than Russia's 44 percent, making Russia more prone to an

¹⁴¹ White, Stephen, and Ian McAllister. "Did Russia (Nearly) have a Facebook Revolution in 2011? Social Media's Challenge to Authoritarianism." *Politics* 34.1 (2014): 72-84. P.72

uprising organized through the Internet. Moreover, the government could lose the control of the political agenda easily as information is conveyed through the Internet, such as bloggers and Twitter. This is dangerous for authoritarian regimes, including Russia, since it could result in losing control over their population. For example, Twitter became a news sources during the Arab Spring making it impossible for the government to control the political discourse¹⁴². The increase in Internet use is an inevitable trend, which means that popular uprising will be even more of an eminent threat for autocratic governments all over the world in the future. In fact, there are many evidences that Russian government has become increasingly concerned of domestic unrest through popular uprisings.

4.4 Russian Response/ Evidences of Fear

The Russian government's response to those events was to increase their attention to the internal stability of the state. The government intensified their pressure against the opposition force, and their focus on controlling their population in order to prevent any uprising against the government. Since those revolutions, there has been an increase in suppression of their political opposition through various means. One way they decreased the influence of their political opposition was through ousting them from office. Through strategies mentioned in the earlier section, such as legislative changes and controlling the electoral resources, the Russian government has effectively diminished the number of their political opponents from political institutions. In addition to ousting

¹⁴² Ibid. P.73

political opponents from office, the Russian government has put an effort to secure control of their domestic population, and measures to counter if unrest were to occur.

Since the Color Revolutions, spending on domestic security forces has increased significantly due to concerns regarding internal stability. As a response to the series of revolutions in neighboring states, the Russian government has increased its spending on internal armed forces and special police forces. In 2008, 5.5 billion rubles was allocated for armed forces in Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to modernize their equipment. Furthermore, the government has invested in increasing special purpose police detachments (OMONs) since Putin came into power, and the number began to rapidly increase following the revolutions in neighboring areas. In 2003, there were 98 OMONs within Russia and in comparison to the 19 OMONs in 1988 this number is already high. Nevertheless, this number continued to increase throughout the 2000s and the number of OMONs reached 121 by 2007. Moreover, there were additional 87 police special designation detachments (OMSNs), with 5200 permanent personnel that operated in conjunction with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In total, there were 208 units with over 25,000 personnel dedicated to dispatch incase of internal unrest¹⁴³. In addition to investments in domestic forces in case of an uprising, the control over media outlets has dramatically increased throughout the 2000s. Nonetheless, due to the increasing usage of the Internet, ousting political opponents and shutting them out from the political arena and the mainstream media is not enough as it was proven in Color Revolutions and the Arab spring. Therefore, the Russian government has tightened restrictions with the

¹⁴³ Blank, Stephen J. *Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy*. ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2012. P.112

Internet in order to control the public discourse.

As early as the late 1990s, the Russian government started Internet surveillance with the System for Operational-Investigative Activities (SORM). SORM forced Internet service providers to install a software that allowed the surveillance by the Federal Security Services (FSB) of users' Internet activities, such as Internet usage and emails. In 1999, the Russian government introduced the SORM2, which required Internet service providers to route all their incoming and outgoing data through a FSB computer, and those providers that did not comply with this policy had their license revoked. Due to increasing criticism, the SORM2 was revised and required the FSB to acquire a warrant prior to monitoring user's activity¹⁴⁴. However, in 2008 following the series of revolution in the post-Soviet space, the Russian government once again expanded the power of SORM2 allowing FSB to monitor all Internet traffic and personal usage without a specific warrant¹⁴⁵. During the later half of the 2000s, the use of SORM has increased dramatically as a response to the Color Revolutions and increased even further as a response to the Arab Spring and domestic protests against President Putin¹⁴⁶.

Following the series of protests in Russia through out 2011 and 2012, there were increase in Internet restrictions with the black list law and bloggers law. Although the Russian government claimed that the black list law, Federal Law No. 89417-6.8 "On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development," was to protect children from harmful Internet content such as pornography and suicide, it

¹⁴⁴ Marcus, Alexander. "The Internet and Democratization: The Development of Russian Internet Policy." *Demokratizatsiya* 12.4 (2004): 607-27. *ProQuest*. Web. 8 Mar. 2016.

¹⁴⁵ Deibert, Ronald, and Rafal Rohozinski. "Control and subversion in Russian cyberspace." *Access controlled: The shaping of power, rights, and rule in cyberspace* (2010): 15-34. P.27

¹⁴⁶ Soldatov, Andrei, and Irina Borogan. "Russia's Surveillance State." *World Policy Journal* 30.(3) (2013): 23-30. Web. 5 Mar. 2016.

was quickly expanded to include mass riots or participation in unsanctioned events. With this law, if the website does not comply to the order of Roskomnadzor, the United States' equivalent of Federal Communications Commission, to take down the content within 72 hours the website could be shut down¹⁴⁷. In addition to the black list law, the Russian government created the bloggers law, which required bloggers with more than 3000 daily visitors to register with the authorities, in which they required those bloggers to bear the same responsibility as other mainstream media outlets. This law allowed the authorities to charge those bloggers with "incitement to rioting" when posting content that are deemed inappropriate by the government¹⁴⁸.

Due to the concern for the Western states' effort to destabilize Russia following the Color Revolutions, the Russian government has also increased restriction for NGOs. In revolutions that occurred in Color Revolutions, both successful and non-successful, NGOs have played an important role in the mobilization of the population. The Russian government has become increasingly concerned of foreign interference through NGOs as a source of internal unrest¹⁴⁹. The way that the Russian government attempted to diminish the influence of the foreign states was through increasing restrictions on NGOs. This was due to the fact that many states that were successful in overturning their governments had a sizable presence of foreign NGOs. Moreover, it was estimated that 90 percent of the

¹⁴⁷ Duffy, Natalie. "Internet freedom in Vladimir Putin's Russia: The noose tightens." *American Enterprise Institute* 12 (2015).

¹⁴⁸ Callahan, Thomas. "Russia's Legislature, Prosecutors Tighten the Screws on Online Expression." *Rights Wire*. Leitner Center, 23 Sept. 2015. Web. 16 Nov. 2015.

<http://rightswireblog.org/2015/09/23/russias-legislature-prosecutors-tighten-the-screws-on-online-expression/>

¹⁴⁹ Olikier, Olga, et al. *Russian Foreign Policy: sources and implications*. Rand Corporation, 2009.

funds for human rights NGOs within Russia were coming from Western states¹⁵⁰. Due to the concern for NGO activities that could threaten internal security of the state, the Russian government passed a new NGO law in 2006. “On Introducing Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation,” was adopted in order to restrict activities of foreign funded NGOs¹⁵¹. What this law did was introduced new documentation requirements for NGOs in order to legally operate within Russia. The new law required NGOs to submit approximately 100 pages of documents, which was a significant burden for NGOs. Even NGOs that are widely known in the international community, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, were forced to suspend their operations due to failure to comply with the legal procedures¹⁵². In addition, the government expanded the scope of the NGO law through prohibiting government officials to participate in any activities related to foreign NGOs in 2007¹⁵³. Many experts were alarmed that the vagueness of this law allows obstruction of any NGO activities that infringes up on the Russian government’s interest¹⁵⁴.

Another development with the NGOs was the outset of the domestic Pro-Putin organizations that were aimed to counter those foreign NGOs’ democracy promotions. One of the prominent examples is the youth group Nashi. Although Nashi has its roots in Soviet era anti-Nazism campaign, they came into the modern Russian political scene following the Color Revolutions. The first visible activity was their inaugural mass rally

¹⁵⁰ Wilson, Jeanne L. "The legacy of the color revolutions for Russian politics and foreign policy." *Problems of post-communism* 57.2 (2010): 21-36. P.22

¹⁵¹ Kamhi, Alison. "The Russian NGO law: Potential conflicts with international, national, and foreign legislation." *SPECIAL SECTION: PHILANTHROPY* 34 (2006). P.34

¹⁵² Ibid. P.35

¹⁵³ Wilson, Jeanne L. P.23

¹⁵⁴ Ambrosio, Thomas. "Insulating Russia from a colour revolution: How the Kremlin resists regional democratic trends." *Democratisation* 14.2 (2007): 232-252. P.239

that took place in May 15th 2005, which celebrated the 60th anniversary of Russia's triumph over the Nazis. Throughout the late 2000s, Nashi has organized many high-profile events in order to show their support for the current Russian government¹⁵⁵.

However, the focus of the group has shifted to countering the West's democracy promotion, and preventing another Color Revolution in Russia. One of their three goals was the preservation of Russian values and sovereignty. In order to achieve that goal against the global democracy promotion by the West, they put their emphasis on "securing the streets" countering mass protests that promotes the West's interests. Some members of Nashi have received trainings on techniques on mass action, and education as means of democracy promotion in order to prevent domestic instability from occurring. Moreover, they aimed to counter the democracy promotion rhetoric with in Russia through critiquing the West's policy. They claimed that the West's policy was foreign intervention to domestic politics, and it corrupts the Russian values and sovereignty¹⁵⁶. Many experts focused on the fact that the Russian government was pouring in large amounts of funds in order to support the organization. Nashi often supported the President Putin and other high-ranking Russian government officials as their campaign, and many presume that they are a puppet organization of the Russian government¹⁵⁷. The Russian government has conducted various forms of propaganda in promoting the stability of their government including promoting the youth group Nashi.

In addition to the propaganda through youth groups, the Russian government has been using media outlets and educational institutions as propaganda tools. After the

¹⁵⁵ Julie Hemment. "Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin Ngos: Making Sense of Civil Society in Post-soviet Russia". *Slavic Review* 71.2 (2012): 234–260. P.245

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. P.248

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. P.247

collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian identity was not updated with a new identity that carries the same weight. In order to create a consensus in national identity, the Russian government put an enormous effort in reforming the media industry especially the television industry. This was due to that fact that television is often viewed as the primary propaganda channel. Since early 2000s, the government aimed to create a unified rhetoric surrounding the state's national identity focusing on "nationalism, patriotism, imperialism, respect for authority, and the idea of the uniqueness of Russian historical development as its chief themes."¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, the government has been using textbooks in order to create a universal ideology that further assists in creating an updated national identity¹⁵⁹. The rhetoric that the Russian government is conveying to their citizen comprises imperialistic ideas that suggest Russia is facing eminent threat from internal and external enemies¹⁶⁰. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, domestic politics and the image that the government is trying to portray has consequences on foreign policy as well.

4.5 Great Power Politics

The result of the promotion of nationalism and sovereignty is the shift of their foreign policy towards a more assertive policy, in other words Great Power politics. Foreign policy is a continuous part of the domestic politics, and both politics cannot be

¹⁵⁸ Liñán, Miguel Vázquez. "History as a propaganda tool in Putin's Russia." *Communist and post-communist studies* 43.2 (2010): 167-178. P.168

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. P.169

¹⁶⁰ Becker, Jonathan. "Lessons from Russia A Neo-Authoritarian Media System." *European journal of communication* 19.2 (2004): 139-163.

isolated from each other's influence. It could be used as a political tool in order to alleviate the internal threat posed to the government, or it could be used against the regime when it is used to enhance the opposition's narrative. Especially the government's relation with the West is an important tool for the government, and also their political opposition. The cooperation with the West is a tool that the opposition force could play as well as the current government¹⁶¹. However, promoting the notion of a stable government and illustrating the fight the West's attack against Russian nationalism is something that only the current government use as a political card, since the success of the opposition inherently means bringing some form of change.

Therefore, the current government has often portrayed the West as an eminent threat to Russian territorial integrity and values. During times that the Russian government was taking a cooperative approach to the West, some argue that it was the Russian government's strong hold on power that allowed them to adopt a more cooperative policy towards the United States and other Western states¹⁶². However, the shift towards internal instability has caused them to revert back to the anti-American rhetoric. In addition, the lack of important strategic ties makes the United States a great target for anti-West propaganda. Russia and the United States do not share any significant land borders, important trade relations, or joint security agreements. Therefore, the relation between the United States' is often used as a tool to marginalize the opposition and mobilize support for the government¹⁶³.

¹⁶¹ Snetkov, Aglaya. "When the internal and external collide: a social constructivist reading of Russia's security policy." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64.3 (2012): 521-542.

¹⁶² Greene, Samuel A. *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in Russia: Why Moscow's Shift to Confrontation with Washington Is Structural*. London: King's Russia Institute, King's College London, 2013. Print. P.1

¹⁶³ Ibid. P.4

The propaganda that the Russian government is carrying out is often consisted of nationalism, imperialism, and protection of sovereignty and what this inherently leads to is foreign policy with an anti-Western rhetoric¹⁶⁴. Color Revolutions are important examples of the source of anti-Western narrative. The Russian government portrayed this event as a disorder caused by the West and a threat to Russian national interest to the public, harshly criticizing the Western states action. The nationalism aspect of the domestic politics is also driven by the belief of Russia's great power status¹⁶⁵. Although Russia's power as a great power could be a difficult claim to make in the international system, it could be used to further promote nationalism in the domestic sphere, especially with the tightly controlled media and the vertical power structure of the current Russian government. Conducting military exercise in order to demonstrate their military power, and defying West's will in promoting Russian national interest could be an effective political tool to promote their government's standing domestically.

What those policies contribute is a pull towards great power politics in their foreign policy. In order to show their strength to the public, and protect the anti-West rhetoric that they are promoting in the domestic sphere, the Russian government is driven towards a more assertive foreign policy that puts an emphasis on nationalism, sovereignty, and imperialism. Edwin Bacon believed that the narrative that the government is telling the public not only affects Russian foreign policy, not also could be a determinant for it¹⁶⁶. Moreover, Aglaya Snetkov argued that the Russia's sense of threat often stems from

¹⁶⁴ March, Luke. "Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New 'Russian Idea'." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64.3 (2012): 401-425.

¹⁶⁵ Kuchins, Andrew C., and Igor A. Zevelev. "Russian foreign policy: Continuity in change." *The Washington Quarterly* 35.1 (2012): 147-161. P.150

¹⁶⁶ Bacon, Edwin. P.769

internal stability, and the domestic stability is often influenced by the conceptualization of Russian national identity. This is the reason why the Russian government focuses on the establishment of a consistent narrative of nationalism driven by the idea of sovereignty, imperialism, and Russia's status as a Great Power. However, those ideas are deeply influenced by foreign policy. Issues such as the relationship with the West and international terrorism are critical in sustaining that narrative, which is a crucial adhesive that binds the Russian public¹⁶⁷. Hence, Russian government cannot afford to be seen as the weaker actor when dealing with the West, and this is one of the factors that Russia's pivot to an assertive foreign policy.

4.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, in the second image the "State," the factor that drives the Russian government to a more assertive foreign policy is the fear of domestic unrest. Due to the authoritative nature of the Russian government, series of revolutions that occurred during the Color Revolutions, the Arab Spring, and the protest against the government in 2011 created a strong fear of domestic unrest for the Russian government. Russian government has been trying to combat the possibility of unrest through tightened control of the media, Internet, political opposition, and NGOs, in addition to the strong narrative regarding nationalism, sovereignty, and imperialism. This narrative that the government is telling leads to a pivot towards Great Power politics owing to the fact that domestic

¹⁶⁷ Snetkov, Aglaya. "When the internal and external collide: a social constructivist reading of Russia's security policy." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64.3 (2012): 521-542.

narrative is a source of foreign policy as well.

In addition, due to the decline in domestic support, the Russian government became unable to risk further decline in domestic support by cooperating with the West and putting their national interest at risk. This leads to a more assertive foreign policy that puts an emphasis on upholding their position on their national interest against Western states, and actively pursuing their national interest in the international world. Therefore, leading Russian foreign policy to gravitate towards great power politics. As Russian journalist said, “the existential void of our politics has been filled entirely by anti-Americanism,”¹⁶⁸ anti-Western rhetoric is an important aspect of Russian domestic politics. Especially in times that the support for the government is low and there is a threat for domestic unrest, the importance increases dramatically. Hence, the concern for domestic unrest due to the events mentioned earlier had a crucial effect on the shift of foreign policy in 2011.

¹⁶⁸ Young, Cathy. "From Russia With Loathing." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 20 Nov. 2008. Web. 18 Mar. 2016. < http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/opinion/21young.html?_r=0>

Chapter 5: War Chapter

5.1 Introduction

In order to analyze any state's foreign policy, the influence of the international system cannot be excluded. This chapter will focus on the third image, "War", how the international system influenced the Russian foreign policy shift in 2011 and the aggression that followed the shift. Kenneth Waltz claimed that, in the international system, it is the anarchic nature of the international world that causes war among states. Since there is no international law that is being enforced in the realm of international system, states resort in using force to impose their will on other states. In the international system, what is important is the relative power of the state rather than absolute power. It is the power relative to other states that is important.

In the case of the Russian Federation, its power decreased significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union in various ways. During the prime of the Soviet Union, as a bipolar power in the international system, they completed with the United States as one of the super powers. After the end of the Cold War, Russian Federation has lost their status as a super power, and their status further declined after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As it is shown in many statistics regarding their economy, years of socialist policies and their effort to maintain their sphere of influence has cost them socially and economically. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the true capability started to surface, and the international world started to deem Russia as a middle power at the most. Russia experienced a significant decline in their international standings and still suffers from it

now in 2016.

Although their economy experienced a significant recovery under the leadership of President Putin, even though the price hike in oil and natural gas probably was the main driving factor, Russia is still on the path of relative decline when compared to rapidly growing states in the international world. One of Putin's plans to stop, or at least decelerate, this decline was the creation of the Eurasian Union. The Eurasian Union would have been an aid to preserve Russian influence in their near abroad. However, even the Commonwealth of Independent States are seem to be moving away from the sphere of influence of Russia. In Central Asia and Eastern Europe, where the Russian government considers its near abroad, there is an increase in the influence of the Western states and China, and Russian influence is in relative decline when compared to those states. The same thing could be said in other parts of the world where Soviet Union competed for influence, such as the Middle East and South America.

From the perspective of "War", the international system, the reason for the shift in foreign policy is to prevent further weakening of Russian standing in the international arena. With the loss of influence in the post-Soviet space, and Putin's inability to regain influence through Eurasian integration, they are driven to resort to a more assertive foreign policy in order to counteract the increased influence of the other states in the international system.

5.2. Russian Decline

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation has suffered from a significant emigration of their citizens to Western Europe. In addition, there was a further decline in their population due to the independence of former USSR Republics. This trend of demographic decline continues through out the 1990s, and finally started to recover in 2006. In 2006, at the annual address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin stated that the demographic decline was Russia's biggest issue¹⁶⁹. How Putin took this issue seriously is even shown in how he renamed the Council on National Projects to the Council for the Implementation of Priority National Projects and Demographic Policy¹⁷⁰. In addition to Putin, Putin's representative to Far Eastern Federal District, Kamil Iskhakov mentioned that the outflow of Russian citizens in the Far East is a critical issue in order for Russia to successfully modernize. In fact, population in the Far East has decreased by 20 percent over the last 15 years due to outflow of migration and the disproportionality in birth and death¹⁷¹.

Although there is no profound demographic study being conducted in Russia, the United States Census Bureau estimated that the Russian population would decrease by 400,000 annually, and between 1999 and 2025 it is predicted to fall almost by 7.6

¹⁶⁹ Putin, Vladimir. "President Vladimir Putin Has Delivered His Annual Address to the Federal Assembly." *President of Russia*. Kremlin.ru, 10 May 2006. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/35528>>.

¹⁷⁰ "Transcript of the Security Council Meeting Devoted to Measures to Implement the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly," President of Russia, Official Website, June 20, 2006, 20 Feb. 2016 <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23657>>.

¹⁷¹ Herd, Graeme P., and Gagik Sargsyan. "Debating Russian Demographic Security: Current Trends And Future Trajectories." *Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security* 13.2 (2007): 51-67. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.51

million.¹⁷² The United Nations Development Programme estimates the annual decline at 840,000, and the decline by 2025 at 21 million and the decline by 2050 as 31 million¹⁷³. The Russian population has decreased by 4,371,200 between 1992 and 2002, and 7,399,800 between 1989 and 2002. In these 13 years the natural population has decreased by 5 percent, with 20,540,000 births and 27,939,800 deaths¹⁷⁴.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the birth rate was significantly low compared to the Soviet Union era. It was a clear indication that people are reluctant to have children with the uncertain future under the newly formed Russian Federation. In addition to the high level of emigration and low birthrate, the general health condition of Russian citizens were low throughout the 1990s, and unlike the other two issues, this issue does not have a sign for improvement¹⁷⁵. Up to 2006, all negative trends continued, and during this period, there were 16 deaths per 10.4 live birth. With the disproportionality in birth and death of the Russian population, the population declined by 700,000 persons per year. The birthrate under the Russian Federation was considerably low compared to the Soviet Union Era. In 1986-87, the fertility rate was 2.19, although the number fell to 1.17 in 1999¹⁷⁶. Despite the fact that the number recovered to 1.34 in 2006, it is still considerably low compared to other industrialized states, which was 2.1¹⁷⁷. In fact, Yekaterina Lakhova, the chairwoman of the State Duma

¹⁷² "Demographic Overview - Custom Region - Russia." - *Region Summary*. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.

<<http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?N= Results>>.

¹⁷³ Heleniak, Timothy. "The 2002 Census in Russia: Preliminary Results," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 44, No. 6, (2003), pp. 430-442

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Juhlin, Jonas Alastair. "Russia's Alternative Strategic Objectives The Strategic Significance of the Demographic Trends in Russia." *Institute for Military Operations, Danish Defence College* (2015). Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.4

¹⁷⁶ Herd, Graeme P., and Gagik Sargsyan. P.53

¹⁷⁷ Juhlin, Jonas Alastair. P.5

Committee for Women's Affairs, stated in 2006 that, almost half of the Russian families are currently child less¹⁷⁸.

In addition, there are other demographic issues that the Russian government is facing, which is male health and life expectancy. Russian males are indicated to have considerably low health conditions and life expectancy, compared to other industrialized states. Life expectancy of Russian males is 160th in the world. This is even lower than states such as Bangladesh and Algeria to put this ranking in context. In fact, life expectancy of Russian men fell by six years between 1989 and 1994¹⁷⁹. Moreover, the gap in life expectancy between males and females are 13-14 years, which is one of the worst in the world¹⁸⁰. The prospective of those issues in the future are not well since those negative trends are expected to continue for at least the next few of decades. Furthermore, the current inflow of migrants is not enough to reverse the decrease in population¹⁸¹. The declining population could have a devastating consequence for the Russian society, and it certainly affects the way the Russian government shapes their foreign policy. The issue surrounding demographics spills over to other issues not only the hard power aspect, but also in the soft power aspects.

Hard Power

Military. Another aspect that the declining population will have an effect on is the security aspect. For Russia, being able to reach the necessary number of conscript is still

¹⁷⁸ Herd, Graeme P., and Gagik Sargsyan. P.53

¹⁷⁹ Herd, Graeme P., and Gagik Sargsyan. P.53

¹⁸⁰ Juhlin, Jonas Alastair. P.5.

¹⁸¹ Rybakovsky, Leonid. and Sergei Ryazantsev, "International Migration in the Russian Federation," UN Populations Division, July 5, 2005, doc. Number UN/POP/MIG/2005/11.

important, although the Russian military has increasingly become specialized compared to the Soviet Union. It is predicted that the number of men available for conscript will soon become half of what the number was in 1996¹⁸². The number of men who are eligible for conscription in Russia is decreasing annually by approximately 100,000. Moreover, with the shrinking of the pool of Russian man eligible for conscript, there is a decline in the quality of military personnel. Due to various health reasons, approximately half of the draftees are unable to be sent to line units of the armed forces¹⁸³. Due to the decline of demographics, Russian military will be forced to engage in an extreme downsizing. This means that the Russian government will be required to start moving away from mass conscription, and work to establish a professional army with greater technological capacity in order to compensate the decrease in number of personnel. However, this leaves the Russian government in a predicament, since this will require the Russian government to allocate funds to the military in a level that they cannot really afford to with their current economic condition. With the increasing demand for economic resources in the social security, it will be hard to allocate sufficient funds for modernization of the military¹⁸⁴. In fact, the 2008 military reform has led to a significant downsizing of the Russian military. At the beginning of the reform, there were about 1.13 million military personnel active in the Russian military and their plan was to decrease the number to about 1 million by 2016. With this estimate, 15 percent of the Armed Force officers were to be reduced¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸² Juhlin, Jonas Alastair. P.7.

¹⁸³ Herd, Graeme P., and Gagik Sargsyan. P.61

¹⁸⁴ Ibid P.61

¹⁸⁵ Kontorovich, Vladimir. "Can Russia Resettle the Far East?" *Post Communist Economies*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2000), pp. 365 384. P. 368.

In addition to the decrease in the size and quality of the military personnel, Russian military faces an issue with the modernization of their equipment. Many military personnel have raised concerns regarding the antiquated equipment that was in used in the 2008 Georgian War. The war has created an enormous criticism within Russian Armed Forces regarding their “deteriorating condition of Russian military hardware and insufficient state funds allocated to overhaul Russia’s dated equipment”¹⁸⁶. In many cases, the Georgian forces were better equipped with modern weaponry than Russian forces, and the war has exposed the Russian force’s need for modernization of their equipment. Majority of tanks in the 58th Army were T-62 and T-72m models, and even the newer T-72BM were not able to withstand Georgian anti-tank warheads¹⁸⁷. Although majority of tanks deployed on the Georgian side were T-72s as well, they were equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS), thermal imagery and “identification, friend or foe” (IFF) technology, which the Russian forces often lacked¹⁸⁸. Further account by a Senior Georgian officer stated that approximately 60 to 70 percent of the Russian vehicles have broke down during the conflict¹⁸⁹.

Furthermore, the state of the Air Force was even worse during the Georgian War. The Su-25 attack jets that were deployed in Georgia were in service for over 30 years, and they have been barely updated during those 30 years in service. Those jets were not even equipped with radar and modern computerized targeting. Therefore,

¹⁸⁶ McDermott, Roger. "Russia's Armed Forces: The Power of Illusion." *Russie.Nei.Visions* 37 (2009). Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.16

¹⁸⁷ Ibid P.17

¹⁸⁸ Klein, Margarete. “Milliraty Implications of the Georgian War: Russian Armed Forces in Need of Reform,” *The Caucasus Crisis: International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany, and Europe*, Berlin, Germany: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, November, 2008. P.14

¹⁸⁹ Cohen, Ariel, and Robert E. Hamilton. *The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. Print.

instead of precision-guided munitions, they were only armed with old types of bombs and missiles without the modern guiding technology. Moreover, the Russian Air Forces lacked resources generally available to other military forces, such as drones and satellites. Although there are Russian arms manufactures that produce unmanned aircrafts, the Russian Armed Force stopped their purchase back in 2006. Additionally, GLONASS, the Russian equivalent of GPS, only had 13 of the 24 satellites operational in order to provide the full information at all times. The lack of information available also led to the poor performance of the Russian Air Force. Nonetheless, some experts have pointed out the human element that might have contributed to the poor performance. It was reported that the Russian pilots only had 40 hours of flight time, in contrast to the 120-150 flight hours of the NATO force pilots. All those factors, antiquated equipment, lack of strategic support, inadequate training of pilots, have led the Russian Air Force to lose three Su-25s in the conflict¹⁹⁰.

It was estimated that 80 percent of the Russian weapons were worn out and outdated, and has not been refurbished since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The conflict with Georgia has exposed the Russian force's critical need to modernize their equipment, especially with the inevitable downsizing of the military. In spite of the fact that Russian military is 40 times the size of the Georgian Military and its budget is 30 times larger, the Russian military faced significant causality considering the clear advantage the Russian military had with their overwhelmingly larger force. It exposed the Russian military's vulnerability in certain aspects of warfare such as nighttime operations

¹⁹⁰ McDermott, Roger. 2009. P.14

and cyber warfare¹⁹¹. Without sufficient modernization, Russian military will continue to decline, particularly due to the demographic issue that Russian government will continue to face.

In addition to the obvious effect of decrease in its military power, the downsizing of the military personnel has an unplanned consequence for regional communities. For many communities, military is the hub of a local community. Presence of a large number of military personnel attracts businesses and industries. One example is the Far Eastern Military district, which considerably downsized their force between 1989 and 1997. Their armored and motorized division was reduced from 24 to 10 divisions, 120 to 43 for the submarines, and 77 to 45 for surface ships¹⁹². The outcome of the downsizing was a significant decline in population and employment in the community, which further contributed to the internal migration towards the western side of Russia.

It has been predicted that the further downsizing of the military will bring those outlying region's population to an unrestorable level. It is predicted that the downsizing will result in migration of those who live in the Far East, and further create a need for the military to send troops to defend those regions. One expert alerted that the population difference in the Russo-Chinese border could lead to increased levels of Chinese probes and, therefore, lead to low intensity conflicts. "Perceptions of low Russian population densities in the Russian Far East could lead to low level Chinese probes and low intensity conflict in the next 10, 20 years, but the continued existence of a substantial Russian nuclear arsenal will probably prevent the Chinese from seriously considering the option

¹⁹¹ McDermott, Roger. 2009. P.15

¹⁹² Kontorovich, Vladimir. P.368.

of launching a conventional military campaign to seize large parts of Russian territory as a result of demographic factors.”¹⁹³ The decrease in population and downsizing of the military causes various issues that are interconnected. The Russian government will continue to face difficulties with their national security unless they are able to solve issues regarding their demographic trend, military, and economy.

Economy. During the first five years after the collapse, Russian economy shrunk to approximately half the size of the former Soviet Union. Issues that came with the transition of the economic system was worsened by the restructuring of the economic ties with neighboring former Soviet states, which often disrupted trading links¹⁹⁴. The economic condition of Russia became worse as the Russian Ruble’s value collapsed and reduced Russian household’s savings significantly, which was caused by the Russian economy’s contraction and increasing unemployment rate. Furthermore, the level of safety net provided during the Soviet Union era was reduced after the collapse of the Soviet Union due to the decrease in funding in the public sector. The Russian economy experienced its lowest point between 1994 and 1995, and slowly started its recovery towards the late 1990s. However, it experienced a set back in 1997 due to the ripple effect of the Asian Financial crisis. From 1999 to 2007, the Russian economy steadily grew under Putin’s leadership hugely owing to the global increase in energy prices¹⁹⁵.

However, the Russian economy experienced a significant setback in 2008 with the global financial crisis. Submerging itself in the global market meant an opening of

¹⁹³ Nichiporuk, Brian. *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*. Santa Monica: Rand.

¹⁹⁴ Macfarlane, S. Neil. "The 'R' in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power?" *International Affairs Int Affairs* 82.1 (2006): 41-57. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.43

¹⁹⁵ Ibid P.43

new markets, although it also meant that Russia would be equally vulnerable to the downturn of the global market. In fact, Russia was one of the states that was most affected by the global financial crisis. In 2008, the oil price fell from 147 dollars a barrel to 35 dollars a barrel, significantly damaging the energy export sector of the Russian economy. Following the oil price collapse, Russian stock market fell by 80 percent due to many investors pulling out of major projects within Russia¹⁹⁶. As a result, the collapse of the financial sector spilled over to the other sectors of the Russian economy, causing decline in production and rise in unemployment rates.

Since energy export was such a significant part of the Russian economy, the collapse of the oil price had a devastating effect to various parts of the Russian economy. Energy export accounts for 18 percent of the GDP, approximately 60 percent of the Russian exports, and 50 percent of the Russian federal revenue. As a result of the 2009 financial crisis, Russian GDP contracted by 7.9 percent, and the unemployment rate had almost reached 10 percent¹⁹⁷. Even the UK, one of the western states that were greatly affected by the financial crisis, the GDP contraction rate was 5.2¹⁹⁸. Even compared to other Western states that suffered from the effect of the financial crisis, Russia was one of the states with the worst effect on its economy.

The expansion of the European Union and NATO has altered the environment of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, not only in the security aspect but also in the economic aspect. It is understood that Russia's deepening relations with the EU would be

¹⁹⁶ Oxenstierna, Susanne. *The Russian Economy in 2009: Steep Decline despite Crisis Management*. Stockholm: FOI, 2009. Print. P.8

¹⁹⁷ Aslund, Anders, and Andrew Kuchins. *The Russia Balance Sheet*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009. Print. P.43

¹⁹⁸ "Long-term Profile of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the UK." [ARCHIVED CONTENT]. Office of National Statistics, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 01 Mar. 2016.

beneficial in a long run with further integration of the economic system and increased trade. Nonetheless, some Russian officials are concerned of the effect of the EU enlargement especially in the realm of increasing welfare disparity with Russia and the EU. In reality, the expansion of the EU has caused some issues with the existing trade agreements with the Eastern European and Central Asian states.

With the expansion of 2004, states that were newly included in the EU were required to adopt *acquis communautaire*. However, the rework in the legal framework of those states have caused changes and even annulment of existing agreements with the Russian government, since many aspect of the state governance have come under EU's jurisdiction. Russian manufactures of mineral fertilizers, agricultural products, aluminum, steel products, and other segments of Russian economy suffered as a result of this shift. The transition from the former standards will have a long-term consequence for Russian manufactures that are seeking to export goods to those EU states in the post-Soviet space. Not only that it will cause difficulties for metallurgical, machine building, food and chemical goods manufactures in terms of adapting to new standers, but it posts some quantitative restrictions well. Moreover, EU's energy diversification effort has an effect on the new member states, which means that the Russian government could lose their influence over those neighboring states as the primary energy source. In this initial stage of the EU expansion, the possible loss on the Russian is estimated to be 150 to 200 million euros annually¹⁹⁹.

As mentioned earlier, energy trade occupies a significant portion of the Russian

¹⁹⁹ Tumanov, Sergey, Alexander Gasparishvili, and Ekaterina Romanova. "Russia–EU Relations, or How the Russians Really View the EU." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 27.1 (2011): 120-41. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.123

economy. Although there is an effort for economic diversification, Russia economy continues to be largely dependent on energy export. Dependence on energy export as the source of their main revenue is perilous for a stable economy, since the price fluctuation of energy prices will have a great effect on the economy. When the energy price starts to suffer, other sector of the economy is also extensively affected as it was in 2008. Furthermore, the dependency on oil affects the prospect of the future development of the economy. The Russian government is in an urgent need to find sources of revenue other than oil production, particularly since, with the current rate of production, Russian oil is expected to be exhausted in about 16 years with an aggressive estimate. In 2006, Russia was producing 9.8mb/d and considering the 79.4 billion barrel of Russian oil reserve that is currently proven, a simple math will tell us that Russian oil will be exhausted by 2032²⁰⁰. Moreover, it is likely the demand for oil will decline due to development of alternative energy sources, and improvement in efficiency of production in developing states in the future.

In addition to the long-term prospect, Russian government face challenge with more short-term economic issues. The more urgent issue regarding oil production is developing means to produce and transport oil for the next two decades. Russian government estimated the required investment in the oil industry to be 250 million dollars, and this is due to the need to develop oil extraction and transportation capability in the underdeveloped oil fields. Since Russian government is financially incapable of financing the amount needed for the development of those fields, third of the investment needs to

²⁰⁰ Bhar, Ramaprasad, and Biljana Nikolova. "Global Oil Prices, Oil Industry And Equity Returns: Russian Experience." *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 57.2 (2010): 169-86. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.176

be obtained through foreign investments. However, due to the unreliable judicial system, tax structure, and inconsistent regulations, foreign investors are reluctant to invest in those Russian energy corporations²⁰¹. Although further development in their production and transportation capability is important, the process could be difficult due to the clash of political and commercial interest that occurs between policy makers and oil corporations²⁰².

Although Russia is currently one of the largest energy exporters in the world, Russia's use of their power as an energy giant as a political card in negotiating foreign policy issues has diminished their position as a reliable supplier. Russia has cut off their gas supply to Ukraine in 2006 and oil supply to Belarus in 2007, and those incidents have seriously damaged their credibility as a reliable energy supplier. In order for increased energy security, the United States and the EU has been increasing investments in states such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Those states in Central Asia are estimated to have over 1000tcf, which is among the largest in the world²⁰³. If the diversification of energy sources was carried out successfully, Russia will further lose their influence in the international world, well before they run out of their reserve of oil and natural gas.

Significant part of the Russian economy is heavily depended on trade of natural resources and labor-intensive manufacturing industry. If the Russia economy continues to be dependent on labor-intensive industries, it will be difficult to secure the labor force

²⁰¹ Ibid P.176

²⁰² "Russia." *Independent Statistics and Analysis*. U.S. Energy Information Administration. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.

²⁰³ Belkin, Paul, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel. "Europe's energy security: Options and challenges to natural gas supply diversification." *Congressional Research Service* (2013): 7-5700. P.18

needed to maintain the current rate of production not to mention growing their industry. One source predicts that the working age population in Russia will decline by 14 million persons by 2020. Considering that the labor-intensive arms manufacturing industry is the second pillar for the Russian economy, the demographics issue is a critical issue. Moreover, due to the poor living conditions and career opportunities, large portion of highly educated young Russians are immigrating to Western Europe. This again presents an issue for the weapons manufacturing industry, since the nature of the industry requires highly educated engineers and skilled workers in order for it to flourish²⁰⁴.

Soft Power

In the realm of soft power, the Russian Federation is unable to compete with the West for the large part. With the loss of the Cold War, Russia has lost significant portion of its soft power. During the Cold War the Soviet Union had an ideology that could compete with the West; communism had an ideological pull to it although the Soviet economy was flawed and dysfunctional in reality. However, contemporary Russia does not have an ideology that could attract states or people in the international world unlike the Soviet Union. As shown in many surveys that aims to measure soft power, Russia is behind the United States and many other European states. In a survey conducted by Monocle, Russia is ranked 29th²⁰⁵, and in another survey by Elcano they are ranked 7th as the state with biggest soft power presence²⁰⁶. However, in a survey by Portland, Soft

²⁰⁴ Juhlin, Jonas Alastair, P.6.

²⁰⁵ "Soft Power Survey 2014/15 - Film." *Monocle*. N.p., Nov. 2014. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.

²⁰⁶ OLIVIÉ, ILIANA, and CAROLA GARCÍA-CALVO MANUEL GRACIA. *ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2015*. Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2015. Print. P20

Power 30, they were not even ranked in the top 30 states²⁰⁷. Nonetheless, they fall behind the United States and major European states in all surveys in terms of soft power.

As discussed in the previous section, the hard power aspect does not support Russia in gaining soft power neither. Although Russia is trying to use the resurgent rhetoric to enhance its soft power, their effort is falling short in gaining soft power because of the lack of hard power. Another rhetoric that Russia is using is the multipolar rhetoric, which is useful in gaining support from state actors that are on the rise such as the BRICS. However, this does not specifically enhance Russian soft power, since many do not consider Russia as the leader of the rising power²⁰⁸. In addition to the issues related to the more ideological aspects, there are more practical issues that cause Russia to lose its soft power, relative to Western states.

Social security is one of the most prominent issues that the Russian government is currently facing. Due to the demographic issues that Russia is facing, providing social security is a difficult issue to resolve for the Russian government. Currently the elderly population suffers from widespread poverty, due to the lack of resources allocated for social security. Although Russia is relieved from providing social security to a significant portion of population that states would usually have to, since the male life expectancy is as low as 58 years, there is still a lack in resources for the safety net that the government provides. In a long term, the ratio of the dependents in comparison to those of working age is predicted to enlarge, leaving less money to be

²⁰⁷ McCLORY, JONATHAN. *SOFT POWER 30*. N.p.: Portland, 2015. Print. P.25

²⁰⁸ Sakwa, Richard. "'New Cold War' or Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International Politics." *International Affairs Int Affairs* 84.2 (2008): 241-67. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.

apportioned for the economy and military²⁰⁹. The gap in their ability to provide welfare from the Western states, especially the EU, is causing Russia to lose their attraction as a state and, hence causing them to lose their international standing.

Another aspect that Russia is falling behind the Western states is the civil and political rights. Although Russia is told to be a democracy, the authoritative nature of the government has put Russia under the watch list at Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The election in 2012 was monitored by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights, and they concluded that there was “a general lack of confidence among many interlocutors in the independence of election officials at all levels, mostly due to their perceived affiliation with local administration and the governing party.”²¹⁰ In addition to suppressing their political opposition, the Russian government is cracking down on their opposition force, violating their civil rights, such as Freedom of Assembly and Expression as we have discussed in the earlier chapter. In addition to the violation of human rights directly related to Russia’s political activity, many governments and NGOs are concerned of violation of other civil rights such as discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. As well as a federal law, Russian LGBT Propaganda Law, that prohibits distribution of materials on “propaganda on non-traditional sexual relationships” to minors²¹¹, there are many anti-LGBT groups that often physically attack individuals at LGBT rallies, which often

²⁰⁹ Herd, Graeme P., and Gagik Sargsyan. P.59

²¹⁰ *Russian Federation, Presidential Election, 4 March 2012: Final Report*. Rep. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2012. Print.

²¹¹ *Russia: Federal Laws Introducing Ban of Propaganda of Non-traditional Sexual Relationships*. London: Article 19, 2013. Print.

are unprosecuted.²¹²

Those hard power issues with low economic security and lack of military predominance negatively affect the Russian soft power, and the actual sources of soft power aspects such as provision of welfare and preservation of human rights are lacking in Russian societies. Although resolving the issue of decline in hard power caused by low population growth requires increased inflow of migrants, the lack of soft power is causing the Russian government unable to attract migrants, since Russia does not appear attractive as a destination of immigration. Nevertheless, those resolving hard and soft power issues are mutually dependent and it is difficult to solve one without another. For instance, without the increase in population, there is low prospect for economic growth, and without sufficient economic growth it is difficult to provide adequate social security. Although issues such as preservation of human rights could be improved through institutional effort by the Russian government, bringing a meaningful increase in soft power will be difficult without solving issues with hard power. Hence, the Russian government faces a conundrum with enhancing their hard and soft power.

5.3 Russian Decline in the Post-Soviet Space

The idea of Eurasian integration has a long history in Russian intellectual community. Eurasianism is an ideological paradigm that emerged in the 1920s among Russian intellectuals. It gained traction as a paradigm that distinguishes itself from racist

²¹² "World Report 2015: Russia." *Human Rights Watch*. N.p., 08 Jan. 2015. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/russia>>.

paradigms such as Nazi-type paradigms and had an influence on other nationalistic paradigms. Eurasianists often downplayed racial and ethnic distress, claiming that Russia was a fusion of Slavs and non-Slavs (non-Slavs mostly being Turks). Those Eurasianists also believed that Eurasia and Russia was different from both the East and the West, but closer to the East; thus, Russia should look for their ally in Asia. Although Eurasianism started to gain popularity under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, it became significantly popular during under Putin²¹³.

Although it seems like the both the West and Russia seem to have moved away from the strategy of the sphere of influence during the Cold War, that is not necessarily true. Especially the Russian government still view post-soviet space as being under their sphere of influence, however there are varying levels of interest among different states. Even in 2008, President Medvedev stated, “There are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.”²¹⁴ Since the beginning of Putin’s presidency in 1999, one of his core foreign policy objectives was the establishment of the Eurasian Union. He aspired Russia to be a hub in Eurasia to facilitate economic and military integration, through organizations such as the Eurasian Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, with the Color Revolutions that started in 2004, the geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe and Central Asia was dramatically altered. In order to maintain the dominance in the region, Russia started to adopt a more assertive policy in the region in early 2000s. Nonetheless, Russian foreign policy shifted once again after the

²¹³ Shlapentokh, Dmitry. "Alexander Dugin's Views on the Middle East." *Space and Polity* 12.2 (2008): 251-68. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.

²¹⁴ Medvedev, Dmitry. "Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, Russia, NTV." *President of Russia*. Kremlin.ru, 31 Aug. 2008. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml>.

reset with the United States. With the belief that the United States would respect Russia as a dominant power in the region, the Russian government toned down their assertive foreign policy. However, as it is evident in Crimea's annexation, the Russian foreign policy shift in 2011 had an effect on the way they interact with their neighbors.

In regards to states in the post-Soviet space, the Russian government is forced to deal with new set of external factors in recent years, such as the expansion of China as one of the dominant player as an economic and a military power, and the increasing presence of the Western states in the region. In both hard and soft power aspects, Russia is suffering from declining influence in the region. In the security aspect, Russia's effort to further increase the capacity of CSTO was undermined by the Uzbekistan and Belarus's refusal to join CORF, in addition to the increasing trend for NATO expansion. In the economic aspect, although the Eurasian Economic Union came into effect in 2015, Russia still struggles to counter the economic power of China and the West, especially with the eastward expansion of the EU. Similarly, the Russian government struggles to retain influence in the post-Soviet space in the soft power aspect. With the Color Revolutions that demanded democracy and further ties with the EU, CIS states' governments are now forced to walk a fine line between dealing with the domestic population and cooperation with the Russian government. Revolutions and the demand for democracy that occurred in those CIS states made those states cautious in making decisions with matters related to Russia.

Ever since the revolutions started occurring in 2003, the Russian government viewed the series of events as the West's effort to undermine Russian sphere of influence in CIS states. Russian political elites viewed the color revolutions as an effort by the

West to promote democracy in post-Soviet states in order to weaken Russian influence than the general public's outcry for a political change²¹⁵. In the post-Soviet space, EU continues to expand its influence through their economic and normative power. The EU conducts trade, and other programs that encourage Eastern Europe and Central Asian states to spread European norms and values, particularly effective economical and political governance and the rule of law²¹⁶. The EU's effort to expand its interest was described as "soft and smart power' to project security and create prosperity,"²¹⁷ by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner. Projects such as European Neighborhood Policy and European Security Strategy, aims to promote better governance and establishment of more stable states in the post-Soviet space.

This is done through promoting European values, democracy, human rights, and rule of law to list few examples²¹⁸. As a part of the use normative power, the EU conducts variety of trade assistance programs, investment and governance facilities, through Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and European Neighborhood, and Partnership Instrument²¹⁹. Those legally established agreements further encourage post-Soviet states to assimilate to the European norms. EU continues to expand their influence over the post-Soviet states through those policies that are mixture of soft power and hard power. In contrast, Russia fails to adapt to the post cold war international

²¹⁵ Wilson, Jeanne L. "The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign Policy." *Problems of Post-Communism* 57.2 (2010): 21-36. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.31

²¹⁶ Averre, Derek. "Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the 'Shared Neighborhood'." *Europe-Asia Studies* 61.10 (2009): 1689-713. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.

²¹⁷ Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2008) 'Perspectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy', Parliamentary Conference on the European Neighbourhood Policy East, SPEECH/08/306, Brussels, 5 June.

²¹⁸ Delcour, L. (2007) 'Does the European Neighbourhood Policy Make a Difference? Policy Patterns and Reception in Ukraine and Russia', *European Political Economy Review*, 7, Summer.

²¹⁹ Casier, T. (2007) 'The Clash of Integration Processes? The Shadow Effect of the Enlarged EU on its Eastern Neighbours', in Malfliet, K., Verpoest, L. & Vinokurov, E. (eds) (2007) *The CIS, the EU and Russia* (London, Palgrave MacMillan).

system, and continues to rely on policies that are rooted in the “great power” rhetoric²²⁰. This continues to be vanquished against “the broader liberal-democratic international community’s, emphasis on freedom of choice, evolution towards democratic law, and human rights-based governance.”²²¹

Those policies that are carried out by the EU undermine both Russian hard and soft power influence on post-Soviet space. In the post-Soviet space, Russia has considerable hard power influence as an exporter of various goods and as an energy super power. For net energy importing states within the post-Soviet states such as Georgia, Hungary, Armenia, and Ukraine, reliability of Russia as an energy source is especially a critical issue²²². The EU’s trade assistance programs in some states include energy trade aspects as well. This includes energy market integration as well as investments in new projects such as development of new gas extraction locations and transit lines²²³. In the case of Ukraine, they were able increase import of natural gas from Turkmenistan. In fact, Turkmenistan has become one of the major natural gas suppliers of Ukraine²²⁴. This decline of Russia’s importance as an energy supplier significantly undermines Russia’s economic influence in the post-Soviet states, Therefore, negatively affects their hard power as well.

In terms of soft power, Russia has a relatively strong influence in the post-Soviet states. Russia’s export of consumer goods, pop culture, and the use of the

²²⁰ Tulmets, E. (2007) ‘Can the Discourse on “Soft Power” Help the EU to Bridge its Capability–Expectations Gap?’, *European Political Economy Review*, 7, Summer.

²²¹ Avere, Derek. P.1691

²²² Pamir, Necdet. "The Black Sea: A gateway to energy security and diversification." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 7.2 (2007): 245-263. P.250

²²³ *Energy, Central Asia and the European Union*. Brussels: European Commission External Relations, n.d. Web. http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/factsheet_energy_en.pdf P.1

²²⁴ Pamir, Necdet. P.256

Russian language in many post-Soviet states have provided Russia with significant soft power. However, with the deceleration of economic growth that struck Russia in 2008, and their stronger presence of the EU has been eroding Russian soft power in the region in recent years²²⁵. The economic benefits and the ideological attraction of the EU could provide through the trade assistance and the legal assistance often overshadows the hard and soft power of Russia. With the decelerated economic growth and the appalling social conditions, including protection of civil and political rights and demographic issues, decreases the attraction of Russia in general, and they are unable to provide them with the economic benefits either. The post-Soviet space is slowly but surely gravitating towards the EU, and the decrease of influence in the post-Soviet space is evident in those states' willingness to cooperate with the Russian government when it is not in their interest to do so.

One of the ways that their declined influence has manifested itself was the refusal of Belarus and Uzbekistan to join the Collective Operational Reaction Forces (CORF). Russian government's effort to create the Eurasian Union, and create a NATO-like military alliance was met by resistance among some CIS states. One example is the creation of the Collective Operational Reaction Forces (CORF). This was the Russian government's effort to create a rapid reaction force within the Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, Russian government's proposal was met with the resistance of Uzbekistan and Belarus, despite the treaty they proposed was a watered down version than the actual treaty that they wanted to sign. Under the new version of the treaty, all troops stayed under each state's jurisdiction without any permanent staff or

²²⁵ Hill, Fiona. "Moscow discovers soft power." *Current History* 105.693 (2006): 341.

commander under CORF²²⁶.

Creating a NATO-like rapid reaction force was one of Russian government's core objectives in order to turn the CSTO into a more capable organization in defending its neighboring states from external and internal threats. After the CSTO meeting held in Moscow, they have announced the creation of their rapid reaction force, CORF on June 14, 2009. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that the agreement as a "step toward creating a military force to be reckoned with, truly capable of responding to a variety of threats."²²⁷

Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified its stance on joining CORF in a statement a week after the CSTO meeting stating that they do agree with the intention of the establishment of the CORF, which is to repel foreign aggression. However, the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that they do not agree with future plans that Russia suggested for CORF. Uzbek government was particularly concerned with one of the CORF's core principal, that it might be deployed as a response to an internal conflict within a member state. Uzbek government argued that CORF should never be used to resolve internal conflicts, and stated that "that each CSTO member state is able to resolve its domestic conflicts and problems by its own forces without involving armed forces from abroad."

Furthermore, they raised a concern on the principle that stated the CORF could be deployed without a unanimous vote within CSTO states. Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs further raised concern for Russia's intention for trying to change CORF into

²²⁶ Ibid P.32

²²⁷ McDermott, Roger. "Russia's Vision in Crisis for CSTO Military Forces." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6.125 (2009). Web. 20 Feb. 2016.

NATO-like structure. They stated, "the CORF should not be turned into a tool to resolve some disputed issues not only within the CSTO but also in the CIS space." Uzbekistan demanded that any possibility of interference in internal affairs of a state to be eliminated before entering the agreement for CORF. Another critique was that this agreement could result in overriding some states' legislation. In the case of Belarus and Uzbekistan, both states' constitution prohibits the use of force outside of their territory. This means that if those states were to enter the treaty, either they would be required to change their constitution, or CORF exercises and operations need to be hosted in Belarus or Uzbekistan in order for them to participate²²⁸.

Uzbekistan criticized Russian government's action of hosting the first CORF exercise without ratification in each states' legislation. The Russian government claimed that the treaty temporarily came into force, and scheduled the exercise without any legal basis. Uzbek Ministry of Foreign affairs sharply criticized the Russian government's action, stating, "In this case, the meaning of the document's ratification is lost, and the opinions of the parliaments of the CSTO member states are fully ignored." After the Uzbek government realized that the all states would not have an equal voice, they are reluctant to join the treaty. The lacks of consensus among CIS states have weakened the CORF and Russian government's position as a regional power in Central Asia²²⁹.

Another example that shows the deterioration of Russian sphere of influence is the Kyrgyz government's decision to overturn their former plan for closing the United States' military base at the Manas airport. This was particularly embarrassing for the

²²⁸ McDermott, Roger. 2016.

²²⁹ McDermott, Roger. 2016.

Russian government, since they have provided Kyrgyz government with financial incentives to close the United States air force base in Manas airport²³⁰. The Russian government had written off 180 dollars in debt, promised to provide an additional 2 billion dollars, and provided 150 million dollars as aid to subsidize the construction of a hydro power plant at the Kambaratinsk Dam²³¹. The Russian government was partially compensated with the agreement to open a military base in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.

5.4 Conclusion

Russia's standing in the international world is currently in decline. Domestic issues that they face are causing loss in both hard and soft power, and they are no longer able to sustain their influence even in their near abroad where they have "privileged interest." Russian government will continue to lose their international standing as long as they are not able to solve root causes of internal issues such as the demographic decline and economic decline. However, resolving those issues are extremely difficult, since many of those issues are mutually reinforcing. For example, in order to counter the domestic population decline, there is a need to create a sizable inflow of migrants. However, without a thriving economy or other factors that strengthens their soft power, there is a low prospective of the Russian government being able to accomplish that objective. Since unless there is a significant instability in the region that would incentivize the population in the near abroad to seek refuge in Russia, economic incentive

²³⁰ Wilson, Jeanne L. "The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign Policy." *Problems of Post-Communism* 57.2 (2010): 21-36. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.32

²³¹ Weitz, Richard. "China, US, Russia Eye Bishkek." *The Diplomat*. 12 Apr. 2010. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.

will be the most effective way to motivate those individual to migrate to Russia. However, Russia again faces a conundrum since creating a thriving economy is often difficult with a decreasing population, especially in a state that its major industries require a sizable labor force.

As a whole, it is difficult for Russia to become a dominant power in the international system with their existing foreign policy. In order to prevent further decline, they were no longer unable to cooperate with the Western states' project. The 2011 Libyan intervention brought the realization that Russia needs to prioritize their national interest in order to prevent their decline and remain a relevant player in the international system. Since the international world is characterized by anarchy, there is a need for states to protect their national interest by themselves. Especially states that are facing decline in their international standings are theorized to behave more aggressively. In his book, "Causes of War," Stephen Van Evara hypothesized that declining states are likely to willingly engage in acts that could lead to war. Evara states that "Impending power shifts tempt declining states to launch an early war before the power shift is complete, to avoid having to fight a war later under worse conditions or to avoid being compelled later to bargain from weakness."²³² Furthermore, he states, "Impending power shifts lead declining states to risk war more willingly. They regard even unwanted wars as less calamitous because their coming declining makes standing pat look relatively worse. As a result they adopt a more high-risk policies."²³³

As Evara's argument shows, what the decline in international standings lead to

²³² Van Evara, Stephen. *Causes of war: Power and the roots of conflict*. Cornell University Press, 1999. P.260

²³³ Ibid.P.260

is a more aggressive foreign policy that aims to prevent further decline. In the case of Russia, their concern for further decline is manifesting in their foreign policy as well. The continuing reluctance by the United States and the rest of the Western states' to accept Russia as at least one of the major powers has led them to react in a aggressive way in order to protect their international standings from declining. One example is the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Despite the repeated signaling by the Russian government that the redline for the expansion of NATO and EU will be Georgia and Ukraine, the United States has ignored Russia's signals and proceeded with their policy that aimed to expand their influence in the post-Soviet states²³⁴. Since their international standings were gravely threatened with the expansions, Russian government reacted with aggressive policy that could risk a war with the West. This trend continues to be true after the 2011 shift in Russian foreign policy. The Russian government is more willing to engage in risky policies, in terms of causing a conflict, due to their declining status in the international system.

²³⁴ Mankoff, Jeffrey. P.264

Conclusion

Those three images in Russian foreign policy explained in, man, state, and war, paints a similar picture with a common theme of concern for domestic instability. The first image, man, tells us a story of an autocratic leader, becoming increasingly concerned of a popular revolution occurring within Russia. Through witnessing Color Revolutions and Arab Spring, and experiencing the series of demonstrations domestically, Putin has become increasingly concerned of the possibility of mass protest leading to regime change. Moreover, it seems that Putin firmly believes Western states were behind the Color Revolutions and Arab Spring orchestrating revolutions. Putin also appear to believe that the Western states, particularly the United States, are plotting a revolution against his regime. The former ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, claimed that Putin had expressed his concern over the issue directly to McFaul.

Due to the concern for losing his power, Putin has adopted strong narratives that focus on Russia's historical heritage and anti-West sentiment. Using those narratives, Putin has marginalized his opponents accusing them for conspiring with the West to create disorder within Russia. Moreover, using the narrative of Russia's historical heritage, he is attempting to invoke nationalism and regain legitimacy as a strong leader. Those efforts to solidify his domestic support have led Russian foreign policy to shift towards a more assertive foreign policy.

The second image, the state, illustrates a similar picture to the first image. This

is due to the fact that it is difficult to separate Putin from the Russian government due to the autocratic nature of the government. Concerns and incentives that Putin and government officials under Putin have are extremely similar, since Putin's loss of power is likely to lead to the loss of benefits that they are enjoying currently under Putin's regime. Since the Color Revolutions, the concern for domestic unrest was increasing and the Russian government started increasing their effort to securing the state by making structural changes that diminishes the influence of the opposition force, and propaganda to secure domestic support. One of the examples is the change in electoral system that made the selection of governors through appointment by Putin. This effectively promoted the Russian government's influence in regional governments as well as the parliament, and diminished the influence of opposition forces. Another policy change of the government after the Color Revolution was the tighter restrictions on foreign NGOs. This was due to the fear for external influence by the Western states through NGOs. Moreover, the Russian government has promoted a youth organization in order to counter the narrative presented by those foreign NGOs that could lead to mass protests. The groups Nashi focused on nationalism and preservation of order in the state, and dismissed foreign intervention on domestic affairs.

All those concern for domestic instability and propaganda leads to a more assertive foreign policy in the international arena, since domestic and foreign policy is something that cannot be separated. When domestic politics is driven towards nationalism and promotion of sovereignty, the foreign policy needs to move towards the same direction, or at least appear to move toward the same direction for the domestic population. When the domestic politics is portraying the West as a source of instability

and states that should be considered as enemies, foreign policy cannot move towards cooperation. The narrative that the Russian government tells its population leads to great power politics since significant part of the nationalism promotion that is done domestically portrays Russia as a state that is meant to be a Great Power. Therefore, foreign policy also gravitates towards pursuing great power status.

The third image, war, tells a similar story of Russia's insecurity regarding their stability. Analyzing Russia's international standing, Russia seems to be declining power in many aspects. Their population is decreasing, and due to the fact that Russia's core industries are labor intensive and the military has a long tradition of mass conscript, it will be difficult for Russia to maintain their current international standing in the future. As mentioned above, maintaining the economic growth and military force will be difficult due to the demographic constraints that they are increasingly facing. Due to their economic decline and social conditions, the soft power standing does not appear to be good either. Both in hard and soft power aspects, Russia's international standing is declining compared to other states that are experiencing rapid growth.

Most importantly, there is a significant decline in their standing in the post-Soviet states due to the increased influence of the EU. The standings in the post-Soviet space is especially important to the Russian government since they still consider the near abroad their under their sphere of influence to a degree. The Russian government's effort to create a common economic space has not been going well after Ukraine, which was the keystone of the Union, started to distance itself after the revolution that demanded closer ties to the EU. In order to prevent further decline, the Russian government has pivoted towards a more assertive foreign policy.

All three images suggest a similar picture of Russia's increasing possibility of domestic unrest. In order to counter the possibility for domestic instability, Russia is impelled to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. The year 2011 was when the shift occurred due to the internal push of the domestic demonstrations and external pull of the Libyan military intervention for a more assertive policy.

Considering the factors that have led to the shift in foreign policy, what will the future hold for Russia-U.S. relations? I believe the relationship between the two states will depend on the United States' willingness to cooperate with the Russian government. As discussed in former chapters, Putin and the Russian government's primary concern is domestic unrest that could lead to the loss of their power. Due to domestic pressure they are currently facing, cooperating with the West is simply not in their interest. It is not for the reason that the current Russian foreign policy is inherently anti-West. However, Russian foreign policy is driven towards an assertive policy due to the concerns they have domestically. Regardless of the West's wills and intentions, the Russia will carry out whatever policy they believe will promote their national interests, and ultimately their domestic standings.

In this post-Cold War international world, Russia is not trying to balance the United States in a way they did during the Cold War. Putin and the Russian government understands that they will need to play by the rule set by the West to remain a relevant player in the international system. Hence, they have decided to join the WTO in 2014 and continue to cooperate with the United Nations and other organizations such as the EU and OSCE to a degree. However, in instances that their national interests are threatened or they have something to gain significantly, they are no longer willing to back down just

because Western states ask them to do so. In terms of cooperating with the West, I believe Russia will be willing to cooperate as long as they have something to gain. Russia does not necessarily view Russia-U.S. relations in a simple zero-sum term, although it often appear so due to the confrontational foreign policy that results from conflicting national interests that the two states have.

One example is Russian foreign policy in Afghanistan. The Russian government has decided to pull out from cooperating with the United States and the United States-backed Afghan government, since it is simply no longer in their interest to cooperate with the United States government in Afghanistan. They also have opened a communication channel recently with the Taliban, going against the United States' will. Although one might say that this is to obstruct the United States' operations in Afghanistan, this is due to the national security concern they are currently facing. Although the Russian government does not deem the Taliban as a direct threat to their national security there are other groups along the Russian border that the Russian government considers a direct threat. The Russian government's concern is groups operating along the Russian border such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other groups in Tajikistan, Chechnya, and Northern China. What the Russian government is actually concerned of is those groups using Afghanistan as training grounds in order to conduct operations in Russia²³⁵. Therefore, cooperating with the United States' effort to eliminate the Taliban force in Afghanistan is simply not the most effective way in countering their eminent national security threat.

²³⁵ Mashal, Mujib, and Andrew E. Kramer. "Russia Pulls Back From Cooperating With U.S. on Afghanistan." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 20 Feb. 2016. Web. 22 Mar. 2016. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/world/asia/russia-pulls-back-from-cooperating-with-us-on-afghanistan.html>>.

The reason why Russia is pulling out from cooperating with the United States is simply because it is not in their national interest. Although the United States' primary concern is the Taliban advancement within Afghanistan, Russian government's concern is Islamist movements within or along their borders²³⁶. It is not that they are no longer willing to cooperate with the United States not due to their shift to the anti-Western ideology. The Russian government's national interest simply outweighs the benefits of cooperating with the United States. It is merely due to the fact that their concern for domestic unrest triumphs the benefits of cooperating with the United States for the sake of gaining political capital.

Therefore, if the United States is willing to cooperate in issues that the two states' interests aligns, and if that does not threaten Russian national interest, I believe an effective cooperative relationship between Russia and the United States is possible. Just as the United States, Russia has its own agenda and they are not willing to give that up in the sake of cooperating with the United States. The concern for domestic instability of the Russian government has made them less willing to establish a cooperative relation, since the risk for cooperation has become higher with the increasing threat of domestic unrest. Due to the difference in the two states' priorities, Russian foreign policy often seem to be confrontational to the West. The Russian government's concern for domestic stability, as discussed in the early chapters, often triumphs other concerns that they might have, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Since Russia and the United States differ in their proprieties in their foreign policy objectives, it often results in a confrontational foreign policy. Nonetheless, since Russian foreign policy no longer view its relations with the

²³⁶ Ibid.

United States in a complete zero-sum terms and its objective is not to counter them as the Soviet Union did in the past, there is a possibility for cooperation among the two states, as it was shown during the reset period.

However, as shown in many recent incidents, the Russian government is no longer willing to cooperate with the United States if it is a risk to their own national interests. The Russian government has shown the extent that they will go to defy the West's will in pursuit their own interest. Although the cooperation between Russia and the United States is possible, the perspective of a successful cooperative relationship in the near future is low. The Russian government and the United States government often have vastly different interests over an issue, which makes it extremely difficult for them to cooperate. As long as the United States is not willing to give up some of their national interests in order to cooperate with Russia, an effective cooperative relation will be difficult to establish.

List of References

- Ambrosio, Thomas. "Insulating Russia from a colour revolution: How the Kremlin resists regional democratic trends." *Democratisation* 14.2 (2007): 232-252. P.237
- ANISHCHUK, ALEXEI. "Putin Flexes Russian Military Muscle in Naval Exercise." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 28 Mar. 2013. Web. 20 Jan. 2016.
- Åslund, Anders. "Putin's lurch toward tsarism and neoimperialism: why the United States should care." *Demokratizatsiya* 16.1 (2008): 17. P.21
- Åslund, Anders, and Andrew Kuchins. *The Russia Balance Sheet*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009. Print. P.43
- Averre, Derek. "Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the 'Shared Neighborhood'." *Europe-Asia Studies* 61.10 (2009): 1689-713. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
- Bacon, Edwin. "Public political narratives: developing a neglected source through the exploratory case of Russia in the Putin-Medvedev era." *Political Studies* 60.4 (2012): 768-786. P.772
- Baev, Pavel K. "Russia's counter-revolutionary stance toward the Arab Spring." *Insight Turkey* 13.3 (2011): 11. P.11
- Becker, Jonathan. "Lessons from Russia A Neo-Authoritarian Media System." *European journal of communication* 19.2 (2004): 139-163.
- Belkin, Paul, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel. "Europe's energy security: Options and challenges to natural gas supply diversification." *Congressional Research Service* (2013): 7-5700. P.18
- Bhar, Ramaprasad, and Biljana Nikolova. "Global Oil Prices, Oil Industry And Equity Returns: Russian Experience." *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 57.2 (2010): 169-86. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.176
- Biersack, John, and Shannon O'Lear. "The Geopolitics of Russia's Annexation of Crimea: Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55.3 (2014): 247-69. Web. 6 Feb. 2016. P.248
- Blank, Stephen J. and Carol R. Saivetz. "Playing to Lose? Russia and the" Arab Spring"." *Problems of Post-Communism* 59.1 (2012): 3-14. P.6

- Blank, Stephen J. *Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy*. ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2012. P.13
- "Bucharest Summit Declaration - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008." *NATO*. 3 Apr. 2008. Web. 04 Feb. 2016.
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm>
- Callahan, Thomas. "Russia's Legislature, Prosecutors Tighten the Screws on Online Expression." *Rights Wire*. Leitner Center, 23 Sept. 2015. Web. 16 Nov. 2015.
<<http://rightswireblog.org/2015/09/23/russias-legislature-prosecutors-tighten-the-screws-on-online-expression/>>
- Campante, Filipe R., and Davin Chor. "Why was the Arab world poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26.2 (2012): 167-187. P.167
- Casier, T. (2007) 'The Clash of Integration Processes? The Shadow Effect of the Enlarged EU on its Eastern Neighbours', in Malfliet, K., Verpoest, L. & Vinokurov, E. (eds) (2007) *The CIS, the EU and Russia* (London, Palgrave MacMillan).
- Charap, Samuel. "Beyond The Russian Reset." *National Interest* 126 (2013): 39-48. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 8 Feb. 2016. P.39
- Cheterian, Vicken. "The August 2008 War In Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict To Border Wars." *Central Asian Survey* 28.2 (2009): 155-170. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 4 Feb. 2016. P.160
- "China and Russia Launch Naval Exercises in Yellow Sea - BBC News." *BBC News*. 22 Apr. 2012. Web. 01 Feb. 2016.
<<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17803624>>.
- Cohen, Ariel, and Robert E. Hamilton. *The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. Print.
- Cook, Brad, Brad Meyer, and Ilya Arkhipov. "Russia Warns U.S., EU Not to Aid Syria Protests After Libya." *Bloomberg.com*. Bloomberg, 2 June 2011. Web. 06 Feb. 2016.
<<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-01/russia-warns-u-s-nato-against-military-aid-to-syria-protests-after-libya>>.
- Dawisha, Karen. *Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?* New York: Simon &

Schuster, 2015. Print. P.52

Deibert, Ronald, and Rafal Rohozinski. "Control and subversion in Russian cyberspace." *Access controlled: The shaping of power, rights, and rule in cyberspace* (2010): 15-34. P.27

Delcour, L. (2007) 'Does the European Neighbourhood Policy Make a Difference? Policy Patterns and Reception in Ukraine and Russia', *European Political Economy Review*, 7, Summer.

"Demographic Overview - Custom Region - Russia." - *Region Summary*. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.
<<http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?N=Results>>.

Duffy, Natalie. "Internet freedom in Vladimir Putin's Russia: The noose tightens." *American Enterprise Institute* 12 (2015).

"Duma Approves Criminalization of Insulting Religious Feelings." *RT. TV-Novosti*, 13 June 2013. Web. 18 Mar. 2016.
<<https://www.rt.com/politics/responsibility-insulting-feelings-believers-526/>>.

Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators 2012 RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Rep. Paris: OECD, 2012. Print.

Energy, Central Asia and the European Union. Brussels: European Commission External Relations, n.d. Web.
http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/factsheet_energy_en.pdf P.1

Fahim, Kareem, Anthony Shadid, and Rick Gladstone. "Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 20 Oct. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-libyan-forces-take-surt.html>>.

Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2008) 'Perspectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy', Parliamentary Conference on the European Neighbourhood Policy East, SPEECH/08/306, Brussels, 5 June.

Grant, Thomas D. "Annexation of Crimea." *American Journal of International Law* 109.1 (2015): 68-95. P.69
<<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-exercises-idUSBRE92R0K320130328>>.

- "Georgia Decided to Restore Constitutional Order in S.Ossetia' – MoD Official." *Civil.Ge.* 8 Aug. 2008. Web. 04 Feb. 2016.
<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18941>
- Greene, Samuel A. *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in Russia: Why Moscow's Shift to Confrontation with Washington Is Structural.* London: King's Russia Institute, King's College London, 2013. Print. P.1
- Gvosdev, Nikolas K., and Marsh, Christopher. *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors.* Thousand Oaks: CQ, 2014. Print. P.23
- Gvosdev, Nikolas. "U.S.-Russia Reset On Display In Afghanistan." *World Politics Review (Selective Content)* (2011): 1. *Academic Search Complete.* Web. 6 Feb. 2016.
- Hale, Henry E. "Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism." *Communist and post-communist studies* 39.3 (2006): 305-329.
- Heleniak, Timothy. "The 2002 Census in Russia: Preliminary Results," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 44, No. 6, (2003), pp. 430-442
- Herd, Graeme P., and Gagik Sargsyan. "Debating Russian Demographic Security: Current Trends And Future Trajectories." *Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security* 13.2 (2007): 51-67. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.51
- Hill, Fiona. "Moscow discovers soft power." *Current History* 105.693 (2006): 341.
- Juhlin, Jonas Alastair. "Russia's Alternative Strategic Objectives The Strategic Significance of the Demographic Trends in Russia." *Institute for Military Operations, Danish Defence College* (2015). Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.4
- Julie Hemment. "Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin Ngos: Making Sense of Civil Society in Post-soviet Russia". *Slavic Review* 71.2 (2012): 234–260. P.245
- Juraev, Shairbek. "Kyrgyz democracy? The tulip Revolution and beyond." *Central Asian Survey* 27.3-4 (2008): 253-264.
- Klein, Margarete. "Millitary Implications of the Georgian War: Russian Armed Forces in Need of Reform," *The Caucasus Crisis: International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany, and Europe*, Berlin, Germany: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, November, 2008. P.14
- Kontorovich, Vladimir. "Can Russia Resettle the Far East?" *Post Communist*

Economies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2000), pp. 365-384. P. 368.

Kuchins, Andrew C., and Igor A. Zevelev. "Russian foreign policy: Continuity in change." *The Washington Quarterly* 35.1 (2012): 147-161. P.150

"Libya: Commanders Should Face Justice for Killings." *Human Rights Watch*. Human Rights Watch, 22 Feb. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/22/libya-commanders-should-face-justice-killings>

"Libya's New Rulers Declare Country Liberated - BBC News." *BBC News*. BBC, 23 Oct. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
 <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15422262>>.

"Long-term Profile of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the UK." [ARCHIVED CONTENT]. Office of National Statistics, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 01 Mar. 2016.

Kamhi, Alison. "The Russian NGO law: Potential conflicts with international, national, and foreign legislation." *SPECIAL SECTION: PHILANTHROPY* 34 (2006). P.34

Karatnycky, Adrian. "Ukraine's orange revolution." *Foreign affairs* 84.2 (2005): 35-52.

Katz, Mark N. "Russia And Iran." *Middle East Policy* 19.3 (2012): 54-64. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 7 Feb. 2016. P.57

Katz, Mark N. "Russia And The Arab Spring Analysis." *Eurasia Review*. Eurasia Review, 5 Apr. 2012. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
 <<http://www.eurasiareview.com/05042012-russia-and-the-arab-spring-analysis/>>.

Ki-moon, Ban. "Secretary-General Tells Security Council Time to Consider Concrete Action in Libya, as Loss of Time Means More Loss of Lives." *Meeting Coverage and Press Releases*. United Nations, 25 Feb. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13418.doc.htm>>.

Konitzer, Andrew, and Stephen K. Wegren. "Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation: United Russia As the Party of Power." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 36.4 (2006): 503-22. Web. 01 Mar. 2016. P.503

Liñán, Miguel Vázquez. "History as a propaganda tool in Putin's Russia." *Communist and post-communist studies* 43.2 (2010): 167-178. P.167

- Macfarlane, S. Neil. "The 'R' in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power?" *International Affairs Int Affairs* 82.1 (2006): 41-57. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.43
- Magen, Zvi. "The Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean: Exercise or Military Operation?" *The Institute for National Security Studies*. The Institute for National Security Studies, 29 Jan. 2013. Web. 01 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2589>>.
- Mankoff, Jeffrey. *Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012. P.98
- March, Luke. "Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New 'Russian Idea'." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64.3 (2012): 401-425.
- Marcus, Alexander. "The Internet and Democratization: The Development of Russian Internet Policy." *Demokratizatsiya* 12.4 (2004): 607-27. *ProQuest*. Web. 8 Mar. 2016.
- Mashal, Mujib, and Andrew E. Kramer. "Russia Pulls Back From Cooperating With U.S. on Afghanistan." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 20 Feb. 2016. Web. 22 Mar. 2016. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/world/asia/russia-pulls-back-from-cooperating-with-us-on-afghanistan.html>>.
- Mcallister, Ian, and Stephen White. "Public Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 63.4 (2011): 663-83. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.
- McCLORY, JONATHAN. *SOFT POWER* 30. N.p.: Portland, 2015. Print. P.25
- McDermott, Roger. "Russia's Armed Forces: The Power of Illusion." *Russie.Nei.Visions* 37 (2009). Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.16
- McDermott, Roger. "Russia's Vision in Crisis for CSTO Military Forces." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6.125 (2009). Web. 20 Feb. 2016.
- McFaul, Michael. "A New Cold War? Explaining Russia's New Confrontation with the West." 2015 Bartels World Affairs Lecture. Cornell University, Ithaca. 16 Mar. 2015. Lecture.
- McGreal, Chris. "Gaddafi's Army Will Kill Half a Million, Warn Libyan Rebels." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 12 Mar. 2011. Web. 25 Mar. 2016. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/12/gaddafi-army-kill-half-million>>

- Mearsheimer, John J. "Why The Ukraine Crisis Is The West's Fault." *Foreign Affairs* 93.5 (2014): 77-89. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 4 Feb. 2016. P.78
- Medvedev, Dmitry. "Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, Rossia, NTV." *President of Russia*. Kremlin.ru, 31 Aug. 2008. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml>.
- Michael McFaul on Vladimir Putin and Russia*. Perf. Michael McFaul. Hoover Institution, 2014. Film.
- Monaghan, Andrew. "The end of The PuTin era?." *The Carnegie Papers*(2012): 8-12.
- Nichiporuk, Brian. *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*. Santa Monica: Rand.
- Obama, Barak. "Remarks by President Obama to the United Nations General Assembly." *The White House*. The White House, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-united-nations-general-assembly>>.
- Oliker, Olga, et al. *Russian Foreign Policy: sources and implications*. Rand Corporation, 2009.
- OLIVIÉ, ILIANA, and CAROLA GARCÍA-CALVO MANUEL GRACIA. *ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2015*. Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2015. Print. P.20
- Orav, Aivo. *Measuring Foreign Relations*. Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006. Print.
- Oxenstierna, Susanne. *The Russian Economy in 2009: Steep Decline despite Crisis Management*. Stockholm: FOI, 2009. Print. P.8
- Pamir, Necdet. "The Black Sea: A gateway to energy security and diversification." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 7.2 (2007): 245-263. P.250
- Payandeh, Mehrdad. "The United Nations, Military Intervention, And Regime Change In Libya." *Virginia Journal Of International Law* 52.2 (2012): 355-403. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 29 Jan. 2016. P.378
- Polese, Abel, and Donnacha Ó. Beacháin. "The color revolution virus and

authoritarian antidotes: political protest and regime counterattacks in post-Communist spaces." *Demokratizatsiya* 19.2 (2011): P.112.

- Pryce, Paul. "Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?." *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 13.1 (2013). P.162
- Putin, Vladimir. "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation." *President of Russia*. Kremlin.ru, 25 Apr. 2005. Web. 18 Mar. 2016.
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml>.
- Putin, Vladimir. "President Vladimir Putin Has Delivered His Annual Address to the Federal Assembly." *President of Russia*. Kremlin.ru, 10 May 2006. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/35528>>.
- Putin, Vladimir. "Putin on Russia & Millenium." *Putin on RUSSIA & MILLENNIUM*. University of Oregon, n.d. Web. 05 Mar. 2016.
- Putin, Vladimir. "Read Putin's U.N. General Assembly Speech." *Read Putin's U.N. General Assembly Speech*. The Washington Post, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
<<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/>>.
- Putin, Vladimir. "Statement On Iraq At a Kremlin Meeting." *President Of Russia*. 20 Mar. 2003. Web. 03 Feb. 2016.
<<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/21942>>.
- Putin, Vladimir. "Working Day." *ARCHIVE OF THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE 2008-2012 PRIME MINISTER OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION VLADIMIR PUTIN*. Prime.gov.ru, 16 Jan. 2012. Web. 18 Mar. 2016.
<<http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/17755/>>.
- Ross, Cameron. 2004. Putin's federal reforms. In *Russian politics under Putin*, ed. Cameron Ross, 155–176. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- "Russia Begins Air Strikes in Syria as US Flags Concern over Targets." *ABC News*. 1 Oct. 2015. Web. 06 Feb. 2016.
<<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-30/russia-begins-air-strikes-in-syria-us-official-says/6818352>>
- "Russia." *Country Report*. Freedom House, 2001. Web. 01 Mar. 2016.
<<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/russia>>.

- "Russia." *Country Report*. Freedom House, 2005. Web. 01 Mar. 2016.
<<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/russia>>.
- Russia: Federal Laws Introducing Ban of Propaganda of Non-traditional Sexual Relationships*. London: Article 19, 2013. Print.
- RUSSIAN FEDERATION Presidential Election 26 March 2000 FINAL REPORT*. Rep. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2000. Print. P.2
- RUSSIAN FEDERATION Presidential Election 14 March 2004 FINAL REPORT*. Rep. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2004. Print. P.1
- Russian Federation, Presidential Election, 4 March 2012: Final Report*. Rep. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2012. Print.
- "Russia." *Independent Statistics and Analysis*. U.S. Energy Information Administration. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.
- "Russian Parliament Unanimously Approves Use of Military in Syria to Fight ISIS." *RT International*. RT, 30 Sept. 2015. Web. 06 Feb. 2016.
<<https://www.rt.com/news/317013-parliament-authorization-troops-abroad/>>.
- Rutland, Peter. "Putin's Path to Power." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16.4 (2000): 313-54.
Taylor & Francis Online. Web. 3 Feb. 2016.
- Rybakovsky, Leonid. and Sergei Ryazantsev, "International Migration in the Russian Federation," UN Populations Division, July 5, 2005, doc. Number UN/POP/MIG/2005/11.
- Sakwa, Richard. "'New Cold War' or Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International Politics." *International Affairs Int Affairs* 84.2 (2008): 241-67. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
- "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions." *Meeting Coverage and Press Releases*. United Nations, 17 Mar. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>>.
- "Security Council Press Statement on Libya." *Meeting Coverage and Press Releases*. United Nations, 22 Feb. 2011. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
<<http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm>>.
- "Security Council - Veto List." *Dag Hammarskjöld Library*. United Nations, 12 Jan.

2016. Web. 18 Mar. 2016. <<http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>>.

Schenck, Lisa M., and Robert A. Youmans. "From Start To Finish: A Historical Review Of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties And Starting Over With The New Start." *Cardozo Journal Of International & Comparative Law* 20.2 (2012): 399-435. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 6 Feb. 2016. P.428

Schmitt, Eric, and Neil Macfarquhar. "Russia Expands Fleet in Syria With Jets That Can Attack Targets on Ground." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 21 Sept. 2015. Web. 06 Feb. 2016. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/world/middleeast/russia-deploys-ground-attack-aircraft-to-syrian-base.html>>.

Schroder, Hans-Henning. "The Caucasus Crisis. International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe." *German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Research Paper N 9* (2008). P.54

Shlapentokh, Dmitry. "Alexander Dugin's Views on the Middle East." *Space and Polity* 12.2 (2008): 251-68. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir. "Perceptions of foreign threats to the regime: From Lenin to Putin." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42.3 (2009): 305-324. P.311

Shuster, Simon. "U.S.-Russia Relations: In Need of a New Reset." *Time*. Time Inc., 16 Mar. 2010. Web. 06 Feb. 2016. <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1971651,00.html>

Sly, Liz, and Andrew Roth. "Russia Defends Syria Airstrikes amid Claims of Blows to U.S.-backed Rebels." *Washington Post*. The Washington Post, 1 Oct. 2015. Web. 06 Feb. 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-vehemently-defends-syrian-airstrikes-and-denies-targeting-us--backed-rebels/2015/10/01/cddada92-67af-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205_story.html>

Snetkov, Aglaya. "When the internal and external collide: a social constructivist reading of Russia's security policy." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64.3 (2012): 521-542.

"Soft Power Survey 2014/15 - Film." *Monocle*. N.p., Nov. 2014. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.

Soldatov, Andrei, and Irina Borogan. "Russia's Surveillance State." *World Policy Journal* 30.(3) (2013): 23-30. Web. 5 Mar. 2016.

- Sussman, Gerald, and Sascha Krader. "Template revolutions: Marketing US regime change in Eastern Europe." *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 5.3 (2008). P.92
- Tagliabile, John. "France, Germany and Russia Vow to Stop Use of Force Against Iraq." *New York Times*. 5 Mar. 2003. Web. 3 Feb. 2016.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/05/international/europe/05CND-PARI.html?pagewanted=all>
- Talbott, Strobe. *The Russia Hand a Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*. New York, NY: Random House, 2003. Print. P. 405
- "Transcript of the Security Council Meeting Devoted to Measures to Implement the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly," President of Russia, Official Website, June 20, 2006, 20 Feb. 2016
 <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23657>>.
- Tulmets, E. (2007) 'Can the Discourse on "Soft Power" Help the EU to Bridge its Capability– Expectations Gap?', *European Political Economy Review*, 7, Summer.
- Tumanov, Sergey, Alexander Gasparishvili, and Ekaterina Romanova. "Russia–EU Relations, or How the Russians Really View the EU." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 27.1 (2011): 120-41. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.123
- United Nations. General Assembly. 65/265, Suspension of the rights of membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Human Rights Council.
 A/RES/65/265. 3 Mar. 2011. Available undocs.org/A/RES/65/265
- United Nations. General Assembly. 68/262, Territorial integrity of Ukraine.
 A/RES/62/262. 1 April. 2014. Available undocs.org/A/RES/62/262
- United Nations. Security Council. 1970, Resolution 1970. S/RES/1970. 26 February 2011. undocs.org/S/RES/1970.
- "UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked." *UN News Center*. UN, 15 Mar. 2014. Web. 06 Feb. 2016.
 <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47362#.VvYFo2QrJdg>>
- "U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Council on Foreign Relations, 6 Apr. 2008. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
 <<http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/us-russia-strategic-framework-declaration/p16193>>.

- Van Evera, Stephen. *Causes of war: Power and the roots of conflict*. Cornell University Press, 1999. P.260
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia UP, 2001. Print. P.16
- Weitz, Richard. "Assessing the Sino-Russian Naval Exercise "Maritime Cooperation 2012" | SLDInfo." *Second Line of Defence*. Second Line of Defense. Web. 31 Jan. 2016.
<<http://www.sldinfo.com/assessing-the-sino-russian-naval-exercise-“maritime-cooperation-2012”/>>.
- Weitz, Richard. "China, US, Russia Eye Bishkek." *The Diplomat*. 12 Apr. 2010. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.
- Wheatley, Jonathan. "Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution." *Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union, Aldershot* 41 (2005).
- White, Stephen, and Ian McAllister. "Did Russia (Nearly) have a Facebook Revolution in 2011? Social Media's Challenge to Authoritarianism." *Politics* 34.1 (2014): 72-84. P.72
- White, Stephen, ed. *Russia's Authoritarian Elections*. Routledge, 2014.
- Wilson, Jeanne L. "The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign Policy." *Problems of Post-Communism* 57.2 (2010): 21-36. Web. 20 Feb. 2016. P.32
- "World Report 2015: Russia." *Human Rights Watch*. N.p., 08 Jan. 2015. Web. 25 Feb. 2016.
< <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/russia>>.
- Wyatt, Caroline. "Bush and Putin: Best of Friends." *BBC News*. BBC, 16 June 2001. Web. 03 Feb. 2016. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1392791.stm>>
- Young, Cathy. "From Russia With Loathing." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 20 Nov. 2008. Web. 18 Mar. 2016.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/opinion/21young.html?_r=0>
- Ziegler, Charles E. "Russian–American relations: From Tsarism to Putin." *International Politics* 51.6 (2014): 671-692. P.688