

# Formal Models in International Relations

POLI 247B

Syllabus, with links to readings and summaries.

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Hours: by appointment

Winter 2010  
Wed 9:00a—11:50a  
SSB 104

## Description

This course is intended for advanced graduate students who are interested in the formal analysis of international relations. The goal is to familiarize students with the practical aspects of modeling various substantive ideas by exposing the advantages and limitations of mathematical formalization. To accomplish this, students will (i) derive or prove results from the selected readings, (ii) identify the contributions of their authors, and (iii) find ways to improve the research or extend the insights. This course concentrates on the theoretical aspects of formal research and complements [POLI 247A: Quantitative Approaches to IR](#), where students investigate statistical modeling and empirical testing, and [POLI 247C: History of International Relations](#), where students explore diplomatic and military history of Europe from 1618 to 1945. Students are expected to have taken courses in international relations (e.g. the core seminar), and game theory (e.g. [POLI 204C](#)).

## Requirements

There are three requirements for this course:

1. Formal presentation of one of the papers to the class (35%). Each student will be responsible for presenting and critiquing one of the articles he or she will be assigned during our organizational meeting. The presentation will consist of: (i) a summary of the article's main points, (ii) a careful exposition of the proofs and the intuition behind them, (iii) an evaluation of the substantive importance of the contribution, (iv) a critique of the paper, and (v) questions for discussion. Presenters must be prepared to lead discussion, which means that they should identify the broad themes underlying the reading, establish links to other literatures, suggest improvements for flaws in modeling or research design, derive testable hypotheses, and have ideas about their empirical testing.
2. Written referee report (45%). Students will select one paper from the list of recommended/background readings (i.e., not a paper that will be discussed in class), and write a formal referee report. The paper must be cleared with me first. It is best to select one as early as possible because I will not allow more than one student to write on the same paper. Come with one or two alternative choices. The report must summarize (in one paragraph) the contributions of the paper, discuss their importance, and then provide a critique/discussion, in which the referee must analyze deficiencies in the model,

possible extensions and improvements, and perhaps outline alternative approaches to the problem. Students must be aware that *every* model is deficient in some ways, and must not fall back on common, but vacuous criticisms of formal models. Instead, students must approach this task as if they are writing suggestions for a colleague or even for themselves (possible venues for research). The reports must be at least three single-spaced pages long (at 11pt font size). These are due to me by noon on Friday of finals week. You can read about writing a referee report from the excellent book by William Thomson. I have scanned the [relevant chapter](#), but I highly recommend you buy this slim volume for reference.

3. Participation in class discussions (20%). Everyone will be expected to have read the articles before coming to class. Presenters will provide the starting point for class discussion and other students will be expected to contribute actively.

## Guidelines

Modern research in international relations tends to be methodologically sophisticated, and even though the formal models are not quite up there with the bleeding edge of the area, they are far from the toy examples of Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken games that used to dominate the field. This means that you should expect to spend quite a bit of time reading each article, which is why we shall rarely discuss more than a handful each week. There is no set way to approach reading formal papers, but I strongly suggest you utilize the following strategy:

1. Begin by reading the introduction and conclusion (and perhaps the literature review). What is the article about? What is its central point? Write down a list of claims (propositions) that you would like to see and that you would need to see to be persuaded of the validity of the article's argument. (And I mean, *write these down!*)
2. Read the description of the formal model. Construct a dictionary for the notation: that is, write down a table with the symbols and their meanings. (As you will quickly see, there is no standard notation in game theory and that results in a lot of notational clutter, so keeping it straight is always a challenge.) Identify the players, their strategies, their payoffs, and the sequence of moves. Is this a game of complete, perfect, and symmetric information? If not, what is it? Why has the author chosen to model it that way? How closely does the formalization match the substantive motivation for the model? What are some of the simplifying assumptions that might be distorting? Why? What solution concept will the author use? Is it appropriate? Recall now your answers to the previous step: do you think this model will be able to address the puzzle adequately?
3. Read the analysis. What propositions does the author present? How do they correspond to your wishlist? Are they stronger, deeper, more satisfying? Or trivial and disappointing? How do they correspond to the author's own claims? Does the author "stretch" their interpretation? How general are these results? Can you recall similar claims from different models? Or contradictory claims from similar models? Do you think there is a general underlying dynamic common to this and other models?
4. (Difficult step.) Satisfy yourself that the claims are valid and the proofs work. Due to journal space constraints, many editors have now taken to insisting that authors leave out parts of (or sometimes even entire) proofs. This is most unfortunate and shows deep misunderstanding about what the value is of a formal article. The whole point of using

mathematics is to verify the validity of conclusions and internal consistency, but without the proofs, one must essentially rely on the author to have done it correctly (bad idea, we all make mistakes, and not rarely either) or reconstruct the proofs themselves (a very time-consuming and often non-trivial task). If the article includes the proofs, then make sure you understand them fully. What is each step designed to accomplish? What is the intuition behind the sequence of steps taken? Are you satisfied that they produce the desired result? Draw pictures to illustrate claims, or to attempt to disprove them. Solve a simple case by assigning numbers to the parameters. If the article does not include the proofs, try to locate a working paper version online (sometimes these have all the math in them). If that fails, try to think of a strategy for a proof of the claim. Think of counter-examples, can you find one? Draw pictures! Look at similar models and observe how the authors have solved them.

5. Evaluate the generalizability of the results. Which assumptions do you think are crucial for the results? Do you think the results are likely to extend if we relax them? Why or why not? Which part(s) of proofs will no longer hold? What do you think would happen instead? Are the implications serious for our substantive interpretations? What are some of the questions and new puzzles that this article raises (perhaps the author mentions some, but most often these will arise from your own reading). What type of article do you think would best handle these questions? Is it on the syllabus or does it need to be written? How does this model fit in the modeling enterprise?
6. Step back and look at the conclusions: what have we learned that we did not know before? How does this relate to the other readings, both formal and non-formal that you have seen? Does it contradict some "received wisdom," modify and limit general claims, or support and extend others? What is the general abstract idea to take away? Is it applicable in other contexts, not necessarily IR-related? Which ones and how? If it needs slight modifications to be applicable, what would these be?
7. What are some empirical hypotheses that this model suggests? Are they testable or is the model at such a high level of abstraction that it is difficult to see how to apply it? If they are testable, what sort of research design would you adopt? What variables would you need? Do the hypotheses differ from ones used in previous empirical studies? Do they suggest that the previous research design was flawed? In what ways? How would you improve upon it?

One thing I should make abundantly clear is that this course will deal with *game-theoretic* formal models. There are many other mathematical formalizations (differential equations, agent-based models, general equilibrium models) but they are not as useful for most of the topics we shall be dealing with because they are unable to account for strategic interdependence of decision-making.

## Presentation Schedule

The schedule of presentations for Winter 2010 is [here](#).

## Readings

No.	Topic
1.	<a href="#">Rational Choice, Game Theory, and International Relations</a>
2.	<a href="#">Bargaining and the Inefficient Use of Power</a>
3.	<a href="#">Crisis Bargaining and Escalation</a>
4.	<a href="#">Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence</a>
5.	<a href="#">Arms Races and Power Transition</a>
6.	<a href="#">Alliances, Balance of Power, and Intervention</a>
7.	<a href="#">Diplomacy, Cheap Talk, and Mediation</a>
8.	<a href="#">Domestic Politics: Constraints, Signaling, Guns versus Butter</a>
9.	<a href="#">Civil Wars and Ethnic Conflict</a>
10.	<a href="#">Sanctions, Enforcement, and Cooperation</a>
11.	<a href="#">International Institutions</a>
12.	<a href="#">Trade and Trade Agreements</a>
13.	<a href="#">Exchange Rates, Debt Crises, and Size of Nations</a>

## Rational Choice, Game Theory, and International Relations

### [Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies](#)

Stephen Walt. *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Spring, 1999), pp. 5-48.

### [The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies](#)

Robert Powell. *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Fall, 1999), pp. 97-106.

### [How Not To Criticize Rational Choice Theory: The Pathologies of Commonsense](#)

James Johnson. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 26, No. 1. (Mar, 1996), pp. 77-91.

### [What Rationality Assumption? Or, How "Positive Political Theory" Rests on a Mistake](#)

James Johnson. *Political Studies*, forthcoming.

### [Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory](#)

Paul K. MacDonald. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 4 (Nov., 2003), pp. 551-565.

### [Rational Choice Theory and Explanation](#)

Frank Lovett. *Rationality and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 2. (2006), pp. 237-272.

### [Modernizing Political Science: A Model-Based Approach](#)

Kevin A. Clarke; David M. Primo. *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 4. (Dec, 2007), pp. 741-753

### [Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory](#)

Ariel Rubinstein. *Econometrica*, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Jul, 1991), pp. 909-924.

### [Rational Choice and Interpretive Evidence: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place?](#)

Iain Hampsher-Monk; Andrew Hindmoor. *Political Studies*, forthcoming in 2010.

Recommended and Background Readings

### [On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science](#)

Roger Myerson. *Rationality and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1. (Jan, 1992), pp. 62-73.

### [An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory](#)

Robert Gibbons. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 11, No. 1. (Winter, 1997), pp. 127-149.

### International Relations: A Strategic Choice Approach

David Lake; Robert Powell. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, Princeton UP, 1999, pp. 3-20.

### [Rationality and the Foundations of Positive Political Theory](#)

Mathew D. McCubbins; Michael Thies. Working paper, 1996, University of California, San Diego.

### [Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics](#)

Helen V. Milner. *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4. (Autumn, 1998), pp. 759-786.

### The Role of Formal Models

Robert Powell. *In The Shadow of Power*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 22-38.

## **Bargaining and the Inefficient Use of Power**

### Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

Robert Powell. *In The Shadow of Power*, Princeton University Press, 1999, Chapter 3.

If you do not have the book, you can read the following two articles instead:

- [Bargaining in the Shadow of Power](#). *Games and Economic Behavior*, Vol. 15, No. 2. (Aug, 1996), pp. 255-289.
- [Stability and the Distribution of Power](#). *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Jan, 1996), pp. 239-267.

### [Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?](#)

Bahar Leventoglu and Ahmer Tarar. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52 (2008), pp. 533-553.

(This version includes the technical supplement.)

### [The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations](#)

Branislav L. Slantchev. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 4. (Nov, 2003), pp. 621-632.

[Corrected proof.](#)

### [Fighting Rather Than Bargaining](#)

James D. Fearon. Working paper, Stanford University, 2007.

### [Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game-Free Analysis of International Conflict](#)

Mark Fey and Kristopher Ramsay. Working paper, University of Rochester and Princeton University, 2007.

### [The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information](#)

Robert Powell. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2. (May, 2004), pp. 231-241.

### [War as a Commitment Problem](#)

Robert Powell. *International Organization*, 60(Winter): 169-203, 2006.

### [Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power](#)

James D. Fearon. Working paper, Stanford University, 1996. [Figures 1 and 2 missing from this paper.](#)

### [The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War](#)

Bahar Leventoglu and Branislav L. Slantchev. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 4. (Oct, 2007), pp. 755-771.

### [The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States](#)

Branislav L. Slantchev. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1. (Feb, 2003), pp. 123-133.

## Recommended and Background Readings

### [War is in the Error Term](#)

Erik Gartzke. *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3. (Jul, 1999), pp. 567-587.  
Correction, [Testing War in the Error Term](#), *International Organization*, Vol. 57, No. 2. (Apr, 2003), pp. 445-448.

### [Rationalist Explanations for War](#)

James D. Fearon. *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Summer, 1995), pp. 379-414.

### [Bargaining Theory and International Conflict](#)

Robert Powell. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 5. (Jun, 2002), pp. 1-30.

### [Bargaining and Learning While Fighting](#)

Robert Powell. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Apr, 2004), pp. 344-361.

### [Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters](#)

Michelle R. Garfinkel; Stergios Skaperdas. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 6. (Dec, 2000), pp. 793-807.

### [Bargaining and War](#)

R. Harrison Wagner. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Jul, 2000), pp. 469-484.

### [How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach](#)

Donald Wittman. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Dec, 1979), pp. 743-763.

## Crisis Bargaining and Escalation

### [Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games](#)

Jeffrey S. Banks. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Aug, 1990), pp. 599-614.

### [Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation](#)

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, and Ethan R. Zorik. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1. (Mar, 1997), pp. 15-27.

[Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow and Zorik](#), M. Christina Molinari. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 2. (Jun, 2000), pp. 425-427.

### [Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes](#)

James D. Fearon. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3. (Sep, 1994), pp. 577-592.

### [Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs](#)

James D. Fearon. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Feb, 1997), pp. 68-90.  
[Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining](#)

James D. Morrow. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Nov, 1989), pp. 941-972.

#### [Military Coercion in Interstate Crises](#)

Branislav L. Slantchev. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 4. (Nov, 2005), pp. 533-547.

#### [Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace](#)

Branislav L. Slantchev. *Cambridge University Press*, forthcoming in 2010.

#### [Feigning Weakness](#)

Branislav L. Slantchev. *International Organization*, forthcoming in 2010.

#### [Game Theory and the Spiral Model](#)

Andrew Kydd. *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Apr, 1997), pp. 371-400.

#### [Mutual Optimism and War](#)

Mark Fey; Kristopher Ramsay. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 4. (Oct, 2007), pp. 738-754.

[Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation for War](#), Branislav L. Slantchev; Ahmer S. Tarar. Working paper, UCSD, 2009.

#### [Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War](#)

Adam Meirowitz; Anne E. Sartori. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3, No. 4. (Dec, 2008), pp. 327-352.

### Recommended and Background Readings

#### [A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict](#)

Lisa J. Carlson. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 39, No. 3. (Sep, 1995), pp. 511-534.

#### [Rational Appeasement](#)

Daniel Treisman. *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 2. (Apr, 2004), pp. 345-373.

#### [A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments](#)

Michael Schwarz; Konstantin Sonin. Working paper, UC, Berkeley, 2004.

### Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence

#### [Selection Effects and Deterrence](#)

James D. Fearon. *International Interactions*, Vol. 28, No. 1. (2002), pp. 5-29.

#### [Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence](#)

Marc D. Kilgour; Frank C. Zagare. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 2. (May, 1991), pp. 305-334.

#### [Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World](#)

Barry Nalebuff. *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 3. (Apr, 1991), pp. 313-335.

#### [Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD](#)

Robert Powell. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 3. (Sep, 1987), pp. 717-736.

#### [Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation](#)

Robert Powell. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 83, No. 2. (Jun, 1989), pp. 503-519.

#### [Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information](#)

Robert Powell. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, No. 1. (Mar, 1988), pp. 155-178.

[Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense](#)

Robert Powell. *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Mar, 2003), pp. 86-118.

[Asymmetric Deterrence](#)

Frank C. Zagare; Marc D. Kilgour. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 1. (Mar, 1993), pp. 1-27.

Recommended and Background Readings

[Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies](#)

Christopher Achen; Duncan Snidal. *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. ?. (Jan, 1989), pp. 143-169.

[Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Crisis Escalation](#)

Daniel Geller. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Jun, 1990), pp. 291-310.

[Deterrence and Foreign Policy](#)

Alexander George; Richard Smoke. *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 2. (Jan, 1989), pp. 170-182.

[Deterrence and International Conflict](#)

Paul Huth. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2. (Jun, 1999), pp. 25-48.

[Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence](#)

Robert Jervis. *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 2. (Jan, 1989), pp. 183-207.

[Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability](#)

Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Nov, 1991), pp. 801-832.

[Modeling Deterrence and International Crises](#)

Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Mar, 1989), pp. 67-83.

[Minimal Nuclear Deterrence](#)

Barry Nalebuff. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 32, No. 3. (Sep, 1988), pp. 411-425.

[Deterrence and Bargaining](#)

R. Harrison Wagner. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Jun, 1982), pp. 329-358.

[The Nuclear Revolution and the Problem of Credibility](#)

Robert Powell. *Nuclear Deterrence Theory*, Cambridge UP, 1990, Chapter 2.

**Arms Races and Power Transition**

[Conflict, War, and Redistribution](#)

Dagobert L. Brito; Michael D. Intriligator. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79, No. 4. (Dec, 1985), pp. 943-957.

[Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?](#)

Michael D. Intriligator; Dagobert L. Brito. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Mar, 1984), pp. 63-84.

[Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective](#)

Andrew Kydd. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Apr, 2000), pp. 228-244.

[A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War](#)

James D. Morrow. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, No. 3. (Sep, 1989), pp. 500-529.

[Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement](#)



Robert Powell. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4. (Dec, 1996), pp. 749-764.

#### [Arms Races and Negotiations](#)

Sandeep Baliga; Tomas Sjöström. *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 71, No. 2. (Apr, 2004), pp. 351-370.

#### [Free Trade and Arms Races](#)

Rafael Reuveny; John Maxwell. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 6. (Dec, 1998), pp. 771-803.

### Recommended and Background Readings

#### [Messenger or Message?: Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict](#)

Paul F. Diehl; Jean Kingston. *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 4. (Aug, 1987), pp. 789-799.

#### [Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate](#)

Paul F. Diehl; Mark J. Crescenzo. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 1. (Jan, 1998), pp. 111-118.

An Introduction to Lewis Fry Richardson and His Mathematical Theory of War and Peace

G. D. Hess. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 14, No. 1. (??, 1995), pp. 77-113.

#### [Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium](#)

Michelle R. Garfinkel. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 80, No. 1. (Mar, 1990), pp. 50-68.

#### [Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights](#)

Stergios Skaperdas. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 82, No. 4. (Sep, 1992), pp. 720-739.

### Alliances, Balance of Power, and Intervention

#### [Stable Alliance Formation in Distributional Conflict](#)

Michelle R. Garfinkel. *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Nov, 2004), pp. 829-852.

#### [Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances](#)

James D. Morrow. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Nov, 1991), pp. 904-933.

#### [Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs](#)

James D. Morrow. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Jun, 1994), pp. 270-297.

#### [Alignment Decisions in the Shadow of Power](#)

Robert Powell. *In The Shadow of Power*, Princeton, 1999, Chapter 5.

#### [Alliance Formation and War](#)

Alastair Smith. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Dec, 1995), pp. 405-426.

#### [To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision](#)

Alastair Smith. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 1. (Mar, 1996), pp. 16-40.

#### [Alliance Formation and General Deterrence](#)

Gerald L. Sorokin. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Jun, 1994), pp. 298-325.

### Recommended and Background Readings

#### [The Dynamics of Alliances in Anarchy](#)

Songying Fang; Kristopher Ramsay. Working paper, University of Rochester, 2004.  
[Instability, Intervention, and Inter-Power Politics](#)

Stephen E. Gent. Working paper, University of Rochester, 2004.

[An Economic Theory of Alliances](#)

Mancur Olson; Richard Zeckhauser. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 48, No. 3. (Aug, 1966), pp. 266-279.

[Alliances: Why Write Them Down?](#)

James D. Morrow. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 3. (Jun, 2000), pp. 63-83.

[The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power](#)

R. Harrison Wagner. *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Jul, 1986), pp. 546-576.

## **Diplomacy, Reputation, and Mediation**

[Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility and Mediation](#)

Andrew Kydd. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 47, No. 4. (Oct, 2003), pp. 597-611.

[Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises](#)

Alexandra Guisinger; Alastair Smith. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 2. (Apr, 2002), pp. 175-200.

[Politics at the Water's Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition](#)

Kristopher Ramsay. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 4. (Aug, 2004), pp. 459-486.

[The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes](#)

Ann E. Sartori. *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Feb, 2002), pp. 121-149.

## Recommended and Background Readings

[Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining](#)

Joseph Farrell; Robert Gibbons. *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 48, No. 1. (Jun, 1989), pp. 221-237.

[Cheap Talk](#)

Joseph Farrell; Matthew Rabin. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 10, No. 3. (Spring, 1996), pp. 103-118.

[Cheap Talk with Two Audiences](#)

Joseph Farrell; Matthew Rabin. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 79, No. 5. (Dec, 1989), pp. 1214-1223.

[Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence](#)

Paul Milgrom; John Roberts. *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 27, No. 2. (Aug, 1982), pp. 280-312.

[Reputation and Imperfect Information](#)

David M. Kreps; Robert Wilson. *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 27, No. 2. (Aug, 1982), pp. 253-279.

[Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice](#)

James Johnson. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1. (Mar, 1993), pp. 74-86.

## **Domestic Politics: Constraints, Signaling, Guns versus Butter**

[An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace](#)

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; James D. Morrow; Randolph M. Siverson; Alastair Smith. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, No. 4. (Dec, 1999), pp. 791-808.

[Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War](#)

George W. Downs; David M. Roche *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 38, No. 2. (May, 1994), pp. 362-380.

[When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty](#)

Keisuke Iida. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Sep, 1993), pp. 403-426.

[Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach](#)

Marc D. Kilgour. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 2. (Jun, 1991), pp. 266-284.

[Domestic Politics and International Trade Negotiations](#)

Helen V. Milner; Peter Rosendorff. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 1. (Feb, 1997), pp. 117-146.

[Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of the Agent Veto in Two-Level Games](#)

Jongryn Mo. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 4. (Dec, 1995), pp. 914-924.

[Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security](#)

James D. Morrow. *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-233.

[Guns, Butter, and Anarchy](#)

Robert Powell. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1. (Mar, 1993), pp. 115-132.

[Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises](#)

Kenneth A. Schultz. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 4. (Dec, 1998), pp. 829-844.

[International Crises and Domestic Politics](#)

Alastair Smith. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 3. (Sep, 1998), pp. 623-639.

[Risky but Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble](#)

Hein E. Goemans; Mark Fey. *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 71, No. 1. (Jan, 2009), pp. 35-54

[Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy](#)

Shuhei Kurizaki. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 3. (Aug, 2007), pp. 543-558.

Recommended and Background Readings

[Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations](#)

James D. Fearon. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1. (Jun, 1998), pp. 289-313.

[Pre-negotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining](#)

Bahar Leventoglu; Ahmer Tarar. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 3. (Aug, 2005), pp. 419-433.

[This version](#) includes the technical supplement.

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