We Don’t Trust You, Either:  
*The Effects of Governmental Surveillance on Trust in Government Among Muslim American Students*

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**Abstract**

Since 9/11, the Muslim American community remains the focus of the federal government’s national security agenda. This manifests in the form of numerous counter-terrorism surveillance programs that encroach upon the civil liberties of Muslim Americans. Against the backdrop of palpable concerns regarding surveillance of Muslims, this paper examines whether programs like the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program increase distrust of the federal government among young Muslims and, if so, whether diminished trust affects the civic engagement of Muslim youth. To answer these questions, I administer an original survey to Muslim college students across California. Although knowledge of surveillance programs like CVE is not significantly related to increased distrust, there is some evidence to suggest that the depth of knowledge about CVE is. Moreover, the data shows that students who are more distrustful of the federal government are significantly more likely to have participated in a political protest or demonstration in the past 12 months. My findings, when considered amongst broader academic discussion, shed light on why surveillance programs like CVE are harmful not only to Muslim students’ trust and civic engagement levels, but also—by repressing Muslims from freely engaging with and finding representation in its political apparatus—to the well-being of our country’s democracy.
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Introduction
Since 9/11, the Muslim American community remains the focus of the federal government's national security agenda. This manifests in the form of numerous counter-terrorism surveillance programs that encroach upon the civil liberties of Muslim Americans.\(^1\) Students are not spared from governmental scrutiny— the FBI specifically monitors Muslim Student Associations (MSA) around the nation, with the NYPD Demographic Unit’s surveillance of the MSAs at New York University and other East Coast colleges as well as its identification of 31 total MSAs to monitor in New York serving as noteworthy examples.\(^2\)

Concerns about being surveilled by the federal government are prevalent among many Muslim Americans. One program that has created significant concern is the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, or CVE. According to the DHS, CVE purportedly manages “the synchronization and integration of a whole-of-government effort to empower local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States.”\(^3\) Despite being partly branded as an innocuous “community engagement” program, CVE is lambasted for policing Muslims and ushering in federal government surveillance of Muslim religious institutions, including mosques— all under the guise of “preventive programming” and counter-terrorism measures.\(^4\)

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1 Examples include: For example, between 2002 and 2011, the National Security Entry-Exit System (NSEERS) required approximately 84,000 non-citizen Muslims from over 26 countries to register their personal information and join a government database or risk deportation or imprisonment. Through 2001 and 2013, the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) monitored the New York Muslim community and recruited Muslims themselves as informants.


In February 2015, the White House convened a summit to “highlight domestic and international efforts to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from radicalizing, recruiting, or inspiring individuals or groups in the United States and abroad to commit acts of violence.” In response to this controversial action, a coalition of organizations comprising of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), among others, issued a joint statement condemning CVE. The joint statement highlighted how programs like CVE stigmatize Muslims as a suspect community, further undermine the already deteriorating trust that Muslims have in law enforcement and the federal government, and confine religious exercise and political expression. These concerns were reiterated multiple times by the coalition in letters both prior to and following the summit, in 2014 and 2016 respectively. Despite these concerns adamantly expressed by many civil rights organizations since CVE’s conception in 2011, the government continues to fund CVE programs and local organizations continue to rapidly implement it.

Against this backdrop of palpable and vivid concerns regarding surveillance of Muslims, this paper examines how programs like CVE affect Muslims, particularly young Muslims. More specifically, does knowledge of CVE and other surveillance programs increase distrust of the federal government amongst young Muslims? In light of corroding trust with the federal government, are there downstream effects on young Muslims’ civic incorporation and engagement?

I explore these questions by administering an original survey to Muslim college students in California. Muslim college students were recruited into the study with the assistance of Muslim Student Association West (MSA West), a 501c3

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non-profit organization that serves as an umbrella organization for individual MSAs in California. The survey was fielded online using Qualtrics from December 31, 2018 to January 25, 2019.

Amongst the sample of 73 Muslim students, regarding trust, I find that a large majority of respondents, 86.3%, believed and were aware that the government has ongoing surveillance programs targeting Muslim communities and 61.6% had heard of CVE specifically. On the question of whether this knowledge of CVE affected their trust in the government, the data shows an insignificant relationship in both the bivariate analysis and also in the multivariate analysis in which I control for gender, country of birth, religiosity, and four attitudes regarding surveillance. However, when the amount of knowledge a respondent had regarding CVE is considered as the independent variable, the data shows a negative relationship, specifically around a 20% difference in distrust levels between those who had sufficient knowledge of CVE and those who did not (26.1% vs 45.5%). In other words, respondents who were well-versed on surveillance programs were more affected by surveillance. While the coefficient on the depth of CVE knowledge is insignificant, this can be attributed to the small sample size and the lack of statistical power to detect significant results; a larger respondent sample may show a concrete correlation between a Muslim’s depth of knowledge regarding surveillance and consequent distrust in the government.

Regarding the civic engagement portion of the study, I find that 63.02% of respondents were distrustful of the government. On the question of whether this overwhelming distrust affected respondents’ civic engagement levels—measured through respondents’ participation in protests—the data presents a statistically significant relationship at the p < .05 level in both the bivariate specification and also the multivariate specification in which I controlled for gender, country of birth, and religiosity. Respondents with more distrust in the government were more likely to actively participate in their democracy to the extent of protesting. The predicted probability that an individual with substantial distrust in the government has
protested in the past 12 months is 52.6% as compared to 22.4% for those who have substantial trust in the government. This 30.2% difference reflects the positive relationship between distrust and civic engagement. However, when civic engagement is operationalized through respondent’s voter status, the data presents an insignificant relationship in the bivariate and multivariate specifications. This can be attributed to the small sample size and a lack of variety in the data, in which only seven people reported being not registered to vote.

This study has two primary limitations. 73 students proves to be too small of a sample size to show substantial variation in responses. Additionally, the sample consists of students who were members of their Muslim Student Association at Californian universities. Although these students displayed high confidence in Islamic values—87.7% viewed Islam as an essential component of their daily life and 64.4% visited their mosques at least once a week—they may present somewhat of an inaccurate representation of the general Muslim student population. Research reveals that students who affiliate with a religious student organization and thereby have higher affinities to their religion exhibit “higher levels of community involvement compared to their nonreligious peers.” Thus, the nature of the small and specific sample size reduces the external validity of the data, indicating that a larger, more diverse sample would have most likely shown the hypothesized relationships as significant across all models as well as more variance in civic engagement levels.

Nevertheless, these results, when considered amongst wider significant work, help mitigate the lack of research on how Muslims, particularly young Muslims, are impacted by the disproportionate presence of surveillance programs, such as CVE, in the Muslim American community. The data, when seen through a lens rooted in various scholars’ case studies of Muslim students and in national surveys from Pew Research Center (Pew) and Institute of Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), shed light on the long-term effects of surveillance on Muslim students.

hypothesized, Muslim students do hold substantial distrust in the government due to surveillance as well as the fear and alienation which stems from these programs. Secondly, this distrust, a byproduct of surveillance, leads to the dual experience of resignation and empowerment of the Muslim in political spaces, all the while encouraging more religious Muslim students to stay politically engaged, as discovered in this study.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I first establish the context that surveillance programs function under by presenting an overview regarding CVE, anti-Muslim discrimination, surveillance theory, and current voting levels in the Muslim community. I then walk through my study by expounding on my hypothesis, methodology, and comprehensive results. Lastly, I discuss my findings as viewed amongst wider research.

Collectively, I find that Muslim students face a permanent democratic dilemma. Scrutinized under surveillance and living in a climate overcome with anti-Muslim discrimination, many of them are forced to choose between participating in their democracy or seeking refuge from the persistent threat of surveillance. Those who choose to continue advocating for their interests still find themselves at risk under the government’s gaze. Eradicating unconstitutional programs like CVE requires the Muslim student community, in its entirety, to mobilize; however, by nature of its systemic design, surveillance suppresses the community from doing exactly so. In essence, surveillance programs like CVE are damaging not only to Muslim students’ trust in the government and civic engagement, but also — in limiting Muslims’ freedom to engage with and find representation in its political apparatus— to the well-being of our country’s democracy.
Background

Countering Violent Extremism Task Force (CVE)

In order to properly understand why Muslim youth are at risk due to CVE programs, CVE must be analyzed through both the lens of the government’s strategy and also the lens of community members and organizations who observe CVE’s implementation on the ground.

Although similar strategies have been a part of American discourse for decades, CVE was officially introduced in 2011— as part of the first national strategy to prevent terrorism in the United States— through two government documents: a report titled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” and an implementation plan titled “White House CVE Implementation Plan,” which was most recently updated in 2016. Three years later, in addition to being implemented across the nation by organizations given CVE grants, CVE formally launched pilot programs in three cities: Boston, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Los Angeles.

The government established CVE to prevent “violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.” Administered by the US Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, and FBI, the program has efforts ranging from “large public partnerships to local youth programming to individual intervention.”


9See CVE frameworks for Boston, LA, and Minneapolis-St. Paul:


It is based on two underlying principles: “(1) communities provide the solution to violent extremism; and (2) CVE efforts are best pursued at the local level, tailored to local dynamics, where local officials continue to build relationships within their communities through established community policing and community outreach mechanisms.” Simply put, the program is federal support for “community-led efforts to build resilience to violent extremism,” which it achieves through supplementing “law enforcement counter-terrorism tactics such as surveillance, investigations, and prosecutions with a secondary set of prevention measures.”

These preemptive measures can be categorized into three areas: research and intervention through determining potential terrorist signatures and then searching for these same signatures in young American Muslims; funds for health, education, and social service institutions to engage with the Muslim community; and promotion of propaganda countering extremist ideology.

CVE aims to implement these measures through a multi-tiered structure. The program relies on various stakeholders including both state and local leaders, law enforcement members, educators, mental health providers, NGOs, and social service organizations to work with the government in creating and implementing a directed, preventive framework for the local community. These stakeholders receive monetary support and grants from the federal government in exchange for their work on the ground. The amount of money these grants receive is striking. President Obama asked for fifty million dollars for CVE grants to award to local partners; Congress elected to provide ten million dollars, all of which was distributed to over 31 local agencies in 2016. By 2017, DHS had provided local agencies in Boston over $480,000 to implement CVE towards Muslim and Somali

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12“FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.” National Archives and Records Administration.
youth. Recently, President Trump tripled the CVE budget from $764,000 to $2,340,000. It is clear that the government prioritizes CVE as a necessary national security strategy.

However, numerous organizations—including ACLU and the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law—argue that CVE is misleadingly branded as community engagement when it actually implements a potent framework that bolsters state-sponsored Islamophobia and marginalization of the Muslim American community. In practice, the five-step part of the program—engagement, prevention, intervention, interdiction, and rehabilitation—is only an elaborate strategy that perpetuates surveillance, targeting, and criminalization of the Muslim-American community.

Through research across multiple reports and organizations, I have pinpointed six central issues regarding CVE that shed light on the reality of the government’s strategy on the ground:

- **It is a policing program targeted almost exclusively at Muslim American Communities**

  In his personal statement of the White House’s CVE Strategy, Barack Obama referred to 9/11 and Muslim American communities’ supposed vulnerability to recruitment from al-Qa’ida—suggesting that Muslim and Islamic ideology spurred CVE’s efforts. This contentious rhetoric translates through these policies. Through its pilot programs, CVE has focused almost exclusively on the Muslim American communities, specifically Black Muslims, Somalis, and young Muslims. Multiple CVE implementation

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documents explicitly mention these communities verbatim.\textsuperscript{20} President Trump introduced the idea of rebranding CVE to “Countering Islamic Extremism” or “Countering Radical Islamic Extremism,” confirming Muslims’ suspicions that they are CVE’s sole target group.\textsuperscript{21} President Trump’s changes to the program have also redirected 85% of DHS’s CVE grants towards Muslims and other minority groups.\textsuperscript{22} Through conspicuously directing its efforts at Muslim communities, CVE aligns with traditional community policing efforts.\textsuperscript{23}

- **It is unclear how the program is specifically implemented and who is recruited and given the grant money**

  Activist coalitions advocating against CVE note that the organizations recruited to work for CVE fall into three primary categories: they have power in the Muslim community, serve low income members, or are non-profits. In regards to the first characteristic, by targeting organizations that have power, CVE effectively dismantles community leadership and works top-down to interfere into the community. In regards to the second characteristic, by targeting organizations that serve low income members like refugees (and as a result, are more often than not financially in need of resources), the government is able to take advantage of these organizations’ financial vulnerability in return for collecting information from the members they serve. In regards to the third characteristic, by targeting non-profits, the government can legally use gathered intelligence from these non-profits to prosecute individuals, a feat they are legally unable to do so when collected through other organizations.


\textsuperscript{22}Patel, Faiza, Andrew Lindsay, and Sophia DenUyl. "Countering Violent Extremism in the Trump Era."

\textsuperscript{23}American Civil Liberties Union. "CVE Coalition Letter, Re: Federal Support for Countering Violent Extremism Programs."
In regards to grants awarded, Brennan Center reported that “The actual recipients of CVE funds are frequently obscured because about half of the funds allocated are earmarked for pass-through organizations, consultants, or contractors. Just under half of the funds earmarked for these entities (approximately 45 percent) will be distributed to unidentified groups and individuals.”

Likewise, much of the information regarding actual implementation of CVE remains hidden. Activists that organize against CVE remark on how most CVE information is deliberately scattered and not published. This leaves little room for the public to hold the government accountable regarding actions taken under CVE.

- **Under the pretext of national security, CVE is a disguise to FBI interference and intelligence gathering of the Muslim community**

  It is important to note that CVE recruits the Muslim community to be a counter-terrorism tool for the government. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Lisa O. Monaco, emphasized the need for the government and Muslim community to work together to have dialogue and take action in building resilience to terrorism in communities. However, this “community engagement” has provided the FBI with a much more coercive purpose in that it facilitates thorough intelligence gathering. The FBI’s approach to “community outreach” comprises of encouraging community members and organizations recruited to work under CVE to look for any flimsy, subjective indicators of extremism in individuals and report

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suspects back to law enforcement authorities, so that action can be taken.\textsuperscript{27}
Especially post 9/11, the community has suffered from extensive FBI interference—reports estimate around 16,000 paid FBI informants are currently amongst Muslim communities in America.\textsuperscript{28}

Government sponsored self-policing not only opens the community up to intelligence gathering, but it also foments internal mistrust between Muslims on an intra-communal level. Muslims find themselves in a state of mental internment, doubting each other and not knowing who is an informant and who is “one of us.”

Additionally, Darakshan Raja from the Washington Peace Center explains that self-policing often hurts those who are the most vulnerable in the community:

“These subgroups [people with intellectual disabilities, the mentally ill, recent immigrants, the poor, and the young] are marginalized within Muslim communities, and are disproportionately impacted by profiling at the hands of state agencies. Meanwhile, they are also the very groups that are in need of institutional support and community protection. CVE programs create additional barriers and further entrench fears for such subgroups of community alienation and government systems...”\textsuperscript{29}

In falsely assuming that terrorism exists in Muslim communities and shifting the responsibility to recognize it to Muslims themselves, self-policing implicitly places blame on Muslims for terrorist incidents by suggesting that it was their fault in failing to catch and report the perpetrator. Taken together, self-policing and public expectation of self-blame lead to Muslims having to prove their innocence,


\textsuperscript{29}“Logging It All: CVE and Schisms in the Muslim Community.” The Islamic Monthly.
which many times manifests in them mitigating their own engagement in political and religious spaces.\textsuperscript{30}

- **CVE is rooted in faulty radicalization theories that have been empirically debunked**

  CVE finds its dogma in problematic conceptions of radicalization and broken-window theories which “invest local social and cultural norms an outsized role in the origination of criminal activity, creating a rationale for the policing of everyday life.”\textsuperscript{31} CVE and radicalization theories assume that extremism breeds terrorism and that there is a predictable trajectory to terrorism—both of these conceptions have been empirically disproved by substantial research over the course of a decade.\textsuperscript{32} Regarding the first premise, counterterrorism experts have explained that there is no significant relationship between those who engage in terrorism and those who have extremist beliefs—Dr. Marc Sageman, a former CIA officer, explained that terrorists are overwhelmingly not ideologues.\textsuperscript{33} Empirical studies conducted by the American and British governments and the FBI also found this relation to be insignificant. Regarding the second premise, research has shown that there is no fixed definition or indicator of a terrorist; hence, it is impossible to predict who is susceptible to becoming a terrorist.\textsuperscript{34} In fact, the Brennan Center gained access to an FBI report which clearly revealed that there are no “unique behavioral changes for those who mobilize to violent extremism.”\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{30}Shams, Tahseen. "Visibility as Resistance by Muslim Americans in a Surveillance and Security Atmosphere." 77.

\textsuperscript{31}Akbar, Amna A. "National Security's Broken Windows." 2.

\textsuperscript{32}Patel, Faiza, and Meghan Koushik. Countering Violent Extremism. 9.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.

In addition to being based in radicalization theory, over 70% of CVE programs also rest on the empirically disproved premise that diversity and experience of discrimination are “sources of danger” and threaten the well-being and security of the country.\textsuperscript{36}

- **CVE equates religious observance and community involvement with potential terrorist indicators and in doing so, curbs Muslims’ first-amendment rights**

  Due to using radicalization theory as its grounding, CVE looks for certain “risk factors” or “vulnerabilities” to determine which Muslims are more prone to terrorism.\textsuperscript{37} The types of radicalization incubators are “religious stereotypes...subjective personality assessments...and evaluations of political beliefs.”\textsuperscript{38} For instance, \textit{The Intercept} obtained access to a 2014 document “Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide for Practitioners and Analysts,” stamped with “For Official use only.” This 36-page document provided local leaders with a subjective rating system to assess individuals and their risk of radicalism based on categories like “Expressions of Hopelessness, Futility,” “Talk of Harming Self or Others,” and “Connection to Group Identity (Race, Nationality, Religion, Ethnicity).”\textsuperscript{39} An individual with a low score warranted intervention and exposed him or her to intelligence gathering of his or her personal life.

  In this way, CVE indefinitely threatens Muslims with capturing the government’s gaze for benign, everyday acts—such as having a beard, actively participating at one’s local mosque or engaging in faith practices, not

\textsuperscript{36} Patel, Faiza, Andrew Lindsay, and Sophia DenUyl. “Countering Violent Extremism in the Trump Era.”
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} The Intercept. "Is Your Child a Terrorist? U.S. Government Questionnaire Rates Families at Risk for Extremism."
drinking alcohol, or engaging with community and advocacy groups. Many indicators are also rooted in constitutionally protected behaviors, such as perceptions of family, identity, and emotional well-being. As aforementioned, these indicators are not based on empirical evidence and have no correlation to terrorism. On the one hand, the US acknowledges that terrorists cannot be predicted, and on the other hand, it continues to propagate a framework that is entrenched in the underlying belief that there are visible flags denoting terrorists.

By conflating religious observance and lawful political activism as pathways to radicalization, CVE uses a “secularization approach” and inherently criminalizes Muslims’ First-Amendment rights. CVE forces Muslims to choose between their personal safety and normal first-amendment protected activities. In fear of surveillance and CVE, many members “abandon discussions about religion and politics or avoid mosque and community spaces altogether to avoid being tracked into CVE programs that brand them as ‘at risk’ or potential ‘terrorists.’”

- CVE is ineffective

The government has failed to provide evidence that CVE has had any positive effects. On the contrary, CVE has been shown to be ineffective and counterproductive. The Australian government found that “strategies for countering violent extremism can erode democratic principles and social

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42 Ibid.
cohesion, increase radicalization and incite conflict and violence” and the European Parliament found that it “is detrimental to both objectives of countering radicalization and fostering community cohesion.”

Overall, CVE efforts seem counter-intuitive. Lone wolf terrorists are the greatest perpetrators of homegrown terrorism and yet are almost impossible to detect, negating much of CVE’s radicalization-based strategy. Furthermore, CVE’s focus on Muslims achieves little purpose. Ample data proves that Muslims are not a significant national security threat: two-thirds of terror attacks in 2017 were carried out by right-wing extremists, not Islamists; an FBI report on terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2005 ascribed only 6% of attacks to Muslims; a 2012 DHS report and Think Progress study found that 56% of domestic terror was due to right-wing extremists and 12% due to Islamic extremists. Despite empirical data indicating otherwise, CVE continues to perceive Muslims as the most pressing threat to the United States.

In summary, it is blatantly apparent that the CVE paradigm de facto criminalizes the Muslim community by assuming they are potentially prone to terrorism. CVE runs under a mantra of “community empowerment,” but in the panoptic gaze of CVE, Islam is the threat and the Muslim community is one that is inherently suspect of terrorism and therefore must be inspected, taught, and groomed of certain beliefs. By providing the government and local leaders with

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52 Ibid.
legal methods to police the political activity, speech, views, and everyday lives of any and all Muslim Americans, CVE is no better than other surveillance programs; in fact, it is possibly a more potent, coercive version interconnected to the systematic criminalization of Muslims.\textsuperscript{51} Although countless Muslim and non-Muslim organizations and institutions have expressed the program’s chilling effects on the Muslim community and pointed to the lack of evidence showing any “real problem” in the Muslim community, the government continues to invest in CVE. Local partners and the state determine what thoughts and actions constitute as acceptable, thereby violating the First Amendment rights of Muslim Americans. In addition to depriving Muslims of their constitutional protections, CVE has a myriad of negative effects including systematic oppression through abusive counter-terrorism practices and \textit{erosion of the relationship} between Muslims and law enforcement as well as government officials.\textsuperscript{52} I explore this latter consequence further through part one of this study.

\section*{CVE and Young Muslims}

CVE particularly focuses on young Muslim Americans: 14 out of 26 DHS programs are dedicated to students and schools.\textsuperscript{53} Many universities have dedicated efforts to implementing CVE on their campuses, including the University of San Diego, Rochester Institute of Technology, and the University of Chicago, Illinois.\textsuperscript{54} For instance, an internal DHS document comprehensively outlines how CVE will be implemented at USD, including the hiring of multiple personnel to manage the program on campus as well as specific community centers such as one catering to the “Somali community of City Heights.”\textsuperscript{55} Moreover, a 2016 DHS CVE strategy

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\textsuperscript{52}American Civil Liberties Union. "CVE Coalition Letter, Re: Federal Support for Countering Violent Extremism Programs."
\textsuperscript{53}Patel, Faiza, Andrew Lindsay, and Sophia DenUyl. "Countering Violent Extremism in the Trump Era."
\textsuperscript{55}See DHS's forms for CVE at USD: \textit{UCVE at USD. Report. Department of Homeland Security.}
\end{flushleft}
report intended that by December 2017 DHS would collaborate with 50 different student groups at American colleges to establish 2015’s “Peer to Peer (P2P) Challenging Extremism” program, which encouraged students to develop social media content countering extremist propaganda.\(^{56}\) Similarly, since 2016, UC Berkeley has offered a course titled “Designing Technology to Counter Violent Extremism” wherein students work directly with the U.S. Department of State to prototype innovations that “counter extremism” and “identify early signs of radicalization.”\(^{57}\) The P2P and UC Berkeley programs exemplify how colleges linked with CVE have served as conduits for CVE to funnel into larger communities. By directly partnering for funding with colleges and making college students the engineers of aspects of CVE, the government strategically places community members, even college students, at the forefront of surveillance.

The strategy CVE uses to work with youth displays a failure to understand the community’s needs and experiences. Amidst the political climate and their stigmatized identities, Muslim youth already grapple with identity conflict, self-doubt, and other forms of coping mechanisms to the political climate. These vulnerable experiences are taken advantage of by CVE. CVE partners, particularly mental institutions, flag sentiments such as feeling alienation, anti-Muslim discrimination, isolation, and marginalization as markers for potential to terrorism (despite lack of any correlation).\(^{58}\) Ironically, these same indicators are consequences of CVE— the U.K Parliament stated that the CVE program is “stigmatizing, [and] potentially alienating.”\(^{59}\) Muslims are stuck in a cycle fueled by surveillance.

Thus, through these examples, it is apparent that Muslim youth remain in increasing danger by CVE efforts. I aim to explore how CVE’s potential to restrain
political activism and religious observance impacts Muslim youth. Does it decrease their distrust in the government? Does it increase their engagement, despite risk of surveillance through CVE?

**Anti-Muslim Discrimination: Hate Crimes and Islamophobia**

CVE’s implications on the Muslim figure are amplified because they occur amidst incessant anti-Muslim discrimination in the United States. This reality must be contextualized to properly understand how surveillance functions with an already difficult, discriminatory experience that Muslims endure in America. Research has shown that discrimination causes issues with mental health, self-esteem, stress, anxiety, and depression. (Deitch et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 1996; Kessler et al., 1999; Sanchez and Brock, 1996). Surveillance only adds to this already traumatic experience.

**Hate Crimes**

Studies from Pew, ISPU, and CAIR reveal that Muslims live in a discriminatory landscape in the United States. A 2017 ISPU survey found that Muslim Americans are the religious group that experiences the highest level of discrimination. Pew reports that in 2017, 48% of all Muslims have experienced discrimination through being called offensive names, targeted at airport security or by law enforcement officials, as well as physically threatened or attacked. ISPU reported a higher number at 60% of Muslims who have experienced discrimination. Being visibly Muslim plays a role in discrimination—around 64% of the 38% of Muslims who are distinctively Muslim (through their outer appearance i.e. head covering or beards) have experienced discrimination.

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In addition to discovering rampant anti-Muslim discrimination, CAIR’s 2018 Civil Rights report found that anti-Muslim incidents have dramatically increased in the past few years. Between 2016 and 2017, there was a 17% increase in anti-Muslim incidents and a 15% increase in hate crimes. Between 2014 and 2016, anti-Muslim incidents rose by 65% and in 2016, Islamophobic incidents rose by 57%. The Southern Poverty Law Center found a 197% increase in anti-Muslim hate groups between 2015 and 2016. The FBI found that hate crime statistics have surpassed the formidable spike of 2001, with hate crimes consistently increasing annually since 2015. Such high levels have not been seen since 2010, following the “Ground Zero” controversy and since 2001, following 9/11. However, this data does not even fully represent the extent of discrimination. FBI statistics are based on voluntary collection from law enforcement agencies and 56% of hate crimes are usually not reported—the rates of hate crimes perpetrated against Muslims are much higher in reality. For example, for 2017 alone, despite a 17% increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes, many were left unreported, such as a Minnesota mosque bombing or vandalism of the Islamic Center of Tennessee. In 2014, the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism (CSHE) at California State University San Bernardino, through compiling data from 20 states, found the total number of Muslim hate incidents to be 29% higher than the FBI’s reported number of incidents in those same states.

The New America Think Tank illustrated over 763 separate hate incidents between 2012 and present day. Incidents were grouped into six separate categories: (1.) Anti-Sharia Legislation, (2.) Opposition to Refugee Resettlement, (3.) Opposition to Mosques, Muslim Cemeteries & Schools, (4.) Anti-Muslim Actions & Statements by Elected & Appointed Officials, (5.) Hate Incidents Against Mosques & Islamic Centers, and (6.) Media Reports of Anti-Muslim Violence and Crimes.\textsuperscript{68} The data conveys the massive spike in hate crimes over the past three years.

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\caption{Image from New America Muslim Diaspora Initiative}
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Airports, in particular, have become examples of physical spaces where the Muslim American is objectified as “a threat to national security and [one that] requires careful monitoring and surveillance.”\textsuperscript{69} A researcher interviewed 48 South Asian and Arab Americans living in Dallas and Chicago and found that due to their


\textsuperscript{69}Considine, Craig. “The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and “Flying While Brown”.”
perception as threatening and suspicious, Muslim Americans have consistently had discriminatory experiences at U.S. airports.

Interestingly enough, in 2017, 35% of anti-Muslim bias incidents were incited by federal government agencies, of which 10% were incited by the FBI. Additionally, in the first quarter of 2018, CAIR found that the FBI was the perpetrator of the most anti-Muslim incidents. This marks CVE and other surveillance programs as potential vehicles of abuse towards Muslims.

Furthermore, bullying is also a form of discrimination that Muslims face. Young Muslims experience bullying four times more than the general public. Through a 2012 survey conducted amongst California young Muslims between the ages of 11 to 18, CAIR-CA found that a majority of young Muslims had experienced some form of bullying: 50% were verbally bullied, 10% were physically bullied, and 21% were cyberbullied.

These statistics reveal an incessant, grotesque reality of anti-Muslim stories. In 2015, a White man murdered three Muslim students at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, two of whom were covered Muslim women. In June 2017, Nabra Hassanen, a covered Muslim woman, was raped and murdered — her remains were found by police in a lake in Virginia. In 2019, a White supremacist shot fifty-one Muslims in their own masjids in New Zealand. The week following this terrorist act saw a 593% spike in anti-Muslim hate crimes, with the Guardian reporting 85 crimes in the span of six days. The list is lengthy and exhausting and terrifying. Each of these incidents represent not only individual lives that are

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70TARGETED Civil Rights Report. 13.
Public Opinion Against Muslims and Islam

Muslims themselves believe discrimination is an issue: 75% believe there is “a lot of” discrimination towards Muslims in the US. At 83%, Muslim women in particular believe there is more discrimination than Muslim men do (68%). Even though this negative climate has had an effect on Muslims—over half feel that it is becoming more difficult to practice Islam in America—Muslims are still positive about being both American and also Muslim; nearly 90% of Muslims are proud of holding both Muslim and American identities.\(^75\)

The data is more complex amongst larger American society. A 2015 Gallup survey revealed that 43% of Americans have some prejudice against Muslim Americans and over half believe that “most Americans are prejudiced towards Muslim Americans.”\(^76\) Through a survey administered in 2015, the Arab American Institute found that the public held 67% of unfavorable attitudes towards Muslim Americans.\(^77\) Islam is also viewed with contempt. A 2017 survey conducted by the New America foundation and the American Muslim Institution discovered that 42% of Americans believe that Islam is not compatible with American values.\(^78\)

Still, substantial data also shows positive views towards Muslims, especially amongst those who identify with more liberal values. In a 2018 survey, ISPU found that 66% of Americans agree that “negative things politicians say regarding Muslims is harmful to our country” and 81% believe that Muslims are “committed

\(^{77}\)Considine, Craig. “The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and “Flying While Brown”.
to the well-being of America.” Most relevant to this study, however, is the fact that 39% of Americans believe that Muslims should be scrutinized more than other Americans.

Anti-Muslim bias plays a significant role in the political scene. In an effort to appeal to right-wing voters, candidates often run anti-Muslim campaigns and officials develop and pass anti-Muslim legislation. Anti-Muslim stances have frequently been pushed by candidates. A Muslim Advocates report revealed that in the 2017 and 2018 races, anti-Muslim rhetoric had been used over 80 times; over two-thirds of this anti-Muslim rhetoric had been endorsed by presidential candidates or elected officials. Religious discrimination has also been institutionalized through Islamophobic policies. Since 2013, over 81 bills, aimed at “vilifying Islamic religious practices,” were introduced in state legislatures across the United States.

**Discrimination Against Hijabi Muslim Women**

Muslim women report higher levels of discrimination (68% vs 55%) and fear more for their personal safety (47% vs 31%) than Muslim men. Field experiments in the context of hiring practices identify evidence of a “hijab effect,” or discrimination toward Muslim American women wearing religious attire. For example, Ghumman and Ryan (2013) conducted a field experiment in which employers were provided photos of prospective job candidates included some women who were wearing Muslim religious attire and others who were not. The authors

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found evidence of both interpersonal discrimination, wherein those portrayed wearing Muslim religious attire were met with negativity and indifference, and also formal discrimination, wherein those wearing Muslim religious attire were less likely to receive call backs or to be invited to complete a job application.\textsuperscript{84} Another study using data from 2007 and 2011 Pew Surveys found that Muslim women who wear hijab, i.e. are visibly Muslim, had a 31\% less predicted job probability than those who did not. Although 66\% of this could be pointed to sociodemographic differences, the researcher, Abdelhadi, suggested that the remaining 20\% likely stemmed from anti-Muslim sentiment, considering that the predicted job probability between non-hijabi Muslim women and non-Muslim women was comparable.\textsuperscript{85} Abdelhadi concluded her study by attributing the gap between hijabi and non-hijabi women to the discrimination that hijabis face in the workforce proved by multiple researchers including Aziz 2014, Ghumman & Ryan 2013, and Moore 2007. Workplace discrimination is not limited to hijabi women — multiple researchers have found widespread discrimination in workplace hiring of Muslim women and men.\textsuperscript{86} Moreover, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) saw a 250\% increase after 9/11 in Muslim discrimination in the workforce and every year since then, Muslims have comprised a disproportionate amount of the EEOC’s discrimination claims.\textsuperscript{87} 

In the discussion surrounding discrimination against Muslims, two things must be noted. First, Muslims have intersectional identities that lead to varied experiences with discrimination. Notably, Black Muslims experience much higher


\textsuperscript{86}See more at:
Acquisti, Alessandro and Fong, Christina M., An Experiment in Hiring Discrimination Via Online Social Networks (July 17, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2031979 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2031979

Bartkoski, Timothy; Lynch, Ellen; Witt, Chelsea; and Rudolph, Cort (2018) "A Meta-Analysis of Hiring Discrimination Against Muslims and Arabs," \textit{Personnel Assessment and Decisions}; Vol. 4 : Iss. 2 , Article 1. DOI: 10.25035/pad.2018.02.001 Available at: https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/pad/vol4/iss2/1

levels of discrimination, a number that only increases with Black Muslim women.\textsuperscript{88} Often, having multiple stigmatized identities also translates to increased surveillance. It is also important to recognize that religious discrimination more often than not fails to separate race from religion, causing religious and racial identity to be the same, and thus leading to discrimination towards those of a certain appearance and color of skin, rather than those of a certain faith. As a result, racial profiling occurs and differences between Muslims, Arabs, Sikhs, and Brown folks are blurred—those who look like Muslims are also targets of Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{89}

**Islamophobia: The Origin of Discrimination**

Anti-Muslim discrimination results from anti-Muslim racism, or more technically, Islamophobia. The Runnymede Trust is credited with formalizing the phenomena of Islamophobia through their flagship evidence-based report titled *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* published in 1997. In his book *American Islamophobia: Understanding the Roots and Rise of Fear*, Professor Khaled Beydoun deliniates that Islamophobia is a systemic, structural, and institutionalized industry rooted in the assumption that Islam and Muslims are “violent, alien, inassimilable” and have a “propensity for terrorism.”\textsuperscript{90} Runnymede summarizes it as follows:

> “Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or


\textsuperscript{89}Considine, Craig. “The Racialization of Islam in the United States: Islamophobia, Hate Crimes, and “Flying While Brown”.”

exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”

Islamophobia works through three dimensions: “structural policy, private animus, and the dialectical process by which the former legitimizes and mobilizes the latent and patent bigotry of individuals and private actors.” Beydoun emphasizes that Islamophobia is not a new phenomena, but is a modern caricature of Orientalist and bigoted discourse endemic in American legal and political systems. Formidable forces, such as the War on Terror, White supremacy, political leaders, state-sponsored legislation, wealthy donors (the Bradley Foundation), distinguished network of individuals (Pamela Geller, David Horowitz), and institutions (American Freedom Law Center and the Clarion Institute) fuel the Islamophobia industry and have functioned to erect Islamophobia into a full-fledged institution systemic in global society.

The Figure of the Muslim Under Surveillance

In recognizing the impact of surveillance on a Muslim’s distrust and civic engagement levels, it is crucial to scrutinize how surveillance functions in a larger, racialized cycle entrapping Muslim students and working to erode the relationship between Muslims, their identities, and the government.

Dr. Arshad Ali, a researcher studying the Muslim American experience, points to Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality as the underlying reasoning for the government’s surveillance of the Muslim community. Surveillance is a tool to achieve governmentality, or the “organized construction and control of a population

94 Countering the Islamophobia Industry Toward More Effective Strategies.
through mentalities, rationalities, and technologies into particular roles and relationships as citizens.”95 Through surveilling a community, the government does not intend to see everything, but rather, it intends for individuals to believe that it sees everything. In making citizens believe that they are being watched at all times, surveillance is a panoptic gaze that disciplines Muslims “not only on the individual level but also serves to socially control and discipline entire communities and factions of the populace in unique and precise ways.”96 As a result of surveillance, Muslim students perpetually believe that their interactions, actions, and words—whether at school, in private and public spaces, or on social media—could potentially catch the eye of the state. Some remain unapologetic and continue their activities unfazed, while others self-censor and curb their routine, normal activities in fear of being put on a watch list, being reported to the FBI, or becoming victim to a multitude of other surveillance mechanisms. This is a devastating loss to students as they lose efficacy in expressing themselves and in building their identities (Ali 2016).

Surveillance must be validated for governmentality upon Muslims to succeed. The media and government sustain surveillance through fueling an image of a Muslim that evokes fear and—when pitted against claims of national security in a post-9/11 world—subdues the unconstitutionality of surveillance programs. These forces inseminate the mind of America with a violent, threatening image of a Muslim.97 Of course, one must note that post-9/11 depictions only further the primordial, Orientalist image of a Muslim that has been objectified in cultural discourse for decades.98 In 2016, on the day after the infamous ISIS terrorist attack in Brussels, Senator Ted Cruz claimed that the country needed “to empower law enforcement to patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods before they become

96Ibid, 89.
98Ibid, 80.
Statements such as these by political leaders reflect the influence of
governmentality: all Muslims are bad and must not only be monitored, but they
themselves must know they are being monitored and subsequently, remain
cautious. Even more, the FBI has been exposed for using “entrapment strategies,”
in which it conjures fake terrorist plots and lures in susceptible people into
committing these plots who, without the informant’s incitement and resources,
would have never committed such a crime. The FBI seems to say that if evidence
doesn’t appear, then make it appear. In the long run, these sting operations allow
the FBI to continue its surveillance of Muslim communities. This dynamic of
creating a Muslim that must be surveilled ultimately is the moral ethos of
surveillance— each Muslim must be surveilled because he could be a terrorist. It is
through this approach of a ‘Muslim threat’ and national security, that the
government defends its intrusive surveillance methods and deems them
constitutional.

Other scholars point to surveillance being justified by the government
creating a “security atmosphere” (Hyusmans 2014), a “panic regime” (Lyon 2003),
and engaging in “politics of fear” (Altheide 2006). All of these theories categorize a
sociopolitical climate prevalent with anxiety, insecurity, and fear of enemies that
the government uses to warrant its surveillance of a group of citizens. Shams
states that “foreign policies, domestic legislations, surveillance measures, increased
military intelligence, and mass media discourses all contribute to preserving a
security mentality in which persecution of a threatening “other” for the sake of
national security not only seems logical and acceptable but is also desired.” The

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99 Hirsh, Michael, Ben Schreckinger, Jack Shafer, and John F. Harris. “Inside the FBI’s Secret Muslim
100 Harris, Paul. “Fake Terror Plots, Paid Informants: The Tactics of FBI ‘Entrapment’ Questioned.” The
101 Shams, Tahseen. “Visibility as Resistance by Muslim Americans in a Surveillance and Security Atmosphere.”
75.
102 Ibid, 76.
security atmosphere and forces that breed this atmosphere amalgamate into a permanent anxious, fearful mentality amongst Muslim Americans.\textsuperscript{103}

This mentality has pernicious consequences. Dr. Ali found that surveillance impedes Muslim students as they construct themselves and their identities in academic and political spaces. Muslims’ multifarious formations of their identities affect their engagement not just with their internal communities, but with their external communities — socially, economically, and politically. Surveillance relocates students from the fringes of the media and political discourse to the front lines of the domestic war on terror.\textsuperscript{104} These students, who grapple with discrimination and political character assassination simply due to benign beliefs and actions they choose to engage in, such as attending a mosque, wearing a hijab/headscarf, or simply having a “Muslim” sounding name, view surveillance with a unique, charged perspective. To these students, surveillance is the palpable, ugly result of the bigoted narrative that they see, hear, and experience on the media and in the social, political, and economic landscape — evidence that Islamophobia is not limited to cultural rhetoric, but is a political agenda that is fueled and acted upon by the American government itself. Surveillance is evidence of the tangible danger the government presents to Muslim bodies; it is the potent threat the government poses to the student community: a state sponsored gaze that does not wait to see something suspect, but already sees Muslims as suspect with or without seeing. In the omnipresent eyes of the state, Muslims are not benign citizens, but rather a suspect class that is “an exceptional group who are outside the normal realm of citizenship.”\textsuperscript{105} Thus, Muslim students situate their identities against a government and political context that works to dismantle the same identity that they construct. Through structural programs such as CVE, the government testifies that it does not trust Muslims, why, then, would Muslim youth reciprocate remain trustful in this same institution?

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104}Ibid, 93.
\textsuperscript{105}Ali, Arshad Imitaz. “Citizens under Suspicion: Responsive Research with Community under Surveillance.” 88.
In a law article for Berkeley Technology Law Review, John Penny explains that “If democratic self-governance relies on an informed citizenry...then “surveillance-related chilling effects—” by “detering people from exercising their rights,” including “...the freedom to read, think, and communicate privately—” are “corrosive to political discourse.” Although he specifically discusses government surveillance of users’ online activity, his attestation demonstrates that surveillance confines citizens’ rights. Under the complex political and social cycle as delineated above, surveillance programs chisel away at Muslims’ identities. In doing so, as Penny points out, they inhibit Muslims’ agencies as citizens of a democratic state—this paper explores on this effect further.

**Voting Rate of Muslim American Communities**

The Muslim community remains a severely delegitimized group in the U.S. Despite predictions that the 2016 elections would witness Muslims rushing to the polls to stomp out anti-Muslim candidates, ISPU reported that Muslim voter turnout in the 2016 elections was the least of any major faith or non-affiliated group: although 68% of Muslim Americans were registered to vote, only 61% voted in the polls. However, once voter registration was factored in, Muslims were just as likely to vote as any other American group. The Muslim community seems to be gradually increasing their civic engagement—in the time between 2016 and 2018, Muslim voter turnout has increased to 75%. This upward trend presents the possibility that Muslims are more actively exercising their political rights, perhaps due to their increasing dissatisfaction with the government (At 13%, Muslims were the least likely group to approve of President Trump and the percentage of Muslims

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who were satisfied with the direction of the country has decreased in the past two years).\textsuperscript{109}

The data is more striking amongst young Muslims. ISPU found that young Muslims fall behind older Muslims in registering to vote and voting. A little over half voted in the 2016 election, while over two-thirds aged over 30-49 and over three-fourths over 50+ voted.\textsuperscript{110} This is perplexing considering young Muslims are America’s youngest faith community.\textsuperscript{111}

One explanation for low Muslim youth voting rates could stem from the intense discrimination, stigmatization, and surveillance of the Muslim community. Surveillance has historically served as a tool to prevent communities from organizing and gaining power in the political system—is surveillance successfully preventing young Muslims from being civically engaged?

**Hypothesis**

The study is performed in two interdependent parts. Part one explores whether Muslim students’ knowledge regarding surveillance, CVE in specific, affects their levels of distrust in the government: *knowledge of surveillance* serves as the independent variable while *distrust* serves as the dependent variable. Part two explores whether these levels of distrust in the government affects Muslim students’ civic engagement levels: *distrust* serves as the independent variable and *civic engagement* serves as the dependent variable.

**Part 1: Distrust**

**Hypothesis 1:** *Muslim students who have more knowledge about surveillance programs will have higher levels of distrust in the government.*

Surveillance programs reveal the tarnished promises of our constitutional system. They are, perhaps, the antithesis of government protection—a blatant


\textsuperscript{110}Mogahed, Dalia, and Youssef Chouchoud. "American Muslim Poll 2017: Muslims at the Crossroads."

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid.
indication that the government is willing to brand its Muslim citizens as suspicious of terrorism and sacrifice their rights despite a lack of any substantial reasoning to do so. Students who know more about these programs will have less expectation in the government protecting their rights and more suspicion towards its treatment of their community.

**Part 2: Civic Engagement**

**Hypothesis 2:** Muslim students who have higher levels of distrust will consequently have higher levels of civic engagement.

It is more difficult to predict how varying levels of distrust will affect a Muslim’s civic engagement levels. Here, students could turn inwards and resign from political engagement due to distrusting the government’s treatment of Muslims in political spaces or for the same reason, they could also turn outwards and demand for their rights. However, because this survey is focused on Muslim students who are a part of their Muslim Student Associations— in other words, these are students who have a certain level of affiliation with their Muslim identities—based on research, they are more likely to be civically engaged (Amaney 2005). I believe their awareness of the government’s actions and distrust in its capability of serving them will encourage them to be more politically engaged in hopes of advocating for their community’s needs and better representation. Civic engagement will serve as their outlet to dismantle perceived issues.

**Hypothesis 3: Controls.** These hypotheses will still hold when controlling for attitudes towards surveillance (belief in surveillance, belief in government monitoring Islamic institutions, belief in government monitoring Muslims, and belief in government monitoring the respondents themselves), gender, origin of birth, and religiosity.
Methodology

Administering the Survey

I developed a survey for this study and circulated it amongst Muslim American college students in California. In order to target this population, I sampled Californian Muslim American students a part of their campus-based Muslim Student Associations (MSAs). The survey assessed the respondents’ attitudes and behavior towards the government, surveillance, and civic engagement. I administered it vis-à-vis an online survey on the surveying platform, Qualtrics, and was active from December 31st, 2018 to January 25th, 2019.

MSA West, a 501(3)(c) nonprofit organization, circulated the survey amongst over 10 college MSAs across California. A group of over 10 MSA representatives received a message that included the survey link. They then shared this link on their respective, private MSA mediums, such as Facebook groups or WhatsApp chats. MSAs that shared the survey with their members include MSAs at UC Davis, UC San Diego, and UC Los Angeles.

The survey received a total of 146 responses from Muslim students attending colleges (and a few upperclassmen in high school) across California. However, after restricting the sample size to responses that were three minutes or longer and removing eight duplicate IP addresses, the resulting analysis sample consisted of 73 responses.

The survey’s focus on MSA members introduces limitations and nuances to this study. Students who are a part of their campus MSAs most likely have higher affinities with their Muslim identities and are more comfortable practicing their faith than other Muslim students in the country. Because studies have shown that Muslims with higher religiosity levels have shown “higher levels of community involvement compared to their nonreligious peers,” our sample’s affiliation with MSA — and consequently, its high level of group consciousness — may lead to higher civic engagement levels that are not comparable to those of other Muslim
students.’ Nevertheless, although the small and targeted size of the sample limits the external validity of the conclusions, the study still reveals underlying trends about surveillance of Muslims.

**Modeling CVE Knowledge and Distrust**

In order to answer the first question *whether knowledge of surveillance affects Muslims’ trust in the government*, I operationalized knowledge of CVE as the independent variable, trust as the dependent variable, and controlled for seven variables (attitudes towards surveillance (belief in surveillance, belief in government monitoring Islamic institutions, belief in government monitoring Muslims, and belief in government monitoring the respondents themselves), levels of practicing Islam, gender, and country of birth). Formally, trust can be modeled as:

\[ Y(\text{Trust}) = mx + B_0 + B_1(\text{CVE}) + B_2(\text{CVE knowledge}) + B_3(\text{FBI}) + B_4(\text{Att}_1) + B_5(\text{Att}_2) + B_6(\text{Att}_3) + B_7(\text{Att}_4) + B_8(\text{Religiosity}) + B_9(\text{Gender}) + B_{10}(\text{Foreign Born}) \]

In Models one through twelve, **trust** was measured by question 4 on the questionnaire: “How much do you trust the federal government to protect your constitutional rights as a Muslim living in the United States?” It was a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if respondents answered *a great deal, a lot, a moderate amount* and 0 if they responded *a little or none at all.*

**Question 13 determined CVE Knowledge:** *Have you heard of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Task Force?* This variable was coded as 1 if they answered *yes* and 0 if they answered *no.*

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To determine **Amount of CVE knowledge**, question 14 asked those who were coded as a 1 in question 13: *How much would you say you know about CVE?* It was a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if respondents answered *a great deal, a lot, a moderate amount* and 0 if they responded *a little or none at all*.

Questions 11 and 12 determined by **FBI interaction**: *Have you ever been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)?* Do you know someone who has been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)? **FBI interaction** was coded as 1 if they answered *yes* and 0 if they answered *no*, for both questions respectively.

The following questions determined **attitude_1 or belief in surveillance**, **attitude_2 or belief in government monitoring Islamic institutions**, **attitude_3 or belief in government monitoring Muslims**, and **attitude_4 or belief in government monitoring the respondents themselves**. The variables were coded as 1 if respondents answered with *strongly agree* and *somewhat agree* and coded as 0 if they answered with *neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree*.

**Q6**: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *"The federal government has ongoing surveillance programs targeted at Muslims living in the United States."*

**Q7**: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *"The federal government monitors the religious institutions and organizations of Muslims living in the United States."*

**Q8**: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *"The federal government monitors the social media accounts, telephone calls, and emails of Muslims living in the United States."*

**Q9**: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *"The federal government is monitoring my own social media accounts, telephone calls, and emails."*
Religiosity was a variable based on respondents’ answers to question 31: *How often do you attend a mosque or Islamic Center for Salah or Jum’ah Prayer?* It was coded as 1 if they attended the mosque *more than once a week, once a week, or once a month* and 0 if they *attended once a year, less than once a year, or never.*

Gender was coded as 1 if respondent was a female and 0 if respondent was a male.

Foreign-born was coded as 1 if respondent was born in the United States and 0 if respondent was not.

Modeling Distrust and Civic Engagement

In order to answer the second question, *whether distrust affects Muslims’ civic engagement levels,* I operationalized civic engagement as the dependent variable, and analyzed it through models accounting for respondent’s attendance at protests, voter status, and three controls (gender, country of birth, and religiosity, or levels of practicing Islam).

Formally, civic engagement can be modeled as:

\[
Y(\text{Civic Eng}) = mx + B_0 + B_1(\text{Protest}) + B_2(\text{Voter Registration}) + B_3(\text{Religiosity}) + B_4(\text{Gender}) + B_5(\text{Foreign Born})
\]

In Models 13 through 16, distrust was measured by question 4 on the questionnaire: “*How much do you trust the federal government to protect your constitutional rights as a Muslim living in the United States?*” It was a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if they responded *a little or none at all* and 0 if respondents answered *a great deal, a lot, and a moderate amount.*

In Models 13 and 14, level of civic engagement was determined by question 20: *In the past 12 months, have you participated in a political protest, rally, or*
demonstration? This variable was coded as 1 if they answered yes and 0 if they answered no.

In Models 15 and 16, level of civic engagement was determined by question 17: Are you registered to vote? This variable was coded as 1 if they answered yes and 0 if they answered no.

The controls, religiosity, gender, and foreign born were coded as they were in the previous part of the study.

Results

Descriptive Results

In the survey, respondents were asked 31 questions relating to six overarching topics: general attitudes, trust in the government, knowledge of surveillance programs including the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, civic engagement, Islamic life, and demographic background.

General Attitudes

To assess respondents’ general attitudes towards the country’s current environment, respondents were first asked simple attitudinal questions. The two questions were as follows:

“*In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the United States at this time?*” 69.9% of respondents stated they were dissatisfied, 16.4% were indifferent, and close to 11% stated they had some level of satisfaction with the country’s current state (2.7% declined to state).

“In general, has it become more or less difficult to be a Muslim living in the United States?” 58.9% of the respondents believed it had become more
difficult, while 11% said it had become less difficult, and 27.4% reflected no change in their experience as a Muslim living in the United States.

**Muslim students hold very little trust in the government**

Around 63% of respondents had little to no levels of trust in the government to protect their constitutional rights as a Muslim living in the United States (34.3% had some level of trust and 2.7% declined to respond).

**Muslim students overwhelmingly believe surveillance programs threaten their communities**

Respondents were asked a series of questions to gauge their knowledge and attitudes related to government surveillance of their community. 86.3% of respondents agreed that the federal government has ongoing surveillance programs targeting Muslims living in the United States, while 6.9% remained indifferent, and only 2.7% disagreed (4.1% declined to state). When asked whether the federal government specifically monitors religious institutions and organizations of Muslims living in the United States or not, around 87.7% of the students agreed while 6.9% remained indifferent, and only 1.4% disagreed (4.11% declined to state). Even more of the students agreed that the federal government monitors the social media accounts, telephone calls, and emails of Muslims living in the United States: 76.7% agreed, 15.1% remained indifferent, and only 2.7% disagreed (5.5% declined to state). However, when asked if they believed that the federal government monitored their own social media accounts, telephone calls, and emails, a little over half of the respondents agreed. This 53.4% reflected a significant decrease from the initial 76.7% that agreed the government monitored Muslims. At 26.0% and 13.7%, many more students remained indifferent to and disagreed with this sentiment, respectively (6.9% declined to state).

After assessing their beliefs of these programs, the survey then questioned whether respondents had changed their behavior due to these beliefs. Over half of
respondents (53.43%) stated they are more cautious about what they do and say in public because of surveillance programs targeted at Muslims living in the United States (19.2% were indifferent, 20.6% disagreed, and 6.9% declined to state).

**Most students have not had interaction with the FBI, but know someone who has**

A majority of the respondents themselves had never been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) (85.9%). However, almost one-third of the respondents knew a friend or family member who had been questioned.

**Most Muslim students lack understanding of CVE**

When asked about the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Task Force, a majority of samplers were aware of the program: 61.6% answered yes, 31.5% answered no, and 6.9% declined to state. But of the 61.6% who knew of the program, only 15.7% stated they knew significant information about the program, while 33.3% stated they had moderate knowledge, and almost half, 48.9%, stated they knew little to nothing about the program. No one left this question unanswered.

In order to understand respondents’ attitudes towards the validity of surveillance, respondents were asked a hypothetical question: “In your opinion, are there any circumstances that justify federal government surveillance of Muslims living in the United States?” While most (68.5%) believed there were no circumstances that warranted surveillance, 21.9% believed that there were, and 9.6% declined to state. Those who answered affirmatively to the question were asked to elaborate — interestingly enough, most of the responses argued that surveillance of Muslims is justified due to the government having “valid concerns” with the community. The responses revealed that many students have internalized Orientalist and radicalization ideology and have been indoctrinated by anti-Muslim
media. They also conveyed that many students lack knowledge regarding the reasoning, processes, and integrity of these programs.

Civic Engagement Indicators

The fourth section of the questionnaire focused on political engagement. Respondents were first asked about voting: 75.3% were registered to vote, 15.1% were not, and 9.6% declined to state. When asked if they voted in the most recent November 2018 election, 56.2% of the initial 75.3% stated they had voted, 9.6% did not vote, 9.6% were not registered at the time of the election, and 24.7% declined to state. This and the following question received the most “decline to state” responses of the survey. 31.5% said yes when asked whether a political party or organization contacted them—either over the phone or in person—to encourage them to vote in the November 2018 general election; 35.6% stated no, 8.2% couldn’t remember, and 24.7% declined to state. Next, the respondents were asked the following questions:

In the past 12 months, have you participated in a political protest, rally, or demonstration?

37.0% responded yes, 53.4% or over half said no, and 9.6% declined to respond.

In the past 12 months, have you read a news article about a hate crime against a Muslim living in the United States?

80.8% had, 9.6% had not, and 9.6% declined to respond.

In the past 12 months, have you read a news article about the contributions that Muslims make to American society?

63.0% had, 27.4% had not, and 9.6% declined to respond.

Muslim Students have high levels of Islamic faith

Respondents were asked whether Islam encourages Muslims to be politically active in society: 68.5% believed it did, 19.1% remained indifferent, 2.7% disagreed, and 9.6% declined to state.
All respondents believed that their faith provided them with some level of guidance in their everyday life: 87.7% believed it provided them with a great deal or a lot of guidance and 2.7% believed it provided them with a little (9.6% declined to state). A majority of the respondents reported frequently visiting their local mosques or Islamic centers: 64.4% reported attendance at least once a week, 17.8% once a month, and 6.8% once a year or less. 1.4% stated they never attended and 9.6% declined to state.

34.3% of respondents stated that they wore a headscarf or hijab.

Demographics

Half of the respondents were female, 38.4% male, and 11.0% declined to state.

68.5% were born in the US, while 21.9% were born in countries such as but not limited to, India, Canada, Turkey, Palestine, the United Kingdom, Algeria, and Jordan (9.6% declined to state).

32.9% of respondents were Asian, 5.5% were African American, 16.4% were White, 34.3% were “other” (10.7% declined to state), and 2.7% identified as Hispanic/Latino.

1.37% of respondents had converted to Islam.

Analysis

I performed bivariate and multivariate regressions of the data to determine relationships between a Muslim’s knowledge of surveillance and distrust in the government, and consequently, between their distrust and civic engagement levels.

Bivariate Analysis

Knowledge of Surveillance & Trust in the Government
A bivariate regression between respondent’s answers to the trust and CVE questions yields an insignificant correlation: 34.8% of those who had not heard of CVE and 35.6% of those who had heard of CVE trust the government a moderate amount, a great deal, a lot. The .8% difference between the two was statistically insignificant. The 95% confidence interval around the estimate presents uncertainty in the relationship between CVE and trust.

However, when a student’s depth of CVE knowledge is factored into the regression, there is a significant difference between the groups. Those who are more informed on CVE have a 26.1% level of trust in the government, while those who have little information on CVE, have a 45.5% level of trust in the government. This implicates that there is almost a 20% decrease in trust levels when a respondent knows more information about CVE. Although the cross-tab shows this relationship to be statistically insignificant with a P-value of .179, the 20% decrease indicates a possible negative relationship between the amount of CVE knowledge and distrust.

Moreover, students who either knew someone who had or had themselves been questioned by the FBI displayed lower levels of trust in the government. 41.0% of those with no exposure to the FBI had trust in the government while 27.6% of those who had had some level of interaction with the FBI had trust in the government. This 13.6% difference also indicates a possible negative relationship between more directly experiencing surveillance mechanisms and distrust.

While the statistical values indicate these relationships are insignificant amongst this study’s sample population, the data itself does suggest that students have significant distrust in the government and that this distrust could potentially stem from students’ various levels of exposure to surveillance, whether through sufficient knowledge or FBI interaction. A larger respondent sample may show this as a concrete correlation.

Distrust & Civic Engagement
A bivariate regression between a respondent’s mistrust in the government and consequent level of civic engagement (measured through respondent’s participation in a protest, rally, or demonstration) showed a statistically positive relationship with a p-value statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The predicted probability of a distrustful individual being civically engaged was 52.6%, while the predicted probability of a trustful individual was 22.4%. This 30.2% difference reflects the consequential impact of distrust on one’s civic engagement.

**Multivariate Analysis**

**Knowledge of Surveillance & Trust in the Government**

Models one through four assessed the relationship between trust and surveillance, while controlling for attitudes, religiosity, gender, and foreign-born variables.
Model 1 illustrates the bivariate relationship between an individual’s knowledge of CVE and level of trust in the federal government. Based on the hypothesis that knowledge of CVE increases one’s distrust of the federal government, we would expect the data to display a negative relationship. Instead, as seen in Table 1.1, the data shows a weak, positive relationship, suggesting that knowledge of CVE increases trust in the federal government. However, the result is statistically insignificant ($p = .537$) and the 95% confidence interval intersects zero (-1.019, 1.087) categorizing this as an incorrect interpretation.
Model 2 illustrates the multivariate relationship between an individual’s knowledge of CVE and consequent trust in the federal government while also controlling for the four attitudinal variables: belief whether the government has surveillance programs targeting Muslims, whether it monitors Islamic institutions, whether it monitors Muslims’ social media accounts and phone calls, and whether it is monitoring the respondent’s’ own social media and phone calls. The relationship between the DV and IV remains as it did in model 1: positively correlated, but statistically insignificant (p-value = .563). Based on the hypothesis, those who coded as 1 in the controlled attitudes should display higher levels of distrust since they believe that surveillance actively manifests itself through tangible methods that currently affect the Muslim community and their own selves. The data tells a more nuanced story. Attitude_1 has a negative effect on the relationship between CVE and distrust: the more one believes that the government has ongoing surveillance programs targeting Muslims, the more trust they hold in the government. This may indicate that it is not simply that one knows about surveillance programs, but rather, how much they know about these programs. This is explored later on. Attitude_2 and Attitude_3 have a negative effect on the perceived relationship between CVE and distrust: the more that one believes the government actively monitors Islamic institutions and Muslim individuals, the less trust they have in the government. This is as expected. Attitude_4 has a negative effect on the relationship between CVE and distrust: the more that one believes they themselves are being surveilled, the more trust they have in the government. This is counter-intuitive and since the data is statistically insignificant (p-value = .531), it is an incorrect interpretation. With p-values over .5, all of these data were statistically insignificant, yet still, they propose interesting trends.

Model 3 illustrates the multivariate relationship between an individual’s knowledge of CVE and trust in the federal government while controlling for religiosity, gender, and country of birth. The study hypothesizes that those who are more religious may have higher levels of distrust in the government. The data
shows that those with higher religiosity have more trust in the government than those with lower religiosity do, women have less trust in the government than men do, and US born individuals have more trust in the government than foreign-born individuals. However, with p-values of .693, .582, .617, and .813, respectively, these are all statistically insignificant. Much of this can be attributed to the lack of a large and diverse sample size; more data would have provided more accurate data.

**Model 4** illustrates the multivariate relationship between an individual’s knowledge of CVE and their trust in the federal government while controlling for all seven variables: the four attitudinal variables, religiosity, gender, and country of birth. The relationship between CVE and trust remains positive, but statistically insignificant. All the controls also continue to have the same insignificant positive or negative effect on trust as seen in Models 2 and 3. I analyze further models to gain a better understanding of the proposed relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Models 5-8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of CVE Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Att1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Att1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in gov monitoring religious inst. (Att2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in gov monitoring Muslims. (Att3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in gov monitoring respondent (Att4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.852)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Figure 1.2
Models 5 through 8, repeat a similar analysis, however, they instead focus on the relationship between an individual’s depth of knowledge about CVE (variable representing “surveillance”) and trust in the government. A student having heard of CVE, as the question asks, means exactly so — they have simply heard of the program. This could mean they know close to nothing about the program and hold little context of what it entails or it could mean they know every detail of the program. In order to gain a more accurate sample, Models 5 through 8 assess the relationship between only those people who have more depth in knowledge of CVE and their consequent trust in the government. These models support the hypothesis: all models display strong negative relationships between the DV and IV, indicating that those who have sufficient knowledge of CVE are more distrustful of the government than those who lack understanding. Still, we cannot confirm this relationship because the p-value categorizes the data as insignificant across all models. However, we learn that distrust may increase not simply based on one knowing about surveillance, but rather, based on how much one knows about surveillance.
Table 1: Models 9-12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>-.859</td>
<td>-.840</td>
<td>-1.732</td>
<td>-2.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.639)</td>
<td>(.740)</td>
<td>(.889)</td>
<td>(1.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in</td>
<td>.555</td>
<td></td>
<td>.970</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>(1.060)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.566)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Att.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in gov</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>1.091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring</td>
<td>(1.090)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.534)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious inst.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Att.2)</td>
<td>-1.360</td>
<td>-1.795</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.958)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.280)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in gov</td>
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<td>-.071</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring</td>
<td>(.931)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.200)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims. (Att.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in gov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respondent (Att.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.766</td>
<td>2.081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.232)</td>
<td>(1.325)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-1.580</td>
<td>-1.621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.915)</td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td>.371</td>
<td>.671</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.852)</td>
<td>(1.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.182</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>-.229</td>
<td>-.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.428)</td>
<td>(.532)</td>
<td>(1.533)</td>
<td>(1.673)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Figure 1.3

Models 9 through 12 repeat the analysis while focusing on the relationship between an individual's interaction with the FBI and their consequent trust in the government. The hypothesis is shown to be correct: all models have a negative coefficient, indicating that those who themselves have had or know a friend who has had direct interaction with the FBI are more likely to distrust the government. Still, we cannot confirm this relationship because the p-value categorizes the data as insignificant across all models.

These models present limitations that must be considered to properly understand the data. Regressing attitude_1, attitude_2, attitude_3, attitude_4, all of which are attitudinal variables, against the dependent variable of trust, another
attitude indicator, introduces limitations in determining the direction of correlation between the variables. It is unclear whether a respondents’ attitudes towards surveillance programs lead to less trust or if less trust leads to respondents’ attitudes towards surveillance programs. This limitation is kept in mind when drawing conclusions from this data.

**Distrust & Civic Engagement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Models 13-14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 13</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest/Distrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations | 66 | 64 |

*** \( p < 0.001 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), * \( p < 0.05 \)

**Figure 1.4**

Models 13 and 14 repeat the analysis in previous models while focusing on the relationship between a respondents’ distrust in the government and their consequent levels of civic engagement through measuring for a respondent’s participation at protests. The results confirm a robust positively correlated relationship between distrust and protesting with a p-value statistically significant
at the p < .05 level. The relationship remains significant while controlling for religiosity, gender, and foreign-born.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote/Distrust</td>
<td>-0.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.732)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.812)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td>-0.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.787)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

**Figure 1.5**

**Models 15 and 16** repeat the analysis in Models 13-14, however, civic engagement is now measured through measuring for respondents’ voter registration levels. These models show a negative, statistically insignificant relationship between mistrust and civic engagement. The relationship remains insignificant while controlling for religiosity, gender, and country of birth foreign born. However, the difference between models 13 & 14 and models 15 & 16 may be due to two reasons. First, voter registration, when compared to protesting, may be a more passive form of civic engagement and therefore, for the purposes of this study, may
not be a sufficient indicator of a civically engaged individual. Unlike participating in a protest, citizens can be registered to vote, but rarely use this power. On the contrary, protestors, by definition, actively express their political efficacy. Secondly, the survey’s sample size is too small and its lack of variance, i.e. only seven respondents were not registered to vote, introduces doubt to the accuracy of the sample size. A larger sample size may have shown conclusive evidence to a positive relationship between variables when measuring for voter registration in place of civic engagement.

Discussion

The primary takeaways of the descriptive results from the survey are as follows: Muslim American students—both male and female and both US and foreign born—are overwhelmingly distrustful of the government, are civically engaged at varying levels, and display high levels of religiosity. With these data in mind, does knowledge of surveillance affect Muslim students’ levels of distrust in the government? To the extent that they are more distrustful of the government, do Muslim students become more civically engaged? The models, in addition to a broader academic discussion related to these questions, help propose conclusive findings.

Trust in the Government

In regard to the first question, the models present mixed findings. Although a student’s knowledge of surveillance programs like CVE is not statistically significantly related to increased distrust, there is some evidence indicating that depth of knowledge or exposure to CVE is. The large difference in levels of distrust seen amongst students in Models 5-8 suggests that those who have substantial knowledge of the program have higher levels of distrust in the government. Models 9-12 also suggest a negative relationship between those who have felt the adverse effects of surveillance through experiences with the FBI and their distrust levels.
Taken together, these models indicate that students who are well-versed on surveillance programs may be much more affected by surveillance than those who simply know that they exist but lack proximity to the programs through either detailed information or exposure to the FBI. The lack of a significant p-level to confirm this as a statistically significant conclusion can be attributed to the small and homogeneous sample size. Additionally, these models reveal that although Muslim students show high levels of belief in surveillance and distrust, many display a lack of knowledge regarding the specific methods of surveillance. 61% knew generally about CVE, but out of this majority, almost 50% reported they knew little to nothing regarding specific information about CVE. Similarly, 87% of students believed Muslims were being monitored, but only around half believed they themselves were being monitored. Thus, part one of the study also introduces a need for Muslims to have sufficient exposure to these programs in order to properly understand their negative consequences and consequently develop a distrust of the government. In all, the data does identify important trends which, when observed amidst existing research and similar studies, help reveal a relationship between exposure to surveillance and distrust.

There are various studies illustrating that surveillance actively dismantles trust between Muslims and government officials. A researcher at the Brennan Center pointed to a correlation specifically between CVE and distrust. Price found that state and local organizations recruited to work for CVE efforts, through conflating “community services and intelligence gathering, often under false pretenses,” debilitate trust between Muslims and CVE recruited agencies. This discovery is concerning, considering the fact that DHS believes CVE represents “a national message of inclusion, respect, and non-discrimination” and establishes

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“trust with communities across the United States...” These findings therefore shed light on the blatant disconnect between CVE’s rhetoric and its ramifications.

More generally, a Gallup study found that Muslims, when compared to other religious groups, hold the least confidence in the FBI, due to its history of inflicting the Muslim community with false accusations and surveillance. Additionally, Pew found that three out of ten Muslims mistrust law enforcement and believe they often arrest innocent people. \textit{Mapping Muslims}, a study conducted by New York based legal organizations, discovered that intense surveillance prompted the New York Muslim community to sever their ties with law enforcement and develop a deep-rooted mistrust in the NYPD. The study also confirmed that distrust furthers the cycle of surveillance. Muslim community leaders cannot trust law enforcement and government officials. Fearing that a relationship would not only be disempowering and dehumanizing, but that it also would risk “enabling surveillance,” community leaders cut ties with local officials. Alienating these forces then leads to the government’s hidden attempts to further encroach on the community. For these reasons, it is apparent that the Muslim community remains distrustful of governmental agencies and officials. As a result, because a robust relationship with officials is conducive to the community’s long-term well-being, the Muslim community ultimately lacks an essential aspect of a healthy political community.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item Pew Research Center, July 26, 2017, “U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the American Dream.” 100.
\item The Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) \textit{Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its Impact on American Muslims}.
\item The Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) \textit{Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its Impact on American Muslims}. 37.
\end{itemize}
Civic Engagement

With the newfound understanding that knowledge and exposure to surveillance leads to increased distrust in the government, how does this distrust affect the political identities of Muslim students?

The survey results confirm that respondents are more cautious about what they do and say in public, specifically because of surveillance programs targeted at Muslims living in the United States. This observation confirms that students change their behavior due to surveillance programs. Models 13-16 exhibit how this self-censoring affects Muslims in political spaces.

Models 13 and 14 confirm a robust, significant relationship between distrust and civic engagement when it is operationalized through protest levels. Those who have more mistrust in the government are more likely to protest its actions. However, when voting levels are considered as civic engagement, the relationship becomes both negative and also insignificant. This is most probably due to the small sample size in which almost everyone was registered to vote (75% registered and almost 10% declined to state). Moreover, protesting and voter registration are both expressions of civic engagement but vary qualitatively in the amount of investment an individual has made while participating in each action. Voter registration moreso represents an intention to be civically engaged at a later election—many may be registered to vote, but much less may actually vote. Conversely, protesting implies that an individual has actively engaged with a certain political cause. Thus, protesting may be more of a persuasive indication of a civically engaged individual than voter registration. The difference may also stem from the proposed impact of each act; students frustrated with the government may consider protesting a stronger form of engagement with more potential to create change than voting. In future surveys, I would have more accurately asked respondents questions on their specific voting patterns, inclination to vote, and their thoughts on the concept of voting so as to have had a more accurate understanding of the depth of their
engagement. Nevertheless, other scholars’ findings provide more nuanced insight on the relationships between civic engagement and distrust in the government.

Many researchers have confirmed a causal relationship between perceptions of discrimination and civic engagement. A Zogby Poll and researchers Sirin and Katsiaficas show that anxiety and discrimination lead to higher political efficacy levels. Surveillance, by inflicting fear in the mind of the surveilled and racially profiling a group as suspect (Ali 2016), leads to distrust. Because this distrust can be operationalized through measuring anxiety and discrimination, these studies help add to this paper and suggest relationships between surveillance and civic engagement as well.

First, a 2004 Zogby International poll elucidated a positive relationship between anxiety levels and political participation amongst Muslim Americans. Considering the political climate has only tensed—incited by President Trump’s presidency which is rooted in anti-Muslim policies and Islamophobic cultural rhetoric, and a dramatic spike in hate crimes and bias incidents—anxiety levels could be increasing for Muslims and, as the relationship posits, this anxiety may increase Muslims’ political engagement.\(^{120}\) Since distrust which stems from surveillance theoretically (Altheide 2006) and empirically (Ali 2016) instills fear in the minds of the watched, it could undoubtedly reflect a similar relationship to that of anxiety and civic engagement.

Second, Sirin and Katsiaficas found that Muslim students’ civic engagement levels fluctuate based on how they perceive discrimination towards their community.\(^{121}\) They found that Muslim women with higher levels of perceived discrimination were more civically engaged, while Muslim men’s civic engagement levels did not change due to discrimination.\(^{122}\) Since distrust manifests from


Brian Robert Calfano, Nazita Lajevardi & Melissa R. Michelson (2017): Trumped up challenges


\(^{122}\)Ibid, 1531.
surveillance, which represents discriminatory policing, we can infer that the same correlation may exist between distrust and civic engagement.

More specifically, research expounds that surveillance directly influences Muslims’ agency in political spaces. Dr. Ali, a Professor at George Washington University, engaged in two years of ethnographic fieldwork with Muslim students, including 25 interviews with Muslim students, where he explored the general effects of surveillance. Dr. Ali found that knowledge of surveillance led to the simultaneous resignation and empowerment of the Muslim student. Under knowledge of the omnipresent state gaze, distrust and Foucault’s concept of governmentality (as discussed previously) compel students to retreat inwards. The government’s actions towards Muslim youth, including surveillance, caused “personal isolation, community alienation, and political apathy” and led to “a sense of political disempowerment.” The Mapping Muslims study, also through interviewing MSA students, likewise found that “political organizing, civic engagement and activism are among the first casualties of police surveillance...the surveillance program has, in fact, quelled political activism, quieted community spaces and strained interpersonal relationships.” Surveillance has had devastating effects on the lives of MSA students interviewed in these studies — in fear of intelligence gathering, they were forced to stifle their political expression in various spaces.

While many students repress political expression, others turn to community organizing as a way to proactively engage with the nuanced realities of their Muslim American identity. The same identity which is a source of stigma for them in the political framework also becomes a source of empowerment for them to disrupt this framework. Sirin and Katsiaficas coin it best:

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124 Ibid, 88.
125 Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its Impact on American Muslims. 20.
126 Ibid, 45.
“When young people experience moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), as is the case for Muslim Americans in post-9/11 U.S. political context, community engagement can become an effective coping mechanism for asserting their stigmatized identity (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Keeter, Jenkins, Zukin, & Andolina, 2005).”

This exclusive experience of living under a government that has betrayed them and, subsequently, wanting to hold it accountable motivates Muslims to stay engaged with the political space in hopes of materializing the American promise ripe in each minority group’s élan vital. They can work to manifest negative circumstances into positive engagement to neutralize or perhaps better the political climate.

Tahseen Shams argues that as a result of the hypervisibility of Muslim American students and the distrust which accompanies it, students can strategically determine which parts of their identity to make visible and invisible and when to do so. In this sense, Muslims can use their visibility to gain empowerment. However, I question whether having strategic control over visibility is a positive power. In fact, Shams acknowledges that embracing this power is only necessary because of social power dynamics that warrant some aspects of Muslims’ identity as undesirable and thus, necessary to present as invisible if they want to progress in society. In other words, this is a “weapon of the weak” or as Shams explains, “the relatively powerless in society often have to seek indirect, seemingly passive or conformist ways to defy the dominant group because an all-out confrontation would jeopardize their daily existence” (Scott 1985).

Muslim American students realize their weak positions in the surrounding power structure and are therefore forced to change their behavior only in order to protect themselves from unwanted government attention. With crumbling trust in each other and the

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129 Shams, Tahseen. "Visibility as Resistance by Muslim Americans in a Surveillance and Security Atmosphere." 78.
government as a result of surveillance, students lose sense of what constitutes a safe space. They are bereaved of their essence as free activists, citizens, and humans—with little self-autonomy in their civic engagement, their political identities are “reduced to simply affirming their humanity and presence in the United States.”

Operating in spaces infested with the threat of surveillance, Muslims face a democratic dilemma: their indefinite categorization as suspect ensures that while partaking in monitored political spaces, they will never be invisible; however, they can not be too visible either, for fear of attracting the state’s gaze. They are forced to decide between being politically active in important causes and finding protection from surveillance. In this way, the Muslim activist remains in the interim between visibility and invisibility, shifting from these spaces based on fluctuations in his or her perception of safety, discrimination, and the need for political advocacy.

Under these implications, by preventing Muslim students from having freedom when engaging with political spaces and subsequently repressing their political representation, surveillance programs are damaging to the long-term sustainability of both the Muslim community and also of our larger democracy.

**Increased Risk for Religious Muslims**

Religious Muslims are surveilled and civically engaged at higher rates. It is noteworthy that the government conflates everyday religious routine as suspicious activity, inherently making religious Muslims primary targets of surveillance. This is reflected in the causal relationship between religion and state surveillance where mosques, MSAs, and platforms and organizations that are more religious remain the focus of state surveillance. CVE also equates “more religious” activities as indicators of potential pro-terror tendencies. As discussed in the CVE section,
these are problematic assumptions that have no empirical evidence. Nevertheless, religious Muslims feel the repercussions of surveillance much more significantly than those who may not as strongly affiliate with their Muslim identities or engage in Islamic practices.

This increased scrutiny influences how religious Muslim Americans engage in political spaces. Research has shown that both religiosity and also being part of a social faith based network increase Muslims’ activism. Crystal & DeBell and other scholars delineated a model which outlines the relationship between religion and civic engagement—central to this model is the moral framework that faith provides Muslim students with religious identities; from this model then stems the “prosocial concerns, which include engaging with the larger social community.”

Studies also argue that members of religious organizations and institutions are more likely to be mobilized as a direct result of their membership.

Because this study’s data sample was entirely based on students actively involved with their MSAs and students who reported high levels of religious salience (in addition to high levels of distrust and civic engagement), we can infer that these students may be more civically engaged than other students with the same levels of distrust in the government. Although it is a limitation to the overall conclusion, it further confirms that religious students have more distrust and tend to become more civically engaged due to these feelings, rather than retreating inwards.

I recommend that future research on this topic focus on a more diverse sample of Muslim students which is not limited to those who are members in religious organizations, includes a variance in religiosity amongst students, samples specific age groups and different types of educational institutions, and expands the sample to different parts of the country. In improving my work, I would not only sample a larger, more diverse population, but I would also more precisely attempt

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to operationalize distrust and civic engagement through questions that focus not simply on whether students know about surveillance or are distrustful and civically engaged, but rather try to capture how they perceive these variables as complex experiences and identity-markers.

**Conclusion**

This study and broader academic findings offer important trends which, when considered holistically, demonstrate that Muslim American students who have sufficient knowledge and exposure to surveillance are left distrustful of the government. Although a larger body of research indicates that students are both empowered and reserved in their civic engagement due to surveillance, the students surveyed demonstrate a statistically significant, positive correlation between distrust and higher protest levels.

Against a backdrop of rampant anti-Muslim discrimination, students across the country pledge allegiance to a government that has politically hijacked their identities and, through programs like CVE, classified them as “an other”— a subaltern, suspect group. The implications of this *othering* have been far-reaching and significant. Foucault signified the surveilled as those jailed in an open-air prison: “the principle of the dungeon is reversed; daylight and the overseer’s gaze capture the inmate more effectively than darkness...” (Foucault 1980:147). The relentless cycle of governmentality through surveillance ensures that Muslim students remain jailed in a democratic dilemma. This dilemma manifests through a variety of ways as Muslims attempt to interact with political spaces. For example, programs like CVE must end due to constitutional concerns and their effects on Muslims, but ending them requires collective action by the affected community, i.e. the Muslim community. However, by design, surveillance suppresses Muslims from having freedom to fully mobilize. They fear organizing against surveillance and if they do organize against it, then they are its victims: so how then should Muslim

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students effectively dismantle the surveillance framework? How then should they ensure their needs and voices, in their entirety, are represented in our democracy?

*Sapientia est potentia, knowledge is power*—Muslim youth and the public need to be aware of the chilling reality of surveillance and Muslims’ hypervisible identities in relation to programs like CVE. Despite prevalent discrimination, distrust, and the looming threat of surveillance, equipped with knowledge of the sociopolitical spaces that they are simultaneously *a part of* and *apart from*, many Muslims students—specifically those with high religiosity—grass-roots mobilize for their community’s rights. Still, they lose political agency to freely engage in political spaces and are forced to tread carefully solely due to the baggage of their Muslim identities. Other students are left fearful and resign from political spaces entirely. This should be alarming to all of us.

Scholars in conversation with my research clearly identify these effects as evident issues. In order to effectively address these issues, we must work together to further research and then implement solutions that will uplift communities marginalized by CVE. I recommend that we research the effectiveness of the following trajectories: creating campaigns that inform Muslims, academic institutions, and the larger public regarding the realities of the CVE and surveillance frameworks in hopes of increasing organizing against surveillance, developing policies which protect the rights of students and community members (particularly those gaining services from non-profit organizations such as mental health institutions) and prevent intelligence gathering, and expanding research on surveillance to broaden evidence in support of dismantling surveillance frameworks. Additionally, academic institutions should prioritize services which educate and support Muslim student activists. Certainly, it is only through civic engagement that Muslim students can resist the power that strives to control them and stand fully visible under the government’s panoptic gaze, letting the government know their truth. So, despite the government’s surveillance, many risk it all. Self-assured,
courageous, and unyielding, their voices echo: we don’t trust you either, and we will continue mobilizing against un-American values. Perhaps we should all take note.

Appendix

Survey Results Codebook - Muslim American Civic Engagement

The survey received 146 responses. However, after restricting the sample size to only those responses that were three minutes or longer and after removing eight duplicate IP addresses, the resulting sample is 73. Below is a detailed breakdown of each question and the percentage and frequency of each respective answer out of the 73 responses.

General Attitude

Governmental Trust Identifiers / DV

Surveillance Awareness - CVE

Civic Engagement Indicators

Profile

General Attitude

gen_sat_1

general satisfaction

Q2 - In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the United States at this time?

46.58%   Very dissatisfied - 34
23.29%   Somewhat dissatisfied - 17
16.44%   Neither S or D - 12
 6.85%   Somewhat satisfied - 5
 4.11%   Very satisfied - 3
 2.74%   Declined to state - 2

gen_sat_2

general satisfaction
Q3 - In general, has it become more or less difficult to be a Muslim living in the United States?

58.90% More difficult - 43
27.40% Neither more or less - 20
10.96% Less difficult - 8
2.74% Declined to state - 2

Governmental Trust Identifiers / DV

trust_1

trust level with
government

Q4 - How much do you trust the federal government to protect your constitutional rights as a Muslim living in the United States?

13.70% None at all - 10
49.32% A little - 36
27.40% A moderate amount - 20
5.48% A lot - 4
1.37% A great deal - 1
2.74% Declined to state - 2

Q5 - ?

trust_sur_1

distrust of government

Q6 - Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The federal government has ongoing surveillance programs targeted at Muslims living in the United States."

50.68% Strongly agree - 37
35.62% Somewhat agree - 26
6.85% Neither agree or disagree - 5
1.37% Somewhat disagree - 1
1.37% Strongly disagree - 1
4.11% Declined to state - 3
Q7 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The federal government monitors the religious institutions and organizations of Muslims living in the United States."

52.05% Strongly agree - 38
35.62% Somewhat agree - 26
6.85% Neither agree or disagree - 5
0% Somewhat disagree - 0
1.37% Strongly disagree - 1
4.11% Declined to state - 7

Q8 - Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The federal government monitors the social media accounts, telephone calls, and emails of Muslims living in the United States."

42.47% Strongly agree - 31
34.25% Somewhat agree - 25
15.07% Neither agree or disagree - 11
1.37% Somewhat disagree - 1
1.37% Strongly disagree - 1
5.48% Declined to state - 4

Q9- Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The federal government is monitoring my own social media accounts, telephone calls, and emails."

23.29% Strongly agree - 17
30.14% Somewhat agree - 22
26.03% Neither agree or disagree - 19
10.96% Somewhat disagree - 8
2.74% Strongly disagree - 2
6.85% Declined to state - 5

67
Q10 - Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I am more cautious about what I do and say in public because of federal government surveillance programs targeted at Muslims living in the United States."

24.66% Strongly agree - 18  
28.77% Somewhat agree - 21  
19.18% Neither agree or disagree - 14  
10.96% Somewhat disagree - 8  
9.59% Strongly disagree - 7  
6.85% Declined to state - 5  

exp_sur_2 experience with government surveillance

Q11 - Have you ever been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)?

84.93% No - 62  
4.11% Yes - 3  
4.11% Maybe - 3  
6.85% Declined to state - 5  

exp_sur_3 experience with government surveillance

Q12 - Do you know someone who has been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)?

41.10% No - 30  
39.73% Yes - 29  
12.33% Maybe - 9  
6.85% Declined to state - 5  

Surveillance Awareness - CVE

awareness_1 knowledge of surveillance programs


61.64% Yes - 45  
31.51% No - 23  
6.85% Declined to state - 5
Q14 - How much would you say you know about CVE? (out of 73)
- 8.89% A lot - 4
- 6.8% A great deal - 5
- 33.33% A moderate amount - 15
- 33.33% A little - 15
- 15.56% None at all - 7
- 0% Declined to state - 0

Q15 - In your opinion, are there any circumstances that justify federal government surveillance of Muslims living in the United States?
- 68.49% No - 50
- 21.92% Yes - 16
- 9.59% Declined to state - 7

Q16 - Briefly describe under what circumstances you believe that federal government surveillance of Muslims living in the United States is justified.
Responded - 14

Civic Engagement Indicators

Q17 - Are you registered to vote?
- 15.07% No - 11
- 75.34% Yes - 55
- 9.59% Declined to state - 7

Q18 - Did you vote in the November 2018 general election?
- 56.16% Yes - 41
- 9.59% No - 7
9.59% Was not registered at that time - 7
24.66% Declined to state - 18

civic_eng_3

Q19 - Did a political party or organization contact you—either over the phone or in person—to encourage you to vote in the November 2018 general election?
31.51% Yes - 23
35.62% No - 26
8.22% Don’t remember - 6
24.66% Declined to state - 18

civic_eng_4

Q20 - In the past 12 months, have you participated in a political protest, rally, or demonstration?
36.99% Yes - 27
53.42% No - 39
9.59% Declined to state - 7

civic_eng_5

Q21 - In the past 12 months, have you read a news article about a hate crime against a Muslim living in the United States?
80.82% Yes - 59
9.59% No - 7
9.59% Declined to state - 7

civic_eng_6

Q22 - In the past 12 months, have you read a news article about the contributions that Muslims make to American society?
63.01% Yes - 46
27.40% No - 20
9.59% Declined to state - 7

islam_civ

engagement
Q23 - Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Islam encourages Muslims to be politically active in society."

- 42.47% Strongly agree - 31
- 26.03% Somewhat agree - 19
- 19.19% Neither agree nor disagree - 14
- 1.37% Somewhat disagree - 1
- 1.37% Strongly disagree - 1
- 9.59% Declined to state - 7

Q24 - No observations

Profile

gender

Q25 - Gender
- 38.36% Male - 28
- 50.68% Female - 37
- 10.96% Declined to state - 8

demographic_1

country

Q26a - In what country were you born?
- 68.49% United States - 50
- 21.92% Other - 16
- 9.59% Declined to state - 7

demographic_1a

Q26b: where?
Malaysia, UK, Bangladesh, Turkey, Lebanon, UAE, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Palestine (2), Pakistan (2), Jordan (2), Canada (2), India (4).

demographic_2

Q27 - What is your race?
- 32.88% Asian - 24
34.25% Other - 25
16.44% White - 12
5.48% Black or African American - 4
10.96% Declined to state - 8

demographic_3

Q28 - Are you Hispanic/ Latino?
2.74% Yes - 2
87.67% No - 64
9.59% Declined to state - 7

Islam Engagement Indicators

islam_1

Q29 - Would you say that religion provides a great deal of guidance in your day-to-day living, a lot of guidance, or a little guidance?

75.34% A great deal - 55
12.33% A lot - 9
0% A moderate amount - 0
2.74% A little - 2
0% None at all - 0
9.59% Declined to State - 7

islam_2

Q30 - Are you a revert to Islam?
1.37% Yes - 1
89.04% No - 65
9.59% Declined to State - 7

islam_3

Q31 - How often do you attend a mosque or Islamic Center for Salah or Jum’ah Prayer?
27.40% More than once a week - 20
36.99%  Once a week - 27
17.81%  Once a month - 13
4.11%  Once a year - 3
2.74%  Less than once a year - 2
1.37%  Never - 1
9.59%  Declined to State - 7

islam_4

Q32 - Do you wear a headscarf or hijab?
34.25%  Yes - 25
26.03%  No - 19
39.73%  Declined to State - 29

Profile (cont.)

school

Q33 - What school do you attend?

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msa_west

Q 35 - Receive emails from MSA West?

31.51% Yes - 23
46.58% No - 34
21.92 Declined to State - 16

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